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Abstract
Of the various Marxist or Marx-influenced works on the USSR, many have 
criticised the Soviet system as being based either on capitalism or class 
exploitation in a new guise. Few, though, have analysed the class struggle in 
any depth. The principal aim of this thesis is to place an understanding of 
this struggle at the centre of an understanding of Soviet political economy; 
and in doing so, to broaden the scope of the Autonomist Marxist critique.
First, a description is given of the overall theoretical approach. 
Described as communist, this is governed by concepts elaborated within the 
poorly-known political tendency which has consistently fought for the 
abolition of wage-labour, money, and the State. References are made to 
works by Marx, Negri, Cleaver, Pannekoek, and Debord.
Given that the h u ll hypothesis' regarding the failure of a wartime 
revolutionary proletarian movement must be that the production relations 
remained capitalist, a critique is then made of the various existing theories 
of Soviet capitalism. (Some depict the system as 'state capitalist'; others do 
not.) These are shown to offer an inadequately profound understanding of 
Soviet economic bureaucracy, and an insufficient dem onstration of the 
dominance of the category of capital A new theory is therefore developed. 
Soviet relations of consumption, distribution, and production are shown to 
be based on generalised exchange; the form of labour is show n to be 
wage-labour (abstract labour); and a drive for growth is shown to be 
intrinsic to the economic system. Categories of value, surplus value, and 
capital are identified. In relation to the specific functioning of the cycle of 
investm ent and production, im portant new concepts are introduced of 
bureaucratic exchange-value and bureaucratic money.
A ttention is then turned  to the class struggle. First, various 
'sovietological' analyses are shown to fall short of p rov id ing  an 
understanding even of the existence of such a struggle. A few broader 
conceptions have the merit of relating to overall views of the nature of the
system, but these hardly amount to critiques of the political economy. Next, 
various 'M arxist' theories are considered: that is, theories which use 
Marxian terminology but which neglect to consider the working class as a 
force independent of representation. (Official 'Com m unist' theories, not 
being held to be critical, are not considered). These are categorised 
according to three theories of the nature of the system: the 'degenerated 
w orkers' state,' 'capitalism,' and the 'mode of production sui generis/ 
Although there are many 'Marxist' views of the political-economic nature of 
the system, few have brought into their theorisation a consideration of 
working class struggle. And even the exceptions have not traced the class 
polarities through with consistent resolution. Then, once it is shown that the 
class struggle in the USSR has not been paid a great deal of attention by 
communists either, consideration is given to the theories of Dunayevskaya 
and James, Castoriadis, and Ticktin. Although Ticktin's theory suggests a 
profound understanding of class antagonism, it remains restricted by 
concepts of non-capitalist 'exceptionalism' and capitalist 'decline.' This is 
the first time that the theories of the nature of the USSR have been criticised 
in systematic relation to what they say about the working class and its 
struggle.
After a theoretical description is given of the class struggle under 
capitalism in general — with emphasis on opposition to the control over the 
circuits of capital and labour-power — an original view is constructed of the 
relationship between class struggle and capitalist political economy in the 
USSR. W orking class power is discussed not simply in opposition to the 
control over capital, but also in relation to the problems of that control in the 
context of capitalist growth. Whilst capitalist domination in the USSR did 
enter the period of relative surplus value extraction, and wages rose, the form 
of growth — involving the systemic prioritisation of material investment 
and 'gross output' — was based merely on increasing productivity, and not 
also on labour intensification (accelerated turnover). The rulers thus m ade 
substantial concessions to the workers' struggle for less hard work, especially 
in terms of product quality. This ensured that the capitalist subsumption of 
labour, although 'real' rather than simply 'formal,' was not only inefficient 
but eventually chronically so. This conclusion is corroborated with reference 
to the importance ascribed by Gorbachev, Aganbegian, and Zaslavskaia to 
the 'hum an factor' and the need to interest (zainteresovat 0 workers in their 
work.
* * * * *
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Introduction
1 AIMS OF THE THESIS
Of the considerable number of Marxist and Marx-influenced works on the 
USSR, there are many which have criticised the Soviet system as being based 
either on capitalism or on class exploitation in a new guise. There is at the 
same time a great paucity of profound analyses of w hat Marx himself would 
have considered the most important factor in the history of the country: 
namely, the class struggle. The first aim of this thesis is to place an 
understanding of this factor at the centre of a critical theory.
The second aim, related to the first, is to broaden the scope of the 
Autonom ist Marxist critique. No other Marxist school has focused so 
unfalteringly on the centrality of class antagonism; and yet until now  no 
Autonomist scholar has ever really theorised the conditions of class struggle 
in the world 's largest country. This failing has been all the more glaring 
given that the 'hidden' — or rather, until the end of the 1980s, the largely
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'unrepresented ' — nature of the Soviet workers' struggle, which m ost 
commentators agree has involved a widespread 'refusal of work,' w ould 
seem prima facie to make the USSR the country most clearly conforming to 
the Autonomist model. I do not, of course, aim simply to transfer insights 
developed in criticism of Keynesianism to a context where there has been no 
Keynesianism, but I do emphasise the necessarily antagonistic nature of any 
class struggle, and seek to identify the real political-economic importance of 
the antagonism. In this sense, the thesis adds to the area of work in which 
im portant more 'general' contributions have been m ade in the present 
decade by Lebowitz (1992) and Shortall (1994).
In order to achieve these aims it is necessary to work on the basis of 
an overall theory of the nature of the Soviet system. If such a theory's clarity 
and coherence must be grounded above all in its explanatory and analytical 
value in relation to the class struggle, it is nonetheless true that a study of 
w orking class struggle alone provides an insufficient basis for an 
understanding of the nature of the society. My third aim is thus to reach an 
understanding of the underlying logic of the mode of production in the 
USSR and the specifically Soviet political-economic forms.
2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
2.1 The Theoretical Approach Adopted
In Chapter 1 1 present my main theoretical concepts. Describing the overall 
theoretical orientation as communist, I present two ideas as fundamental: 
first, that the basic stuff of history is class struggle; and second, that the basic
INTRODUCTION
basic stuff of class struggle is class antagonism. References are made to the 
w ork of Marx; and Marxist theoretical positions are sum m arised which 
might be denoted as anti-Statist and Autonomist. In order to emphasise the 
radicality of the approach, and specifically of the view taken of autonomous 
w orking class struggle, I give outlines of positions on leftism , trade 
unionism, and so on, as they have developed in western Europe. Other 
writers who have adopted a similar approach (Negri, Cleaver, Pannekoek, 
Debord) are also referred to, but restrictions of time and space have meant 
that there is no discussion of opposing views, such as those espoused by 
empiricists or functionalists, democrats or Leninists.
It is to be noted that this is a theoretical thesis. It has therefore 
involved the development and critique of theoretical concepts rather than 
the unearthing, collection, presentation, and analysis of a mass of empirical 
data. Assuming on the part of the reader a graduate-level empirical 
knowledge of the Soviet 'administrative command system,' I have naturally 
taken as given a certain familiarity with such matters as gross output targets 
and  other success indicators, the ratchet principle (planirovanie ot 
dostignutogo), the plan revision process, passive money, full employment, 
norms, storming, plan fulfilment bonuses, wage levelling, the role of the 
ministries and their glavki, and so on. (See for example the works on the 
Soviet Economy by Berliner 1957, Kaser 1970, Nove 1980b, A. Smith 1983, 
Lane 1985a, Rutland 1985, H ew ett 1988, and Aslund 1989; on Soviet 
Economic Development specifically, see for example, H utchings 1982, 
M unting 1982, Nove 1982 and Rutland 1985). I have further assum ed a 
comparable familiarity w ith degree-level Soviet History and Politics. (See 
for example the textbooks by Kochan and Abraham 1983, Hosking 1985, and
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Dziewanowski 1989; and those by McCauley 1981, Lane 1985b, Hill*and 
Frank 1986, G. Smith 1992, and Ponton 1994). I have not felt a need to repeat 
w hat will be familiar to those with university qualifications in the Soviet 
Studies area.
In short, the contribution to knowledge lies in the field which is best 
defined as the theoretical critique of political economy. To paraphrase a 
well-known passage from Marx (1903, pp.205-06), I would say that when 
examining the USSR from the standpoint of the critique of political economy 
the proper thing to do may seem to be to start with the characteristics of 
concrete conditions such as industrial development, success indicators, and 
shortage. But in fact the m ethodological requirem ent is no t so 
straightforwardly empirical, and the basis of the critique m ust on the 
contrary be the explanation of the "few decisive abstract, general relations" 
the movement of which lies behind the concrete historical developments. In 
the main the present thesis constitutes a contribution precisely to the 
theoretical critique of these 'general relations.'
The thesis is not, then, offered in the field of economics. Rather than 
studying
how men and society choose, with or without the use of money, to 
employ scarce productive resources, which could have alternative 
uses, to produce various commodities over time and distribute 
them for consumption (Samuelson 1967, p.5),
or how supplies are distributed upon the stark assumption that they m ust
necessarily be scarce in any "community" whatsoever (Bergson 1964, p.3), I
am interested in developing a theoretical critique of a set of production
relations. (See Perlman 1968). And, as Rubin puts it, some production
relations among the members of a given society presuppose the existence of
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Others, whereas the latter relations do not necessarily imply the existence of 
the former. (1928, pp.31-32). It is held to be especially important, first, that 
the division of labour everywhere is social and not 'natural,' and hence can 
take a social form other than the existing one, and second, that privative 
appropriation is not 'natural' either, but rather preventive of the real 
possibility of active hum an community or communism. (See Marx 1932, 
pp.90-97). Thus the thesis is quite outside economics even of a 'comparative' 
nature.
The principal 'thesis of the thesis' is thus expressible as follows: it is 
that the M arxist critique of capital and the A utonom ist M arxist 
understanding of class struggle are tools of very substantial utility in a 
consideration of the political economy of the USSR; and indeed provide a 
framework for a more profound theoretical understanding of the history 
and nature of Soviet production relations than has hitherto been available. I 
w ould go further and say that previous considerations of the USSR, both 
'M arxist and sovietological, have not offered a critique of the production 
relations of an adequately profound kind; and that even those Marxist 
writings which have approached one have paid insufficient attention to the 
necessarily classist and antagonistic basis of those relations. If the main 
thesis were untrue, meanwhile, then clearly the attem pt I have m ade to 
develop it would lead to a conflict with the basic facts, if not to downright 
absurdity. I would hold that no such conflict is apparent between the main 
thesis and the empirical facts of the Soviet economy which are familiar to 
Soviet Studies scholars.
Insofar as further work could be done, however, in attempting to 
explain Soviet economic functioning in greater detail in terms of the
'4'X-
INTRODUCTION
manifestation of the underlying relations described here, the present thesis 
undoubtedly does point the way to further endeavours in w hat M arx 
referred to as the "reproduction of the concrete situation." (1903, p.208).
2.2 The Nature of Soviet Society
In Chapters 2-3 I consider the question of the type of society which existed 
in the USSR, Arguing that the 'null hypothesis' regarding the production 
relations which existed after the clear failure of a wartime revolutionary 
proletarian movement m ust necessarily be that they rem ained capitalist, 
I show that such a hypothesis can be shown to be fully compatible with the 
fundam ental tenets of Marxian theory. I do not, though, in these two 
chapters, consider the role of the class struggle. Instead, enacting w hat 
Shortall would call a 'provisional closure' (1994), I close off the issue of class 
subjectivity in order to focus on the nature of the Soviet system as an 
objective reality.
In order to theorise the mode of production which existed in the 
USSR as capitalist, it is first necessary, of course, to be quite clear on w hat 
capitalism actually is. At the same time, if capitalism can take 'classical,' 
Soviet, and other forms, one would expect a Marxist theory of Soviet 
capitalism to enhance the Marxist critique of capitalism as a whole. One 
w ould m istrust any mere 'application' of a theory whose exposition was 
based on earlier developm ents in England (Marx 1867), G erm any 
(Hilferding 1910), the United States (Braverman 1974) or elsewhere.
Before developing this line of thought, however, I first consider the 
various theories of Soviet capitalism which have been advanced so far.
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(Chapter 2). (Limitations of space have meant that I do not consider the 
numerous 'non-capitalisf theories at this stage). In analysing and criticising 
them, I look first for whether or not they show the capitalist nature of the 
USSR in such a way as to reinforce and enhance M arx's critique of 
capitalism in general; and second, for whether or not they really contribute 
to a profound understanding of the specifically Soviet forms of economic 
bureaucracy. In short, I look for how they deal with the following two 
questions: why should the USSR be called capitalist? and how is it specific? I 
deal with the weaknesses of each theory individually, but in general I find 
that the grounding of each in Marx's critique of capital as self-expanding 
value is either inadequate or non-existent, and that the specific critique of 
Soviet bureaucracy is either untheoretical or else severely misinformed.
It may seem that it is putting the cart before the horse somewhat to 
criticise various previous 'capitalist' theories of the USSR prior to presenting 
an understanding of Marx's critique of capitalism in general, but the reason 
lies in the unfeasibility of presenting a theory of Soviet capitalism as in any 
way separate from the critique of capitalism as a whole. Since I have felt it 
best to expound my own theory only after having criticised earlier theories, 
and since any Marxist theory of the capitalist nature of the Soviet social 
formation m ust stand or fall according to whether or not it enhances the 
overall critique, I have chosen to leave the formulation of a critique of 
capitalism in general until Chapter 3.1. The categories of exchange-value, 
commodity, wage-labour, production for profit, value, abstract labour, and 
capitalist money are gone through in sequence, and particular stress is laid 
on generalised exchange and the drive for growth. The central organising
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concept of the Marxist understanding of the capitalist system is desribed as 
being that of the M-C-M^ cycle.
Given the unsatisfactory nature of previous theories, I have 
consequently had to develop a theory of Soviet capitalism which is entirely 
new. (Chapter 3,2). Soviet relations of consumption, distribution, and 
production are discussed in detail and are shown to take forms based upon 
generalised exchange; the form of labour is shown to be wage-labour; and a 
need for profitable growth is shown to have been intrinsic to the Soviet 
economic system. I then discuss how the functions of the M-C-M" cycle are 
fulfilled in a manner specific to the Soviet context. The most important new 
concepts developed are those of bureaucratic/&/flt exchange-value and 
bureaucratic/Wat money.
Im portant questions which I do not consider in this work include 
those of the origins of the system and the matter of the 'Russian question' in 
general, questions which have often been related to that of the multilinearity 
or unilinearity of the succession of modes of production. (See Wittfogel 1957, 
Melotti 1972, Zimin 1977, Barbaria 1980, Shanin 1983; also Marx 1856a and 
Marx and Engels 1843-95). In light of the theory of Soviet capitalism argued 
here, though, it would now seem necessary to broaden the scope of research 
in this area. Not only must various developments within a single mode of 
production, capitalism, be considered in relation to the contradictions of 
preceding societies — a point which has been argued very effectively by 
Goldner (1991) — but the relative efficiency and inefficiency of various types 
of capitalist 'system ' m ust be studied in terms of their relationship to 
various types of proletarian struggle as well as to contradictions within
s
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2.3 The Class Struggle
relation to both the history of the system and its eventual crisis and 
downfall. Indeed, one would not expect to be able to reach a satisfactory
.133'
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world capitalist society as a whole. These are theoretical tasks which I hope 
will eventually be taken up in another context.
’IIi
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If the USSR should rightly be understood as capitalist, then of course, 
according to the ideas given in Chapter 1, one would expect the Autonomist 
critique — to some extent at least — to be of a certain explanatory value in
:#
theory of the nature of the system without understanding the forms which 
have been taken by the class struggle. Having moved from the 'world in 
general' (Chapter 1) to the fundamental nature of Soviet society (Chapters 
2-3), I therefore concentrate in Chapters 4-7 upon the significance of class 
struggle in the region. The 'provisional closure' of Chapters 2-3 is removed.
Having narrowed down the topic of consideration, I am able to consider a 
broader literature.
In Chapter 4 1 consider the 'sovietological' theories: that is, theories 
presented within the field of Soviet Studies but outwith the area of 'Marxist 
critique.' I begin by scrutinising the most influential theories of the nature of 
the system to see what they have to offer, if anything, concerning the nature 
of working class struggle. It is probably necessary to clarify the point that I 
do not attempt to cover exhaustively the entire literature on the various 
characteristics and problems of the Soviet economy — from the problem of 
technological introduction to the prevalence of poor quality output, from the 
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of various kinds of targets to the role of
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plan fulfilment bonuses, from consumer shortages and excessive savings to 
the hoarding of supplies and the weight and relative efficiency of the 
military sector. Since the suggestion that most sovietological work has been 
focused elsewhere than on the class struggle is not in any way controversial, 
there is no need to cover this material at great length. Instead, after choosing 
as illustration a number of important works focused upon three im portant 
concepts (technological development, success indicators, and the constraints 
of shortage), I show how they do not provide an adequate basis for the 
formulation of a meaningful theoretical understanding of class struggle, 
(Chapter 4.1).
Nor do I criticise in detail the full gamut of all the sovietological 
analyses of various characteristics of workers' conditions either inside or 
outside the workplace, from the details of hiring to the role of closed 
enterprises, from the composition of expenditure to the role of the propiska 
and various types of convict labour, from the rise of the sovkhozy to the role 
of technical training. Instead, after showing how a range of descriptive work 
falls short of providing a basis for understanding even the category of class 
struggle, I proceed to look at three conceptions developed w ith in  
sovietology: those of the 'incorporated worker,' the 'social compact,' and the 
'historic compromise.' (Chapter 4.2). If not particularly influential in terms 
of 'general theory,' these nonetheless involve considerations of the class 
relation which suggest certain views of the nature of the political-economic 
system.
Next for consideration are the various 'Marxist' theories. Given that 
according to the positions outlined in Chapter 1 it is apparent that m ost of 
those who have endeavoured or claimed to write from a Marxist perspective
INTRODUCTION 11
have in fact failed to do so, I make a clear distinction between their theories 
and those of the few theorists I hold to have done so in reality. Chapter 5 is 
thus devoted to a critical review of the various theories I have labelled 
'Marxist.' These are the theories which, while using Marxian terminology, 
have nevertheless neglected to consider the working class as a subversive 
force independent of representation, and consequently defend, in one way 
or another, the use of force over the working class. From the precepts of 
Chapter 1, it is clear that these include the various Leninist theories. 
Categorising them according to the three main theories of the nature of the 
system — the 'degenerated workers' state,' 'capitalism,' and the 'mode of 
production sui generis' — I scour them, as I have already scoured their 
'sovietological' rivals, for w hat they have to say about working class 
struggle. In particular, I look at how working class struggle is understood to 
relate to the nature of the system.
In Chapter 6 I consider from a similar standpoint the existing 
Marxist theories of Dunayevskaya and James, Castoriadis (in one period) 
and Ticktin and the Critique school. Showing how, in all three, working class 
conditions and resistance play a much more important role than they do in 
the theories criticised in Chapter 5 ,1 nonetheless point up the weaknesses in 
each of them. Paying special attention to Ticktin's theory, I show it to be 
suggestive of an Autonomist understanding of class relations even as it 
rem ains confined w ithin faulty concepts of capitalist decline and 
non-capitalist 'exceptionalism.'
To my knowledge, this is the first time that these theories of the 
nature of the USSR have been systematically criticised in terms of what they 
say about the working class and its struggle.
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It is worth stating at this point, however, what I do not cover. Thus I 
give no consideration to what the official 'Com m unist ideologies have said 
on the issue. These I view as fundamentally conservative — either of the 
international standing of one of the world's established regimes (the USSR, 
China, Yugoslavia, etc.), or of the parliamentary standing of certain western 
political parties — when not literally reactionary in the sense of harking 
back to the original Cold War. If they are (or were) thus necessarily 
apologetic — of present, past, or both — rather than critical, then in the very 
Marxian terms to which they themselves superficially appeal they have to be 
understood as being propagandists rather than theoretical.
Second, nor do I consider here the works of Soviet social scientists. 
If it would be a mistake to deny their theoretical interest, nonetheless the 
m ain aim from an Autonomist viewpoint would be to show how they 
appear not as 'objective' analyses or theories, but rather as constituting a 
necessary field for policy debates on one side of the class antagonism. In 
other w ords, since the proletarian pole of this socially-determ inant 
antagonism is understood as being identical to working class autonomy, all 
consideration of 'w hat official policy should be,' however 'objective,' and 
perhaps even especially when 'radical' or 'progressive,' would be explained 
as serving the material interests of the exploitative society. This point has 
already been amply demonstrated by Arnot (1988) with reference to various 
Soviet academicians. More specifically, Arnot shows how the utility of the 
"traditional Stalinist view of political economy" declined from at the latest 
the 1960s on, and how a revised, 'functionalist' sociology was fostered 
instead until it became able to provide serious "policy responses to 
management problems." (p23).
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I come in Chapter 7 to construct my own view of the relationship 
between class struggle and the nature of the system. The structure of this 
chapter is similar to that of Chapter 3. In the first section, then, I present a 
theoretical understanding of the class struggle under capitalism in general. 
The antagonism between the working class and capital is identified at each 
stage of the capital and labour-power circuits: investm ent and  sale, 
production and reproduction. I also discuss the antagonism with reference 
to capitalist growth, paying special attention to the categories of 
productivity and labour intensity, absolute and relative turnover, and the 
workers' struggle for less work and higher wages. Specific references are 
made to works by Kay and Negri.
In the second section I proceed to construct a view  of the 
importance and radicality of working class struggle in the USSR. This bears 
a number of original aspects. Building upon the theory of Soviet capitalism 
developed in Chapter 3, I attem pt to avoid the weaknesses of previous 
theories criticised in Chapters 4-6. In discussing the control exercised by 
Soviet capital over its own circuit, over socialised production  and 
reproduction, I emphasise throughout the inherent and fundamental class 
opposition. Looking in particular at the extraction of absolute and relative 
surplus value, and at the twin issues of productivity and labour intensity, I 
reach the view that the USSR knew an inefficient form of the real 
subsumption of labour. Over the long term, both productivity and wages 
increased, but owing to the workers' successful resistance to hard  work 
Soviet capital was unable to institutionalise a dynam ic of labour 
intensification. With brief reference to analyses m ade by Gorbachev, 
Aganbegian, and especially Zaslavskaia, it is shown that this understanding
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is fully consistent with the views expressed by these im portant strategists 
during the 'pre-crisis' period of the late 1980s.
2.4 Summary
A summary of the theoretical contribution made is given in Chapter 8, along 
w ith a brief list of suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 1
A Communist Approach
In this chapter I give an account of the theory and concepts I have used in 
my research. Since I formulate a theoretical understanding of the nature of 
the USSR and of the class struggle within its borders in Chapters 3 and 7 
below, the present chapter is confined to the theoretical considerations I 
deem to be the most over-arching.
It is a fact that the political tendency whose Weltanschauung I share 
is not very well-known, and so I begin by outlining its core ideas and 
terminology. As I show, its thought has been greatly influenced, although 
by no means defined^ by the school of Autonomist Marxism. Major references 
are made to the works of Marx, Pannekoek, Negri, Cleaver, and Debord.
Concepts deemed the most important are given in bold  when they 
first appear in the main text.
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1 CLASS STRUGGLE AND COMMUNISM
It is convenient to clarify my theoretical starting-point w ith reference to 
Marx's conception of the class struggle and communism.
First, it is taken as axiomatic that "the history of all hitherto existing 
societies is the history of class struggles." (Marx and Engels 1848, p.67). In 
any society which is not communist — that is, in any society founded upon 
exploitation, in any class society — there is held to be a necessary struggle 
between the exploiters and the exploited. In the most general terms possible, 
the underlying categories which relate to this struggle are those of the 
surplus product and the control over its extraction. In Marx's words:
the specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is 
pum ped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of 
domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production 
itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based 
the entire configuration of the economic community arising from 
the actual relations of production. (1894, p.927).
The surplus product itself is defined as that part of the social product which,
rather than going to fulfil the needs of the producers and those of their
dependants, is appropriated instead by the exploiters. In other words, it is a
category defined by the exploitation by one social group of the productive
activity of another. Clearly the extraction of this surplus m ust be subject to
some kind of control. The nature of the overall set of social production
relations, or mode of production, is tlius defined by two categories which
form a pair. These are, first, the form which the social product actually takes;
and second, the form of control which is exercised over its extraction. In
determining the mode of production, these categories thus determine the
CHAP.l - A COMMUNIST APPROACH 17
overall conditions in which the struggle between exploiters and exploited 
unfolds.
Given the unified nature of the specifically capitalist m ode of 
exploitation, according to which the exploited do not have any control even 
over the production of goods which they themselves consume, it is held that 
the class struggle under capitalism is an antagonism which expresses itself 
across the entire society. (Marx and Engels 1848, p p .33-35). In short, the 
struggle of the exploited antagonises not only all of the controlling 
institutions of the reigning society but also its entire logic.
In terms of the critique of this capitalist mode of exploitation, the 
methodological implications of the insistence on the centrality of class 
struggle are taken from Marx's Grundrisse as read by Negri. In the latter's 
words,
materialism and dialectics have given us totality and difference as 
well as the structural link which subjectively unites them. But that 
is not enough. It remains insufficient as long as this structure, this 
totality is not internally split, as long as we do not succeed in 
grasping no t the structural (capitalist) subjectivity bu t the 
subjectivities which dialectically constitute the structure (the two 
classes in struggle). (1979, p.44).
In other words. Autonomist theory hypostatises neither the 'contradictions
of capital,' nor the laws of crisis, but the class struggle. Hence the theory's
'voluntarism ,' which has led Negri to describe the methodology as being
that of the 'point of view,' as opposed to that of the 'totality.' (1984,
pp.56-58).
The understanding gained by applying this methodology
does not in any way become transcendent in relation to the 
formation and development of the [two] subjects. The method of 
the 'point of view' works on the traces, symptoms and experiences
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of rupture and recomposition of the subjects. It reconstructs the 
general framework without losing sight of the subjects' singularity: 
it is more a forced movement ahead from the reality of class 
relations than a theoretical mastery over them. The analytical 
materialism of this advance is no less rigorous than in the method 
of the totality; but the specifically political dimension appears with 
a freshness that the latter often fails to express, (pp.56-57).
Explaining the approach, Cleaver writes that
In the class war, as in conventional military encounters, one m ust 
begin with the closest study of one's own forces, that is, the 
structure of working class power. W ithout an understanding of 
one's own power, the ebb and flow of the battle lines can appear as 
an endless process driven only by the enem y's unilateral 
self-activity. When the enemy regroups or restructures, as capital is 
doing in the present crisis, its actions must be grasped in terms of 
the defeat of prior tactics or strategies by our forces — not simply as 
another clever move. That an analysis of enem y strategy is 
necessary is obvious. The essential point is that an adequate 
understanding of that strategy can be obtained only by grasping it 
in relation to our own strengths and weaknesses....
It serves little purpose to study the structures of capitalist 
domination unless they are recognized as strategies that capital 
must struggle to impose. (1979, pp.42-43).
The contradiction between the two sides of the class struggle is thus 
understood  as being 'antagonistic ' rather than 'd ialectica l/ Such a 
conception is derived from the m aterialist view that the essentially 
proletarian content of working class activity is its tendency to d isrupt the 
rational, 'integrative' functioning of exploitation. Rather than theorising a 
'dialectical' relation between capital and labour, therefore. Autonom ist 
theory grasps the respective natures of the poles of this contradiction 
according to what it is that makes them contradictory poles in the first place: 
no t their interpenetration within an 'entity,' conceived philosophically in 
term s of 'necessary m ediation,' bu t their a n ta g o n is m / "O utside of 
antagonism, not only is there no movement, but the categories do not even 
exist." (Negri 1979, p.9).
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The A utonom ist approach can be clarified in term s of the 
distinction between the working class in itself and the working class for 
itself.
The working class in itself is constituted of all those who are forced 
to sell their labor-power to capital and thus to be labor-power. It is 
a definition based purely on a common set of characteristics within 
capital. The working class for itself (or working class as working 
class, defined politically) exists only when it asserts its autonomy as 
a class through its unity in struggle against its role as labor-power. 
(Negri 1979, p.74).
Defining the latter category in different words in the Grundrisse^ Marx writes 
that
the opposite of capital cannot itself be a particular commodity [i.e. 
not even lahour-power—NCF], for as such it w ould form  no 
opposition to capital, since the substance of capital is itself use 
value; it is not this or that commodity, but all commodities. The 
communal substance of all commodities, i.e. their substance not as 
material stuff, as physical character, but their communal substance 
as commodities and hence exchange values, is this, that they are 
objectified labour, labour which is still objectifying itself, labour as 
subjectivity, (pp.271-72).
But whereas Marx defines this labour as productive labour (pp. 272-73,
304-05), as "that which produces capital," Negri, stressing the general social
level of the function of value, holds that it is no longer possible to
distinguish between productive labour and that which is reproductive.
W hether or not Marx's "heavily reductive definition" is attributable to the
"noxious effect of the limits of the workers' movement," as Negri asserts
(1979, pp.63-65,182-84), it is Negri's position that I rely upon.
In this connection it is useful to compare the Autonomist position 
w ith that developed by Castoriadis, since in going 'beyond M arx' both 
describe the evolution of capitalist society as a product of the antagonistic 
thrusts and parries of two main class subjects. (Castoriadis 1960-61). Like the
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A utonom ists, Castoriadis also Insists (p.264) on the im portan t and 
historically 'formative' role of the "implicit, informal, daily and hidden 
struggle at the point of production," and rejects the idea that since 1945 a 
crisis of capitalism could conceivably result from the operation of 'objective 
law s' or dialectical contradictions. (1958, p.240). The two theories differ 
substantially, however, in their understanding of the relationship between 
working class and labour-power. In Castoriadis's terms, the "extraction of 
'use-value from labour-power'...is a process of bitter struggle in which, half 
the time, so to speak, the capitalists are the losers." (1960-61, p.248). Formal 
enterprise organisation thus conflicts with informal enterprise organisation 
(1958, pp .170-72), and capitalist bureaucratisation with an autonom ous 
struggle tending to push towards a 'transitional society' where work would 
be managed directly by the workers.^ Outside of production, meanwhile, 
the class struggle either no longer expresses itself at all, or else does so only 
in a "truncated and distorted way." (1960-61, p.229). The Autonomist view 
of the class-for-itself is completely different. Autonomous struggle is not the 
struggle of 'labour-pow er' against its transform ation into a capitalist 
use-value; rather, it is the emergence within social labour-power of the 
working class as a separate subject.^ It is the non-exploitative assertion of needs 
and desires, and the appropriation of resources to fulfil them: hence it 
operates not only in the workplace but also on the terrain of the 'social 
wage' and looting. As 'proletarian self-valorisation' it relates to use-value, 
rather than simply labour-power. In other words, as Negri has shown 
(1971), it is the subversion of the enterprise-form and of work in general. 
(See also Echanges et Mouvement 1979; Negri 1978, chap.4; and Zerzan 
1974).
CHAP.l - A COMMUNIST APPROACH 21
In theoretical terms the categories of 'working class in itself and 
'working class for itself are brought together again within the category of 
class composition. For Negri this is defined as
that combination of political and material characteristics — both 
historical and physical — which makes up: (a) on the one hand, the 
h isto rically  given structu re  of labour-pow er, in all its 
manifestations, as produced by a given level of productive forces 
and relations; and (b) on the other hand, the working class as a 
determ inate level of solidification of needs and desires, as a 
dynamic subject, an antagonistic force, tending towards its own 
independent identity in historical-political terms. (1982, p.209).
As yet, there are no Autonomist studies of the history of the USSR,'^ 
so an example of the application of this approach is perhaps best provided 
by Negri's work on Keynesianism. (1968). In the beginning, Negri argues. 
Keynesianism appeared as a response by capital to workers' success in 
making wages 'sticky downwards.' By tying wage increases to productivity 
increases, the bourgeoisie attempted to harness working class struggle as a 
sort of motor of economic development.
W ith Keynes, capitalist science takes a remarkable leap forward: it 
recognises the working class as an autonomous moment within 
capital. With his theory of effective demand, Keynes introduces into 
political economy the political notion of a balance of pow er 
between classes in struggle, (p.28).
Working class struggle, however, was able to subvert the Keynesian strategy
by setting in motion a mobility in the labour market, and by means of the
process whereby "the mass worker [of large factories]... spread the infection
of his subjective behaviour into the fabric of proletarian society [i.e. outside
the world of work]." (1982, p.211). Capital's response this time was both
political, as evidenced by the Italian repression which began in 1979 (Red
Notes 1981), and economic, as demonstrated by the increasing parcellisation
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of industrial tasks, the grow th of precarious work, and  the rise in 
unemployment caused by the 'Thatcherite' free-market offensive. Arguably 
the growing disaffection with the law and the party system, as typified by 
the eruption of a major riot in London in 1990 (the biggest in Britain for over 
a century), and a full-scale insurrection in Los Angeles in 1992 (ditto for the 
US), should be seen as heralding a new counter-offensive by the working 
class. Both sets of events have already influenced macroeconomic policy: in 
the UK, by helping force the abolition of the poll tax, and in the US by 
forcing the government to spend more on the inner cities. Meanwhile the 
ongoing 'third industrial revolution,' associated not only with information 
technology but also w ith genetic engineering, involves a ruling class 
strategy of altering the terrain of battle in ways which have yet to be fully 
theorised.^
The methodology is clear. The complexity of historical change and 
continuity is examined not in terms of the internal contradictions of 
capitalism, nor even those of its administration, but in terms of the 
antagonism between two subjects: on the one hand, capital's dialectic, which 
seeks to harness w orking class potential to the yoke of capitalist 
development; on the other, w orking class subjectivity, whose logic is 
separate, non-dialectical and 'autonom ous.' Since this antagonism  is 
understood as being permanent within capitalist society, the view that the 
working class is essentially passive is consequently written off as 'm y th / 
(Gorman 1990).
The second plank of my theoretical approach concerns the relation 
between class struggle and communism. Here my understanding is taken
CHAP.l A COMMUNIST APPROACH 23
from that which Marx expressed when discussing w hat was new  in his 
work:
W hat I did that was new was to demonstrate: 1) that the existence of 
classes is merely linked to particular historical phases in the development 
of production) 2) that class struggle necessarily leads to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat) 3) that this dictatorship itself only 
constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a 
classless society. (1852b, p.64).
The classless society is understood as a world hum an community in 
which "the free development of each [would be] the condition for the free 
development of all." (Marx and Engels 1848, p.87). It is the
complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being — a 
return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth 
of previous development.... [It is] the genuine resolution of the 
conflict betw een m an and nature, betw een m an and m an, 
...between the individual and the species." (Marx 1932, p.20).
In such a society the foundations of capitalism (wage-labour, commodity
economy and money) would no longer exist: private property w ould have
been abolished, along with the family, nations, the State, classes, and all
forms of exploitation. The means of achieving this goal are seen as those of
violent revo lu tion . Carried out by the international working class, this
revolution w ould enforce what Blanqui and Marx referred to as the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Finally, the forces currently working for such
a revolution are defined not as ideas, but as those of "the real m ovem ent
which abolishes the present state of things," the "old mole" underm ining
capitalist domination in the here and now. (Marx and Engels 1846, p.47;
Marx 1856b, p.300).
This much would seem familiar. The ideologies and practice of 
opponents of communism, however, often employed in the nam e of
CHAP.l - A COMMUNIST APPROACH 24
communism itself (a phenomenon Marx and Engels observed as early as 
1848 [sec. 3]), suggest that further clarification is required.
Communism as a goal is seen as incompatible with all conceptions 
of a transitional society. (See Buick 1975). The creation of communism is 
accepted as being something processual, but is identified w ith the direct 
'communisation' of social relations, rather than with the onset of a stage 
accessible only after a transition through 'socialism.' (See the journal La 
Banquise, and L'Insecurité Sociale 1984). In other words, the "transition to 
the abolition of all classes" is understood as the process of replacing capitalist 
or other exploitative social relations with communist ones. Communism is 
conceived of as Marx understood it in 1844, that is, not differentiated into 
'phases,' rather than as he described it in 1875, as consisting of a "first 
phase" where distribution w ould be according to work. (Marx 1932, 
pp.87-101; Marx 1875; Crump 1975). Work would be eliminated in favour of 
a "new type of free activity," (SI 1963, p.l02; see also Marx and Engels 1846, 
pp.85 and 220). Lenin's position, that "under communism there remains for 
a time not only bourgeois right, but even the bourgeois state, w ithout the 
bourgeoisie!" (1917b, p.94) is not only em phatically  rejected as 
anti-communist, but also regarded as a distortion even of Marx's later 
position.®
Violent revolution is understood as a mass, armed confrontation, a 
war between revolutionary proletarians on one side and the 'Party of Order' 
on the other. The dictatorship of the proletariat is conceived of as being 
necessarily anti-Statist, in that it cannot institutionalise its relationship with 
its enemies: it seeks to destroy them, not to rule over them. (Pannekoek 
1912, pp.119-36; Debord 1967, para. 179). The intensive and extensive spread
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of communist social relations thus relates very clearly to the abolition of 
class society.
Finally, I have asserted that the forces already at the proletariat's 
disposal are understood as constituting a social tendency which is 
inherently  antagonistic to capital. In accordance w ith  m aterialist 
methodology, therefore, my insistence on proletarian autonom y excludes 
any idea that the class by itself is incapable of developing revolutionary 
consciousness. No overlap is imagined beween this communist conception 
on one hand, and that of a Kautskyist-Leninist 'injection' of consciousness 
on the other. (Lenin 1902, p.98; see also Barrot 1977). The essence of 
proletarian autonomy is understood to be non-exploitative hum an need, 
and its manifestation is understood as necessarily tendential towards the 
full realisation of communism.
2 AGAINST INCORPORATION
On the basis of the above understanding, further concepts have been 
developed within a 'political tendency' of a som ewhat 'am orphous' 
character. This tendency, referred to as the communist one, is that which has 
consistently fought for the abolition of wage-labour and the State. Influences 
have included council communism (especially Pannekoek), the Situationist 
International (especially Debord), Autonomist Marxism (especially Negri), 
and the writings of the French theoretician Jean Barrot.^
In general these concepts have been developed in relation to 
capitalism in the West, but in order to illustrate the radicality of the view 
which is taken of class antagonism, it is of interest to list some of them here.
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They cannot, of course, be applied automatically to non-western capitalism, 
bu t they will nonetheless help to explain the meaning of the insistence on 
proletarian autonomy. Those chosen can be grouped under two headings: 
capitalist politics, and the incorporation of struggle.
2.1 Capitalist Politics
One of the tendency's major tenets is that the autonom ous proletarian 
m ovem ent grows in strength the more independent it is of the political 
'spectrum,' indeed, the more hostile it is towards its constituent parts. Thus 
there is the concept of capitalist politics,® understood as comprising the 
entire tableau from extreme right to extreme left. The struggles which the 
participants in such politics are engaged in are seen as revolving 
fundamentally around the management of the capitalist State and economy 
(and usually both).
Debord has further explained how
the historical moment when Bolshevism trium phed for itself in 
Russia and when social-democracy fought victoriously for the old 
world marks the inauguration of a state of affairs which is at the 
heart of the domination of the modern spectacle: the representation 
of the working class radically opposes itself to the working class. 
(1967, para. 100).
In the past century this state of affairs has often been associated w ith the 
non-com m unist idea that changes in the existing society —- such as an 
increased dose of nationalisation, participation, welfare expenditure, or 
'p lanning ' — w ould am ount to the creation of a new one. Specific 
terminology is therefore needed to denote those sections of the capitalist 
political spectrum which propagandise about the need for 'socialism' and
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'com m unism ' and aim to build a base in the working class. These are 
divided as follows.®
The left, in loose usage, is taken to denote all such sections lumped 
together. More strictly, it denotes those which, being more moderate, do not 
seek disorder. Thus in western Europe the left includes m ainstream  
'Socialist' Parties, and, to the extent that they still present themselves as 
'socialist,' the former 'Communist' Parties too. The French Socialist Party, 
whose members sing the Internationale at party occasions, is considered to 
be on the left, whereas the British Liberal Democratic Party is not. Most of i
the Scottish National Party is seen as left-wing too, since more often than not 
its pro-independence ideology is presented as being pro-working class. The 
nom inally analogous British National Party would not be described as 
left-wing, since its traditionalist and racist brand of nationalism is populist 
rather than 'socialist,' pro-work rather than ostensibly pro-worker.
Extreme left and leftist (from the French, gauchiste) are the terms 
used to designate groupings which are more extreme than the left. The 
changes they seek to implement often involve violence and usually a 
significant change in the legal system. W hereas Trotskyists stress 
nationalisation, anarchosyndicalists stress the power of unions in industry, 
and 'Red Greens' the need for a comprehensive environmental policy. Much 
of the energy of these groups is spent on denouncing the 'official' left as 
insufficiently representative of the working class, or as 'treacherous', w ith 
the implication that working class people should switch their support away 
from the left to the extreme left. Correspondingly, most parts of the extreme 
left have a Leninist conception of the division between 'political' and
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'econom ic' struggles, and adopt a 'substitutionist' position on class 
consciousness.
The term u ltra -le ftis t is used to describe those sections whose 
politics are more radical than those of the left, the Leninists and the 
anarchosyndicalists, but who are nonetheless loath to reject ideas and forms 
of activity which conflict with the communist project. For example, they 
might oppose each and every force which would substitute itself for the 
w orking class, but still support some sort of self-managed capitalist 
economy. (See, for example, the advocacy of wage equalisation in 
Castoriadis 1957, pp.126-27 and Solidarity 1961, p. 11.) Or they might even 
understand the need to abolish wage-labour, but still propagandise in such a 
way as to encourage workers to put their hopes in some force other than 
proletarian autonomy, such as economic crisis (see Révolution Sociale), or in 
an ostensibly 'cure-all' organisational form such as the workers' council. 
Ultra-leftists are usually active in criticising the left and extreme left, and in
encouraging workers to organise. They are distinguishable from the extreme 
left in that they do not retrospectively 'support' past counterrevolutions, 
such as the Bolshevik one in Russia or the Republican one in Spain. And 
unlike m ost leftists they do not support any of the w orld 's national 
liberation movements.
Another political term which needs to be mentioned in this section 
is democracy. Democracy is understood as the form of relation between the 
capitalist State and capitalist civil society such as that established by
bourgeois political revolution.
In democracy, man does not exist for the sake of law, but the law 
exists for the sake of man, (Marx 1843a, p.88).
5;:S
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2.2 The Incorporation of Struggle
The concepts given in the preceding section were those denoting the 
relations of representative capitalist politics. The ones listed in this section 
relate to the dynamics of class struggle.
Proletarian autonom y (or subjectivity) has been described as 
something separate from, and antagonistic to, the logic of capital. Since that
I/a-
In criticising Bauer's project of political emancipation, Marx explains:
The rights of man as such are distinguished from the rights of 
the citizen. Who is this man who is distinct from the citizen? None 
other than the member of civil society. Why [in the New  Ham pshire 
constitution] is the member of civil society simply called 'm an', and 
why are his rights called the rights of man? How can we explain 
this fact? By the relationship of the political state to civil society, by 
the nature of political emancipation.
The first point we should note is that the so-called rights of man, 
as distinct from the rights of the citizen, are quite simply the rights of 
the member of civil society, i.e. of egoistic man, of man separated from 
other men and from the community. (1843b, pp.228-29).
Marx focuses on one particular right of man in order to illuminate the 
whole:
II
...The right of m an to freedom is not based on the association of 
man with man but rather on the separation of man from man. It is 
the right of this separation...
The practical application of the right of m an to freedom..., 
together with this application of it, forms the foundation of civil 
society. It leads each man to see in other men not the realisation but 
the limitation of his own freedom, (pp.229-30).
Since modem democracy, unlike that of ancient times, tends to subsume the 
exploited class into civil society, democracy achieves its fullest expression 
under capitalism. (ICG 1987). I
-::îi
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logic is understood as one of harnessing working class potential, it follows 
that the advancement of autonomy implies resistance to the imposition of 
mediated, 'negotiated,' institutionalised forms of struggle. Conceptual tools 
are therefore required in order to be able to analyse the force of this 
separateness and the dynamic of this resistance, definable as the negation of 
incorporation, as subversion.
For Negri, it
seems...fundamental to consider the totality of the process of 
proletarian self-valorisation as alternative to, and radically different 
from, the totality of the process of capitalist production and 
reproduction. I realise that I am exaggerating the position, and 
oversimplifying its complexity. But I also know that this 'intensive 
road,' this radical break with the totality of capitalist development, 
is a fundamental experience of the movement as it stands today.
Today the process of constituting class independence is first and 
foremost a process of separation....
...W orking class self-valorisation is first and  forem ost 
de-structuration of the enemy totality, taken to a point of exclusivity 
in the self-recognition of the class's collective independence. (1978, 
p.97).
This Autonomist perspective on the essence of class struggle can be 
seen to be not far removed from that put forward by the council communists 
in relation to the trade unions. Thus Pannekoek, in a major controversy with 
Kautsky in 1912, gave his view that
The proletariat's organisation — its most im portant source of 
strength — must not be confused with the present-day form of its 
organisations and associations, where it is shaped by conditions 
w ithin the framework of the still vigorous bourgeois order. The 
nature of this organisation is something spiritual — no less than the 
whole transformation of the proletarian mentality. It m ay well be 
tha t the ruling class...succeeds in destroying the w orkers ' 
organisations; but, for all that, the workers will remain as they 
were.... The same spirit, compounded of discipline, cooperation, 
solidarity, the habit of organised action, will live in them more
■I
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vividly than ever, and will create new forms of intervention.
(1911-12).
W hat Pannekoek was theorising was the relation betw een the 
power of the autonomous working class and the type of organisation within 
which it invested its hopes. His view was that if struggle intensified, 
workers would intervene in new ways, independently of both parliament 
and the unions. (See Bricianer 1969, chap. 3). In 1918, during the German 
revolution, new forms of organisation indeed appeared: action committees, 
factory organisations and workers' and soldiers councils (Raten). The 
fast-forming 'council communist' tendency, however, did not simply adopt 
Pannekoek's earlier insights: they nuanced their position in the light of 
experience. Thus Ruble and his comrades denounced the official workers' 
councils after a week, identifying them as a brake on the movement. Whilst 
continuing to advocate the council form, they launched a struggle to create 
new  councils that fought directly for the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
(Authier and Barrot 1976, p.83). In 1920 Pannekoek spoke for the tendency 
as a whole when he wrote of the need for proletarian autonomy to mature in 
opposition to incorporative forms of organisation. (1920, pp.lll-16).i®
The term trade union is used to denote the form par excellence of the 
'encadrement' of workers' struggle. (Zerzan 1974; Echanges et Mouvement 
1977; W ildcat 1986). More specifically, it denotes a large, perm anent 
organisation of workers in a specific branch or sector, disposing of a 
perm anent staff and functioning both to represent workers' interests in 
negotiations and to regulate strike action when there is no other alternative. 
Such a body aims to monopolise not only the enforcement of workers' 
interests w ithin a specific part of the capitalist economy, bu t also the 
communication with workers elsewhere. Based on and reinforcing both the
 •   '
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divisions in the working class, and its 'integration' within the economy, this 
form is understood to be obligatorily defensive of a society founded on 
wage-labour, and hostile to the advancement of working class subjectivity.
The necessary contradiction between, on one side, union mediation, 
and on the other, the antagonistic development of the autonomous workers' 
movement, is explained by Brendel as follows:
From the very first day of their existence unions have had the task 
of mediating between capitalists and workers, mediating...in order 
to extinguish the flames of conflict between the two parties, not to 
kindle the fire by pouring oil into it, mediating in order to stabilize 
the antagonistic relationship of workers and capitalists, not to 
destroy it.... Not a single union would ever have been accepted for a 
single day by any capitalist or employers' association if it had not 
shown its capacity of operating a combination of defending and 
integrating workers, or, to be more precise, of integrating them into 
the capitalist system by defending them to a certain extent and with 
regard to specific problems. On the other hand not a single union 
would ever have been accepted for a single day by any worker or 
group of workers if it had not defended them to a certain extent and 
with regard to specific problems. That's what m ediation means. 
(1992, p.30)
Two further concepts have been found to be particularly useful in 
the com m unist consideration of the barriers to the developm ent of 
autonomous struggle. The first is that of w orkers ' dem ocracy. This is 
understood both as an ideology concerning the advancement of struggle, 
and as a form of organisation. It is defined in terms of three characteristics. 
First, there is the application of the principle according to which, wherever 
possible, decision m ust follow discussion and precede action. Second, the 
minority m ust submit to the decision of the majority. Third, each worker 
involved in a struggle must have an equal say, regardless of level of interest, 
involvem ent or commitment. (ICG 1987). In other w ords, w orkers' 
democracy is seen as "the application of democratic parliamentarian rules at
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the heart of the proletarian 'mass' organs (assemblies, unions, councils,...)." 
(p.52).
The second concept is that of self-m anagem ent, understood as a 
system wherein a maximum num ber of economic decisions are taken at 
enterprise level. Behind the retention of the enterprise form, there lies all 
that it entails: privative appropriation, exchange, and — if we ignore 
'm utualist' utopias of simple commodity production — capitalism. (Negation 
[1974?]; Sabatier 1977, pp.27-28). One type of self-management requires 
specific mention: namely, w orkers' management, or the management of an 
enterprise by its workers. (This is to be differentiated from workers' control, 
or the right of workers to inspect the books and be consulted on matters of 
policy). (Brinton 1970, i-xv). W orkers' m anagem ent is seen as a 
debureaucratised form of capitalist economy, as a sort of fantastic 
'reconciliation' of workers' interests with those of enterprise capital.
3 MARXISM AND 'MARXISM'
It is readily apparent that the the overall theoretical orientation outlined 
above has been greatly conditioned by a sympathetic reading of Marx. 
I certainly consider it to be in close accordance with Marx's basic attitude
towards the role of the class struggle in history, the self-assertion of the 
proletarian class in particular, and the tendency towards communism. As is 
made clear in the first part of Chapter 3 below, it also relies heavily upon 
M arx's historical and materialist critique of capitalist political economy.
(1867,1885, etc.). In these terms, it is evidently Marxist.
IS
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At the same time, the theoretical approach adopted cannot usefully 
be described as 'orthodox Marxist,' since it neither relies upon, nor follows 
on from, the political and theoretical positions developed within the various 
traditions associated with the Second and Third Internationals/ “* It is, on the 
contrary, highly 'heterodox.' Being neither social-democratic nor Leninist, it 
is the product rather of a wholly separate 'heritage' associated principally 
with the council communists, the Situationists, and the Autonomists.
The adoption of such an orientation implies a position regarding 
both social democracy and Leninism which is not only 'different,' but which 
is also antagonistic. In short, both of these other sets of positions are 
perceived not simply as being oblivious to proletarian autonomy in theory, 
bu t as expressing social interests and aspirations which are radically 
opposed to it in practice. Social democracy and Leninism — alongside, for 
that matter, anarchism'll — are understood to be but parts, in both theory 
and practice, of the widespread 'representation of the working class' which 
arose in the late 19th century and which has wholly opposed itself to 
working class autonomous practice (or power). (See Debord 1967, para.lOO). 
It follows that whereas the approach I have described above, along with the 
positions of the three movements to which I am especially indebted, can 
usefully be characterised as communist, the positions of 'orthodox Marxism,' 
of social democracy and Leninism, cannot be so characterised.
The matter then remains of the use of the term Marxist, Two points 
in particular should be clear in relation to this. First, the theories produced 
by the application of various 'orthodox Marxist' approaches are perceived to 
have been wholly out of line with the theoretical approach, the practical
I
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IIorientation, and the revolutionary intent displayed by Marx himself from 
the 1840s on. As Debord has described,
Marx's theory is fundamentally beyond scientific thought, and it 
preserves scientific thought only by superseding it; w hat is in 
question is an understanding of struggle, and not of law. (1967, 
para.81)
,This is true even if it was the "deterministic-scientific/«ccf" [emphasis 
added] in Marx's own thought which
was precisely the gap through which the process of 'ideologization' 
penetrated, during M arx's own lifetime, into the theoretical 
heritage left to the workers' movement, (para.84).
Recently this view has been developed highly successfully by Shortall, who
demonstrates how the 'closure' within Capital, which Marx enacted in order
to focus upon capital as an objective and positive system outside of class
subjectivity, is essentially provisional in nature. And since it is provisional,
even this scientific analysis necessarily points 'beyond itself' to a unitary
communist critique. (1994).
Second, the communist insistence on proletarian autonom y and 
subjectivity, on the power disposed of by the working class, while 
describable as Marxist, cannot be reconciled with any sort of epistemology 
which argues the 'correctness' of a position with reference mainly or solely 
to an exegesis of the works of Marx. I have, in fact, no intention here of 
arguing in depth that any position is 'true' to Marx, with all its rivals being 
'false,' To argue thus would imply first making a full-scale analysis, in the 
light of various historical developments, of all the numerous interpretations 
of Marx's positions (and, crucially, their material roots: see Goldner 1991); 
and w ould also have to involve a critique of certain of Marx's positions 
themselves. That is not the point of the present thesis, which is focused more
'1
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narrowly on the USSR and the the struggle of the working class on Soviet 
territory.
As a consequence, I have found it possible, and indeed useful, to 
have more leeway with the term 'Marxist' than with the term 'com m unist/ 
When used in inverted commas (Chapter 5), the former term thus denotes 
the various positions which are straightforwardly social-democratic or 
Leninist; when used without them, it denotes those positions which might 
not necessarily be communist — these are considered in Chapter 6.1 — but 
which have been developed outside of the m ainstream  of 'orthodox 
Marxism' in such a way as to underline, however weakly or strongly and 
w ith whatever reservations, the autonomous power of the workers as a 
category independen t of representation. (Chapter 6.2). The term  
'communist,' meanwhile, without inverted commas, will be used to denote 
the positions of the three specific tendencies mentioned, as well as any other 
writings which are considered to be founded on the principles outlined 
above, such as those of Barrot.
Since all the theories and positions considered are assessed 
according to the same criteria, the a priori nature of this classification will not 
constitute a hindrance to the precision of the critique. Indeed, providing as it 
does a rem inder of the underlying theoretical and political orientation 
described in this first chapter, it will on the contrary prove of clarificatory 
significance in the chapters to follow.
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4 SUMMARY
I have defined a theoretical approach above in which the most im portant 
organising ideas are as follows. First, in the words of the Com m unist 
Manifesto^ the history of all existing societies is seen as a history of class 
struggle. Second, this struggle is understood not merely as an objective 
'conflict of interests,' but as an antagonism in the literal sense; that is, as an 
irreducible contest between class subjects or subjectivities. Third, the 
fundamental 'tendency' of proletarian struggle, understood to express truly 
hum an need, is seen as being towards a revolution which would bring about 
communism on a world scale. Fourth, and in accordance with the ideas pu t 
forward by Marx and the Situationists, communism is understood to be a 
society w ithout money, comm odities, the State, w age-labour, and 
exploitation, wherein work would be eliminated in favour of a new type of 
productive activity.
As an example of the application of a communist approach, further 
concepts are then outlined on a less abstract level in relation to the West. 
Capitalist politics, described as a struggle to manage the capitalist State and 
economy, is taken to include the entire spectrum from extreme right to 
extreme left. Democracy, or the rights of the member of civil society to 
citizenship, is the political form which expresses m ost profoundly the 
capitalist principles of separation and atomisation.
Finally, proletarian autonomy is defined negatively as subversion, 
as the negation of capital's tendency to incorporate w orkers' struggle.
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Concepts used in connection with this incorporation include trade unionism, 
which expresses incorporation either into the national economy as a whole 
or into one of its sectors or branches; workers' democracy, which consists of an 
adoption of bourgeois 'parliamentary' attitudes by workers in struggle; and 
self-management, which binds workers to the enterprise-form and therefore 
to the m arket (See Figure 1).
* * * » *
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Figure 1: Main Concepts Introduced in Chap* 1
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NOTES
The term 'antagonism ' is sometimes m isused to denote, simply a 
conflict of interests. (See for example Szelenyi 1979). Here it^used in its 
proper meaning of an active conflict between subjects (from the Greek 
avTL, against, and aycovLCTTriç, combatant, actor).
For Castoriadis the "central problem of socialism" is "in short, the 
question of the management and goals of work." (1960-61, p.302; see 
also 1957) The Situationist International criticised such conceptions for 
abandoning "the very core of the revolutionary project, which is 
nothing less than the suppression of work in the ordinary sense (as 
well as the suppression of the proletariat) and of all the justifications of 
previous forms of work." (1963, p.102). See also Négation 1974.
"The working class is defined by its struggle against capital and not by 
its productive function!' (Zerowork 1975, p.3).
For an Autonomist-influenced view of class struggle in the USSR, see 
Chapter 7 below. For a brief comment on Negri's marginal comments 
on the struggles in Eastern Europe, see the first footnote in Chapter 6.
It should be noted that Autonomist Marxism, whilst it understood very 
well the relationship betw een class struggle and the crisis of 
Keynesianism, has more or less collapsed in its efforts to understand 
the changes of the 1980s and 1990s. Either it has fallen into a kind of 
post-Frankfurt school concentration upon 'difference,' focusing on 
'cu lture ' in a w ay form erly associated w ith various left-wing 
intellectuals from Gramsci to Bahro, albeit w ith the more m odern 
terminology of 'plurality,' 'multipolarity,' and 'information' (see for 
example, Guattari and Negri 1985, Negri 1990, and Witheford 1994); or 
else it has theorised the supposedly subversive nature of the politics of 
single-issue campaigns (see Cleaver 1989), becoming at most a species 
of anti-imperialist leftism. (For the rudiments of a much more useful 
and dassist discussion of the information revolution and present 
changes, see Tillium 1994). It is worth pointing out in addition that 
some communists have argued, with substantial justification, that even 
at the peak of their influence in the 1970s the Autonomists did not, in 
practice, break effectively with leftism. (Insurrezione 1984). Neither 
political vanguardism nor national liberationism were ever put into 
question.
A few further comments are in order. Thus I would suggest that 
although Autonom ist Marxism always had the strength of being 
commendably 'up-to-date' and indeed forward-looking, it also had the 
weakness of being unable, even in the 1970s, fully to compensate for its
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lack of a fruitful encounter w ith earlier com m unist theoretical 
contributions, particularly those of the council communists and the 
Situationists. Bologna, for example, in discussing in a comparative 
context the workers' councils movement of 1918 in Germany, fails 
altogether to consider the practical (and armed) force of the council 
com m unist w orkers' organisations which arose as part of that 
m ovem ent, (1972). Despite his useful concentration on class 
composition, especially in the United States, his omission to consider 
the ideas and experience of European council communism can then 
reinforce his assumption that Russian Bolshevism was still some kind 
of a proletarian manifestation even as late as the civil war. (pp.90-91). 
Such views in turn reinforce the failure to reach a full rejection of 
partyism. More generally, a theoretical understanding of the fact that 
the working class necessarily holds power which is tendentially 
disruptive of the realisation of capitalist imperatives, so long as it 
remains untied to a full understanding of means of integration, can quite 
feasibly allow a movement from the original 'workerism' (operaismo) of 
the 1960s tow ards a positive appraisal of various kinds of 
accommodation, or at least to an abdication from the need to criticise 
them wholesale. Unlike Situationist theory. Autonomist Marxism has 
little or no concept of false consciousness, and Negri has even been able 
effectively to equate use-value with proletarian power. (1979, p.l37). By 
such means the idea of global communist revolution can be shifted 
towards a concept of the 'permanent' contestational occupation of a 
militant or sub-cultural 'area of autonomy,' corresponding in effect to a 
form of self-management. (See Insurrezione 1984).
The case of the early 'workerist' theorist Tronti, who in 1967 
decided to espouse the 'really-existing workers' politics' of the 
Communist Party of Italy — which in the late 1970s became a m ain 
force in the Italian judicial repression of the principally Autonomist 
radical movement (see Red Notes 1979) — was admittedly exceptional. 
More recently, though, Lebowitz has been able, while elaborating a 
largely Autonomist theory of the primacy of class struggle, to maintain 
a non-Autonomist view of the trade unions as the "critical organising 
centre of the working class" and the State as a 'm ediator of labour' 
which is apparently independent of capital. (1992, pp.149-51).
This is not the place to discuss the Autonom ist oeuvre in the 
overall context of the more general development of revolutionary 
theory and autonomous class practice. Indeed, to deal in full with such 
a topic would dem and not only an entire dissertation bu t also a 
knowledge of Italian. The theoretical strength of Autonomist Marxism 
which I rely upon in the present thesis, however, can be summarised as 
the insistence on antagonistic class polarity, as is especially manifest in 
N egri's discussion of Marx's Grundrisse (1979), first published in 
English in 1984.
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G While some communists (for example, Rubel and Crump 1987) use the 
words 'socialism' and 'communism' interchangeably, I have followed 
the majority in preferring to use the latter word exclusively.
7 Im portant works and collections of works include: Pannekoek 1912, 
1920, 1934, and 1947-49, Rühle 1924 (council communist); SI Anthology 
1953-71, Debord 1967 (Situationist); Negri 1967-83, 1973-74, 1978 and 
1979, Cleaver 1979, Kay 1975 and 1979a (Autonomist); Barrot and 
Martin 1972-74, and Barrot 1979. Journals include: A Communist Effort 
(London); Aufheben (Brighton,*); La Banquise (Pans);Communism [in 
English] (Brussels,*); L'Insecurité Sociale (Paris); Internationale  
Situationniste (Paris); Midnight Notes (New York,*); Radical Chains 
(London,*); Wildcat [in German] (Karlsruhe,*); Wildcat [in English, 
unconnected with the above] (London,*); and Zerowork (New York). 
(* = current). A detailed history of much of the communist tendency is 
given in La Banquise 1983; also useful are the essays on various 
tendencies in Rubel and Crump 1987.
® This and the following terms have become 'common usage' within the 
tendency, and I have been unable to find rigorous definitions. Given 
that the usage of such terns as 'left' and 'extreme leff is based on these 
tendencies' self-description, however, and given that the ideas which 
demarcate the communist tendency have been detailed above, such 
definitions are not necessary in the present context.
® Communist usage of the terms 'left,' 'extreme left' and 'ultra-left' in
these meanings was developed in western Europe, particularly in 
France.
10 Pannekoek's view that any future capitalist collapse would have as its 
essential ingredient the "will to revolution of the proletariat" (1934, 
pp.78-79) adds further evidence to the case for relating his contribution 
to that later made by the Autonomists.
11 The International W orkingm en's Association, of course, or First 
International, did not formulate an agreed ideology of any comparable 
type.
12 On social democracy, see for example Pannekoek 1919 and 1920; on 
Bolshevism, Voline 1947 or Brinton 1970; on the conflict between 
proletarian autonomy and the anarchist union the CNT during the 
Spanish civil war, Seidman 1988, pp.1-14.
CHAPTER 2
Soviet Capitalism: A Critique of Existing Theories
In this chapter I look at the various theories which depict the Soviet system 
as capitalist. Critical consideration is given first to the numerous theories of 
'state capitalism/ and then to the other 'capitalist' theories. In analysing and 
criticising each theory, I ask two main questions: why is the USSR perceived 
to be capitalist? and how is it perceived to be specific?
The view that Soviet society was capitalist has been held by a large 
num ber of writers from various political tendencies, including — in 
alphabetical order — anarchism, council communism, 'impossibilism,' many 
types of Leninism (including Bordigism, Maoism, and a num ber arising out 
of Trotskyism), libertarianism , M arxist-Humanism, M enshevism , the 
Situationist International, and social democracy. 1 If the very disparity of 
these tendencies raises significant problems in classifying the theories they 
have produced, I have found the most straightforward solution to be one
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which has rarely, if ever, been applied before. This is to classify them 
according to the simple presence or absence of an idea, however conceived, 
of 'state capitalism.' Present in the works of the Socialist Party of Great 
Britain, Rühle and the later council communists, Buick and Crump, W ildt, 
Dunayevskaya and James, Munis, Cliff, Bettelheim, and Sapir, this concept 
is quite absent in those of Gorter, Castoriadis, and Bordiga.
The 'state capitalist' theories are discussed in the following order. 
First, I take the earliest theories, developed in the aftermath of the Bolshevik 
seizure of power: namely, the theory of the Socialist Party of Great Britain 
and the som ewhat more profound theories of Rühle and the council 
communists. I then look at a more recent work by Buick and Crump which 
draws on both of these sources, as well as a little-known contribution by 
Wildt. All of these theories stress that neither the changes of government in 
1917, nor the zigzags of economic policy thereafter, in any way led to the 
abolition of workers' exploitation.
Next I consider the theories produced by those writers who were 
originally of the Trotskyist view that the USSR was a 'workers' state,' but 
later rejected it in favour of the view that under Stalinism this was no longer 
the case. These theories, produced by Dunayevskaya and James, Munis, and 
Cliff, were developed in the 1940s: around the time, that is, that the USSR 
began to receive military assistance first from the United Kingdom and then 
from the United States, proceeding to defeat Germany and become a major 
imperialist power. Criticism is made not of Bolshevism, but of Stalinism, 
established ostensibly in the course of a 'counterrrevolution' in the late 
1920s.
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I then consider the alternative Leninist theory crafted by Bettelheim,
who stresses above all the changes which took place in the years following 
the death of Stalin in 1953. If Chavance has de-emphasised these changes, 
and Sapir has more recently argued that capitalism has predominated since 
before 1917, both theorists base themselves chiefly on Bettelheim's view of 
the capitalist nature of the Soviet system.
Of the 'capitalist but not state capitalist' theories I deal first with the 
early council communist view constructed by Gorter, and then with the 
som ew hat lengthier anti-Leninist w ork produced in the 1950s by 
Castoriadis. Lastly, I consider the theoretical work of the left-Leninist 
Bordiga.
At this juncture it is worth mentioning, though, that this is not the
only way the various theories m ight be sorted. Another sensible system
would involve concentrating on the extent to which the development of the
USSR is understood to have differed from the development of 'traditional'
or 'classical' capitalism in the West. According to this second system, it
would then appear that at one end of 'state capitalist' thinking there is Cliff,
who holds that in the USSR there were neither com m odities nor.wage-labourers, but that even so the country was capitalist, owing to the 
internal effects of military competition with the West; and at the other end 
there are those such as the Socialist Party of Great Britain, for whom Soviet 
'state capitalism' is little more than state ownership, as well as the more 
recent scholars Buick and Crump, who refer to the existence throughout the 
Soviet period of a market — albeit an unfree one — wherein prices were 
ultim ately determ ined by value. In between these two positions w ould 
stand Bettelheim, who sees the 'p lan ' as being a sort of transm ission
CHAP.2 SOVIET CAPITALISM: EXISTING THEORIES 46
mechanism for the logic of the market; and Dunayevskaya and James, who 
write of capitalist profit but avoid falling into the trap of identifying it with 
its apparent forms,
A similar division is evident in the camp rejecting 'state capitalism.' 
Thus Castoriadis begins by making a major distinction between 'private 
capitalism' and 'bureaucratic capitalism'; and even once he decides that 
'bureaucratic capitalism' prevails in the West as well as in the USSR, he still 
perceives a major structural difference between the two areas, w ith 
'bureaucratic capitalism' being 'fragmented' in the former and 'total' in the 
latter. Bordiga, on the other hand, even more so than Gorter in the first half 
of the 1920s, takes the view that any differences are quite unimportant: 
given that 'mercantilism' is dominant in the USSR just as it is elsewhere, he 
sees no need to add a supplementary adjective to the basic characterisation 
as 'capitalist.'
Since in every case one is dealing prim arily w ith  qualitative 
analyses, any attem pt to give precedence below to the second m ethod of 
classification would prove needlessly confusing, not to say inelegant; but the 
display given in Figure 2 will nonetheless serve to demonstrate the relevant 
axes of variety in the group of theories considered.
1 'STATE CAPITALISM'2
1.1 The Socialist Party of Great Britain's Theory^
Consistently em phasising the nature of socialism as a wageless and 
moneyless society, in the years following 1917 the SPGB lays particular
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Figure 2: Theories of Soviet Capitalism
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stress on the fact that it is not seriously possible to view Soviet conditions as 
socialist. In short, "capitalism has always existed in post-revolutionary 
Russia and the working class there has never had political power." (1967, 
p.27).
In an endeavour to explain w hy it w as that no socialist 
transformation came about, they then point to the backwardness of the 
productive forces (1918, pp. 13-14), Lenin's explicit support for capitalist 
development (1920, pp.20-21; see Lenin 1917a, 1918b, and 1918-23), and the 
role played by private enterprise in both town and countryside under the 
New Economic Policy (NEP), (SPGB 1924, p.32). Whilst these points are 
interesting, however, they are not offered as a full theoretical demonstration 
of the capitalist nature of Soviet (urban) society, and it is perhaps w orth 
pointing out that if they had been they would have been inadequate. Thus 
the first argument would fall straightaway since it would depend primarily 
upon two dogmatic assumptions, namely that capitalism can only be 
succeeded by socialism, and that socialism is impossible w ithout an 
industrial society. (Clearly it is impossible to derive these tenets either from 
M arx's basic categories or from empirical reality.) The second point, 
meanwhile, relates only to part of the urban economy, and at most to the 
political ideas and overall aims of Lenin's government; and the third can 
explain neither the role of the state sector nor the developm ent of the 
economy after the 'Great Leap Forward."^
In this early period the SPGB's theory of 'state capitalism' remains 
rudim entary, and they use the term — as Lenin does — prim arily to 
describe the regulation and supervision of 'private' trade by the State.
  _   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _
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(1918). Allied to this conception there is the idea of a capitalist "road" along 
which the Bolshevik government is seen as being in "retreat." (1920, p.21). 
By 1924 the SPGB goes as far as to argue that the country already stands 
"halfway on the road to capitalism." (p.35). The implicit view here is that 
after 1917 there were at least some non-capitalist (and non-pre-capitalist) 
elements operating in the economy at a fundamental level, presum ably 
associated with regulators other than market competition. Since, however, 
the SPGB eventually comes to adopt another view this is never argued out 
in full or reinforced theoretically at any great depth.
By the late 1920s the SPGB begins to oppose the concept of 'state' 
capitalism to that of 'private' capitalism (1928, p.40), w ith the implication 
that the former is not simply a form of regulation of the latter. Even after 
this, however, the old idea continues to exert an influence, and the resultant 
theoretical perspective is therefore highly confused. On one hand, there is an 
em phasis on the fundam entally  capitalist relations — com m odity 
production, wage-labour, profit, and capital — which underlie even the 
"extremely centralised" system of economic control under Stalin (see 1967, 
p.33); on the other there is a revealingly 'over-determ ined' interest — 
relating to the very same period — in such matters as the role of concessions 
granted to foreign companies (1930), the importance of interest-bearing 
government bonds, and the rise of Soviet rouble millionaires (SPC 1948, 
pp.45-46).
To understand the SPGB's theory of 'state capitalism,' it is first 
necessary to follow their argument as to why the USSR is capitalist. This is 
so, in their view, because all the essential features of capitalism continue to 
exist: namely, the class monopoly of the means of production; the wages
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system; great inequalities of wealth and income; State coercion against the 
workers; the production of commodities for profit; and arm s production, 
nationalism , and war. (1967, pp.13-14). Endeavouring to theorise more 
precisely, they focus on four features in particular: the class monopoly of the 
m eans of production, commodity production, w age-labour, and the 
accumulation of capital, (p.27). Correctly, from a Marxist standpoint, they 
then point out that commodity production itself is not a sufficient condition 
for capitalism: there must also be categories of wage-labour and profit.
Unfortunately, though, their usage of the w ords 'p ro fif and 
'capital' remains extremely loose, suggesting little more than the extraction 
and reinvestment of a surplus product.
In Russia the means of production are used to exploit wage-labour Ifor a surplus. In other words they function as capital, (p.29).
This may be formally true, since wage-labour plus accumulation as the aim 
of production do indeed imply capital; but there is nonetheless a gaping 
hole in the theory. As 'orthodox Marxists' the SPGB m ust certainly believe 
that Soviet profits derive from the production of surplus value, but they make 
no attem pt to show how this might be the case. To do this, of course, would
first of all mean showing how value actually functions other than through 
the market, particularly in the producer goods sector. (Or, of course, one 
m ight argue that the apparently non-market forms were in fact forms of the 
market). Since, however, the SPGB's concepts of profit and 'capital' remain 
detached from the Marxist concept of value, they must necessarily be judged 
inadequate. It may be possible to deduce from the SPGB's writings that the 
Soviet system really was capitalist, but it is not possible to gain an 
understanding of how the various capitalist categories actually worked.
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Their residual concept of 'state capitalism' is highly patchy, and 
som etim es seems to boil dow n to little more than the idea of state 
ow nership, (1943, p .85; 1967, p.29). Elsewhere, reference is m ade to 
ministerial target-setting under Stalin.
The State directed what should be produced; the factory managers 
merely had to carry out these orders. The State also fixed the prices 
at which goods were to be sold to the consumer. As in all systems 
of rationing (which this State-directed system resembled) a black 
m arket appeared. Industrial agents or 'pushers' made a living by 
getting scarce supplies for a price. Indeed they became an essential 
part of the system. (1967, p.33).
The reference to rationing here would seem only to obscure the fact that,
w hilst it m ight have been possible in wartime Britain to buy bread 'off
ration,' and in Stalin's USSR to procure industrial raw materials for cash or
favours, it was not possible in the latter to buy, say, machine-building plants
or car factories for roubles. This impossibility was as much an essential part
of the system as was the operation of industrial tolkachi. But to such
systemically necessary and apparently non-market aspects the SPGB give no
more than passing attention. As a consequence, their theory is weak because
they do not theorise any significant differences between the USSR and the
West.
1.2 Council Communist Theories®
Among those who saw the USSR as capitalist in the 1920s were precisely 
those Marxists who were the most committed to proletarian self-liberation, 
namely the council communists, whose theoreticians included Pannekoek, 
Gorter, Mattick, Rühle, and, for a time — albeit somewhat belatedly —
' - i - ' v :
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Kbrsch.® After 1920-21, once the facts about Russian conditions had become 
clear in western Europe, the council communists forthrightly condemned 
not only the despotism  of the Bolshevik political system but also the 
capitalist economic conditions it policed and defended.^ At first, during the 
NEP (1921-28), the majority emphasised the role of market competition and 
the capitalist peasantry (see below, section 2.1 on Gorter), and only a 
m inority theorised 'state capitalism '; but by the mid-1930s the 'state 
capitalist' position had become one of the tendency's principle tenets.
1.2.1 Ruble's Theory®
The origins of the council communist theory of 'state capitalism' lie w ith 
Rühle, who in a major work of 1924 comes to understand the internal 
economic role of the Soviet State in terms of capitalist development on a 
world scale. Whilst keeping to the view that in the capitalist economy "the 
m arket is the centre," Rühle thus attributes substantial significance to 
growing State authoritarianism and administrative centralisation, not as 
purely Soviet developments, but rather as aspects of a general tendency 
throughout the capitalist world. In this view, it is precisely the "centralism" 
of the capitalist economy, expressed through the market, which determines 
the changes in the political organisation of the State.
One can undoubtedly criticise Rühle for being confused, in that he 
fails to trace convincingly the interactions between the economic 'centrality' 
of the market and the political 'centralism' of the State, preferring simply to 
aver that the latter 'corresponds' to the former. (1924, pp.19-22). He can 
hardly  be said to deal w ith the full complexities of Soviet economic
I
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bureaucracy. But at the same time, in describing "nationalisation w ithout 
socialisation" — or, as the Bolsheviks called it, 'War Communism ' — as 
tending m aximally tow ards a "large-scale tightly centrally-run state 
capitalism" (p.15), Rühle undoubtedly provides the germ s of a more 
advanced critique.
In 1931 Rühle published pseudonymously a m uch fuller theory 
which remains remarkably little known. In The World Crisis, or Towards State 
Capitalism, he first shows that capitalism has undergone a trem endous 
process of cartelisation and monopolisation, evident in the consumer retail 
sector as much as in coal, electrical technology, or steel, (pp.90-119).
Economic power in Europe now rests in very few hands indeed, (pp.105-06). 
Rühle then points to the parallel and long-term growth in State subsidies, 
(pp.120-49). W hen economic crisis appears, each capitalist governm ent's 
need to subsidise becomes particularly acute; and as a result, capitalist 
domination employs ever greater levels of State intervention and indeed 
planning. It is no longer a paradox that early subsidies were given especially 
readily to concerns which lay outside the monopolies, and which indeed the 
monopolies threatened. Monopolisation and intervention are simply twin 
aspects of the concentration of the productive forces. Looking specifically at 
the Germany of the time, Rühle correctly predicts that the State and the 
economy will increasingly overlap and intermesh. (p.l78). In this view. State 
involvement eventually reaches such a level as to constitute a fundamental 
change; and even if 'State capitalism ' neither perm anently  solves 
capitalism's problems, nor fundamentally alters its nature, it nonetheless 
represents a genuinely new stage of capitalist domination.
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It is in this context that Rühle sees the USSR. Here, though, rather 
than being a consequence of the 'over-ripeness' of a capitalism racked by 
crisis. State capitalism emerges instead from far more primitive forms of 
capitalist evolution. In Russia,
the planned economy was introduced before the free capitalist 
economy had reached its full fruition, before its life-cycle had led it 
to senility. In concrete terms, it amounted to a prem ature birth, 
rendered possible by specific historical circumstances, (pp.179-80).
In Ruble's view, not only did the world war destroy Russian 'feudalism '; it
then also "devoured" a bourgeoisie which was unable to make peace.
Following the collapse of the war effort, many capitalist concerns, despite
being officially subject to increased 'supervision' (kontrol 0, lapsed into a
state of utter chaos, or even complete inactivity. They ended up  being
nationalised. In quick succession, the banks, the m erchant navy, foreign
trade, and whole industries were taken into State hands: the "form of
property" was changed. During NEP, the State then kept control of at least
the commanding heights of industry, and set about laying the foundations
of the organised State capitalist system which was later to undergo such
rapid expansion, (p. 192).
Different in origin to w estern European developm ents, the 
subsequent industrial, agricultural, and infrastructural upheavals launched 
by the Soviet State at the end of the 1920s are also of a different significance 
in their effect, (pp.207-09). State disposal of the means of production allows 
the revolutionisation of technique in all the main sectors; and moreover, 
millions of new workers are made available for such development to exploit. 
W hereas in western Europe there is hunger, misery, and the threat of total 
ruin, in the USSR besides hunger and w ant there is also a great leap
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forward, growth, and a new future. There is no crisis. Capitalist 'planning' 
in the USSR has evidently nothing whatsoever to do with socialism, but 
nonetheless it consititutes a movement quite distinct from those occurring in 
Germany and elsewhere. Whereas in western Europe the declining "free 
capitalist" economy seeks to move beyond the stage of cartels and 
monopolies so as to save itself by means of State planning, in the USSR State 
planning started at "the bottom  of the ladder" (p.209), rubbished the 
inheritance of feudalism, and now makes use of the conquests of the free 
capitalist economy in its own autonomous self-expansion. Since sooner or 
later the lines of development m ust cross, it is the East which shows the 
W est the light of 'salvation' and not vice versa, Rühle later describes the 
Bolshevik State as a model for Nazism and fascism. (1939, p.6).^
It is, however, only State capitalism that western Europe tends to 
copy, not its specific Soviet manifestation. Whereas western Europe will see 
either the 'usurpation ' of the private economy by the State, or else the 
establishm ent over the State of a strict control by private firms (1931, 
pp .229-40), Soviet capitalism follows an altogether different route. In 
considering this route in his final chapter, though, Rühle loses much of his 
earlier clarity. W ithout providing adequate theoretical support, he thus 
avers that whilst the measures advocated in the Communist Manifesto (Marx 
and Engels 1848, pp.59-60) have been "almost completely realised," in terms 
of the manner of their realisation there are still "survivals of capitalism." 
(Rühle 1931, pp.227-29). It is, of course, straightaway apparent here that 
Rühle fails to appraise the rather more radical position on the State which 
Marx later expressed in the aftermath of the Paris Commune. (See Marx 
1871, pp.206-12, and, for clarification, the first draft, 1934, pp.246-52). More
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than this, though, the question of the "manner of realisation" of measures 
advocated in 1848 is really a non-question. Either capitalism survives or it 
does not survive; the implied division between two dimensions of change, 
non-capitalist and capitalist, would seem to make little sense and at any rate 
is not coherently argued out.
Such carelessness only increases. Explaining Soviet 'S tate 
capitalism ' Rühle mentions in addition to economic backwardness the 
suppression "in principle" both of private property  in the m eans of
:§|
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production and of class antagonism. (1931, p.227-29). In this view, though, if
t 'the high level of planning and the w idespread "tendency tow ards 
co-operation" will be useful in the future, they are of little importance today.
State capitalism in the USSR "tends towards" and prepares the road for 
socialism; it is even the most m ature form of a "transition tow ards 
socialism" (sic). But it is not socialism. Indeed it is completely opposed to 
socialism. It is capitalism. The wage remains the price of labour-power, not 
an "aliquot-part" of the social product. 1° The production process adapts 
itself to market requirements, not to needs. And the value of the currency
I
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rem ains set according to the gold rate, not according to "collectivist iaccountability." The leadership of the State, meanwhile, is authoritarian, 
bureaucratic, and dictatorial; and there are no real councils expressing the 
collective will of the masses, no associations of free and equal producers. All 
these factors constitute what Rühle calls "capitalist atavisms."
It would seem, of course, rather an under-statem ent to describe 
such relations as wage-labour as mere "survivals" of capitalism, sloppy to 
refer thus to the market, and simply rhetorical even to use the phrase 
'capitalist atavisms' at all. (As yet, capitalism does not date back to a distant
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ancestral past). Moreover, having avoided referring to the original wartime 
dislocation of 1917-21 as a 'crisis,' and preferring for unexplained reasons to 
explain the 'Soviet route' with reference instead to an untheorised category 
of 'co-operation,' Rühle fails to show how the tendency tow ards such 
co-operation is actually manifested. Correspondingly, he neglects to explain 
in w hat way mere 'atavisms' might permit substantial capitalist growth. His 
view of the actual Soviet production relations consequently remains fuzzy 
and poorly theorised.
1.2.2 Councilist Theory 11
The 'councilists' of the 1930s soon rejected the view  that Soviet 
developm ents were only one expression of a movem ent tow ards state 
capitalism which operated globally. In the Theses on Bolshevism (1934) — an 
im portant landmark in the maturation of the councilist tendency 12 — the 
Group of International Communists (GIK) give correspondingly m uch 
greater consideration to the USSR as a specific case. They thus begin by 
pointing to Russia's intermediate situation between the industrialised area 
of western Europe and North America and the colonial, agricultural regions 
of eastern Asia, They show how, before 1917, the Russian economy 
combined an antiquated and feudal agriculture with a capitalist industrial 
sector which was relatively far more advanced. Russian industry had not 
only been 'engrafted' onto the country by the Tsarist State; it also, in its own 
sphere, preserved m any feudal features, such as the binding of m any 
workers to the village and their accommodation in barracks while in the 
towns. Since the workers were largely 'unfree,' Russian industry  was
f i
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organised upon the basis of "capitalist serfdom." Elements of feudal 
agriculture and capitalist industry interpenetrated, (pp.5-6).
The "economic tasks" of the Russian revolution became those of 
commodifying agriculture and facilitating the unrestricted creation of a class 
of really 'free labourers' for exploitation in industry. In other words, they 
were the tasks of the bourgeois revolution. As in the western countries, this 
m eant overthrowing the nobility. Since, however, Russian absolutism in the 
20th century differed considerably from, say, French absolutism three 
centuries before, the contradictions were not identical. The bourgeoisie in 
Russia had become anti-revolutionary even before the tasks had been 
accomplished, and the revolution therefore had to be carried out against it.
(p.8).
As the bourgeoisie gradually threw in its lot with reaction, it was 
left to elements among the petty bourgeoisie, schooled in western ideas and 
organised Jacobinically, to take its place in the struggle against Tsarism. In 
time these forces assumed the leadership of the peasantry, which was 
revolutionary but politically weak; and of the working class, which may 
have developed an "independent class policy" in 1917 but nonetheless 
rem ained socially weak in the country as a whole. The revolutionary 
petty-bourgeois intelligentsia found its vanguard first in the broader 
Russian social democracy, and then, more specifically, in the Bolshevik 
party under Lenin, (pp.9-10).
A lthough the Bolshevik leadership had originally aim ed to 
collaborate with liberal employers and priests (p.l3), once in government it 
was forced by working class pressure to undertake the full nationalisation of 
the enterprises. The capitalist economy was not simply appropriated by the
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State, which had played such a large role in building it up; it was now  
administered directly by the State bureaucracy. Bolshevik 'socialism' was 
nothing but "state-organized capitalism." (p.21)
The GIK's analysis of Soviet conditions once the Bolsheviks are 
fully established in power, however, is considerably less impressive. With 
scant argumentation, they thus assert that whereas
the proletariat, enchained w ith the m ethods of com pulsory 
membership in the trade unions and the terrorism of the Tcheka, 
formed the basis of the bolshevistic bureaucratically conducted 
state economy the peasantry concealed and still conceals in its 
ranks the private capitalist tendencies of that economy, (pp.24-25).
Tossed back and forth between the "two tendencies," the Soviet State
attem pts to 'm aster' them, but only at the expense of increasing the
contradictions; it 'overtensions' the forces of the workers and peasants. By
now  the analysis appears mainly rhetorical, and the language is both
confused and confusing; there is no clear definition of w hat the first
'tendency' actually is.
The previous rigour vanishes.
The inner character of the Russian economy is determined by the 
following circumstances; it rests on the foundation of commodity 
production; it is conducted according to the viewpoints of capitalist 
profitability; it reveals a decidedly capitalist system of wages and 
speed-up; it has carried the refinements of capitalist rationalisation 
to the utmost limits. Bolshevist economy is state production with 
capitalist methods, (p.25).
All of these assertions may well be true, but four years after the onset of
collectivisation the commodity nature of the product undoubtedly requires
to be argued out in full. And if the goal of production is presented as being
profitability, this has to be shown unambiguously to be the case, since after
the onset of breakneck industrialisation such an idea clearly goes against
CHAP.2 SOVIET CAPITALISM: EXISTING THEORIES 60
I
prima facie impressions. Instead of showing that the surplus product takes a 
value form, though, the GIK simply assumes that it does and ploughs on 
regardless. Further assertions that the surplus value is "pocketed" by the 
State by means of the "bureaucratic, parasitical apparatus as a whole," and 
that part of that value is then passed on to the peasantry (pp.25-26), albeit 
original, fail to compensate for the lack of theoretical foundation. This 
becomes even clearer once it is realised that the nationalisations and mass 
proletarianisation which put an end to NEP were, in terms of accumulation, 
a major economic success.
1.3 Buick and Crum p's Theory
Building upon insights from both the above sources, Buick and Crum p also 
take the view that capitalism was never abolished. Not only do they thus 
avoid having to give a Leninist explanation of the 'degeneration ' of 
proletarian revolution due to 'i s o la t io n , 'in  fact they go further and argue 
that the revolution that did occur was a state capitalist one. They then 
proceed to analyse the Soviet system in terms of a 'state capitalist market.'
Like the SPGB and the council communists, but unlike Cliff (see 
below, 1.7), Buick and Crump see the USSR as capitalist because of w hat it 
was like internally. They consequently begin their exposition in w hat seems 
an eminently sensible fashion:
To say that state capitalism is a variety of capitalism m ay be a 
tautology, but it brings out the need to be clear on what capitalism 
is before embarking on any discussion of what state capitalism 
might be. (1986, p .l) .
____________________________
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Capitalism they define as a class society with six essential characteristics: 
generalised commodity production, where nearly all wealth is produced for 
sale on the market; investment of capital in production w ith a view to 
obtaining a monetary profit; wage-labour; regulation of production by the 
m arket via a competitive struggle for profit; accumulation of capital; and a 
single world economy.
In their discussion of state capitalist revolution, they explain 
(pp.46-47) how capitalist revolutions are not always carried out by the 
bourgeoisie. Thus in Japan the revolution of 1868 was led by samurai, bu t 
was "no less capitalist in its effects than the French Revolution of 1789, 
[for]...both...succeeded in creating an environment in which commodity 
production and wage labour could develop further." (p.46; see also Crump 
1983, pp.3-19). Countries particularly  susceptible to state capitalist 
revolution tended to be those which were backward, "unable to accumulate 
sufficient capital rapidly and hence to modernise at an acceptable rate," and 
under either "the threat or the actuality of foreign domination." (1986, p.45). 
In the Russian context, Buick and Crump also mention (p.47) the im portant 
role the Tsarist State played in industry prior to 1917, a role which hindered 
the emergence of a revolutionary bourgeoisie.
Their theory concerning the specific nature of state capitalism is 
contained in a chapter on "The Capitalist Dynamic of State Capitalist 
Economies." (pp.67-101). The model they develop has seven main features 
(p.72): state ownership of the principal means of production; generalised 
wage-labour; generalised use of money and monetary calculation; a free 
m arket for consumer goods; a market for producer goods that is closely 
monitored and 'directed' by the State; widespread 'planning', in the form of
I
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State allocation, target-setting, price-fixing and direction of capital flows 
between sectors; and a sizeable black market.
Since it cannot seriously be denied that accumulation was the basic 
motive of Soviet production, even despite the stagnation which began under 
Brezhnev and led in 1990 to negative growth, the core of Buick and Crum p's 
argum ent that the USSR was capitalist relates to two subjects in particular: 
wage-labour and the market. If it can be shown that these were the 
fundam ental bases of the Soviet economic system, then their particular 
'capitalist' argument will prevail.
Buick and Crump argue for the existence of a Soviet labour market 
(and hence, wage-labour) by stressing (p.75) that "enterprises have always 
retained a degree of independence," and that this has been especially 
manifest in the sphere of adjusting wages and working conditions. Even the 
draconian restrictions on labour mobility introduced in certain periods, such 
as between 1940 and 1956, when it was illegal to change jobs w ithout 
permission, have always proved unenforceable in the long term. Annual 
labour turnover was 38% in 1956, the year the ban was removed, and fell to 
about 20% by the early 1980s (p.76), a level that clearly cannot be dismissed 
as u n i m p o r t a n t . ^  4  One can assume that most of the workers who changed 
their jobs, as an 'average' worker might do once every five years, did so 
because they wanted to. Moreover, in the late Brezhnev period almost all 
hiring took place either at the factory gates or at the labour exchange. (Sapir 
1984, p.61; see also Lane 1987, p.59, and Marnie 1990, pp.4-5). So, w ith 
w hatever limitations, and there were many, labour was to a substantial 
degree 'free.' It is worth anchoring this point with reference to Marx, who 
devoted a chapter of Capital to the sale and purchase of labour-power. For
   _ _ .      _ .
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him, labour-power could appear on the market as a commodity only if the 
worker really possessed it, that is, if he disposed of it as a "free proprietor." 
The wage-labourer is the possessor of his labour-capacity, and "hence of his 
person." (1867, p.271). It is thus clear that labour turnover and competition 
to em ploy workers provide a strong argum ent for the existence of 
w age-labour in the USSR. (I am disregarding the question of the 
concentration camps, where labour was not at all free: the present context is 
that of work in the rest of the economy alone).
When they endeavour to show the existence of a product market, 
however, Buick and Crump move to ground which is theoretically much 
weaker. First they mention (1986, p.82) that Soviet planning was based on 
guesswork, approximation and often just "wishful statements of intent" (in 
other words, as Ticktin has shown [1973a and 1991c, pp.116-29], it was not 
real planning^®); then they state their approval of the Maoist Bettelheim's 
argum ent that Soviet planning was in fact no more than the planning of 
m arket transactions. (See below, 1.8). Thus "the 'plan' does not abolish 
exchange relations between enterprises, but merely attem pts — not too 
successfully — to quantify the exchanges in advance." (Buick and Crum p 
1986, p.83). Physical inflows of equipment were balanced by corresponding 
outflows of money. On the one hand, they seem to be saying, there was no 
(successful) planning, or at least no t much, b u t instead there was 
competition between enterprises; on the other, even if there had been 
planning, it would still have been the market that was being planned.
Their attempt to square this circle undermines their entire theory of 
the state capitalist market. In answering the anticipated objection that 
buying and selling between Soviet enterprises was a purely formal matter.
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since enterprises were prevented from dealing w ith  each other 
independently and directly, they naturally arrive at the question of price. 
Reminding us that although commodities do not normally sell at their value 
even in "private capitalism," it is still value that "ultimately determines 
prices," they then accept that
if, in  the state capitalist countries, exchange between enterprises 
occurred at prices which were established entirely arbitrarily by the 
state, the case for seeing this as genuine commodity exchange 
would be weakened. Yet what, in fact, ultimately determines state 
capitalist prices is once again value....The process of extracting 
surplus value can be accomplished efficiently only when suitable 
indicators for measuring value exist, in the form of money prices 
which take into account the law of value. Certainly state capitalist 
prices do not directly reflect value, but...this is not the case in 
private capitalism  either....[The] refracting effect of p lanning 
modifies but does not cancel the commodity status of the means of 
production in state capitalism, (pp.83-84).
A consideration of basic Soviet economics will make Buick and 
Crum p's main mistake clear. Generally speaking, producer prices did not 
reflect considerations of monetary (rouble) profit; and in any case, the main 
indicator was hardly ever rouble profit but almost always gross output. It 
might be argued with reference to the above extract from Buick and Crump 
that the process of extracting surplus value was therefore inefficient, since 
rouble prices simply did not adequately take into account the law of value. 
But the reality was that prices, not being determined principally by the drive 
for maximum rouble profit, did not reflect the law of value in any significant 
way: instead, they reflected "the preference of the centre or whoever [had] 
m ost control in fixing the price at any one time." Moreover, "changes in 
price in the producer goods sector [had] only secondary effects, since the 
physical target [was] all important." (Ticktin 1976, p.26). In other words.
________________________________
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rouble price did not play an important mediating role in the producer goods 
sector: neither its formation, nor its effects, were at all determ inant in 
decisions as to production, distribution or consumption.
In making this point, Ticktin speaks of the need to analyse "the 
blend of force, administration, self-interest and price." (p.27). Rather than 
taking this approach, Buick and Crump do not begin with empirical reality: 
instead, their argument concerning the 'state capitalist market' seems to be 
that since the USSR is capitalist, prices 'm ust' reflect value. They display an 
over-eagerness to compare the USSR to the countries ru led by the 
bourgeoisie, and consequently arrive at a faulty conclusion.
1.4 W ildt's Theory
In some ways W ildt's theory can likewise be placed within a political area 
quite close to that of council communism. Having as his main aim the 
unification of a political theory of totalitarianism with a political-economic 
theory of 'state capitalism,' he cites with approval the council communist 
insistence on the "counter-revolutionary historical function of Bolshevism" 
and the "transformation of capitalism as a whole promoted by fascism and 
Stalinism." (1979, p.45-47; see also pp37-38). After outlining an original 
framework for an understanding of 'state capitalism,' he then attempts to 
make use of that framework in the development of a non-liberal theory of 
totalitarianism.
It is W ildt's overall approach to Soviet 'state capitalism' which is 
relevant here. Wildt may not study the Soviet economy in any great depth.
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but even so his work is useful in that he describes explicitly a certain critical 
attitude towards the applicability of Marx's categories.
It is argued that one can speak of capitalism only in a m arket 
econom y, i.e. an econom y w ith a division of labor and  
independently producing economic units that relate to one another 
through com petition in the marketplace.... Of course, Marx 
occasionally says that market competition is a necessary condition 
for 'capital.' But Marx's and Engels's discussions of the abolition of 
'private production' or of 'capital as private p ro p e r t /  in stock 
companies, trusts, and cooperative factories, are not entirely 
applicable, since these forms of organization, as well as partial 
nationalization, government contracts, etc., do not abolish the 
m arket economy. If m arket competition were to be part of the 
definition of capitalism, it is unlikely that Marx was really all that 
concerned with distinguishing the 'inner nature' of capitalism from 
these phenomena, (p.43).
The translation here could doubtless be improved, but W ildf s point is that if
Marx had seen the market economy as the one capitalist economic form
which underlay all the others, he surely would have said so more often
when actually analysing them.
In itself, such an abstract assertion is not very interesting, since even 
taken as a whole Marx's work is evidently incapable of providing all that is 
needed for a theoretical critique of modern capitalism either w ithin the USSR 
or without. Capitalist forms continue to develop historically: history does 
not stop. But that is something of which Wildt is not unaware, as his next 
point shows. He writes as follows:
As for the system atic description of capital, a dialectical 
'development' can be interpreted so radically that in the course of 
developm ent the categories w ith which the description begins 
[commodities and money] are not just critically relativized, specific, 
and completed, but abolished, (pp.43-44).
Above all, he puts the emphasis on the most fundam ental definition of
capital itself: namely, as "a disjointed movement of the self-exploitation of
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that Marx presents money and the commodity in Capital. Wildt, however, 
fails to consider in any concrete fashion the form which Soviet capital's 
disjointedness may actually have taken. The only non-market form which he
value." ('Self-expansion' might be a better translation). In W ildt's reading of IMarx,
disjointedness and self-exploitation are m ore central...than 
commodity and money, and are followed by the definitions of the 
'domination of reified labor over living labor'.... Accordingly, what 
is decisive for capitalism is not that the products of labor take the 
form of commodities, but the structural pressure for accumulation, 
which is realized through the exploitation of the commodity 'labor 
power.' Whether this compulsion for accumulation is the result of 
market competition or otherwise is secondary, (p.44).
There are m any things wrong with this view. For instance, it is 
impossible to sustain a concept of value in the absence of a concept of 
exchange-value; and goods which possess an exchange-value are by 
definition commodities. Second, Wildt does not define w hat it was that 
Soviet workers were paid in return for selling their labour-power which was 
non-monetary in nature. (In the conventional view, of course, wage-labour 
is by definition bought with money). Third, one might add that whatever a 
commodity is exchanged for, even if that commodity is labour-power, m ust 
surely itself be a commodity. Wildt's concepts of value without commodities 
and of wage-labour without money are prima facie insupportable, and at any 
rate are very poorly-founded.
As will become clear in Chapter 3, however, the m ost useful 
critique one can make is that the concept of 'disjointedness' is left 
completely undeveloped. If capital is defined as disjointed, then one m ust be 
able to define further at least two functional elements w ithin it whose 
interrelation is disjointed in nature. It is, indeed, precisely as such elements
:
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does present, namely the totalitarian state machine, remains not only 
singular and 'undisjointed,' bu t also essentially political rather than 
political-economic, (pp.55-57).
It m ust be acknow ledged that W ildt show s courage and 
im agination in daring to develop M arx's conception 'beyond M arx.' 
However, his argument that capitalism exists in the USSR remains at bottom 
that of the SPGB: namely, that capitalism reigns w herever there is a 
"structural pressure for accumulation.-.realized through the exploitation of 
the commodity 'labour-power'." (p.44) His originality lies in the view that 
this is so even w hen other commodities and m oney are absent. 
Unfortunately, though, since he offers no alternative definition of capital to 
M arx's formula M-C-M^ his use of the term 'capitalism' actually explains 
very little.
1.5 The Johnson-Forest Tendency's Theory
Another view of Soviet 'state capitalism' was pu t forward by James and 
Dunayevskaya, who lent their respective pseudonyms of J. R. Johnson and 
F. Forest to a tendency which emerged within American Trotskyism in 1941 
and lasted for ten years."'® Although later to follow widely divergent 
trajectories, they would both always keep to the original 'state capitalist' 
view upon whose development they cooperated.
The tendency's main theoretical work on the USSR was published 
by Dunayevskaya in the form of two series of articles appearing between 
1942 and 1947. In the first series, she describes two phenomena in particular: 
first, the significant growth of Department One (means of production)
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relative to Departm ent Two (means of consumption); and second, the 
related fall in working class living-standards since the start of the first Five 
Year Plan in 1928. (1942-43, pp.329 and 18). At this time, Dunayevskaya does 
not present these two factors as adequate proof of the continued operation 
of the law of value, but later she not only does this, but she also asserts quite 
incorrectly that she has already done so in the earlier work. (1946-47^7^ 
p.313). Since, however, it is quite easy to draw up models of non-capitalist 
societies where these factors are also present — as they are, for example, in 
the model 'bureaucratic collectivisms' of Shachtman (1940-61) and Rizzi 
(1939) — Dunayevskaya undoubtedly stands on very weak ground, A more 
precise application of Marx's method would show that before theorising the 
'law of value' one must first show the existence of value itself (and its form, 
exchangeability), rather than just its effects. (See Marx 1859,1867).
In comparison, Dunayevskaya's more specific w ork on the 
mechanics of value accumulation is considerably stronger. If a t first she 
simply describes the turnover tax and the official profit motive as being 
accumulation's two 'handm aiden' (1942-43, p.l9), in the second series she 
concentrates much more usefully upon the various categories which Marx 
saw as necessary ingredients of capitalism. Taking first of all the category of 
profit, she begins by dealing with the official Soviet position that the USSR is 
not capitalist because there is no systemic equalisation of the profit-rate. 
Ostensibly, "capital does not migrate where it is most profitable, but where 
the state directs it," Dunayevskaya demolishes this argument by explaining 
that profit does not at all
have the same meaning in Russia as it does in classical capitalism.
The light industries show greater profit not because of the greater
productivity of labor, but because of the state-imposed turn-over
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tax which gives an entirely fictitious 'profit' to that industry. In 
reality, it is merely the medium through which the state, not the 
industry, siphons off anything 'extra' it gave the worker by means 
of wages. It could not do the same things through the channel of 
heavy industry because the workers do not eat its products. That is 
why this 'profit' attracts neither capital nor the individual agents of 
capital.
She continues:
Precisely because the words, profit and loss, have assum ed a 
different m eaning, the individual agents of capital do not go to the 
most 'profitable' enterprises, even as capital itself does not. For the 
very same reason that the opposite was characteristic of classic 
capitalism: The individual agent's share of surplus value is greater 
in heavy industry. The salary of the director of a billion-dollar trust 
depends, not on whether the trust shows a profit or not, bu t 
basically upon the m agnitude of the capital that he manages. 
(1946-47, p.314).
W hat 'state capitalism ' has changed, in this view, is the "m ode of 
appropriation" by the agents of capital of their respective shares of the 
global surplus value. Dunayevskaya points out that at no time in the history 
of capitalism has the agent of capital realised directly the surplus value 
extracted in his particular factory: instead, he has only participated in the 
distribution of surplus value
to the extent that his individual capital was able to exert pressure 
on this aggregate capital. This pressure in Russia is exerted, not 
through competition, but state planning. (p.314).
W hat is impressive here is that Dunayevskaya does not try  to 
defend the view that what the Soviet State says is 'profit' actually is profit. 
She prefers instead to undertake a functional analysis of the cycle of capital 
accumulation as it really takes place, regardless of what things are called. In 
doing so, she finds that rouble profit can qualify only as 'profit,' or 'fictitious 
profit,' and that the mechanism of distribution of surplus value is quite
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distinct from that which operates under classical capitalism. These are 
highly significant theoretical achievements.
Unfortunately, though, Dunayevskaya does not provide adequate 
answers to the questions her work raises. First and foremost, if rouble profit 
is only 'profit,' then what form does profit, w ithout the inverted commas, 
actually take? Second, in what way do individual capitals exert pressure on 
aggregate capital? Since the very idea of pressure by parts upon the whole 
implies some sort of competition, the view that such pressure is exerted by 
means of state planning would appear to represent a mere reinterpetation of 
the official position.
A similar criticism can also be made of Dunayevskaya's discussion 
of Soviet money, which she sees as the means through which prices and 
wages are equated in the supply and dem and for consum ption goods. 
(p.315). In Departm ent Two at least, as long as profit is interpreted as 
m eaning 'm ore m oney' — and Dunayevskaya does not reject this 
conventional interpretation — there w ould seem to be no reason to 
distinguish between profit and 'profit' so long as a similar distinction is not 
draw n betw een money and 'm oney.' In other w ords, if m oney is 
unam biguous, then profit should be so too. To p u t the same poin t 
differently: if profit is not w hat it seems, then nor is money. Admittedly, 
Dunayevskaya considers money only in the context of consumer goods, but 
rather than providing a defence this in fact only makes the inadequacy of 
her consideration of money more apparent. It was, of course, crucial to 
Marx's critique of capitalist political economy that money be understood to 
be divided between the two Departments. (1885, pp.474-78).
.5
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Despite these weaknesses, however, the Johnson-Forest Tendency 
undoubtedly deserves credit for endeavouring to nuance its theory of state 
capitalism with a consideration of the empirically operative reality of some 
of the basic capitalist categories. It can only be regretted, therefore, that in 
considering the nature of Soviet capitalism in a subsequent book on 'state 
cap ita lism ' James focuses m erely on the tendency tow ards the 
personification of capital by bureaucrats, and on the intensified exploitation 
of the workers (1950); and fails even to reiterate, let alone make more 
profound, the points derived earlier from the application of a 'categorial ' 
approach . The sim ilarly  d isappo in ting  work later p u b lished  by 
Dunayevskaya as a 'M arxist-Humanist' philosopher (1958, chap. 13), in 
which she largely restricts her attention to a recounting of nuts-and-bolts 
data about purges, camps, and Stakhanovism, demonstrates that neither of 
the Tendency's leaders was able to break the theoretical impasse any more 
than the other.
1.6 M unis's Theory"'®
Emerging from Trotskyism around the same time. Munis takes similar care 
to consider the USSR in terms of some of the categories presented by Marx 
in Volumes 1 and 2 of Capital In his case, though, the categories understood 
to be the most crucial are not profit and money, but rather the various 
portions of the overall social product.
According to Marx, of course, the social product under capitalism 
can be divided into three parts: constant capital c, variable capital v, and 
surplus value s. (See for example Marx 1867). These specifically capitalist
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forms can be expressed in relation to more general terms, applicable not 
only to capitalism but to any society which produces in excess of the 
immediate needs of the producers. Thus constant capital is simply the form 
taken under capitalism by the material means of production, both fixed and 
circulating; variable capital is the capitalist form of the portion of the 
product which meets the socially-determined consumption needs of the 
producers; and surplus value is the capitalist form of the surplus product. 
M unis's argum ent is that in the USSR each of these portions takes a 
recognisably capitalist form, hence so does the mode of production.
Munis makes this argum ent by first offering a model of 'planning', 
which he seems to see as an adequate definition of communism. (1946, p.l5). 
Using c, V,  and s somewhat confusingly to denote the more general terms, he 
then argues that whereas under capitalism surplus value is appropriated by 
and in the interests of a specific social stratum {catégorie), which then splits it 
into investm ent and consum ption portions, in a planned society the 
capitalisation [sic] of $ is now governed solely by the needs of consumption 
(that is, by v). If on one hand the surplus now passes wholly and directly 
into new means of production, and is no longer split into two parts, on the 
other hand the very expansion of the means of production is itself directed 
solely towards the enlargement of consumption. "The fulcrum of [the] c-v-s 
[relation] passes fully from s to u." (p.l6).^®
Munis then assumes that in the years following 1917 Soviet Russia 
was "in the first stage of the society of transition." He admits that some 
strata still benefited from surplus value, even if the only example he gives is 
that of the non-party technicians. But since, in his view, "u, the working 
population, was in possession of the instruments of labour, and disposed of
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the distribution of s,” the state of affairs was qualitatively wholly different 
from the "systematic exploitation of surplus value practised by the Stalinist 
bureaucracy." (p.l8; see also Munis 1975, chap. 1).
Under Stalinism, s is not in the hands of "society"; it is in the hands 
of a particular stratum  or category. In short, s is once again the fulcrum of 
production . In line w ith the establishm ent of dom ination  by  the 
bureaucracy, the surplus adopts anew its former character as surplus value. 
Looking then at the actual material composition of s, M unis focuses 
especially on military production and the luxury consumption of the elite 
"privileged caste." Military production he sees as especially im portant, 
given that it occurs only in the interests of the bureaucracy, insofar as the 
latter does not seek 'w orld revolution.' Meanwhile, w hilst it m ight be 
possible to imagine that all of s could be ploughed into c even in a 'society of 
transition,' one could not conceive of the development of production in such 
a society perm itting the uninterrupted growth of c for 10 or 20 years 
w ithout a consequent growth in the consumption of v. (1946, pp.18-19). In 
actual fact, the intelligentsia's living-standards have soared as those of the 
working class have plummeted.
It would perhaps be too easy to criticise M unis's view of Soviet 
conditions following 1917. Thus he conceptualises surplus value w ithout 
capitalism; assumes without argument that production occurred for a time 
on the basis of a "society of transition"; inadequately nuances the term 
'bureaucracy'; draws the figure of 10-20 years seemingly out of thin air; and 
remains implicitly burdened with the insupportable Trotskyist view that the 
adoption in 1925 of the ideology of 'socialism in one country' constituted a 
major turning-point.^^ At the same time, however, he does effectively show
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w hat he is principally aiming to show: namely, that the fulcrum of social 
production in the USSR is the extraction of a surplus $; and that controlling 
the extraction and reinvestment of s there stands a particular social group 
which exploits the workers.
The point is that this is not enough to prove the existence of surplus 
value. As Marx was well aware, surplus labour (and hence the surplus 
product) "has an antagonistic form" just as m uch in the slave system as in 
capitalism. There too, its "obverse side is pure idleness on the part of one 
section of society." (1894, p.958). The rulers of capitalism do, of course, 
unlike the Pharoahs, dictate the systematic expansion of production, rather 
than simply consuming or squandering the surplus they appropriate. But it 
is quite possible in principle to imagine modernised slave-owners doing the 
same. Unfortunately for Munis, for the surplus product to take the form of 
surplus value there m ust be more than the predominance, in the absence of 
'transitionality ,' of expanded reproduction w herein a portion of $ is 
necessarily reinvested into c under the control of a specific group. This is 
because it is impossible to grasp the essence of the category of surplus value 
w ithou t reference to the category of value, w hich in capitalism  is 
inextricably bound up with that of wage-labour, and at any rate depends on 
the generalisation of the relation of exchange-value. (See Marx 1867, parts 
3-5, and Rubin 1928). It is difficult to see how exchange value might operate 
if, as Munis claims, the ruling stratum "dictates wages and prices outside of 
all competition." (1975, p.28).22 M unis's insistence that the USSR is not 
transitional to socialism, which m ight be deem ed self-evident, is no 
compensation for the inadequacy of his attem pt to demonstrate that it is 
capitalist while eschewing any reference to these categories.
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1.7 Cliff's Theory23
Sharing the view held by the other Leninist former Trotskyists that w hat is 
usually known as the 'October revolution' of the Bolsheviks led to the 
formation of a "workers' state under Lenin and Trotsky (1917-23)/' which 
was defeated in the later 1920s by means of a gradual counterrevolution 
(1955, p.l81). Cliff differs w ith them by holding that viewed in isolation 
from world capitalism the USSR knew no real exchange of commodities.
His first argument is that this is so because "the ownership of all the 
enterprises is vested in one body, the state"; his second, given in the 
following paragraph, begins with the "direct connection betw een the 
enterprises through the medium of the state," which "controls production in 
nearly all of them," and posits this as a basis from which to conclude that 
prices no longer have the "unique significance of being the expression of the 
social character of labour." (p.203). One is thus left confused as to why 
exactly Soviet goods were not commodities: is the reason to do w ith  
ownership, or is it derived from control? And if control is the key, then it 
hardly makes sense for Cliff to refer in the same section to the "almost 
complete plan of the division of the total labour time," w hen earlier he has 
denied that planning exists at all,
[if] by the term 'planned economy' we understand an economy in 
which all component elements are adjusted and regulated into a 
single rhy thm ,... [and] in which foresight prevails in the making of 
economic decisions" (p.83).
W hen denouncing "bureaucratic mismanagement" (p.83) Cliff focuses on
the absence of planning, but when dealing with deeper issues of the Ï
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"Russian economy and the Marxian law of value" he falls back on the legal 
category of state ownership and the unelaborated one of "regulation" (p.205) 
by governm ent rather than through the price system. In the process, he 
omits to bring into his discussion whatever existed in the USSR in place of 
planning.
From such a fragmented and confused discussion Cliff moves on to 
state (p.206) that "there is one thing in Russia that appears on the surface to 
fulfil the requirements of a commodity: labour-power," before describing 
how this is an illusion, since there is only one employer: the State. Once 
again, an im portant question, namely that concerning the existence or 
non-existence of wage-labour, is answ ered w ithout reference to the 
contradictions within a system that is not planning but which is still a form 
of control over the extraction of the surplus product, namely, over labour. 
Such matters appear in Cliffs argument only to show up the inefficiencies of 
Stalinist "mismanagement."
Cliff is forced to conclude — or rather, assert — that "the division of 
labour is planned," but that it would nonetheless be "absolutely arbitrary" if 
"Russia" had  not had to compete w ith other countries, (p.209). This 
competition was primarily military, but military use-values, "while being an 
end, still remain a means," serving the end of victory in the competition. 
(p.211). He then argues that production in "traditional" capitalist countries 
has also become determ ined by the production of m ilitary use-values. 
Relations of exchange between arms manufacturers and governments have 
become "purely formal," since the "state does not offer another commodity 
in exchange for arms." (p.212), (Why such countries are still capitalist is not 
explained). In other words, there are use-values and there is competition.
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but the basis of capitalist economy is no longer com m odity exchange: 
instead, there is the arms race.24 Rather than conceiving of the arms race as a 
product of capitalist contradictions, we are asked to agree that it is the arms 
race which makes the society capitalist. One can only wonder as to the type 
of contortions Cliff m ight have got into if Soviet m ilitary competition had 
been w ith China alone!
C liffs position appears untenable when it is rem em bered that 
whatever capitalism may or may not entail, what it is is a society, defined by 
a certain type of social production relations. If the USSR was capitalist 
simply because it produced weaponry to compete with those countries that 
themselves would have been capitalist even without such competition, then 
one might as well say the same about tribes whose production is directed to 
the provision of tomahawks in the fight against colonialism.^® By arguing 
purely from the existence of an arms race. Cliff is forced to take the view 
(pp. 159-61) that "state capitalism" was "a partial negation of capitalism," or, 
in other w ords, although he never says so explicitly, the USSR w as 
somehow less capitalist than the West.2® His term "state capitalist" m ight 
just as well be replaced by "not-quite-so capitalist." Since he has a minimal 
grasp of the categories by means of which capital can be defined, his work is 
of little use to investigators of the 'really-existing' society and class struggle 
of the USSR.
1.8 Bettelheim 's Theory
Bettelheim's 'state capitalist' thesis is in some ways at the other end of the 
Leninist spectrum  from Cliff's. Rather than focusing on international I
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relations, he grounds his argument (1970, p.85) on the existence of a 'double 
separation': of the workers from the means of production, and of the 
en terp rises from  each other. G iven the cap ita list n a tu re  of the 
enterprise-form, he argues, there m ust be a continuous struggle in the 
'transition period' to 'revolutionise' the enterprises in the sense of working 
to abolish them. W ithout this struggle — which for Bettelheim means 
w ithout the necessary type of ruling party and 'ideological revolution' [sic] 
— the 'representatives' of the workers, the state and the party come to 
identify themselves with enterprise managers rather than w ith the workers; 
and the 'plan,' instead of exercising a dominance over the enterprise-form, 
becomes an "instrum ent of the 'duplication' of commodity relations." 
(pp .89-93).27 Ultimately, then, for Bettelheim the ruling party  was not 
adequately ideologically correct and representative of the 'masses': as a 
consequence, the separation between enterprises came into its own and 
capitalism was re-established.
In a slightly later work (1971, p.59) he argues that the existence of 
wages — upon which he does not elaborate — com bined w ith the 
separation between the State and the masses, m eant that Soviet workers 
suffered both capitalist production relations and the rule of a state 
bourgeoisie. The State's 'separation' from the masses he blames on the 
absence of a ruling party with a 'proletarian character' and a 'mass line,' a 
party embodying a 'proletarian ideology.' (p.64). His Maoist prioritisation of 
'politics' is self-evident. Since Bettelheim always assumes that throughout 
the Stalin era the USSR was 'transitional' between capitalism and 'socialism', 
for him  the workers only began to be exploited after Stalin's death. This 
conclusion is remarkably unconvincing.
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Bettelheim's theory fails for two reasons. First, despite his useful 
insistence on the 'double separation,' his argument for the capitalist nature 
of the Soviet economy ultimately depends on an identification of capitalist 
commodity relations with the market; with competition and assessment in 
terms of currency; and more specifically with the disposal of enterprises by 
their possessors so as to gain similarly expressible profits. (For an opposing 
view, see Chapter 3 below). Second, he imagines that such a system was 
predom inant in the USSR. In other words, he vastly overestim ates the 
autonom y of the enterprises, and takes almost at face-value the official 
propaganda about the role of rouble levers, price formation and 'profit' 
targets. (For this he is adequately criticised elsewhere [Ticktin 1976]). He 
fails to tackle the nature of bureaucratic dependence as a fundam ental 
characteristic of the system. He is therefore unable to get to the roots of 
capitalist competition in its bureaucratic form. In his case the reason for this 
appears to be prim arily political: rather than analysing the nature of 
bureaucratic relations as they were established under Lenin and Stalin — 
indeed, with influences which go back further still — he concentrates above 
all on the post-Stalin period and fails to draw  a distinction betw een 
'capitalist restoration' and w hat was 'merely' a process of liberal reform.
Later work from the same theoretical viewpoint has been carried 
out by Chavance, whose main originality lies in his attem pt to develop a 
deeper view of the contradictoriness of Soviet price formation. He thus 
writes (1980, p .193) that since full and effective price-setting by the State 
would necessitate that the planning authorities be informed of the realisable 
values of each unit of production, it m ust be impossible in practice. It 
follows that there m ust be some kind of unplanned compensation for the
î
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1.9 Sapiï's Theory
deviation of prices from values. This acknowledgement, however, allows 
Chavance to supersede Bettelheim's analysis only superficially, for it does 
not lead him to go beyond the letter's original assum ption that purchase 
cost and price are one and the same thing.28 In fact, all he means to point out 
is that the sum  of prices is necessarily equivalent to the sum  of values, from 
which it follows that prices which are less than values are balanced out by 
those which are greater. (1980, pp .191-96; see also 1989, pp.67-77). This is 
hardly a theoretical breakthrough. Like Bettelheim, Chavance bases his 
analysis prim arily on a critique of the written 'political economy' of the 
Soviet authorities (that is, their ideology), and hence he necessarily fails to 
deal with the concrete forms which this 'compensation' takes. He has no 
concept either of hlat or of capitalist bureaucracy.
I
Another theorist influenced by Bettelheim is Sapir. If Chavance is vaguer 
than Bettelheim concerning the beginning of capitalist dom inance in the 
USSR, Sapir is willing to suggest, albeit without argument, that it was first 
established during the rise of Stalin in the mid-1920s. (1980, pp.20-21 and 
31-32).
At this time, however, he uses the term 'state capitalism ' as little 
m ore than a label, and is most intent on arguing that the USSR and its 
satellites are heading for a severe economic crisis. (1980). His view of such a 
crisis is straightforward: it is a product of the economic system's structural 
problem s in coping with the changes required to move from a period of 
extensive accumulation to one of intensive accumulation, (pp. 64-65 and
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284). But although he is evidently thinking about the accumulation of the 
productive forces in the form of capital, the attention he gives to the term  
'capital' is minimal.
More recently Sapir has developed concepts of the USSR which owe 
m uch to the French 'regulation school.'^® He begins by analysing the 
economic effects of mobilisation in both Germany and Russia during the first 
w orld war, pointing to constants such as the central fixing of prices, the 
receipt of profits according to the volum e of production, and  the 
de-emphasis on the production of consumer goods. In Russia these effects 
were largely overseen by the War Industries Committees set up  by the 
employers in 1915, Similar developments were later instituted by the new  
government during the civil war, and then by the ruling faction led by Stalin 
which imposed warlike conditions at the end of the 1920s. (1990, pp.23-33).
Sapir proceeds to develop his concepts. In his current view, then, 
whenever mobilisation is limited in scale it produces 'negative feedback': it 
appears as a deviation from the usual system. But when it leads as far as a 
full-scale war economy, it produces instead 'positive feedback.' It itself 
becomes the system. When it is further generalised under Stalinism to the 
whole of industry "with the aim of inducing a radical tranformation in the 
country 's mode of growth," what results is a fully mobilised economy of 
which the war economy was a mere prototype. (pp,36-39).
This mobilised economy is still a commodity economy, bu t it is not 
a 'commercial' economy, since "the validation of production is no longer 
effected through the sale (or non-sale) of the goods concerned."
As a constraint, this validation no longer rests directly upon the 
producer, [ie, upon the enterprise directors—NCF]. It is the organism 
which replaces the commercial system which also, at the end of
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each period, notices that such-and-such products have rem ained 
unused and such-and-such demands unmet. For this organism, this 
translates into a need for finance (which it reports to the fiscal 
agency); for the economy, it translates into a disequilibrium  
between supply and demand. The constraint is still present, but 
operates a t the level of the society as a whole, (p.39).
The "principle of non-commerciality" is systematised.
Sapir discusses his underlying reasons for ascribing a capitalist 
nature to the Soviet 'mobilised economy' in the following terms:
[To reach a definition of capitalism  w hich is analytically  
operational,] it would be perfectly conceivable to work from the 
apparent functioning of economies which are already w idely 
known to be capitalist.,.. Criteria such as the nature of property or 
the forms of adjustment, or the existence of unem ploym ent or a 
stockmarket, are quite admissible. W ith such a definition, though, 
we should see the num ber of capitalist economies wither away 
miserably. A nd why not? But it would then be necessary to invent 
new systems, with their own laws, to account for all the economies 
which had thereby become non-capitalist. (p.20).
Although it would, of course, be possible to do precisely this, perhaps
leaving the definitions of some of the 'other systems' to other scholars, Sapir
proceeds to write that
we therefore need a definition which will allow us to distinguish 
between, on one hand, the logic of a system, and on the other, those 
forms which stem from the specificities constituting each society's 
individuality , or from procedural conditions confined to a 
particular historical period. (p.21).®®
In fact, though, as Sapir readily avers, the definition he chooses remains that ;
of Bettelheim. Since there is a labour market, there is wage-labour;®^ and
since roubles play an important role in the economy and the ideology of
planning does no t quite correspond to reality, there is a commodity
economy, (pp.14-17). The workers are separated from the m eans of
production, and the enterprises are separated from each other. (Sapir 1989,
p.lO).
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The insufficiency of these points as an explanation of the basis of 
capitalism  is evidenced by Sapir's discussion of the form w hich the 
'non-commercial' system actually takes. He thus explains that in the USSR 
there are theoretically two money circuits. On one hand, there is 'scriptural 
money' (credit instruments or scrip), which circulates among enterprises; on 
the other, there is 'fiduciary money' (paper money or current deposits in fiat 
form). W hereas the first kind is merely a passive means of account, the 
second is active and also functions as a means of exchange and a store of 
value. Households have access only to the second type. In practice, the two 
types are not 'w atertight,' since every purchase by an enterprise creates 
some fiduciary m oney and every sale destroys some. It is therefore 
impossible to distinguish between roubles destined to stay 'scriptural' and 
roubles destined to become active. (1990, pp.78-79).
It is noticeable here that Sapir theorises neither capital, nor m oney 
as a form of capital. He points out instead that, since the USSR is not just one 
large enterprise, both goods and labour-power must be bought locally. They 
m ust also be sold, which implies money as a means of account, a means of 
exchange, and a store of value. (p.l9). This may indeed be the case, bu t there 
is no identification here of the existence of what Marx saw as m oney in its 
capitalist form: namely, money as the "absolute form of existence of exchange 
value"; as the general representative of wealth which takes the form  of 
exchange value (1867, p.234, and 1939, pp.203-12; see also Rosdolsky 1968, 
chap.8); and crucially, as the form in which value m ust appear if it is to 
accrue a surplus. (Marx 1867, pp.247-69). Bereft of concepts of value and 
surplus value, Sapir writes of money as a "store of value" w hen w hat he 
really means is a means of deferred payment, or a hoard.
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One should certainly respect his efforts to employ concepts which 
explain capitalist functioning in the USSR while not detracting from its 
specificity. But his western-style model of 'firms and households' hardly 
lends itself to being applied to those Soviet enterprises which supply only 
producer goods to the State. (From a Marxist point of view  it m ight be 
added, of course, that the model fails to explain the functioning of 'classical' 
free-market capitalism too).®® When the terms 'supply' and 'dem and' are 
applied in a critique of capitalist political economy, they should not be 
equated with 'production' and 'perceived requirem ent : they relate directly 
to the role of active money as the basis of the capitalist system. It is not 
enough simply to show that not all 'passive m oney' stays passive. His 
distinction between scrip and fiat money is intelligent, bu t he makes no 
attem pt to theorise any over-arching form; and as a result he fails to explain 
how and w hy it is that the Soviet system has the pursuit of more money — 
that is, the drive for profit, for more capital — as its foundation. But this is 
precisely w hat has to be shown if the system is rightly to be called capitalist. 
(See Chapter 3 below).
Sapir's idea of capitalism appears as separate not only from any 
concepts of capital and value but also from any idea of m oney as the 
generalised representative of exchange-value. The purpose which it serves 
in his work is therefore limited. At the same time, concentrating as he does 
on rouble accounting he is unable to produce a sufficiently discerning 
analysis of the theoretical significance of other forms such as gross output 
targets and economic bureaucracy.
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2 'CAPITALISM' BUT NOT 'STATE CAPITALISM'
2.1 Gorter's Theory
The first theory of Soviet capitalism not to label Soviet Russia 'state 
capitalist' was defended by the Communist Workers' Party of Germany 
(KAPD)®® and the Fourth (Communist Workers') International (CWI).®'^ 
Espoused by the majority of the left communists of the early 1920s, it rested 
above all on the thesis of 'dual revolution.' Thus in the view p u t forward in 
the CWI's Manifesto, written by Gorter in 1921, not only did the Bolshevik 
ascendance to power depend on the peasantry as well as on the workers, but 
in fact two revolutions took place which could be distinguished one from 
the other. W hereas in the towns the revolution was 'socialist,' and the 
proletariat had taken the economy from the bourgeoisie, in the countryside 
the revolution was bourgeois and capitalist, since the peasants had become 
petty  landow ners en masse. It was "the bourgeoisie in the shape of the 
peasants" which now ran the economy. In the towns the change had been 
from capitalism to socialism; in the country, from feudalism to capitalism. 
(1921, p.l). The desires and interests of the peasants, who constituted the 
vast majority, came increasingly to dictate government economic policy in 
all areas, including industry  and trade. The culm ination w as the 
introduction of NEP in March 1921, under which grain requisitions were 
replaced by a tax in kind (and soon by a tax in money), m ost of light 
in d u stry  was denationalised , and private trade  and  sm all-scale 
m anufacturing were officially encouraged. In G orter's terms, capitalist 
wage-slavery was then 'reintroduced' in the towns, (p.7).®®
ï
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If G or ter stresses the actual conditions of exploitation under NEP, 
and correctly underlines as an im portant factor the capitalisation of 
agriculture, he unfortunately fails to provide a theory which could explain 
the exploitative conditions either of W ar Communism' (1918-21) or of the
Stalinist industrialisation period which came later. The reason for this is 
straightforward: while he criticises bureaucracy (pp.3-4), he neglects to 
consider either its origins or its role in the economy.
This major weakness in his critique is also apparent in a text he 
published in 1923. By this time he has updated the thesis of 'dual revolution' 
in favour of the view  that the 'Russian revolution' was of "double 
charac ter,"  p a rtly  p ro le ta r ia n  b u t "in m ost of its  fea tu res  
bourgeois-democratic." Even in the first period (1917-21) the m easures 
introduced by the Bolsheviks are now understood to have had "to a large 
extent, a bourgeois character." (1923, p.2). Gorter still describes the 
nationalisation of industry and some of the measures of 'War Communism' 
(1918-21) as being "proletarian  and communistic"; b u t now , having 
denounced the Bolshevik aims of national self-determination and peace with 
foreign capitalist powers as "bourgeois-capitalist," he explains how  "the 
bureaucratic despotism  of the leaders was also bourgeois-capitalist." He 
continues:
In leader-dictatorship lies the kernel of the bourgeois capitalist 
revolution....
The party dictatorship was in its origin bourgeois capitalist. It 
began through the power of the peasants, the non-proletarian class. 
A party dictatorship could overpower and lead the peasant class in 
Russia. A proletarian class dictatorship could not do this, for a 
dictatorship of the proletarian class will always aspire to pure 
Communism, (pp.4-6).^® 11
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Unfortunately, though, Gorter does not look too closely at the relationship 
between the party dictatorship and the urban workers prior to NEP; and 
fails to show exactly how a government based on the principles he describes 
— or, indeed, any governm ent ■— m ight be capable of in troducing  
communistic changes of any sort.^^ Ultimately, the only differences he 
points to between the conditions of "rising capitalism" (p.3) in Russia and 
Asia and the conditions of fully-established capitalism elsewhere are those 
which concern the peasantry. In the light of subsequent history, his failure to 
draw  a convincing theoretical connection between the force of the peasantry, 
supposedly determinant, and the specific authoritarianism of the Bolsheviks 
towards the workers can rightly be called glaring.
2.2 Castoriadis's Theory^Q
The first 'capitalist theorist to eschew any concept of 'state capitalism' but at 
the same time to theorise economic forms which were specifically Soviet 
was the libertarian scholar Castoriadis, who to an even greater extent than 
Ruble sees the USSR as the most administratively 'advanced' capitalist 
country. Where Ruble, however, focuses on the role of the State, Castoriadis 
stresses above all the role and contradictions of bureaucracy. In this view 
increasing bureaucratisation is a necessary tendency of m odern capitalism in 
general — indeed, it is capitalism's very essence. (1960-61, p.282). The USSR 
then appears as the country furthest along the bureaucratic path.
Although nowadays, of course, it is impossible to defend a view of 
the USSR or its successors as more capitalistically advanced than, for 
example, their creditor countries, nonetheless there remain in Castoriadis's
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theory two elements of great utility and significance. The first, which I shall 
discuss below in Chapter 6, is his insistence on the perm anent struggle 
waged by the Soviet workers against the bureaucracy. The second is his 
original understanding that not only do Soviet capitalist forms differ from 
free-market and 'monopolistic' forms, but they are also irreducible to forms 
such as state ownership or state control.
A major problem w ith Castoriadis's work, though, is that he never 
states precisely what elements have to be present in a country for it to be 
capitalist, so as then to show how  it is that the USSR fits all the 
requirements. Thus even though he discusses, in the context of imperialism, 
the differences between competitive capitalism, monopoly capitalism, and 
bureaucratic capitalism  (1954, pp.258-61), he does so w ithout actually 
defining the term 'capitalism' which figures in all three concepts.
In fact all we have in way of a demonstration that the USSR is 
capitalist is a collection of disparate statements scattered through a num ber 
of articles. First, it seems that for capitalism to exist there m ust also exist a 
class of proletarians. Clearly no-one doubts that such a condition is present 
in the USSR. Second, in Castoriadis's view, those who exploit the proletariat 
m ust control both production and accumulation. In the Soviet context he 
sees such exploiters as forming a 'bureaucratic class' exercising
sovereign control over how the total social product will be used. It 
does this first of all by determining how the total social product will 
be distributed among wages and surplus value (at the same time 
that it tries to dictate to the workers the lowest wages possible and 
to extract from them the greatest amount of labor possible), next by 
determining how this surplus value will be distributed between its 
own unproductive consumption and new investments, and finally 
by determining how these investments will be distributed among 
the various sectors of production. (1955,293-94).
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Unless, however, one's definition of 'm odern capitalism ' is a purely  
empirical one — such as 'whatever the capitalism of Marx's day has turned 
into' — Castoriadis's formulation remains unconvincing. Certainly in the 
USSR there do exist those who exploit the producers, control production, 
decide investment priorities, and try their utmost to determine and limit the 
share of the social product paid in wages; but if we bear in m ind that it is 
theoretically possible for a non-capitalist social form ation to replace 
capitalism for a time in one area or another (or indeed in the whole world), 
such exploitation does not a/itself necessarily imply capitalism. The key term 
in the piece cited is surplus value, and a sceptic would be perfectly justified in 
pointing out that Castoriadis gives neither a rigorous definition nor an 
explanation of why he holds such a form to exist in the USSR.
Castoriadis's confusion on the issue of value is all too evident. Thus 
even when he still self-identifies as Marxist, he fails to follow the concept of 
capitalism  back th rough  capital to value, despite the fact that an 
understanding of capital as self-expanding value is famously crucial to 
Marx's entire critique of political economy. (Marx 1867, chap. 6 and app.; see 
also Rubin 1928). Instead, the nearest he comes to focusing on the form of 
value — namely, exchangeability — is when he describes how  Soviet 
'planning' is 'as chaotic as the market.' This is so, he explains, not because 
the USSR is capitalist, but because it is bureaucratic. (1956, p.63). Conflict 
within the bureaucracy — Castoriadis declines to write 'competition' — is 
described not as something which actually makes the system work, on the 
basis that without competition there can be no exchangeability and hence no 
value, but merely as "a basic sociological given in a regime organized along 
the lines of a 'civil service.'" (p.63).
I
i
I
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The notion of 'bureaucratic capitalism' in Castoriadis's sense fails to 
satisfy. Thus even while asserting (p.76) that the Soviet 'regim e' was 
"sim ply another form of the capitalist system of rule in which the 
bureaucracy has taken the place of private employers/' Castoriadis writes in 
the very same text that the essence of 'bureaucratic planning/
like that of capitalist production [sic], lies in an effort to reduce the 
direct producers to the role of pure and simple executants of 
received orders, orders form ulated by a particular stratum  that 
pursues its own interests, (p.62).
From here it is only a short step to rejecting Marx's view of w hat constitutes
capitalism 's m ost fundam ental contradiction, namely that which exists
betw een the proletariat and capital. Neglecting to theorise the crucial
importance of value, exchangeability, and exchange, Castoriadis eventually
ends up replacing this contradiction with one which for Marxism is far less
'basic/ namely that which sets 'order-givers' against 'order-takers.' (1960-1,
pp.258-59; 1964, p.6). Theorising 'bureaucratic capitalism' in relation to the
capitalist 'fragmentation' which preceded it, he writes that
th is fragm enta tion  [i.e. the division of p ro d u c tio n  in to  
independently m anaged units] has nothing essentially capitalistic 
about it. From the point of view of the system itself, such an 
arrangem ent is just as absurd as the independent management of 
various workshops in a large factory would be. The logic of 
capitalism is to treat the whole of society as one immense, integrated 
enterprise [emphasis added]. Far from revealing the essence of the 
system, the problems it encounters as long as this integration has 
not been fully realized serve only to mask it. (1964, p.282).
By this time the concepts of exchange, value, and the adoption by things of a
comm odity form have vanished entirely. Denying that fragm entation
constitutes part of the basis of capitalism, and unable to postulate forms of
fragm entation other than that of independently m anaged enterprises.
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Castoriadis cannot back up his theory of Soviet capitalism  on M arxist 
grounds, and soon rejects Marxism explicitly. (1964,1964-65).
2.3 Bordiga's Theory^®
Bordiga too rejects the idea that the USSR was 'state capitalist,' and refers to 
it instead simply as 'capitalist.' In response to Stalin's Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR (1952) he argues that the system  of com m odity 
production — unlike in pre-capitalist societies when it was purely marginal
:— is not merely incompatible with socialism, but also inseparable from 
capitalism. (1952, pp .11-12). Thus when Stalin accepts that comm odity 
production exists in the USSR, he is in fact admitting the capitalist nature of 
the country over which he rules. Far from capitalism being absent because 
wage-labour is absent, on the contrary it is wage labour itself which m ust 
have led the mass of commodities to appear in the first place.
The major problem here is that in wanting to criticise Stalin's 
pam phlet Bordiga is led to accept the assertions which the former presents 
as fac ts/^  If there is no disagreement between the two m en as to the 
existence in the USSR of a 'system of commodity production,' m ore 
importantly there is no dispute as to the meaning of the term itself: both 
men use it solely to denote the production of things for sale on the m arket 
for roubles. M oreover, Bordiga accepts Stalin's false — or at least, 
irrelevantly legalistic — assertion that coUective-farm output belongs wholly 
to the collective farms (Stalin 1952, p. 19), whereas in fact com pulsory 
procurement remained in force, at least for part of production/^ Correctly 
pointing out that Soviet workers sell their labour-power in order to earn
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wages to buy goods, he then refers to the fact that they spend a greater 
proportion of their wages on agricultural products than that spent by their 
American counterparts/^  Hence, he argues, the USSR is further from 'full 
state capitalism' than the US, since in both countries it is industry rather 
than agriculture which falls under the greatest State control. If the strength 
of Bordiga's work lies in the emphasis he puts on the spread of capitalism 
and monetary economy throughout the countryside — and on the massive 
expansion of the proletariat in formerly pre-capitalist areas such as Central 
Asia (Bordiga 1952, p.27) — this example of his argumentation typifies his 
chronic over-concentration on agriculture, and on the collective farm in 
particular. In arguing from agriculture to the rest of the economy — as
opposed to focusing on control over labour, surplus product, and 
accum ulation — he follows Stalin in avoiding a real discussion of
I
bureaucracy. Since for Bordiga (1956-57, p.340) bureaucracy is wholly 
d e p en d e n t upon  "m onetary  accountability  and the com m odity  
budget-system ," it is of little interest as an empirical reality: far more 
im portant (p.324) are the successive "unstable and spineless forms of social 
kolkhozianism."^^
Problems follow when he looks at industry. Accepting that "the 
large enterprises belong to the State," he adds that
they are subject, however, to monetary accountability, and they 
have to show profitability in m oney terms — that is, a credit 
margin, a profit — if the law of value is to be respected as regards 
both raw m aterial prices and wages (outgoings, costs), and the 
prices of goods sent out (income). (p.40).
As I have pointed out above, though, this is incorrect: in fact, gross output 
targets were far more important than rouble profit targets. As Kontorovich 
has shown (1988), the first attempt to increase the significance of the latter.
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made in 1965 as one of the Kosygin reforms, failed dismally owing to a basic 
'organic' conflict with the 'efficiency' of the system, Bordiga's view that the 
"key to the entire system" is the accumulation of roubles by the State 
(1956-57, p,320), even when allied to an understanding of money as part of 
the capital cycle, points to a very weak grasp of Soviet economic reality.
Turning his attention to the process of investm ent, Bordiga is 
further led to draw a distinction between enterprises and the State in such a 
way as to avoid giving an adequate definition of the latter. Thus he asserts 
that
industrial enterprises have their own budget and carry out an 
internal investm ent — which figures in the plan bu t no t in the 
income and expenditure of the State as entrepreneur, operator and 
investor. (p.216).
R eading in official Soviet sources that a substantial p roportion  of 
construction work is farmed out to 'special organisations' by 'allocation of 
contracts,' Bordiga decides that since contracts can only occur betw een 
parties w ith different interests, the organisations receiving the contracts are 
not themselves part of the State bureaucracy. In such cases, the State itself 
lacks the 'courage' to be an 'economic operator,' and simply hands over 
money-capital to other organisations to distribute among the enterprises. 
This form of capital distribution Bordiga sees (pp.232-33) as expanding after 
the introduction of the sovmrkhozy reforms in 1957.
Whilst unlike Cliff he rightly points to the competition which is a 
necessary feature of a value-based society, Bordiga neglects to m ention the 
basic characteristics of the 'organisations' to which he refers. Directed by the 
appointees of Party committees, and not disposing of anything even 
approaching 'inalienable' rights over resources — either in term s of
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directors' individual rights or on a collective level — these organisations 
cannot seriously be considered as anything other than part of the State. 
Bordiga is clear that it is rather easy for them to get hold of funding — in 
other words, the part of the State which gives it to them does not usually 
control them in directly economic fashion — but fails to grasp that the 
bureaucratic bîat-nàden  considerations which do exist also govern the 
exchanges which take place lower down. He is simply mistaken to view 
such exchanges as primarily determined by considerations of rouble profit.
3 SUMMARY
It will be understood that a Marxist theory of Soviet capitalism can be 
argued successfully only if it is grounded very solidly in relation to one or 
other set of Marxian categories. In addition, one m ust then judge whether or 
not it explains empirical Soviet reality with sufficient accuracy. In order to 
construct a theory which meets both these criteria, I shall in the following 
chapter give much more rigorous definitions of various Marxian categories 
than I have been able to hint at above. In this chapter, however, I have tried 
negatively to contribute to the construction of an adequate theory by first 
scratching away at the weakest points of positions defended up to now by 
previous theorists. I shall now sum m arise the failings of the theories 
considered.
It is evident that some theories m ust be deemed to have fallen at the 
firs t hurdle, If Cliff's concentration on externalities involves an 
unemphasised but ultimately extremely weak redefinition of capitalism in
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tools for the analysis of Soviet political economy after the end of the 1920s.
--Î
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terms of use-values, Castoriadis's theory of bureaucracy — which has the 
merit of de-emphasising legal state ownership — similarly fails to give real 
weight to a characterisation of the mode of production in the USSR as 
capitalist. Both theorists avoid outlining precisely what is involved in capital, 
and thereby fail to come at all close to giving a coherent theoretical account 
of w hat it m ight m ean for the Soviet economy to be based upon  its 
accumulation,
Gorter and the early council communists, meanwhile, along with 
the SPGB, make use somewhat more insistently of Marxian categories such 
as those of profit and wages. But they do so in such a way as to avoid giving 
the necesssary consideration to the role of value, upon which Marx based his 
entire theory of capitalism. (See Marx 1867 chap.1-3,1939; and Rubin 1928). I 
feel that I have shown successfully how the lack of explanation they offer of 
this apparent theoretical weakness corresponds to an unrealistic desire to 
exaggerate the similarities between the USSR and the 'classical' capitalism of 
the free market.
Writing slightly later, the councilists admittedly lay greater stress 
on the economic role of the State, but even they fail to focus w ith sufficient 
clarity upon the actual value-related functioning of bureaucracy. Meanwhile 
Riihle, who theorises the difference between Stalinism and western forms in 
term s of an over-arching theory of a global tendency, som ew hat 
surprising ly  bases his analysis of the form er upon a concept of
'co-operation' w hich rem ains highly vague. Like the earlier council
. ■communists, these theorists too are unable to provide adequate theoretical
:
I
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Munis, on the other hand, does make a valiant attem pt to base his 
theory on a profound consideration of categories, but unfortunately he 
chooses the w rong set in that he shows only that the aim  of Soviet 
production is the accumulation of a surplus in the interests of the exploiters. 
He fails to show that the surplus takes a capitalist form (surplus value). 
M eanw hile Sapir, w ho is less in terested in the political-econom ic 
significance of the surplus in the first place, similarly fails to theorise either 
value or capital. His consideration of Soviet money rem ains theoretically 
unarmed.
D unayevskaya and  James point the way to a solution of the 
problem, by suggesting that profit must not automatically be reduced to 
w hat appears to be profit; but equally unfortunately they avoid developing 
the point. W ildt, meanwhile, attempts to cut through the forms of capital 
altogether, so as to get to its essence, but ends up with a concept of capital 
which is deprived of any nuance or substantial meaning.
Buick and Crum p give w hat is undoubtedly the m ost elegant 
presentation, in that they move from a category-based definition of 
capitalism to an elaboration of the concept of 'state capitalism' — bu t fall 
quite badly at the second hurdle, in that they wildly over-estimate the extent 
of rouble-based competition in the producer goods sector. Cruder examples 
of the same type of mistake appear in the works of Bettelheim, Chavance, 
and Bordiga. If Bettelheim's approach is based upon an ideology of the 
contradictions of 'transition,' like Bordiga's and Chavance's i t  depends 
chiefly upon an 'immanent' critique of Soviet official propaganda. Although 
self-consistent, these models remain far removed from reality.
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The various theories have been shown to share one overriding 
failing. That is this: in arguing that the Soviet social formation is capitalist, 
they do not dem onstrate the existence of capital as the dom inant 
political-economic category.
NOTES
1 If it is impossible to give a full bibliography here of all the texts 
wherein the USSR has ever been called capitalist, it is nonetheless 
w orth m entioning that in regard to the relations and m ode of 
p roduction  m any works give m ere descriptions or analytical 
rudiments, and cannot be said to contain fully-fledged theories. Bauer 
('Austro-M arxisf/social democrat) and Mattick (council communist), 
for example, even as they use they term 'state capitalist,' both also 
describe Soviet society as 'socialist': 'despotic socialist' and 'state 
socialist' respectively. (Bauer 1920; Mattick 1969, pp.251-53). This idea 
w ould seem completely insupportable in terms of the very Marxian 
categorial approach they seek to apply, and in the absence of a prior 
explanation of an alternative approach it can only mystify. Meanwhile 
Negri (Autonomist) redefines socialism, as opposed to communism, as 
a kind of planned capital accumulation structured according to forms 
of State coercion and amounting to a form of backward capitalism. But 
in a few brief sentences he does not refer to the USSR directly. Indeed 
he does little more than to call for a substantial analysis which w ould 
provide a "composite image of the development of die societies based 
on the exploitation of wage-labour" and suggest "various alternative 
shapes that this model may assume." (1986, p.180). He does not himself 
assume the task.
In the period after 1917 the term 'state capitalism' was applied to 
Soviet Russia by a num ber of writers both from Russian Menshevism 
and from orthodox social democracy abroad. As Jerome and Buick 
show, though (1967), the main reason that writers from  these two 
tendencies mention 'state capitalism' is that they see Russia as being 
too 'backward' for socialism. Not recognising the theoretical possibility 
of the existence of any modern large-scale society other than capitalism 
or socialism, they reason that since bureaucratic nationalisation could 
not bring  socialism, nor can it have abolished capitalism . The 
undemocratic nature of the political system is further cited as evidence 
that there is not even a 'transition' towards socialism. (Kautsky 1919, 
lugov 1929).
For the Mensheviks the term 'state capitalism' refers to little more 
than the State restrictions on 'private' capitalist enterprise, primarily 
under NEP. (lugov 1929, p.336; see also Brovkin 1987, p.79-86). Since it 
is not used to bolster any overall political-economic critique of 
capitalism, which is still taken to mean essentially the 'private sector/ 
the term 'state-restricted capitalism' might equally well be used. The 
subjective attitude corresponding to this view is as follows: whilst in 
the political sphere the M ensheviks denounce repression, in the 
economic sphere they level their criticisms merely at the limitations on
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capitalist freedom, not at capitalism itself. (See W olin 1974, and 
Brovkin 1987). Even the Menshevik left, which eventually joined the 
'Austro-Marxisf Bauer in seeing Stalin's economic reforms as generally 
positive, never breaks with this view. The various factions adopt 
different positions on the expansion of the economic role of the State 
after 1928, bu t there is w idespread agreement among them all that 
from then on capitalism exists only peripherally, if at all. (lugov 1929; 
and see Wolin 1974, pp .325-33).
The exception here is Xurevskii, w ho in an  em pirically  
wide-ranging critique insists on calling Soviet society 'state-capitalist.' 
(1932, pp.143-56). (It is w orth noting in parenthesis that I have been 
unable to discover his real identity, and my regarding him  as a 
Menshevik is based on circumstantial evidence alone). Referring not to 
the 'private sector' bu t to the systemically necessary "widest possible 
capital accumulation by the state" (p.l45), he then describes the 
operation of "primitive capitalist accumulation within a state-capitalist 
framework." But he explains his choice of the term 'capitalist' only in 
passing, simply by citing the severity of the exploitation of the workers 
and the State control of accumulation. (p.l45).
In 1919 the social democrat Kautsky also refers for a time to the 
existence in Soviet Russia of capitalism, which he sees as subject to an 
ongoing 'resuscitation.' Seeing the working class as necessarily 
unready and inadequately self-disciplined and intelligent to institute 
socialism, he describes how  the governm ent had  to becom e 
increasingly despotic in order to protect its position. This involved the 
perm itted growth of corrupt "private capitalism" and the m erger of 
State and capitalist bureaucracies into a single system . (1919, 
pp.201-02). "Industrial capitalism, from being a private system, has 
now become a State capitalism." (p.202). U nfortunately, though, 
Kautsky does not define the term 'state capitalism,' nor does he justify 
his view that capitalism temporarily left the picture.
In his book on Bolshevism in 1930 (q.v.) Kautsky no longer calls 
the USSR capitalist, and three years later he states specifically that "of 
course, capitalism has been destroyed." (1933, p.207). By this time he 
takes the view that Soviet society involved a new kind of exploitative 
and despotic "state econom y." This view was shared  by  the 
'Austro-Marxist' Hilferding. (1940).
A third political area within which various people used the term 
'state capitalism ' w ith reference to Soviet conditions was tha t of 
Bolshevism itself. Owing, though, to their social base and their support 
for the regim e and the party , neither Lenin (1918-23) nor the 
'constitutional' Bolshevik oppositionists who focused upon  'sta te  
capitalism' — namely the confusingly-named 'Left Communists' (1918)
CHAP.2 - NOTES 101
and the later 'Zinoviev' Opposition (1925-26) — merit consideration 
here. (See Introduction; on the politics of these groups, see Osinskii 
1918, Theses of the Left Communists 1918, and Zinoviev 1925; see also 
Daniels 1960, chaps. 3 and 11, and L'Insecurité Sociale 1982). As works 
by Schapiro (1955) and Daniels (1960) make clear, an oppositional 
attitude towards Bolshevik party rule as such was quite as absent for 
these factions as it was for the more numerous Bolshevik groupings 
w hich chose not to emphasise 'state capitalism,' such as the early 
Democratic Centralists (1919-20), the Workers' Opposition (1920-21), 
the Left O pposition (1923-24), the U nited (or Left) O pposition 
(1926-27), and  the Right Opposition (1928-29). (See Theses of the 
Democratic Centralists 1921, Kollontai 1921, Platform of the Forty-Six 1923, 
Platform of the Left Opposition 1927, and Bukharin 1928; see also Service 
1979).
This leaves us with a num ber of other factions which emerged 
within the Bolshevik party but which later broke with it, rejecting the 
Party of Lenin and Stalin to call for proletarian struggle against the 
system and against the Party itself. These factions evidently form a 
quite distinct fourth category. Perhaps best known is the W orkers' 
Group around Miasnikov, founded in 1921 by elements w ho rejected 
the W orkers' Opposition's support for the suppression of Kronstadt, 
and who were clandestine from the following year. Its manifesto, 
though, published in 1923, stops short of calling the country capitalist: 
it merely makes the suggestion that the NEP m ight in the future 
become "transform ed into the New Exploitation of the Proletariat/' 
(1923, p.48). Nonetheless, the Workers' Group seems to have had a 
strong connection, to say the very least, w ith  the G roup of 
Revolutionary Left-Wing Communists of Russia, a faction which 
founded the Communist Workers' Party of Russia in 1922 and rallied 
to the positions of the Communist Workers' International (CWI). (See 
W orkers' Dreadnought 1922a and 1922b.) The CWI emphatically did 
see Soviet Russia as capitalist, and I consider its positions in the main 
text below.
Another faction was the W orkers' Truth group inspired  by 
Bogdanov, which stated explicitly in its Appeal of 1922 that the NEP 
heralded the "rebirth of normal capitalistic relations," This group held 
tha t the State and  economic bureaucracy had  becom e a new  
bourgeoisie  stand ing  alongside the NEPm en. M oreover, the 
Com m unist Party  "has become the ruling party, the party  of the 
organisers and directors of the governmental apparatus and economic 
life." (1922, p. 148). But it did not take the theoretical critique of Soviet 
capitalism any deeper than that. Like the W orkers' Group, W orkers' 
Truth was destroyed by the security authorities in the aftermath of the 
strike wave of August 1923. (See Daniels 1960, p.210).
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Some of the Democratic Centralists, a group which was originally 
a very moderate and loyal' opposition very much to the right of the 
W orkers' Opposition, also eventually came round to a 'state capitalist' 
view. Their precise history is rather interesting. After calling in 1926 for 
the formation of a new party — a position which placed them far to the 
left of, say, Trotsky — in 1928 the group did not react to the first Five 
Year Plan in any consistent fashion. Many 'Decists' 'capitulated ' to 
Stalinism, while others responded in traditional Leninist language by 
referring to the transformation of the USSR into a "petty bourgeois 
State." (See Ciliga 1938-50, p.276). It seems that only later, in jail in the 
early 1930s, did various 'Decist' factions then m anage to reject 
Leninism altogether and criticise Soviet conditions comprehensively as 
'state capitalist.' V. Smirnov, for example, came to argue that Lenin had 
always been an "agent of the intelligentsia," and that the entire w orld 
was tending towards State capitalism under a ruling bureaucracy. (See 
Ciliga 1938-50, Book 3, chap. 9). But any documents written by the 
revolutionary prisoners who held such a position, or indeed by the 
uncompromising 'Miasnikovists' of the same time, have yet to come to 
light.
Anarchists have also adopted a 'state capitalist' position, and 
constitute a fifth group. Thus Berkman (1922, pp.29-32) writes of a 
mixture of 'private capitalism' and 'state capitalism,' even as he does 
little to develop a theory of the latter beyond pointing to the fact that 
the State oppresses the workers within the economic sphere as well as 
outside it. E. Goldman's work is even less theoretically useful. She may 
describe (1925) the despotic, exploitative, and  anti-socia list 
characteristics of Bolshevik rule, but her central notions rem ain the 
highly vague ones of the conflicting ideas of liberty and authority. 
Ultimately, neither Berkman nor Goldman add m uch that was not 
already present in their respective journals. (Berkman 1925, Goldman 
1931).
Those anarchists who were involved for longer and immersed in 
greater depth in the revolutionary movement in Russia have produced 
accounts which are more valuable and less impressionistic, but they 
too have omitted to give profound theoretical consideration to the 
nature  of Soviet society. M aksim ov provides a lengthy an d  
well-sourced account of the Bolshevik counterrevolution and terror, 
but writes of 'state capitalism' only in passing (1940, pp.62-63 and 329), 
in reference to Lenin's belief in its necessity. Colourfully bu t w ithout 
m ateria list explanation, he refers to the State as the "sole 
capitalist,...monarch,...teacher, landowner, policeman, philosopher, 
[and] priest" (pp.325-26). Voline, meanwhile, who undoubtedly has a 
m ore nuanced  view  of the p roduction  re la tio n s  of the 
post-counterrevolutionary period (1947, pp.353-408), also refers to 
'state capitalism.' (pp.389, 391, 402). Bound by the m istaken belief.
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though, that Soviet industrialisation is only a pretence (pp.402-05), he 
fails to relate the concept to the relations and contradictions of actual 
capitalist profit-making.
In the sense that they did not withdraw the term 'state capitalism' 
at the onset of Stalin 's 'G reat Leap Forw ard,' anarchists have 
undoubtedly proved loyal to it. On a theoretical level, though, 
anarchist writers on Soviet Russia have shown but two things: first, 
that just as in 'private capitalism' the workers remain exploited; and 
second, that the Soviet system of exploitation is completely opposed to 
revolutionary liberation. The term  'state capitalism' serves only to 
underline these basic insights, not to aid their development.
W orks by  Ciliga (independen t com m unist) and  D ebord  
(Situationist) also deserve mention. Ciliga's extremely well-observed 
revolutionary autobiography covering the years up to 1935 is critically 
very rich and not at all ideological (1938-50), despite his earlier support 
for Bolshevism, but does not offer itself as a profound work of theory. 
Debord's magnum opus, on the other hand, is such a work, but in  the 
few pages he devotes to the USSR the focus is much more on economic 
underdevelopm ent and the lunatic mendacity associated w ith the 
reigning bureaucratic ideology (1967, paras. 102-11), and  the 
relationship betw een the two, rather than on the specific political 
economy of Soviet production.
Secondary works include Jerome and Buick 1967; Beilis 1979, 
chaps. 4-6; CW O 1982; and, less useful, Kelly 1985.
Since my aim here is to consider the various 'state capitalist' theories of 
the USSR, I shall not be dealing w ith those aspects of the 'sta te  
capitalist' literature which relate solely to perceived developments in 
(or from) 'classical' capitalism, or to the question of the 'transition to 
socialism' (for example Bukharin 1915 and 1920, and Lenin 1918-23). 
Nor shall I consider the totally abstract model constructed by Pollock. 
(1941).
The political positions of the SPGB and its sister parties, often term ed 
'impossibilist,' involve an uncompromising intellectual rejection of the 
wages system, and hence of reformism; and the belief th a t the 
achievement of socialism depends primarily on workers' education 
and democratic organisation. If the former distinguishes them from the 
anti-revolutionary approach of the left, the latter separates them  too 
from the revolutionary approach of the communists. For a discussion 
of 'impossibilist' positions, see Barltrop 1975, and Coleman 1987.
This is not to deny, of course, the major role played by the m arket 
under NEP, In 1923 two developments occurred which showed the
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macroeconomic nature of this role in particularly dramatic fashion. The 
first was the 'scissors crisis/ when the differential between industrial 
prices and agricultural prices soared to three times its pre-war level. 
Given that agriculture had recovered considerably more rapidly than 
industry from the dislocations of war between 1914 and 1921 (see Nove 
1982, pp.93-96), such a movement of prices is precisely what should be 
expected from an elementary consideration of supply and demand. The 
second was the removal of the prohibition of alcohol which had been in 
force since 1914. As Carr has shown (1954, p.35n), since this took the 
form of a re-establishment of the State vodka m onopoly, it vividly 
dem onstrated the government's fiscal dependence on the indirect 
taxation of luxury goods.
The most valuable general works on council communism in English or 
French are Authier and Barrot 1976 and Bourrinet 1992. Both are in  
French; no works of comparable quality exist in English. For an account 
of 'anti-parliamentary communism' in Britain, see Shipway 1988. More 
specific works include Bricianer 1969 and Mattick 1939-67. A shorter 
work is Gombin 1978.
Korsch refers to the USSR as a capitalist State (1938) in an expanded 
article published in the council communist journal Living Marxism  
(Chicago). But he does not discuss the country's actual conditions.
Of course, the revolutionary Marxist view of Soviet Russia was also 
coloured by the le tte r 's  role in w estern Europe, w here the 
Bolshevik-dominated 'Communist' International tried to bounce those 
who considered themselves communists into sustained m ilitation 
within parliam ents and trade unions, and eventually insisted on the 
formation of national 'united fronts.' In May 1920 the W est-European 
Bureau of the Comintern was shut down by Moscow, and in June 
Lenin published Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. The 
following year, pro-Bolshevik forces fused in Germany with the bulk of 
the Independent Social-Democratic Party (USPD), a more 'orthodox' 
and much larger faction of social democracy. All these developments 
were clearly in keeping with Soviet diplomacy: trade treaties were 
secured w ith both Britain and Germany in 1921. The sam e year, 
Krassin criticised the British m iners' strike for in terfering w ith  
Bolshevik trading needs. (Shipway 1988, p.27). (When MI5 eventually 
needed evidence of Bolshevik 'revolutionary internationalism ,' they 
had to forge it in the form of the 'Zinoviev letter.' See W est 1981, 
pp.60-62). M ilitary co-operation with Germany began in 1922, and  
possibly even earlier. (See Sutton 1968, chap. 15). (For a discussion of 
the impact of Bolshevik foreign policy on the left communist critique, 
see Authier and Barrot 1976, pp.130-43 and 175-88. See also Lenin 1920; 
McCauley 1981, p.62; and the Com intern's Theses, Resolutions and 
Manifestos [1919-22]).
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s A leading member of the International Communists of Germany (IKD),
an extrem ist group to the left of Liebknecht and  Luxem burg's 
Spartacus League, Rühle was later a leader of the East Saxony section 
of the council communist KAPD (see below, note 33). From 1921 he 
was involved in the General W orkers' League of Germany (Unified 
Organisation) (AAUD-E), also council communist, which rejected the 
party form and insisted on the workplace as the basis of council 
communist organisation. On the developm ent of his thought, see 
Socialist Reproduction/Revolutionary Perspectives 1974, and Authier 
and Barrot 1976, chap. 14.
9 Rühle would eventually also use the phrase 'world fascism.' (1940),
■'0 Perhaps surprisingly, neither Rühle nor the 'councilists' rejected the 
'orthodox Marxist' view of 'lower' and 'higher' stages of communism. 
(See GIK 1930). Ruble's failure to question this view only adds to his 
confusion.
 ^1 Councilism can be defined as 'anti-vanguardist,' anti-party council 
com m unism , s tre ss in g  above all the form s of w orkers ' 
self-organisation. (For elements of a critique, see Barrot 1973 and 
Shipway 1987, pp. 118-24). Growing from the positions defended by the 
Group of International Communists in the N etherlands (1927-40), it 
won adherents in the U nited States, Scandinavia, France, and  
elsewhere, and proved overall to be the most abiding current of council 
communism. Ceasing to be a properly international 'm ilieu' with the 
second world war, it decomposed in the Netherlands only in the 1970s. 
(Bourrinet 1992, p p .153-284). By this time, of course, the term  
'councilism' had adopted new shades of meaning, relating to the ideas 
of Castoriadis (1957) about the self-management of wage-labour, and 
to those of the Situationists (see Riesel 1969) about the organisation of 
communist revolution by mass assemblies and revokable delegates. 
The rise of these two tendencies, however, both of which also 
decomposed in the 1970s, was largely sui generis: hence their ideas on 
the USSR are considered separately elsewhere.
It is undoubtedly noteworthy that apart from this document there is 
very little councilist material on the USSR of a similar theoretical level. 
In Lenin as Philosopher (1938), the only explanation Pannekoek gives of 
the capitalist nature of a system of production "directed by a state 
bureaucracy under the leadership of the Com munist Party" is that 
"state officials...have the disposal over the product, hence over the 
surplus value." (p.75). I have already pointed out the inadequacy of 
this argum ent w ith reference to the SPGB. He later writes in Workers' 
Councils (1947-49) of the collective possession of the m eans of 
production by leading officials who exploit the workers and pay them
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wages, but fails to take the analysis any further than that. (Part 2, p.85). 
It is revealing that in a section on "The Foe" (Part 3) he applies rigorous 
analysis to a num ber of national capitalist groupings, but fails to 
include in his sights the rulers of Soviet Russia.
They also avoid having to find reasons for the defeat of w hatever 
radical movement there really was among Russian proletarians. It 
should be remembered, of course, that one can agree with them that 
capitalism was never abolished while still affirming that Bolshevik 
power was only imposed in opposition to a proletarian revolutionary 
movement, albeit a weak one. (Voline 1947; [Fernandez] 1985; and 
Wildcat 1986 and 1991).
As Sapir has shown (1984, p .60), job-hopping was far more frequent 
among younger workers. The annual rate of job-changing by workers 
aged 20 to 25 reached some 50-65%.
13 For a critical analysis of Ticktin's arguments, see section 2.3 of Chapter 
6 below.
1® James and Dunayevskaya began their collaboration as the leaders of 
the minority tendency (1941-47) within the W orkers' Party in the 
United States, eventually ending their involvement in the Trotskyist 
m ovement in 1950. Their increasing and important recognition of the 
autonomous power of the workers then led both to formulate positions 
in opposition to traditional Leninist vanguardism. James co-operated 
for a time with longer-standing defenders of w orkers' autonom y 
w orking within council communism and the group Socialisme ou 
Barbarie, but eventually came to base his politics m ainly upon  
anti-imperialist nationalism. Meanwhile, Dunayevskaya became the 
founding figure of idealist-Hegelian 'M arxist-Humanism.' It should 
perhaps be added that neither James nor Dunayevskaya ever arrived at 
explicit opposition to Leninism in its entirety.
After James and Dunayevskaya ended their co-operation in 1955, 
it soon became clear that no love was lost between them. It is thus 
doubly unfortunate that a satisfactory non-partisan analysis of the 
tendency's developm ent has yet to appear in English. (But see 
A ppendix to James, Lee, and Chaulieu 1958, and D unayevskaya 
1958-72.)
17 This work was in fact w ritten in August 1943, not long after the 
publication of the first series.
13 As I show below in Chapter 6, though, the theoretical impasse which 
they reached in their consideration of the nature of the system in the
CHAP.2 - NOTES 107
USSR did  not prevent them  from adding m eaningfully to the 
understanding of the class struggle in that country.
13 The founder of the Spanish section of organised Trotskyism during the 
Spanish civil war. Munis (Grandizo) continued to be its leader once it 
was exiled to Mexico. Although his 'state capitalist' and non-defencist 
view of the USSR would eventually lead him to reject Trotskyism (see 
Munis 1975, pp.7 and 39-42), his sympathetic view of Bolshevism and 
his belief in the need for the leadership of the working class by  a 
Leninist vanguard party rem ained heavily influenced by Trotsky. 
Correspondingly, M unis denies that the im position of Stalinism  
represented primitive capitalist accumulation and "the beginning of a 
social era." (1975, p.28). One should have thought it self-evident, 
however, that the proletarianisation of scores of millions of peasants 
and the breakneck industrialisation and urbanisation (which have 
never been reversed) did indeed involve the move to a new way of life 
for the majority of the population. For a presentation of the politics of 
this tendency, see FOR 1965.
20 M unis's presentation of this train of thought as being the commonly 
acknowledged Marxian one is highly questionable, since at no time in 
his life did Marx himself write of a future 'society of transition ' or 
'transitional society.' (See Buick 1975). Furthermore, the young Marx 
states outright that communism will embody the "true resolution of 
the strife between freedom and necessity." (1844, p.90). In short, rather 
than 'freeing' labour, communism abolishes it, as Marx and Engels also 
say explicitly. (1846, p.220). Such a revolutionary transformation can 
hardly be reconciled with the continued existence of a categorical gulf 
between 'immediate needs' and subjective indulgences, or indeed w ith 
a division between the necessary product and the 'surplus,' between v 
and s. Admittedly, later, in Volume 3 of Capital, Marx suggests that the 
tw in  realm s of freedom  and necessity will no t a ltogether be 
superseded, bu t even so his vision of com m unist society m ost 
definitely still centres upon the "development of hum an powers as an 
end in itself." (1894, p.959). This cannot be reduced to "planning for 
consumption/ (Munis 1975, p.37).
21 In fact, as the council communists and others showed, the Bolshevik 
governm ent never sought w orld revolution, and  w as alw ays 
principally concerned with the rescue, stability, and expansion of the 
national economy. (See note 7 above). Moreover, the adoption of the 
new ideology, strongly advocated by Bukharin as well as by Stalin, in 
no w ay brought an end to NEP. (See for example N ove 1982, 
pp.122-29).
1
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22 For Munis, the struggle between different "clans" of the bureaucracy 
for the distribution of surplus value and the control of the State is 
something for the future. (1946, p.24).
23 Breaking with orthodox Trotskyism over the Soviet question in the 
1940s, Cliff became a leading light in the British group the International 
Socialists, and then the top leader of the Socialist Workers' Party which 
replaced the IS in 1976. If the first contained certain tendencies which 
leant towards Luxemburgism (not associated w ith Cliff), the second is 
more clearly substitutionist and Leninist. For an account of C liffs 
political itinerary, see Callaghan 1984.
24 Drawing a clear relation of determination between the place of the 
USSR in w orld society and the nature of the internal social relations. 
Cliff manages to look at both, even if he mistakes the direction of the 
determ ination. The 'world-system ' theorist W allerstein, how ever, 
simply assumes the USSR to be part of the 'capitalist world-economy' 
and then goes on to make assertions about Soviet conditions which are 
idealist, incoherent, or demonstrably false. In his view, the USSR was 
'state capitalisf — a term he leaves undefined — because "the CPSU 
forgot the dialectical relationship between transformation within the 
Soviet Union and evolution of the capitalist world-economy (of which 
it remained structurally a part)." (1975, p.240). It would thus seem that 
the CPSU "created a variant of state capitalism" because it had  
m istaken ideas. Elsewhere he holds that even as late as 1945 the 
'unw orkability ' of a 'Leninisf road to socialism was impossible to 
appreciate. (1990, p.96). So the USSR would seem to have been destined 
to be part of the capitalist 'world-economy,' even if no-one could have 
known. This analysis is clearly incoherent. Moreover, whereas the first 
assertion is idealist, the second contains an empirical falsehood, since 
such m ovements as anarchism and council communism appreciated 
very rapidly the supposedly inappreciable.
There are m any sim ilar examples of such confusion in 
W allerstein's view of the USSR. Thus even as he fits the country into a 
theory of the 'capitalist world-system,' he asserts that to try to create a 
"morphological category" for such "socialist states" [sic] is futile, since 
any morphology assumes, first, that the units to be described are the 
States, and second, that these States have (their own) m odes of 
production. In fact, of course, however one labels a State, from  a 
Marxist view point param ount importance m ust always be given to 
modes of production. Moreover, to ascribe the label 'capitalist' to a 
single State can hardly be to deny that the capitalist m ode of 
production might be global. Wallerstein proceeds to assert that any 
'm orphology' portraying the Soviet State as capitalist leads "alm ost 
immediately" to the view that the State is in some "transitional stage." 
(1982, pp.93-94). Actually, many theories of Soviet capitalism do not
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say this at all. But for W allerstein the USSR's m ost im portant 
characteristic is its presence in the 'world-system / and to theorise its 
production relations in any fashion is pointiess. His own approach is 
consequently not as 'empirical' as he might wish, and his view  of 
Soviet 'state capitalism' would seem to be based on pure belief.
23 In a different context, Marx was quite clear tha t non-capitalist 
economies did not become capitalist simply by trading with capitalist 
ones. (1885, pp.189-90).
23 This conclusion is approached even more closely by the 'world-system 
neo-Marxist' Chase-Dunn, who writes that "it m ay be a mistake" to 
over-emphasise the exploitative nature of class relations in 'state 
capitalist' countries. There is only one other aspect of his overall view 
of the nature of the USSR which differentiates it notably from Cliff's: 
that is, his inclusion among the internally influential considerations of 
foreign policy — alongside the arms race — of a reluctance to allow 
labour and capital exports. (1982, pp.34-38).
27 Bettelheim refuses to infer even the non-existence of 'socialism / let 
alone the existence of capitalism, just from the simple existence of 
money, prices and the market, which he refers to as a mere "surface 
fact." (1969, pp.18-19.) Disregarding what I hold to be the capitalist 
nature of the USSR even under Lenin and Stalin, however, as well as 
the nominal character of its producer markets, it w ould seem quite 
straightforward that people creating a new and free society would have 
no reason to mimic the terminology of the commodity. But for those 
who have already crossed the hurdle of seeing a regim e that 
incarcerated millions in concentration camps as even potentially 
'socialist/ this is a relatively easy point to miss.
Missed it is, though, by Bland, who argues that the creation of a 
privileged stratum  was achieved by an "opposition" within the CPSU, 
against the "minority" led by Stalin and Beria. (1980, pp.i-xv, 72-91). 
This, he states, provided a basis for the "restoration" of capitalism and 
the emergence of a "fascist-type State of a new type" [sic] after the 1965 
reforms. (p.312). In discussing the 'Leningrad affair' of 1949-50, which 
led to the execution of Gosplan chief Voznesensky, Bland praises 
Stalin's sterling defence of 'socialism' which supposedly culminated in 
the publication of his work on the Economic Problems of Socialism in the 
USSR in 1952. (pp.343-56). In particular, he quotes Stalin approvingly 
to the effect that the law of value can operate w ithout being the 
'regulator' of production. Together with his combination of support for 
Beria w ith a condem nation of Brezhnev's 'fascist' persecution of 
'independent' trade unions, this is an example of w hat can only be 
called doublethink. Value can only exist if it regulates production, 
(Rubin 1928, pp.77-83). Bland's pro-Chinese (Liu Shao-Ch'i-ist rather
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than Maoist) and later pro-Albanian ideology exists at the extreme 
'fundam entalist' fringe of Stalinism, and need not be considered 
further.
28 The Hong Kong left communist' L. L. Men, meanwhile, adds even less 
to Bettelheim's critique, asserting that at the 'point of departure' the 
'content' of Soviet prices is totally insignificant. Admittedly he accepts 
that subsequently it does become relevant, but even so his argum ent is 
indistinguishable from Bettelheim's, Thus he writes that
prices in the 'socialist' countries are set by the state (as said, we 
are assuming a perfectly planned economy), but obviously, the 
state planners cannot set them arbitrarily, at will, w ithout any 
basis whatsoever at all. Otherwise, the economy will be in 
complete chaos. W hat is this basis which governs the state 
planners' decisions w ithin specific boundaries, i.e. which 
determines the prices? In Marxist analysis, only one thing and 
one thing alone can constitute this basis: the socially necessary 
labour congealed in products. (1986, pp.34-35).
The dogmatic nature of the analysis is self-evident.
29 But he fails to account for the apparent change in his viewpoint. If in 
1980 he focuses on the system's inability to institutionalise intensive 
accumulation, by the end of the decade he writes of a 'voluntaristic 
mode of regulation' which gives way to a 'consensual' one during 
de-Stalinisation. (1989, p.33; 1990, pp.128-29). This is quite a jum p — 
but Sapir neither explains how the two views can be brought together 
nor explicitly rejects his earlier view. It would seem that the underlying 
basis of his theory of Soviet economic developm ent, w hich was 
originally political-economic, has now become primarily political; and 
he explains the crisis of the mobilised economy (seen as a "metamode") 
chiefly in terms of international relations. (1990, pp.129-30).
39 Notable here is the very 'sociological' use of the term 'society to mean 
'country.' Apparently, then, capitalism would be no t a society bu t 
rather a conglomeration of societies. This, of course, is a view separated 
by an unbridgeably wide gulf from Marx's. (See Marx and Engels 1848, 
Marx 1867, etc.).
31 Sapir was previously of the opinion that workers m ust sell their 
labour-pow er so long as production is not based on their free 
association. (1980, p. 165). A glance at any pre-capitalist exploitative 
mode of production, such as feudalism or ancient slavery — or indeed 
colonial slavery — is sufficient to demonstrate the untenability of this 
position.
CHAP.2 - NOTES 111
32 See Perlman's remarks on 'economics' as opposed to the critique of 
political economy. (1968, ix-xi).
33 The KAPD was founded in April 1920 by the large m ajority of 
m embers of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) who rejected 
parliam entary and trade-unionist tactics, party  substitutionism , and 
co-operation w ith  social democracy, favouring instead w orkers' 
self-organisation and revolutionary action. See Authier and  Barrot 
1976, chaps. 10-14.
34 The CWI's affiliate in England was the Dreadnought group around 
S. Pankhurst, which joined in 1921.
35 In Scotland the Anti-Parliamentary Com munist Federation (APCF) 
around Aldred reached positions which were very similar. This group 
first recognised the existence of capitalism in Russia in 1925, and 
proceeded the following year to describe the adoption of the NEP as 
the 'liquidation' of the revolution, (APCF 1925b, p.43, and 1926, p.113; 
see also idem , 1925a). Eventually in 1935 the APCF arrived at a 
'councilist' position, publishing the Theses on Bolshevism under the title 
The Bourgeois Role of Bolshevism.
33 This represented a repudiation of the earlier left communist position 
that whereas party  substitutionism was inapplicable as a revolutionary 
tactic in western Europe, it was nonetheless acceptable in Russia. (See 
Gorter 1920). W ith this development left communists became council 
communists.
37 Elements of communistic change introduced in K ronstadt were 
supported  by  the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Maximalists, and 
Anarchists, but bitterly opposed by the Bolsheviks. See Voline 1947, 
pp.456-63.
33 Although best known as the leading member of the political group 
Socialisme ou Barbarie [Socialism or Barbarism] (1949-65), Castoriadis 
wrote copiously on the USSR from the late 1940s until the 1980s, which 
was time enough to change and develop his views on a num ber of 
relevant issues. Of prime importance in the present context are those 
articles published between 1949, when he first referred to the USSR as 
capitalist, and 1961, when he brought out the final part of M o d e m  
Capitalism and Revolution. In addition, the summary he wrote in 1977 
has also been useful. It is perhaps worth mentioning the distance which 
later separates him even from 'M arxism.' Thus in 1964 (p.l46) he 
argues that the social w orld is "in every instance constituted and 
articulated as a function of...a system of significations...[which exist] 
in the mode of the...actual imaginary"; in the same year he makes his 
rejection of Marxism explicit. (1964-65). By 1972 he rejects even the
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concepts o£ exploitation and class (1973, pp.24-25), holding instead that 
the basic Institu ting ' factor in society is the 'radical im aginary ' 
'incarnating ' itself in various imaginary significations (pp.30-31). 
Returning in the 1980s to matters Soviet, he then develops a ttveory of 
'stratocracy' (army rule). (1981a). Although he himself asserts a 
continuity with his earlier critique of Soviet bureaucracy (p.9), in my 
view this latest shift should be assessed together, first, w ith his now  
disproven belief in a substantial Soviet m ilitary superiority over 
NATO; and second, w ith his newly-found self-identification w ith  
"Greco-Western ('European')" tradition and society. (1981a and 1974-91 
passim, especially 1981b and 1982b).
39 Although of a certain influence in Belgium, France, and Italy, Bordiga's 
ideas remain little-known in the English-speaking world. 'Bordigism' 
can be described as a variety of Leninism to the left of Trotskyism, 
whose central organising concepts are the 'class party ' and  the 
'invariant program m e.' For an account of the developm ent of this 
tendency and those related to it, see Bourrinet 1982.
40 For the sake of accuracy, it should also be m entioned that the first 
official admission that the law of value operated in Stalin's USSR came 
not in 1952, bu t in 1943. (Leontiev et al. 1943). W hen a translation 
appeared in the American Economic Review of September 1944, the 
m atter even m ade the front page of the New York Times. Given the 
timing — during the international conference at Dumbarton Oaks — 
one can and should speculate on the role this adm ission played in 
matters of foreign policy, particularly Soviet-American diplomacy.
41 After a limited drift towards privatisation during the second w orld 
war, governm ent and party control was strengthened in 1946- For 
details on Soviet agriculture under late Stalinism, see for example Nove 
1982, pp. 298-304.
42 Bordiga also states rather bizarrely (1952, p .13) that the enterprises 
w hich produce such goods as clothing and housing  rem ain  
'untouched' by the State. Although even Stalin does not go this far, this 
could be taken as an exaggeration of the official Soviet position. See 
"The N ature of the Operation of the Law of Value in Socialist 
Economy," sub-chapter in Soviet Academy of Sciences 1957, pp.590-99,
43 Today's Bordigists still make the same mistake, holding that it is w ithin 
"agriculture and the kolkhozian hybrid" that we find "the real nucleus 
of the reproduction of mercantile relations and the accumulation of 
capital." (ICP 1991, p.4).
CHAPTER 3
development of each" was the condition for the "free development of all'
Soviet Bureaucratic Capitalism: A New Theory
iII
In this chapter I develop an original understanding of the capitalist nature of 
Soviet society. After giving expanded Marxist definitions of the basic 
underlying categories of capitalism, and showing how they continued to 
exist in the USSR, I then provide a framework for understanding capitalist 
formations where the function performed in bourgeois countries mainly by 
the market is performed in ways which are qualitatively more bureaucratic.
In a discussion of the nature of the USSR it is best to begin by
5,
stating clearly w hat it definitely was not. Since it is an obvious fact, then, 
that privative appropriation and exploitative production were not replaced
with a society based upon collective happiness and goodwill (Babeuf and i
Buonarotti's bonheur commun — see Rose 1978, chaps. 13-15), where the "free
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(Marx and Engels 1848, p.61), it is self-evident that Soviet social relations
It is further clear that the fact that the social relations were not 
communist does not automatically imply that the country was cap ita list
,were never communist.
.1
■I
Thus according to M arx's theory, and indeed to the general principles of 
logic, there is nothing to prevent the theoretical possibility that a society 
m ight exist which is neither capitalist, nor 'pre-capitalist,' nor communist. 
Such a society m ight arise from a development som ehow 'parallel' to 
capitalism , from  the "common ru in  of the contending classes" of 
capitalism,^ or perhaps from an unforeseen and unforeseeable technological 
revolution. It should not be assumed at the outset that m odern forms of 
exploitation differing substantially from 'classical' laissez-faire forms, and 
indeed from w hat has replaced those forms in their heartlands, m ust 
necessarily be capitalist themselves.
It is important, though, to recall a few facts about the nature of 
Russian conditions of production prior to 1917. And in this connection there 
are two main points to be made. The first is that even at that time the 
conditions were not those of 'classical,' bourgeois, free-market capitalism. 
Thus a crucial role in the economy was played by the State, bo th  in 
providing demand — primarily in heavy industry — and in supporting the 
credit system. Foreign investment was massive: directly in stocks; in shares, 
including  bank shares; and  in governm ent and m unicipal bonds. 
Meanwhile, even as the urban economy was skewed towards large-scale 
heavy industry, substantial numbers of industrial workers belonged to arteli, 
either supporting families who remained in the villages or keeping their 
own plots to work on in the summer. In the countryside itself, subsistence
■<
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production was widespread and most peasants remained in communes. (For 
an excellent account of the Russian economy in the post-em ancipation 
period, see Milward and Saul, 1977). But the second point is that behind 
these specifically Russian conditions we can identify  a list of more 
fundam ental features which in w orld history are quite familiar. Thus 
industry was organised on the basis of wage-labour and profitable growth; 
banking was advanced; and the countryside was increasingly subject to 
monetary relations. In short, it is not at all controversial to state that the 
predom inant mode of production was precisely capitalism.
Regarding what happened after 1917, there is thus a choice of two 
theses. The first is that of the 'abolition of capitalism.' This states that the 
peculiarity of Russian conditions — including, of course, political conditions 
— and  of external conditions affecting Russia, caused the previously 
prevalent non-classical capitalism to be abolished in such a way that 
capitalism  itself was abolished. Since this did not involve proletarian 
communist revolution, we should thus have to explain why it was that 
capitalism was abolished in a way that was totally different from the ways 
that had  been envisaged and discussed up to that time. The second, 
alternative thesis is that of the 'non-classical developm ent' of capitalist 
forms which were already non-classical. Although we do not now have to 
argue that industrialisation continued on the basis of a wholly new society 
even if the most evident changes it brought about (virtually everyone 
having a job and watching television), along with m any of its principal 
products (nuclear power, computers, cars, weapons of mass destruction), 
are also apparent in, say, the United States, we still need to argue in a 
theoretical fashion. In short, the problem now becomes that of discovering
w hether or not we can demonstrate the viability of this thesis w ithout
I
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becoming tied up in too many theoretical knots.
Before we undertake this task, though, it is important to understand 
exactly w hat kind of assertion is made when a country is adjudged to be 
capitalist. For the Marxist, then, to call the USSR a capitalist country is to 
m ake a statem ent about the relationship between a set of real social 
production relations on one hand and Marx's theory of capitalism on the 
other. Such a statement clearly says something about both the former and 
the latter. It implies many things. First, it means that the interests of the 
exploited inside and outside the USSR/CIS are fundam entally identical: 
h igher w ages, unity  in struggle, and, ultim ately, the revolu tionary  
destruction of existing society. Second, Marx's theory of capitalism becomes 
of theoretical use for those who wish to undertake a radical critique of 
Soviet society. And third, since Marx knew nothing of the USSR, its critique 
by  today 's communists m ust involve certain interpretations of M arx's 
theory that were not made explicit by Marx himself. In other words, the 
critique of the USSR as a capitalist formation — just like the critique of 
m odern  m onopolies, the grow th  of arm s p ro duction , post-w ar 
nationalisation, and the 'welfare State' — should not be expected simply to 
draw  upon the overall Marxist critique of capitalism, bu t rather to enhance 
it.
It is w orth noting in this context that the fact that M arx's Capital 
cannot be applied lock, stock and barrel to the USSR does not invalidate the 
'capitalist' theory of the USSR right from the start. In his preface to the first 
volume, Marx writes that
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w hat I have to examine in this work is the capitalist m ode of 
p roduction , and  the relations of p roduction  and form s of 
intercourse that correspond to it. Until now, their locus classicus has 
been England. This is the reason why England is used as the main 
illustration of the theoretical developments I make. (1867, p.90).
His use of the phrase "until now" should be noted. W hat he conceived
himself as doing in writing Capital was not to write a book for all time, bu t
to construct a theory of capital in general as seen through the lens of w hat
were then (in 1867) its forms in the most advanced country, that of 'classical'
capitalism. If, more than a century later, we are seeking for a definition of
w hat to include under the heading of capitalism, we should therefore be
looking for relations which do not necessarily appear in 'classical' forms, but
also in 'non-classical' forms. The theory of Soviet capitalism thus clears the
first hurdle: it is not absurd. It would be quite wrong to infer that the major
differences between the USSR and the bourgeois countries allow us to
assume without proof the non-capitalist nature of the former.2
At the same time, it is equally wrong to go too far in the opposite
direction, and to reduce or abstractify Marx's definition of capitalist
relations to such a degree that the categories with which the description of
capital begins, namely, the commodity and money, "are not just critically
relativized, specific, and completed, but abolished." This is what W ildt does,
and even if he is right (1979, p.44) to view capital as a "disjointed movement
of the self-exploitation [or self-expansion] of value, for which commodities
and money are mere forms," he is wrong to rule the commodity and money
out of his definition entirely. As I shall argue below, if capital is, as W ildt
says, necessarily 'disjointed,' then one m ust be able to identify  two
theoretically separable categories w ithin it, namely those which M arx
labelled M and C. Otherwise the concept of 'disjointedness' has no meaning.
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And once the categorial analysis of Marx's Capital is ignored as too 'specific/ 
even the concept of 'capital' becomes at best purely mystical and at w orst 
superfluous.
1 DEFINING CAPITALISM
My starting-point is thus the same as Buick and Crum p's: namely, the 
consideration of what capitalism essentially is. The definition of capitalism 
which I shall use has three main elements, and it is convenient in the present 
context to deal with them in the following order: the commodity (hence 
exchange-walue), wage-labour (hence the proletariat)^ and generalised production 
for profit on the basis of generalised exchange (hence profitable growth). I 
then deal in section 1.2 with the underlying categories of value, abstract 
labour, and the value (or capital) forms of the commodity and money.
1.1 Commodities, Wage-Labour, and Production for Profit
Commodities are goods which are bought and sold. On one hand, they are 
useful things which satisfy hum an needs, and hence have a utility or a 
use-value. On the other, since they are exchanged, they m ust also have a 
value in exchange, or an exchange-value. At this level, they are only useful to 
their possessor insofar as they can be exchanged for som ething else: in 
themselves they are quite useless. Or, in Marx's w ords, "the exchange 
relation of commodities is characterised precisely by its abstraction from 
their use-values." (1867, p.27),
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Since commodities have only existed for a tiny fraction of hum an 
existence, it is necessary to stress w hat lies behind purchase and sale. First, 
there m ust be an absence of concrete community, of communism, where 
everything w ould belong to everybody. In its place, there is private 
property, a state corresponding to the process of privative appropriatiotij, 
w here constituent parts of the world 's wealth are appropriated in such a 
w ay as to deprive or impoverish those excluded from such appropriation.
Second, if things are appropriated privatively, then by the very fact ,:0
of appropriation their utility m ust have been "mediated through labour."
This does not m ean that they are necessarily 'things'; still less does it mean 
that they m ust be manufactured. Indeed, pure oxygen, once privatively 
appropriated and made saleable, is just as much a commodity as are tables 
or telescopes. But if something's utility has not been so 'm ediated,' as is the 
case w ith unenclosed virgin soil, for example, then it cannot be private 
property. (Marx 1867, p.131). The "essence of private property" can only be 
labour, described by Marx as an "expression of hum an activity w ithin 
alienation." (1932, p .ll4 ). In short, by d in t of being private property , 
commodities must necessarily be the products of labour.
Third, the categories of purchase and sale are but aspects of the 
single category of exchange. This implies the existence of economy, definable 
as the organisation and social reproduction of scarcity. H um an relations are 
m ediated not only by the interrelation of objects, but also, more generally, 
by the very exchangeability and socially reproduced scarcity which underlie 
the exchange process.
IsI
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life-activity is for him  only a means to enable him to exist. He 
works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as part of his 
life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life...The product of his activity is 
not the object of his activity. (1847, p.l9).
i
But however "mystical" the character of the commodity m ay be (as 
Marx puts it: 1867, p.l64), we are not yet able to give an adequate definition 
of capitalism. This is because commodities, while necessary for the existence a
of capitalism, are not yet sufficient for that existence, as is best shown by the
fact that they existed m any centuries before capitalism was born. Indeed 
there is nothing in the definition of commodity exchange which m ight not 
apply to goods which are bartered, or to those exchanged by m erchants 
enriching themselves by buying cheap and selling dear, equally as well as to 
products exchanged under capitalism. Capitalism itself was only established |f
w hen commodity logic became generalised, and crossed its final historical 
barrier by taking over production. Not only does hum an productive pow er
itself now become a commodity, bu t production for sale becomes the 
predom inant mode of production.
There are thus two main aspects of this change. First, the 
developm ent of capitalist relations relied upon the expansion of a class of 
men and women who owned no productive assets apart from their creative
icapacity: namely, their ability to work, or iabour-power'. W hether they are expropria ted  peasants or dispossessed artisans, m ost of them  are 
consequently forced to sell this capacity, demand permitting, in order to be 
able to buy back the conditions of survival. The ability to create, produce, 
and enjoy productive adventure is thus alienated, crushed into an abstract 
common denominator by being sold in return for a wage-packet. In M arx's 
words, the worker's
$
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Qualitative dispossession, or poverty, corresponding to the separation 
between enjoyment of the environment and its productive transformation, 
becomes absolute once productive activity takes the form of wage-labour. The 
adoption by hum an labour of such a form, as Marx makes clear, is thus 
absolutely crucial to capitalism. In his words,
capital presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes capital. They 
reciprocally condition the existence of each other; they reciprocally bring 
forth each other, (p.33).
The second aspect which characterises the emergence of capitalism 
and distinguishes it from previous societies is the generalised establishment 
of production for profit. In other words, the accumulation of exchange-value 
becomes the motive of production in a generalised way. This means not only 
that there must necessarily be profitable growth — and capitalism without 
profit-based material accumulation would be like fire w ithout burning — 
b u t also, more generally, that there m ust be a constant and profitable 
technical development of the forces of production. As this happens, capital 
moves from merely subordinating the labour process to transforming it and 
its actual conditions. (Marx 1933, pp.1023-25 and 1034-38).
Bearing in m ind that wage-labour is the exchange of labour-power 
for the wage, we are now able to compress the above into a 'nutshell' 
definition of capitalism . This is as follows: capitalism  is a mode of 
production which does not simply allow exchange and growth, but which is 
founded upon exchange as a general form and grow th as an underlying 
drive.
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1.2 Value, Abstract Labour, and Capitalist Money
It is necessary now to explain the significance of generalised exchange and 
necessary growth for the determination of the other m ain categories of 
capitalism.
In the first place, the development of production dom inated by 
exchange — and by the drive for the accumulation of exchange-value — 
means that the production of each commodity tends to influence and  be 
affected by the production of virtually all other commodities. As exchange 
relations become generalised, exchange-dominated interconnectedness 
grows. And since labour-power itself is a commodity, a corresponding 
increase must also occur in the social division of labour. As a result, workers 
become increasingly connected with each other through their labour, even if 
they themselves do not determine the conditions of their interconnectedness 
as free and conscious agents. H um an interconnectedness is determ ined 
instead by the exchange of products.
It is in order to explain the implications of this that Marx is led to 
base his entire theory of capitalism upon a rigorous understanding of that 
w hich all commodities have in common, and of which their various 
exchange-values are merely expressions: namely, that which is defined as 
value. He was not, of course, the first to identify human labour as being the 
single universal component of all commodities, and hence the substance of 
value; nor was he the first to insist on socialised labour as the only possible 
basis on which exchange-value can become generalised.^ But he was the first 
to concentrate theoretically on the qualitative aspect of value, and thereby to
Ik:
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criticise the basis of generalised exchange in such a way as to inform a 
root-and-branch theoretical critique of both wage-labour and the capitalist 
forms of the comm odity and money. W hereas Ricardo proposed an 
'embodied labour' theory of value, such that the value of a commodity is 
explained as being proportional to the specific quantity of labour engaged in 
its production (1817, pp.9-51), Marx thus prefers to emphasise the overall 
social im port of the generalisation of exchange relations, including the 
relation of wage-labour. Since such relations cannot be assum ed to be a 
'natural' feature of advanced human society, there is a need to explain the 
social categories that underlie them, and their specifically capitalist forms.
This, then, is the fundamental significance of the Marxian theory of 
abstract labour, (1867, pp.140-54; for a useful commentary, see Rubin 1928, 
p p .107-23). In short, the interconnectedness of capitalist society is 
determ ined by the exchange and exchangeability of products; the 
exchange-values of products express their values; and the category of value 
is dependent upon the form of labour which is socialised and 'equalised' 
exclusively through the exchange of its products. In terms of Marx's famous 
coat,
by equating for example, the coat as a thing of value to the linen, 
we equate the labour em bedded in the coat w ith the labour 
em bedded in the linen. Now it is true that the tailoring which 
makes the coat is concrete labour of a different sort from the 
weaving which makes the linen. But the act of equating tailoring 
with weaving reduces the former in fact to what is really equal in 
the two kinds of labour, to the characteristic they have in common 
of being hum an labour. This is a roundabout way of saying that 
w eaving, too, in  so far as it weaves value, has noth ing  to 
distinguish it from tailoring, and consequently, is abstract hum an 
labour. It is only the expression of equivalence between different 
sorts of commodities which brings to view the specific character of 
value-creating labour, by actually reducing the different kinds of
:
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labour embedded in the different kinds of commodity to their 
common quality of being human labour in general. (1867, p.142),
Labour is, then, social; but rather than being social directly it is social only
indirectly, or abstractly, or reifiedly. Production is not controlled by the
associated producers. Workers work together, and w hat they produce is
socially determined; but the terrain on which they are brought together and
m ade to work, rather than being determined by their own needs, is
determined by the requirement on the part of the controllers of capital to
ensure the expanded production of exchange-value in an environment of
generalised exchange. Labour which is thus alienated can be defined as
taking the form of 'abstract' social labour; and the commodity which
embodies a portion of such labour correspondingly takes the form not just of
exchange-value but also, more generally, of value. In short, abstract labour
and value are the forms taken by wage-labour and exchange-value when
exchange has become generalised.
In the second place, those who do control the extraction of the 
surplus product — that is, the portion of the product in excess of what is 
bought with wages — require the generalisation of a means by which profits 
can first be gauged and then reinvested so as to generate more profits as 
efficiently as possible. In short, exchange-value m ust be able to adopt a 
concrete 'general form.' The predom inance of the capitalist m ode of 
production thus requires that not only the commodity but also money m ust 
adopt a specifically capitalist form.
In other words, generalised exchange and the underlying drive for 
growth can only dominate production if value can take a form which is 
abstracted from specific products: namely, from specific exchange-values
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and from use-value in general. In order to be accumulable and investible, 
self-expanding exchange-value (or capital) must thus be able to appear not 
only in the form of products, but also in the form of a 'general equivalent': 
namely, as money, {See especially Marx 1867, pp.157-63). It is money that 
enables commodities to compete with each other; that m ediates their 
exchange; and that becomes a special commodity of its own type which 
allows the social averaging that defines the categories of abstract labour and 
value in the first place. "Money represents the form of social relations; it 
represents, sanctions and organises them." (Negri 1979, p.23). It is "the bond 
of all bonds," "the alienated ability of mankind." (Marx 1932, pp.122-23).
It is instructive at this point to recall that money, just like the 
commodity, existed prior to capitalism. As Marx points out in the famous 
"Introduction" to his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1903),4 it 
is older even than banks and wages. But it is precisely one of those 
categories which,
despite their validity — precisely because of their abstractness — 
for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character of this 
abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and 
possess their full validity only for and w ithin these relations, 
(p.l05).
Aware, then, that historical theoretical critique m ust be more than just a 
linear tracing of specific categories through time, Marx stresses that
in all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which 
predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and 
influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all 
the other colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular 
ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which 
has materialized within it.
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It follows that in formulating a theoretical critique of capitalism it w ould be 
quite
unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one 
another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically 
decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to 
one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the 
opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which 
corresponds to historical development. (p.l07).
And in capitalist society, the predominant 'kind of production' is evidently
the production of surplus value: or, in other words, of capital. Money is not
just money: it is capitalist money.
The reason for quoting these passages is to show  that the 
theorisation of money can easily reach a dead-end if the w rong kind of 
meaning is ascribed to the fact that Marx starts Capital with a critique of the 
commodity and only later moves to a critique of money. (1867, chps.1-3). 
After all, it is not in dispute that when money first appeared on the scene its 
m ain function was to expedite efficient barter: that is, it was a means of 
circulation (a m edium  of exchange), and an 'ideal' m easure of value 
j^imaginary gold), (pp.188-90). Since Marx does not begin by discussing
money, and since money itself, in a certain sense, is even now a special kind 
of commodity, it m ight be argued that even in capitalist society the 
com m odity is more 'basic' than money. In other words, it m ight be 
suggested that the adoption of a value form by money is no more than a 
special case of the adoption of a value form by the commodity, and hence 
needs little additional explanation.
It therefore needs to be emphasised especially strongly that once the 
theory becomes a general critique of capitalist society, m oney joins the 
commodity as a second form of a more general category, the category of
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capital Crucially, it is this latter category, defined as self-expanding value, 
which is determ inant of the entire nature of capitalist society and of its 
various political-economic categories. Considering the circuit of capital as a 
whole, Marx thus writes that
all the premises of the process appear as its result, as premises 
produced by the process itself. Each moment appears as a point of 
departure, of transit, and of return. (1885, p. 180).
In short, capital is neither a form of the commodity nor a form of money:
rather, the capitalist commodity-form and the capitalist money-form are
themselves both moments of capital, of value. And it is in this context that
Marx writes in the Grundrisse of m oney's "th ird  attribute," which
"presupposes the first two and constitutes their unity." (1939, pp.216). It is
now a "precondition of circulation as well as its result" (p.217), the "material
representative of general wealth," and the "general form of wealth" (p.221).
It is the general form of access to resources, and the "direct object, aim and
product of general labour." (p.224).®
Marx further stressed this 'achieved' function of money in his
late-published 'missing sixth chapter' of Volume 1 of Capital, on the "Results
of the Immediate Process of Production." (1933).  ^ Here the category 'C'
denotes not the 'simple' commodity, but rather the productive forces as
commodity. Under this heading are thus counted not only the material
means or objective conditions of production (namely, instrum ents of
production plus raw materials, or fixed plus circulating capital), but also the
subjective conditions of labour (namely, purchased  labour-pow er
"expressing itself purposively"). (1933, p.979-81). The capitalist commodity
can now be defined as the form of capital which necessarily embodies a
concrete use-value. (And this includes labour-power). Correspondingly, its
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categorial counterpart, capitalist money, or 'M', is now presented as the 
form of capital which has no use-value at all apart from its exchangeability. 
Definable classically as a means of circulation, a medium of exchange, and a 
measure of value, money is best defined critically in direct relation to the 
cycle of capital. It is the mediating form which capital necessarily adopts to allow 
its drive for expansion to dominate its investment. In other words, it is a 
necessary component of what Marx saw as the "general formula for capital": 
M-C-M', or money-commodity-more money. (1867, chap. 4). If, as Marx puts 
it,
capital is, as we have seen, M-C-M['], i.e. value valorizing itself,
value that gives birth to value (1933, p.1060)
then money is essentially a form of capital corresponding to a function. This 
function is the determination of profitability in a sphere outside of the 
im m ediate relations of production so as to ensure (considerations of 
working class struggle aside^) that productive investment decisions can 
continue to be m ade in accordance with the systemic logic of value 
expansion, manifesting itself as the drive for profit maximisation.
The aim of capitalist production cannot, then, be defined simply as 
the accumulation of money by its controllers. Nor can it be defined as their 
accumulation of the productive forces. Rather, it is the accumulation of 
capital, and of capital's power over the productive forces both material and 
human.
This brief definition of capitalism can be summarised as follows. 
First, products m ust be commodities, p resupposing  both privative  
appropriation and exchange. In other words they must have exchange-value
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as well as use-value. Second, labour-power m ust also be a commodity. In 
other words, hum an production m ust take the form of wage-labour, which 
implies the existence both of a dispossessed class and of those who exploit 
it. And third, as the drive for profitable production (that is, the accumulation 
of exchange-value) becomes predom inant and exchange becom es 
generalised , the self-expanding exchange-value w hich  is now  
self-expanding value, or capital, requires a form in which it can exist apart 
from that of the commodity. The extraction of profit and the accumulation of 
capital thus require, as a functional prerequisite, the existence of capitalist 
money.
2 BUREAUCRATIC CAPITALISM IN THE USSR
The question now becomes: did these categories exist or were they absent in 
the USSR? Taking them in turn. I shall argue that they did exist, and that 
consequently the USSR was a capitalist country. The m ain theoretical 
advance will concern the nature of money and the rejection of the confusion 
caused by its identification with its quantity-based forms.
2.1 Bureaucratic Exchange-Value
The question as to whether or not there were commodities in the USSR 
should be dealt with in relation to three areas which for analytical purposes 
can be set out as follows: consumption, distribution, and production.®
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2.1.1 Consumption
Taking first the sphere of consumption, it is readily apparent that there were 
many, m any goods which the vast majority of the population could only 
receive in exchange for roubles and kopeks. It is well known, of course, that 
people used all sorts of connections and information networks to find out 
when and where certain goods were on offer, to jump ahead in queues, and 
to arrange barter deals; but it is hardly disputable that if a worker received 
rouble notes in his pay-packet and had to give them away each day in return 
for bread, then that bread took the form of a commodity, regardless of any 
effects which State subsidies may have had on its price. Similar statements 
can be m ade in relation to other goods and services, from apples and 
armchairs to toys and train tickets. It is equally well know n that such 
'consum er item s' as domestic heating bills were considerably cheaper 
relative to, say, cars, than they are in countries such as the United Kingdom, 
for example; but this is hardly a relevant issue when we are endeavouring to 
focus upon the overall form of the social consumption relation. Of slightly 
more relevance is the fact that quite a large number of urban workers grew 
at least some of their food on individual allotments (uchastki); but even in 
this connection it has to be added that in toto such amateur gardening was 
hardly of great political-economic importance. The fact of the matter is that 
even when goods were on ration proletarians either paid cash or w ent 
without.® Thus it is not seriously disputable that the basic relationship was 
one of purchase and sale. Some, including many rich western travellers to 
the USSR, may have perceived roubles as being 'worthless,' but this was not
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the reality lived by the Soviet working class. The restricted availability, even 
to those proletarians who had saved up enough roubles, of some of the 
consumer goods available on advanced western high streets is not the point; 
nor are the special shops for the elite. The point is that in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, goods passed from retailer to consumer only when roubles 
passed from consumer to retailer.
2.1.2 Distribution
The second area to be considered is that of the distribution of materials and 
goods prior to end-user consumption. As well as the movement of materials 
and semi-finished goods from one productive enterprise to another, this also 
includes the wholesale distribution of finished goods from enterprises to 
warehouses.
212a  Producer Goods
Concentrating first on the movement of producer goods, we see that the 
crucial point which needs to be addressed is not that prices were fixed 
bureaucratically, but that unlike in the retail part of the wage goods sector 
they did not determine the flow of goods. A crude comparative model 
would be as follows: a worker without cash would not be able to take a loaf 
of bread from a shop unless she stole it; but an enterprise director with the 
requisite combination of official seniority and unofficial influence and 
connections could ensure the delivery of the supplies he needed and then 
leave the corresponding flow of bank holdings to be adjusted accordingly
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with minimal fuss. (Since legal considerations are not paramount, we are not 
especially interested here in whether the exercise of influence is legal or 
'para-legaP; or, if it is 'para-legal,' to what extent it is determined by the 
formalities of rank). Such a model of distribution remains rudim entary, 
since it cannot account for phenomena such as dysfunctional inflation (A. 
Smith 1983, pp. 106-15) and the black market (Parry 1966, Grossman 1977, 
Katsenelinboigen 1977, O 'Hearn 1981, Simis 1982^), which indicate that 
considerations of rouble price did play some sort of a role, and that 'active 
m oney' was not altogether non-existent; but it serves as an adequate 
starting-point for the centring of attention on the type of decision-making 
which predominated in this particular area of the Soviet economic system.
It is hardly controversial to note that decisions as to the actual 
delivery of industrial supplies, as differentiated from paper intentions, were 
subject to two main formative influences. The first of these was, of course, 
the enterprise 'plan.' Rather than delving into the intricacies of the relations 
between enterprise management, industrial ministries and their glavki, the 
dedicated planning authorities, the Politburo, and the Central Committee's 
economics departments, I am concerned above all to emphasise the role of 
the plan and the nature of its formulation in terms of the overall social 
production relations. In this connection, then, the most salient point is that 
there was never a completely hard and fast item called the 'plan,' according 
to which all enterprises obtained and supplied a range of goods in strict 
accordance with a set of instructions passed to them at the beginning of each 
period. Even if the principal summary documents of Üie national Plan took 
the form of laws passed by the Supreme Soviet, in practice "as soon as the 
process of confirming individual plans [was] completed an extensive
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process of adjusting plans immediately [began]." (Wilhelm 1979, p.270). The 
various parts of each plan were then subject to a process of substantial and 
repeated revision. And since even current operational plans were very 
rarely drafted on time, for present purposes we can describe the plan 
revision process as effectively continuous.
As a result, the details of the process of supply were not determined 
simply by the successive requirements of the fulfilm ent of long-term  
planned contracts. In actuality, repeated changes in formal plans, together 
with the consequent late communication of relevant instructions, m eant that 
in the course of each year the supply allocation organs had constantly to try 
to cope with endemic disequilibria and misallocations. This they did  by 
issuing instructions according to pragmatic expediency. (See for example 
Nove 1980b, pp.43-45). The process of supply was highly disorganised.
It is known, of course, that supply plans were calculated according 
to underlying considerations of 'material balance,' which stipulated that 
inputs were to be matched with outputs rather than specifying every last 
detail of each receiving enterprise's exact requirements. But even in this 
more general context the constraints on information processing led the 
drawing up of balances to be completed for aggregate categories of goods 
rather than for specific products. (Rutland 1985, p.ll6).i2 Such a system was 
hardly able to erode the famous significance which gross output targets 
enjoyed within each enterprise; nor could it do much about the lack of an 
efficient system of incentives for the managers of one enterprise to be 
materially interested in meeting the full and detailed supply requirements of 
the m anagers of another. And so even the use of such superficially 
sophisticated 'input-output' calculating techniques did not prevent the
- - i k  .    .  ......... .................................  .........................
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elements of 'planning' in the distribution of industrial supplies from 
operating in a highly mishmash and stop-go fashion.
The real role of the 'plan' in determining distribution decisions can 
be summarised as a matter, firstly, of bureaucratic bargaining during the 
plan revision process (that is, in effect, all the time); and secondly, of 
bureaucratic bargaining between enterprises and planning authorities to 
smooth over gaps (which is hardly even 'planning' with inverted commas.)
And in fact, as Nove bluntly concludes, the main reason that complete chaos 
was avoided was that "most enterprises produce this year more or less the 
same things as they did last year." (1980b, p.45).
The other contributory factor in the determ ination of supply 
decisions was that which operated not simply in the interstices of even the
most efficiently revised formal plan, but also with little or no reference to the 
planning authorities. In other words, it was the informal factor defined by
the unofficial links connecting managers of enterprises both with each other 
and w ith various categories of suppliers. Usually these links were mediated 
by tolkachi, the much commented-upon roving representatives hired by 
enterprise managers to procure materials, parts, and equipm ent wherever 
they could and through whatever channels were necessary. As Berliner has 
described, by disposing of good connections with officials working in 
wholesale purchasing and allocation organs, and indeed in the supply
.departm ents of other enterprises, tolkachi played an indispensable role in '
ensuring the delivery of supplies to the enterprises for which they worked.
(1957, chap.ll).i3 Indeed a Gossnab mriad (supply chit) appears essentially 
to have been a 'hunting licence' granted to a manager setting out on the 
search for supplies. (See Rutland 1985, p.l30). The American business
I
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theorist Weitzman has accurately likened the necessary 'brazenness' of such 
'pushers' of an enterprise management's interests to the qualities expected 
of successful salesmen in the West. (1984, pp.36-37). Others might think of 
the role of 'fix-it men' with all the right connections in, say, the supply 
departments of western local authorities. But analogies aside, the important 
role which such people played, their need of good personal connections, and 
their consum mate skill in putting  themselves forw ard and spotting 
openings, are well known.
The most important point to be grasped in relation to the tolkachi is 
that the kind of inter-enterprise relations which they mediated were in no 
w ay 'accidental' to the Soviet system of industrial distribution. Such 
relations were, rather, an inherent part of the system, for w ithout the 
'lubricating' role of the tolkach the administrative-command system would 
have faced insuperable difficulties in restarting production after each 
breakdown. (Rutland 1985, pp.128-33). Conversely, if the system had been 
replaced with one completely dom inated by the drive for rouble profits, 
then Soviet suppliers w ould have been far less willing to hand over 
materials to a particular tolkach unless he or she could be relied upon to pay 
more than all the others trying to obtain the same materials. Hence the role 
of the tolkach would have been quite different from what it actually was in a 
system  where the flow of roubles was not the m ain problem for either 
supplier or receiver.
But that is not all. Once we recall that the nature of Soviet 
'planning' was inseparable from the twin processes of plan formulation and 
plan revision — which are also inseparable from each other — we notice 
that during these processes enterprise managers were themselves called
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upon to exercise bargaining skills which were highly redolent of those 
exercised by the tolkachi. (Berliner 1957, pp.224-27). The justification is thus 
all the greater for concluding that the Soviet distribution of producer goods 
had a unified nature which was not reducible to aspects such as 'command' 
and 'administration/
This is certainly not to deny the fact that there was a hierarchy; nor 
that information really was aggregated by Gosplan and Gossnab; nor that 
those who set targets and then handed them down from on high did indeed 
possess a degree of power; nor that an important role was played by the 
highly efficient prioritisation (qua prioritisation) of heavy industry, military 
production, and specific 'showcase' projects. But what I am arguing is that 
the characteristics of the distribution system, rather than constituting 
successes of 'p lanning ,' are surely evidence of a p laying  o u t of 
political-economic determ inations which were not them selves either 
planning or conducive to planning. In other words, the essence of the 
system was not the successful achievement of interconnected objectives set 
priorly and considered to represent the collective needs and desires of a 
social group (or of everyone). The fundamental nature of the distribution 
system was considerably more profound than was superficially apparent at 
the level of its formal organisational environment. To pu t the same point 
differently: the political-economic role of the plan in determining the nature
%
of the Soviet distribution process should not be understood on its own, but 
only in terms of an overall form of which it was one part, the role of plan
Ïrevision was another part, and the role of the tolkach was a third part. It is necessary to understand that at bottom this overall form was one in which 
the process of bargaining was intrinsic. And the primacy of bargaining
CHAP.3 - SOVIET CAPITALISM: A NEW THEORY 137
among those who benefited from privative appropriation clearly implies 
that the relations of distribution took the form of relations of exchange.
2.1.2h Consumer Goods Wholesaling
This last statement is equally applicable to the wholesale distribution of 
consumer goods, albeit in a slightly different way. The special characteristics 
of this category of distribution lie both in the role played by 'planning' and 
in the other mediating forms of competition. Thus as M. Goldman has 
observed in regard to plan revision,
since consumers' goods are generally not used as components in 
the production of other goods, [...] feedback or readjustment of ail 
m aterial balances is usually not necessary in the allocation of 
consumers' goods. If wants are greater than supply, the frequent 
solution is to send the available goods where the need is most 
critical. (1963, p,57).
This evidently goes some way^^ to explaining why shortages were even
more chronic in the consumer sector than elsewhere in the economy. On the
other hand, though, after the end of the 1950s a substantial part was played
in distribution by the bargaining which took place at wholesale fairs. As
Skurski has shown, these fairs fell into two types. The first was the
"contract" fair, designed to expedite the signing of contracts by pre-decided
partners, as part of the planning process. The second was the "surplus
goods" or "purchase and sale" fair, organised to help reduce unforeseen
stock surpluses and deficits. This latter type functioned by allowing a high
degree of competition among buyers and sellers, wherein the rouble played
an 'active' mediating role. (Skurski 1970, pp.176-91; see also Goldman 1963,
pp.198-200).
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Given that in 1953 the wholesaling system was removed from the 
rem it of the glavki of the various industrial ministries and placed instead 
under that of the Ministry of Trade, the holding of fairs of this second type is 
perhaps not especially surprising. (Skurski 1970, p p .162-66). Since the 
greater proportion of the cash receipts paid into Gosbank were deposited 
through the wholesale trade network, to a large extent there now arose an 
institutional as well as a functional differentiation between, on one hand, the 
receipt of new monies, and on the other, the transfer of monies between 
accounts held by industrial enterprises. And since the role of the rouble in 
retailing, as mentioned above, was real rather than merely nominal, it was 
now  fitting that its role was to some degree enhanced in w hat was, in effect, 
the next stage of the economic cycle.
2.1.3 Production
We have not, however, yet reached the stage of grasping the full significance 
of such observations regarding resource distribution, and in order to do so it 
is now necessary to consider the third area, that of social production in the 
strict sense. Whether the Soviet economy was fundamentally a commodity 
economy or whether in some subtle way it fell short of being one in the full 
sense, it is of course only by looking at this sphere in particular that we will 
be able to achieve an understanding of the whole. In Marx's words,
exchange is merely a moment mediating between production with 
its p roduction-determ ined  d istribu tion  on one side and  
consum ption on the other, bu t in so far as the latter itself 
[consumption] appears as a moment of production, to that extent is 
exchange obviously also included as a moment within the latter, 
[production].
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And, as he continued:
it is clear, firstly, that the exchange of activities and abilities 
which takes place w ithin production itself belongs directly to 
production and essentially constitutes it. The same holds, secondly, 
for the exchange of products, in so far as that exchange is the means 
of finishing the product and making it fit for direct consumption.
To that extent, exchange is an act comprised within production 
itself. Thirdly, the so-called exchange between dealers and dealers is 
by its very organization entirely determined by production, as well 
as being itself a producing activity.... [emphasis added].
The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all form the 
members of a totality, distinctions within a unity.... (1903, p.99).
We should, therefore, expect Soviet production to show at least some of the
same characteristics as Soviet exchange-based distribution. But at the same
time, in looking at production we shall be seeking to shed additional light
on the nature of the entire political economy.
The question now becomes: did the Soviet productive forces and 
products take a commodity form? If they did, in what way did they do so? 
And w hat were the specific implications for the nature of an economic 
system which undoubtedly differed considerably from, say, one based on 
the drive for dollar profits? Clearly to answer this last question fully we 
shall have to discuss the overall nature of Soviet political economy, and this 
indeed is the subject of the present chapter as a whole. Since, however, we 
shall discuss the nature of labour and the nature of accumulation in sections
2.2 and 2.3 below, for the time being we can limit our attention to a 
consideration of the form of distribution of the instruments of production, 
and therefore — in fact inseparably — of the form of the product which the 
use of those instruments gave rise to.
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2.1.3a The Means of Production
It is worth recalling at the outset that whatever form the appropriation of 
the productive forces in the USSR actually took, it was m ost definitely 
privative. Thus however fuzzy or broad the line might have been between 
low-level bureaucrats who were essentially wage-workers and low-level 
bureaucrats who disposed of a small degree of de facto control over the 
productive forces and other people's labour, it is quite clear that the workers 
were exploited by a social layer or conglomeration of social layers which 
stood above them and disposed of the material means of production. It 
evidently was not tRe w orkers who decided that a processing or 
manufacturing plant should be built; or where, when, and to w hat end; or 
w hat it should process or produce; or in w hat quantities, of w hat 
specifications, or at w hat speed. The material means of production were 
disposed of instead by those who exploited the labour of others and who 
were unproductive themselves. On one side, there was the relation of 
alienated labour; on the other, there was the control over the conditions 
under which that labour was expended. Equally evidently, whatever the 
rate m ight have been of workplace 'theft' — and w hatever degree of 
institutional rivalry prevailed among senior officials of the three m ain 
'pillars' of the State: the Party, the Army, and the KGB — the exploiters as a 
whole maintained considerable reserves of force to keep the material means 
of production under their control. The control over the means of production 
was certainly not distributed among the workers.
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The consideration of the distribution of the means of production 
among those who did control them can now be split into two parts. First, 
there is the question of the form which the control over the means of 
production actually took; and second, there is the question of how the 
control was distributed and redistributed among those who possessed it.
To answer the first question we must recognise that the occupations 
which involved varying degrees of control over the productive forces were 
themselves very varied. Thus, on one hand, from very soon after the coup of 
October 1917, the principle which governed enterprise management in the 
State sector — and after the nationalisations and renationalisations which 
put an end to NEP this included the whole of industry — was the doctrine 
of 'one-man management' {edinonachalie)^^ According to this the pivotal 
role in operational management was assigned to the enterprise director, 
whose orders had to be obeyed by everyone beneath him. On the other 
hand, however, he clearly could not act in whichever way he chose. Firstly, 
he was answerable to higher-ups in the relevant industrial ministry and its 
relevant department iglavk). Secondly, through them he was also influenced 
by the decisions made by planning authorities. Thirdly, he was also subject, 
to some extent at least, to pressure from the secretary of the partkom  
(enterprise committee of the CPSU) and the secretary of the trade union, 
who himself would probably be a member of the partkom. And fourthly, 
even if the main line of command came down from  the m inistry, 
nonetheless enterprise directors were still m embers of the party 's  
nomenklatura, appointed in practice by raikom or obkom.'^^
It is equally clear that enterprise directors, ministerial officials, 
planning officials, obkom secretaries, and so on, did not all exercise power in
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the same fashion. Thus enterprise directors would handle m ost of the 
day-to-day running of the enterprises and, crucially, they w ould be 
responsible for passing on the information required in the planning process; 
the ministerial officials would try to wring maximum resources out of 
Gosplan, while simultaneously attempting to indulge in 'empire-building' 
by running their own supply organs for the enterprises under their remit 
(Nove 1980b, p.65); the Gosplan officials would seek to set targets in 
accordance with strategic directives set by the Council of Ministers and the 
Politburo, and to police the plan-revision process; the Gossnab officials 
would try to integrate the supply of ever-short materials; and the ohkom 
secretaries would exercise patronage in appointing the directors whom they 
favoured the most.i7
But if the Soviet political economy has a nature at all, then there 
m ust be some unifying characteristic running through all these types of 
exercise of power over the productive forces. And it turns out that there is. 
Thus, first, bureaucrats of all the types described above exercised power 
which am ounted ultimately to power over the labour of the workers. 
Ministerial officials trying to exercise a degree of control over supplies, for 
example, or Gosplan officials trying to control, against considerable 
obstruction, the objectives of enterprise directors, could only be successful in 
any way at all so long as the workers were alienating their labour. This does 
not, of course, mean that the workers were completely passive, since 
evidently they were not. But the point for the moment is that bureaucratic 
competition among ministerial officials, Gosplan officials, and enterprise 
directors, was ultimately a matter of the distribution and redistribution of
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power over the labour of the exploited and over the means of production 
used — and indeed produced — by that labour.
Second, this power can be traced back in the opposite direction too, 
and it then becomes clear that the power being distributed among the 
various exploitative officials was the very same power expropriated from 
the workers in the course of their labour. A ministerial official or a member 
of the Politburo might have thought that they had conjured some power out 
of thin air by achieving a dominant position in part of the economy, or by 
subduing competitors within, say, Gosplan, but in reality, of course, that 
could not be the case, since bureaucratic in-fighting alone does not increase 
the power of the economic bureaucracy — or, in a broader sense, the State — 
vis-à-vis the workers. The Soviet economic bureaucracy was a competitive 
apparatus in which exploiters fought among themselves for shares in the 
exercise of alienated power.
The third point is that it was not just accidentally competitive. 
Given that the workers were exploited, the only alternative forms of State 
economic system imaginable would have been either totally fragmented, 
with each controller — each enterprise director, say — having a precisely 
defined area of control, and communicating with other controllers only in 
cultural matters generally unconnected with the economy; or, of course, a 
system completely controlled from the top, where the supreme ruler knew 
everything he needed to know to formulate orders which denied everyone 
beneath him any scope for independence or bargaining. And it is not hard to 
see that regardless of the autarkic tendencies which surfaced in various 
ways at various times in the Soviet economy, and regardless too of any 
despotic tendencies, it was not by accident that the system did not take
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either of these forms and instead was bureaucratic. In short, the 
interconnectedness of the economy — that is, of the organisation of scarcity 
defined by industrial exploitation — determined the necessary existence of a 
form of competition among those with alienated powa\
The same principle, of course, applies equally well to the economic 
systems of countries ruled by the bourgeoisie, but in such countries the 
general rule is the prevalence of a socially and legally enforced 
'independence'-based medium for that competition, taking the form of the 
currency. In other words, a bourgeois with a fund of money can in principle 
set up shop trading whatever he likes, buy shares or indeed plant from 
anyone willing to sell them, and bequeathe his money to anyone he 
especially favours. These freedoms are not, of course, absolute. And there 
does exist a State bureaucracy which fulfils various functions for the good of 
the bourgeoisie as a whole, or for a local, national or supranational section of 
it. But where this does not involve direct force over the working class it 
usually means either the ideological defence of the system of private 
property, the collective defraym ent of bourgeois costs such as the 
reproduction of adequate numbers of workers or the investm ent in a 
transport infrastructure, or indeed the hiving off of tax funds to favoured 
bourgeois groups distinct from the increasingly elusive 'national 
bourgeoisie.' Not only is the State's role in the economy principally financial 
— setting interest rates, levying taxes, assigning contracts — but the 
over-arching aim of State functioning is the amassing of capital in corporate 
hands in the alternating forms of means of production and financial 
accounts.
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In the USSR, however, the mediation of competition was not as 
fluid (currency-based) as this, and for this reason the system was founded 
mainly upon the importance of bureaucratic office and effective 'pull.' The 
functioning of the characteristic mix of m anoeuvring, negotiation, 
bargaining, and bureaucratic diktat was thus simply the playing out of the 
necessary competition among individuals who disposed of alienated power 
over the productive forces: either close to the ground, as did the enterprise 
m anagers, or at one remove, as did the ministerial, Gosplan or obkom 
officials. Such competition was necessary because they each possessed only 
a portion of alienated power, and had to relate to each other to retain it; 
because a system totally controlled from the top was unfeasible; because 
co-operative collectivity was not really a likely objective for those whose 
entire culture was exploitative, and who had to defend their positions in a 
competitive and hierarchical environment rather than risk them by spending 
time on the search for a collective exploitative solution; and because they 
were set against each other further by the difficulty of obtaining accurate 
information either from the exploited or from their fellow exploiters. The 
fact that it was impossible to draw a line between the official ('first,' 'white,' 
'legal') economy and unofficial ('second,' 'black,' 'illegal') economy (see 
Katsenelinboigen 1977) illustrates further how competition was the essence 
of the Soviet system.
In brief, the measure of control which each bureaucrat disposed of 
over the means of production was determ ined by his efficiency in 
competition. Certainly, this competition did not operate in a market form; 
nor could bureaucrats pass on their portions of control to those they 
individually chose as their successors. (Instead, control was passed on
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through a m ixture of bureaucratic appointm ent and unofficial Mat 
distribution, including via the family). But bourgeois forms such as market 
competition'll and rights of inheritance are not our concern in the present 
context. We are interested in the underlying relation. The nature of a society 
is determined by the social production relations: not by a set of property 
laws, not even by those governing the details of inheritance. And if there 
was privative appropriation, and also competition am ong bureaucrats 
(post-holders) each of whom possessed a portion of control over the means 
of production (and hence over the extraction of the surplus product), then it 
is clear that this competition was itself neither more nor less than the system 
wherein portions of such privatively-appropriated control were exchanged. And 
anything exchanged (and mediated through labour) is by definition a 
commodity.
2.1.3b The Form of the Product
If the distribution of products was competitive then the fact that the 
distribution of control over the means of production was also competitive 
should come as no surprise. But the generalised environment of exchange 
which dominated Soviet production still requires further elucidation. In 
short, we need to consider what lay behind the use of the means of 
production to p u t out products. Why, in other w ords, were things 
produced?
One property of any Soviet product was that it had a use-value. 
Regardless of the 'relative' quality of Soviet consumer goods as assessed
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subjectively in relation to that of non-Soviet consumer goods, all things that 
were consumed had a use-value to their consumers as a matter of definition. 
The use-value of producer goods which were 'productively consumed' in 
the production of consumer goods is similarly straightforward. In fact, even 
producer goods consumed in, say, the space sector also had a use-value, 
since the people who commissioned space projects m ust have had, to some 
extent at least, a positive view of their utility (to t h e m s e l v e s ) . A n d  
anything with a utility conditioned by its physical characteristics is said to 
have a 'value in use,' or use-value. The problem with wasted use-value is 
beside the point.
The second aspect of Soviet products was that they had a 'value in 
exchange,' or exchange-value. To cover briefly the analysis given above: 
consumer goods were only valuable from the viewpoint of retail officials 
insofar as they could exchange them for roubles; producer goods were 
valuable to tolkachi or enterprise directors or other officials insofar as by 
procuring them or achieving their planned allocation they could maintain or 
increase their blat; wholesale goods were valuable to enterprise purchasing 
executives insofar as they could enhance their blat by reducing stoppage 
time and ensure a greater likelihood of nominal plan fulfilment; wholesale 
goods were valuable to enterprise sales representatives insofar as they 
received in return either the goodwill of planning officials or a payment in 
roubles; and plant and accumulated means of production were valuable to 
those who controlled them, whether at central ministerial level or from the 
office of the enterprise director, insofar as official bureaucratic influence and 
de facto 'pull' could be defended and increased. We can thus summarise by 
stating that there was another aspect of retail and wholesale consumer
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goods, goods to be processed, raw materials, and fixed investments which 
was just as apparent as the utility which they possessed by dint of their 
physical characteristics. This lay in the fact that those who controlled them 
could, by ceding their control to other economic agents, enhance their own 
control, or potential control, over other products or productive forces of a 
different type or at a later time. And here we have a textbook definition of 
exchange-value.
All products and productive forces can therefore be said to have 
had a dual nature which determined their production. On one hand, they 
were produced because they contained use-value. On the other — and this 
aspect was the dominant one — they were produced for exchange.
2.2 Labour-Power in the USSR: Its Purchase and Sale .
The next issue is the question of whether or not labour took the form of 
wage-labour. In other words: was labour-power bought, or was it 
expropriated from each worker in some other way?
It is necessary to begin by noticing that there is a very strong 
apparence that workers did indeed sell their labour-power. Unlike in any 
previous society, virtually every producer had a 'job,' which meant that she 
had to work roughly the same hours every day under the supervision of 
others, make use of means of production controlled by others, and turn out 
a product for appropriation by others, in return for a wage-packet 
containing currency notes which she could then spend on things she needed 
to survive, such as food and clothing. As we have seen, this meant that the
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w orker's consum ption was m ediated by exchange. Unlike the slave, 
therefore, she was not reduced to being merely a quasi-mechanical part of 
the means of production, the feeding and clothing of whom was taken care 
of by the master. Instead, by dint of being paid wages and being allowed the 
freedom to shop, she was permitted a certain degree of independence.
Those acquainted with Soviet reality are of course aware of the 
limitations on consumer choice. Given the endemic consumer shortages and 
the fact that things were usually snapped up as soon as they appeared, 
superm arket shelves were often bare. Often products such as toys could 
only be bought in one place in town. The rate of saving was quite high. 
Moreover, tenancies were hard to obtain, even if rents and domestic heating 
were cheap, at least relative to the ratios between wages and prices in 
western countries. And of course 'connections' were usually required to 
expedite the prom pt purchasing of consumer durables such as cars. But 
these facts are beside the point, which is that the wage-packet given to the 
worker in return for her labour-power was real rather than purely nominal.
The onus is thus very much on those who deny the prevalence of 
wage-labour to prove their case. This, however, they have signally failed to 
do. Thus Cliff and Ticktin have both advanced arguments at the core of 
which lies the view that wage-labour was absent because there was no 'real' 
labour market, (Cliff 1955, pp.202-09; Ticktin 1991c, pp.83-84 and 102-04). In 
this view, workers were simply assigned placements by a single employer, 
the State. They had to work, and to work wherever they were told to. Even 
when they went shopping they received only what had been decided as 
appropriate for them to consume. Hence there was no competition for 
labour and therefore no unemployment. Since the rouble was essentially
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equivalent to company scrip, both wages and consumer prices functioned 
merely as a system of differential rationing.
Such an analysis is faulty from the very start. As I have shown 
above, there was a great deal of competition among the bureaucrats and 
enterprise directors who exercised a degree of power over the productive 
forces. Indeed, it is quite impossible to consider properly the nature of the 
Soviet system unless this is recognised for what it was. Of course if one 
assumes that there was no competition and that 'state ow nership' was 
'monolithic,' then it does indeed follow that there was no competition for 
labour resources — but all one has done is to develop an assumption.^® The 
non-existence of unemployment, meanwhile, would hardly  show the 
absence of a labour market any more than the globalisation of just-in-time 
production would show the absence of a car market. And finally, the idea 
that workers were literally forced to work by non-economic means 
represents a stretching of the facts, since the phenomenon of voluntary 
unemployment was not exactly unknown. (Lane 1987, pp,55-58).2i
In describing above how the bureaucratic system was essentially a 
field in which portions of control over the productive forces were 
exchanged, I have concentrated on the control over the material means of 
production. But it is only necessary to reiterate the point that such control, 
or power, was derived from labour and essentially exercised over labour, to 
see that competition among bureaucrats must necessarily have involved 
competition for labour resources. And if, as seems apparent, workers really 
were independent of the material means of production and received their 
wages in return for selling their labour-power, then it follows that insofar as 
labour was really purchased there must have been a labour market.
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There is abundant evidence to show that this deduction concorded 
w ith empirical reality. As Buick and Crump have pointed out (1986, 
pp.73-80) — relying upon the work of Chavance and Sapir — there was a 
substantial degree of worker-motivated labour turnover. (See the discussion 
of the works of each of these scholars in Chapter 2 above; see also Lane 1987, 
chap.3). Managers were led to collude with their workforces to secure 
bonuses in excess of centrally determined formal requirements. (Nove 
1980b, pp.210-11; Rutland 1985, p.l52). And quite aside from the 
implications of competition during the plan revision process, there was a 
notable level of direct competition for labour among individual local 
enterprises. Not only did enterprises advertise for labour, they also hired 
many workers at employment bureaux or at the proverbial factory gates. 
(Lane 1987, pp.50-54; Sapir 1984, p.61). The hoarding of labour, under 
conditions of microeconomic labour shortage, is well known. (See for 
example Kornai 1980a, p.256, and Hanson 1986). In short, as Nove has 
noted, the "forces of supply and demand" were of considerable influence on 
"actual earnings." (1980b, pp.206-15). If earnings rose so that enterprise 
directors could tem pt or keep workers, then this can only mean that 
labour-power was being bought.
Finally, it might be argued that even if labour-power was bought 
and sold, its exchange was nonetheless not 'general,' given the prevalence of 
the propiska system and a certain lack of congruence between official 
migration policy and the reality of population movement. (See Helgeson 
1986). But even this argument will not hold. First, there is undoubtedly an 
element of class struggle here: a market in labour-power does not have to be 
absolutely 'free.' Second, not only did all workers sell their labour-power.
i!
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but all workers were connected to each other through the generalised 
exchange of the products of their labour as described in section 2.1 above. 
The categories of labour-power and its sale were indeed 'general.' And 
third, every wage-packet contained roubles, which were acceptable in ever}’- 
shop in the country.
Since the distribution of labour-power, then, just as much as the 
distribution of the means of production and the distribution of the products 
of labour, was organised on the basis of generalised exchange, we are now 
able to state that the mode of production in the USSR was founded upon 
exchange as a general form.
2.3 Production for Profit
Finally, did the USSR know production for profit, and the categories 
associated with it, namely money and capital accumulation? This question, 
it seems, is best answered after being split into three parts. First, was the 
determinant aim of the Soviet economic system the production of a surplus? 
Second, if so, was the aim, at a more fundamental level, the accumulation of a 
surplus (that is, growth)? And third, if it was, did the surplus take the form 
of profit, i.e 'more money,' or 'AM'?
There can be little doubt that the first two questions should be 
answered in the affirmative. Even if the emphasis is pu t on m ilitary 
production, or on the various types of extensive growth which were most 
evident under Stalin and Khrushchev, it is clear that the aim of Soviet
CHAP.3 - SOVIET CAPITAUSM; A NEW THEORY 153
production was not the fulfilment of the needs of the direct producers, but 
rather production in excess of those needs, in fulfilment of the needs of the 
exploiters. More than this, it was always apparent that the underlying 
systemic aim was the development, both quantitative and technological, of 
the country's productive base. From Stalin's exhortation in 1931 (end 
backwardness or be crushed) to Khrushchev's speech in 1961 (bury the 
United States, economically) to Aganbegian's avowal in 1988 (increase 
overall growth rates, intensively), the official insistence was always on the 
continued expansion of the economy.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that this insistence was 
thoroughly in keeping with the underlying political-economic reality, and 
therefore with the basis of the Soviet economic system, was the collapse of 
that system at the turn of the 1990s, Even before Gorbachev was ousted, 
virtually the whole of the elite — from Yeltsin to the putschists of 19 August 
1 9 9 1 2 2  — had been converted to the cause of market reform. From a Marxist 
viewpoint it is therefore self-evident, given that ideas do not determine the 
course of history, that the 'administrative-command' system was proving 
dysfunctional in its own terms. The system's rulers wanted to change it. By 
the end of 1990, once even the official rate of growth had fallen below zero 
(Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1991, p.7; see also Schroeder 1991, p.3 and IMF 1992, 
p.93), and once the 'pre-crisis situation' which followed the 'tim es of 
stagnation' had itself given way to an 'open crisis' — to use the parlance of 
the Gorbachev period — the Soviet economic system was doomed.
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Having shown above that the mode of production was founded 
upon generalised exchange, we are now able to add that it was also founded 
upon an underlying drive for growth. It follows that it was capitalism.
2.4 Value, Abstract Labour, and Bureaucratic Capitalist Money
The third question is more difficult to answer. Or rather, the implications of 
the answer are difficult to grasp. Where there is 1) generalised commodity 
exchange, of both producer and consumer goods, 2) wage-labour, and 3) the 
production of a surplus whose reinvestment into expanded production is 
crucial to the system — in other words, where there is capitalism — there 
m ust also be money: this is so because money was defined functionally, as 
the form of capital by means of which the controllers of the extraction of the 
surplus product gauge their returns and reinvest them so as to generate yet 
more returns. In Marx's words,
it is impossible to abolish money itself so long as exchange value 
remains the social form of products. (1939, p. 145).
And 'more money' means the same as 'profit.' Given, however, that in
much of the economy — and most clearly of all in the producer goods sector
— prices expressed in roubles did not fulfil what has been defined as the
m onetary function, identifying the form which money actually took
becomes somewhat problematic.
As I have shown above, the category of capitalist money can only be 
grasped on the basis of an understanding of the category of capital, and this 
itself depends on the categories of exchange-value, accum ulated
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exchange-value, value, and abstract labour. It is therefore necessary to take a 
close look at the specific meaning of these categories in the USSR.
Exchange-value has been shown to be part of the nature of the Soviet 
product, insofar as those who controlled that product — or a part of the 
productive forces — were interested in it in terms of some property which 
v/as quite distinct from and abstracted from its physical characteristics. And 
this property was nothing other than its exchangeability, by dint of which its 
existing controllers could give up their present control and receive in return 
a degree of control over other products or productive forces in due course. 
Indeed for any particular bureaucrat the physical characteristics of the 
products or productive forces under his control were not the principal 
concern.
The question now arises of w hat the accum ulation  of such 
exchange-value actually amounted to. On one hand, of course, this is 
straightforward: successful bureaucrats were those who managed to extend 
their control over increasing portions of the overall social product. On the 
other, though, it is less so, since in order for exchange-value to be 
accumulated it must be able to take a form which is abstracted from the 
material product. And it is apparent that the only form which could play 
this role was symbolic. In other words, it was the representation of blat or 
control which those with whom exchange took place would recognise. More 
simply, one might say that it was a category which unified blat with official 
influence or 'pull.' Thus if a ministerial bureaucrat, say, agreed to allow an 
enterprise director a certain quantity of supplies, he was actually giving 
something up in addition to the actual supplies, since in general he would 
not be able to influence other enterprise directors or bureaucrats by claiming
  . .  _______________________
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to have the power to order delivery of those same supplies. In return for this 
he might hope, for example, in expectation of making it easier for that
'enterprise to meet its nominal targets, to increase his own influence in the 
ministry, relative to that of his colleagues, underlings, and superiors. And as 
he increased his recognised influence, his real influence would increase too 
insofar as his recognised influence was continually invested into the real 
movement of concrete material goods and resources.
Above I have stressed repeatedly that the sum total of all the 
bureaucrats' and directors' control over the productive forces could not 
expand in a vacuum. It was not independent of the use of those productive 
forces: it was exerted over the labour of waged workers and derived from 
the expenditure of that labour. The point must now be made that the 
generalisation of exchange and exchangeability necessarily determined the 
'generality' of a form of exchange-value. In other words, the recognition of 
bureaucratic influence and blat — and, in certain circumstances, blat was 
derived from the possession of large quantities of roubles (see Simis 1982) — 
was spread over the entire country. By dint of the real and social
'interconnectedness of labour and distribution, it should not be theorised as 
being split up into discrete areas of operation.
It follows that the accumulation of exchange-value was the 
accumulation of value, since the wage labour over which the power 
represented by such exchange-value was exerted — and from whose 
exchange-based exploitation it grew — was abstract labour in the fullest sense 
of the term. In other words, alienated labour was socialised through the 
generalised exchange of privatively appropriated products. And another 
word for accumulating value is capital
I
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It is on the basis of this understanding of the categories of the 
political economy that we m ust now endeavour to identify the form of 
fulfilment of the monetary function. Since we are using Marxist categories in 
the consideration of a form of money which is assuredly quite different from 
western or Japanese currency — and indeed not reducible in any way even 
to the rouble — we must now return to Marx and subtract from his theory of 
money those characteristics which are possessed only by 'classical' 
capitalism, so as to leave behind what it is that applies to capitalism in 
general. As we should expect when attention is turned to the present era, 
this m ust also involve going 'beyond Marx.' Since, though, it is not my 
intention either to exegetise or to revise, I shall limit myself here to referring 
to those of Marx's thoughts on money which seem the most useful in the 
present context.
It is fundamental, then, that money has no independent existence. 
Thus in the Grundrisse Marx discusses money as a
symbol [which] presupposes general recognition; it can only be a 
social symbol; it expresses, indeed, nothing more than a social 
relation. (1939, p.l44).
Much of what was in the Grundrisse, of course, found its way into Capital
And as if to demonstrate that his use of such terminology was no accident,
Marx goes further still in the chapter on money in Volume 1 of Capital (1867,
pp.188-244), and makes a string of references to mysticism.23
The name of a thing is entirely external to its nature. I know 
nothing of a man if I merely know his name is Jacob. In the same 
way, every trace of the m oney-relation disappears in the 
money-names pound, thaler, franc, ducat, etc. The confusion caused 
by attributing a hidden meaning to these cabalistic signs is made 
even greater by the fact that these money-names express both the
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values of commodities and, simultaneously, aliquot parts of a 
certain weight of metal which serves as the standard of money. 
(p.l95).
If we disregard here the implicit reference to gold (which in the chapter 
under consideration Marx assumes to be identical w ith the money 
commodity), and attempt to unpack his reference to kabbalah, we see that 
Marx is in fact drawing an implicit analogy between money and God, or 
w hat m ight be called the monotheistic God-archetype. His use of the 
concept of 'names' relates directly to the kabbalah, central to which is the 
idea of the sefirot, conceived of as the ten aspects of God in his capacity as 
Creator (Scholem 1971b, p.ll04), and as the "progressive manifestation of 
the Nam es of God." (Scholem 1971a, p.572). As is clear from the 
Encyclopaedia Judaica, kabbalah ascribes especial im portance to the 
understanding of sacred names (pp.503-30, 538 and 570-638 passim), a fact 
that assists us in deciphering the point of Marx's metaphor. Just as 
understanding the system of Names helps kabbalists understand the nature 
of God, so an understanding of the system of currencies helps communist 
critics of existing society to understand the nature of money. But just as God 
is not equivalent to a list, sum, or system of Names, nor should money be 
reduced to a list, agglomeration, or system of currencies. It is not, then, such 
a great jump to emphasise the crucial role played in the determination of the 
nature of money by its access to "general recognition," rather than its 
manifestation in the form of currency.
When dealing with 'really-existing' money in his own day, Marx 
devotes several chapters of what became Volume 3 of Capital to the nature 
and role of credit. If it is impossible for those working in the Autonomist 
school to agree with Marx that
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[the credit system] is the abolition of the capitalist m ode of 
production within the capitalist mode of production itself,...which 
presents itself prima facie as a mere point of transition to a new form 
of production (1894, p.569),
a critical understanding of credit is nonetheless crucial to an understanding
of 'really-existing' money. Credit certainly aids the equalisation of the rate of
profit and the acceleration of circulation (pp.566-67), but w hat I want to
em phasise here is its fundam entally bureaucratic nature. W ith the
development of the credit system money does not stop being a "symbol
presupposing general recognition": rather, what is at issue is the growth of
an entire structure, or system, wherein controllers of the extraction of the
surplus product negotiate and dictate conditions for the circulation and
investment of large amounts of money, as illustrated, for example, by the
presence of banking representatives on the boards of large companies.
Investment bankers, of course, just like merchant bankers, only lend money
when they think they can can be assured of a return, but what I am focusing
on is the role of bargaining and connections. Money, whose functions are
necessarily derived from its role in the M-C-M^ cycle, and, behind that, from
its role in the accumulation of productive forces, is thus inextricably bound
up with bureaucracy.
Such a recognition assists us enormously in identifying 'money as 
money' in the Soviet system, where, of course, economic bureaucracy was 
much more powerful than it has ever been in the countries of 'classical' 
capitalism. I have argued at length above that Soviet economic bureaucracy 
was essentially a system wherein portions of control over labour, the 
product, and the productive forces in general — portions taking the form of 
permission, clout and blat — were negotiated, exchanged, and, crucially, 
invested in production with the aim of accumulation: it was not simply a
, ■
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system wherein bureaucrats created posts and titles and then shuffled them 
around, without any bearing on labour, the exploitation of labour, and the 
growth of the social product. Bearing in mind Marx's warning to be wary of 
attributing too much significance to currencies, we should not, therefore, be 
afraid to look elsewhere than the rouble economy for the form taken by the 
money-relation, especially in the Soviet producer goods sector. Indeed, such 
a step is directly implied by Dunayevskaya's astute distinction between 
apparent Soviet 'profit' and the actual profit relation of the Soviet capital 
circuit. (See section 1,5 of the previous chapter). If in the 'classical' 
capitalism of Marx's day the credit system was a bureaucracy corresponding 
to a form of money, then in the Soviet context it makes sense to see Soviet 
economic bureaucracy as corresponding to a form of money too, namely 
bureaucratic clout, influence, permission, and blat, and we have solved the 
riddle.
There is, perhaps, one last ditch which the defenders of a 
'non-capitalist' position might wish to defend against this theory. This is the 
argum ent that as a "symbol presupposing general recognition," Soviet 
bureaucratic money was rather more 'fractured' than the pounds, dollars 
and yen which are moved around within the world credit system, to such an 
extent that the 'generality' of recognition as an equivalent should be put into 
question. Hence whereas in, say, the United States a million dollars might 
realistically be transferred from a current account to stocks in a South 
African goldmine, the portion of blat money held by the Kazakh Republic's 
Minister of Industrial Construction was not exchangeable in any realistic 
sense for anything at all even in the Moscow transport sector, let alone 
anything in South Africa.
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Of course there are two objections here: the first relating to 
exchangeability within the USSR, the second relating to the question of 
'world m oney/ Both, though, are in fact resolvable in quite simple terms. 
With reference to the first, Marx accepted in a seldom quoted footnote in 
Volume 1 of Capital that
it is by no means self-evident that the form of direct and universal 
exchangeability is an antagonistic form, as inseparable from its 
opposite, the form of non-direct exchangeability, as the positivity of 
one pole of a magnet is from the negativity of the other pole.
But, as he continued,
this has allowed the illusion to arise that all commodities can 
sim ultaneously  be im prin ted  w ith the stam p of d irect 
exchangeability, in the same way that it might be imagined that all 
Catholics can be popes. (1867, p.l61, n.26).
And he then describes how the literal and direct exchangeability of each
commodity for all the others is simply the "philistine utopia" of Proudhon.
The whole basis of the Marxian critique of the capitalist commodity as a
'value' form is of course the indirect but real socialisation of alienated labour
through commodity exchange: and Marx is rightly very short with the idea
that there has to be literal exchangeability of everything for everything
else.24
The second possible objection reduces to the isolation of the USSR 
from the world market. But this is hardly a substantial argument once the 
general critique of the internal conditions is accepted. One might indeed ask: 
if the capitalist world were divided into two separate halves, would they 
both stop being capitalist? To rely on this argument, one has first to assume 
that the development of capitalism in western countries — ultimately, 
western European countries — was not only 'classical,' but 'normal'; and
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that whatever there was in the USSR was 'peculiar^ and could only have 
been capitalist if it were fully conjoined to developments west of Prague. 
This would be a very biased and anti-empirical way to reach a theoretical 
critique of the history of capitalism. It is not at all based on a consideration 
of the internal contradictions of the political economy prevalent in the USSR.
In the final analysis, those who wish to maintain that the USSR was 
a non-capitalist formation will only be able to stress and stress again the fact 
that there was no individual ownership of enterprises, and that in much of 
the economy rouble holdings did not possess the characteristics of money. 
Accepting both of these points as true, 1 am arguing that in the capitalist 
w orld — which extends across the entire globe — such quantities of 
currency are not the only form money can take. Instead, they are a specific 
type of legally-backed permission, a form of exchange-value whose effective 
currency "depends on the problems, composition, stability and international 
relations" of each particular group, national or other, in possession of a 
degree of control over the extraction and reinvestment of the surplus 
product. ([Fernandez] 1989a, p.4). In the USSR this currency, in any active 
sense, was nil in much of the economy: but the crucial point is that 
non-quantifiable forms of permission could and did fulfil the same function 
as quantities of ''currency' in countries ruled by the bourgeoisie.^®
3 SOVIET CAPITALISM; ITS SPECIFICITY
In formulating a theoretical critique of the USSR I have attributed great 
weight to an understanding of the form taken by exchange relations among 
bureaucrats, and therefore I have not focused simply on 'state ownership,' a
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purely legal form. Consequently I prefer to refrain from using the term 'state 
capitalism ' to describe the nature of the system. Usually em ployed in 
contradistinction to 'private capitalism/ this term has the additional fault of 
concealing the fact that privative appropriation always held full sway in the 
USSR, just as it has done elsewhere. On the other hand, though, since the 
economic system undoubtedly arose sui generis, i t  remains necessary to 
have a ready term to describe the USSR in the context of the history of world
capitalism.27
Whilst I have rejected Buick and Crum p's theory of the 'state 
capitalist market,' emphasising instead the bureaucratic features of the 
Soviet system and the absence of any 'active' role for the rouble in much of 
the economy, it does not follow that bureaucracy is a major feature of 
Soviet-type systems alone, and not of the countries ruled by the bourgeoisie. 
One theorist to point this out has been the 'self-managementist' Castoriadis, 
w ho uses the terms 'fragm ented bureaucratic capitalism ' and 'total 
bureaucratic capitalism' to describe the bourgeois and Soviet-type systems 
respectively. (1977, pp. 15-16). His critique of bureaucracy, however, a form 
which he hypostatises, becomes resolutely non-Marxist, since he holds the 
libertarian view that the fundamental contradiction of capitalism is that 
which exists between the givers and takers of orders. Thus he arrives at a 
rather blunted critique of bourgeois political economy, which for the Marxist 
m ight be bureaucratic but is not essentially so in such a way that capital 
appears as a form which simply mediates bureaucratic rule. Indeed that is 
not even the case in the USSR, Moreover, libertarian anti-bureaucratism can 
easily lead to the view that, since the USSR was 'totally' bureaucratic, it 
m ust have represented a more 'advanced' form of domination than that of
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the bourgeoisie, and consequently should have been seen as the 'main 
enemy.' This indeed is the path along which Castoriadis has travelled in 
recent years. (1981a).2® Thus it is not possible for me to adopt his 
terminology either.
It would certainly be possible to refer to the system in which 
portions of blat money were exchanged, invested and accumulated as being 
a kind of bureaucratic market. But then of course, at the top at least, the 
market in western economies is to a fair extent b/af-mediated too, w ithout 
the role of the currency being reduced to that of the rouble in the USSR.
I
: |
Quite clearly, the difference lies in the form of money. W ishing for a 
terminology which neither over-emphasises nor denies the major differences 
between the bourgeois and Soviet systems, and hoping to encourage critique 
rather than to discourage it with flashy neologisms, I would therefore 
suggest using the terms 'bourgeois' and 'market capitalist' to describe the 
countries where capitalism developed from a 'classical' base, and, faute de 
mieux, 'bureaucratic capitalist' to describe the USSR.29
4 SUMMARY
In endeavouring to develop theoretically the 'capitalist' hypothesis, I have 
assumed throughout that the most logical basis on which to proceed is a 
consideration of fundamental categories of political economy. I have thus 
started by discussing the categories of the commodity, wage-labour, and 
production for profit. I then give a 'nutshell' definition of capitalism as a 
mode of production founded upon exchange as a general form and growth 
as an underlying drive.
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Developing the analysis, I show how behind these realities lie the 
fundamental categories of value and abstract labour. Capital is then shown 
to be a cycle of expanding exchange-value, taking the alternate forms of the 
capitalist commodity (C) and capitalist money (M). Crucially, money is then 
defined in relation to this cycle as a functional necessity.
I then argue that the first three categories continued to exist in the 
USSR, with perhaps the most controversial finding being the continued and 
generalised prevalence of exchange relations, and hence the commodity, in 
the producer goods sector. This is argued in the course of a lengthy analysis 
of the nature of the dominant relations of consumption, distribution, and 
production. After arguing that the predominant form of exploitation of 
labour-power was founded upon its purchase, I then suggest that the 
systemic nature of a drive for growth is similarly evident.
Once the categories of value and abstract labour are identified, the 
theoretical task then becomes one of identifying Soviet 'money as money.' 
This is approached by focusing above all on money's function, as the means 
by which the controllers of the extraction of surplus value gauge their 
returns and reinvest them. A view is presented according to which 
bureaucratic forms of permission, and, more generally, blat, are understood
I
".S.
as fulfilling the monetary function and therefore as constituting a form of 
money other than the rouble.
Special emphasis is laid throughout on the necessarily competitive 
nature of Soviet economic bureaucracy. Since the term 'state capitalism' is 
seen to refer not to competitiveness but mainly to a legal form, it is rejected 
in favour of the term 'bureaucratic capitalism.' This is opposed to the
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'bourgeois capitalism' or 'market capitalism' which holds sway in countries 
where the basic form of money is the currency.
It is argued that the Soviet political economy is founded upon wage-labour 
and upon bureaucratic forms of both exchange-value and money: and 
hence, given the systemic need for growth, on the accumulation of capital. 
In short, the USSR is a capitalist country which is especially bureaucratic.
*****
NOTES
In the Manifesto, the quoted phrase is applied only to pre-capitalist 
societies (Marx and Engels 1848, p.33), but there is nothing that 
removes the theoretical possibility of its relevance at some time to 
capitalism too.
"In the case of the USSR, however, use value is all important." (Ticktin 
1991c, p .ll.)
Nor indeed was he the first, even after the birth of the industrial era, to 
express a revolutionary communist opposition to commodities, money, 
and wage-labour. On the ideas of the Conspiracy for Equality in Paris 
in 1796, for example, see Buonarotti 1828 and the documents collected 
therewith, and Rose 1978, especially pp.185-204.
First published in 1903, this text was written in the notebooks now 
usually known as the Grundrisse, first published collectively in 1939.
The description of capitalist money as 'money as money' (Marx 1939, 
p.872) should not be over-used, since in the context of the idea of 
capitalist money as money's 'achieved form,' it carries more than a hint 
of the idea that the forms intrinsic in the capitalist mode of production 
are the 'necessary' developments of forms which existed in preceding 
modes. The inference can easily be draw n that the progress of 
capitalism was 'necessary' to provide the basis for the inauguration of 
communism. Although this is a statement that I would reject, it is not 
possible to discuss it in the present context.
First published in 1933, this text was written as a draft chapter in one of 
the planned structures of Capital Since its publication in English in 
1976 it has appeared as an appendix to that work.
From a working class point of view, of course, money does not appear 
as a form necessary for capital investment, but more simply as the form 
of the wage and the mediating form of the imposition of scarcity. 'In  
exchange for his sold activity, the worker gets money.... W ith this 
money he can buy commodities, things, but he cannot buy back his 
activity.... He can sell his living activity for money, but he cannot buy 
his living activity for money." (Perlman 1969, p;5). As a capitalist form, 
then, money must endure as long as capitalism. On the other hand, 
though, this does not mean that the quantity of money which is paid to 
the worker, or the quality or quantity of work which the worker does 
for a given wage, are not subject to contestation. But in the approach 
used here in relation to money the issue of class struggle, for reasons of
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clarity, has been 'foreclosed.' (See Shortall 1994, and Introduction 
above).
8 In what follows I have found Marx's "Introduction" to A Contribution to 
A Critique of Political Economy (1903) especially useful.
8 After being in force from 1916 to 1921, rationing was reintroduced in 
1929-35 and 1941-47, and again in the late Gorbachev period. Except for 
a short time during the economic collapse marked by the civil war, all 
goods on ration have always borne a price. See Nove 1982, pp.87, 
156-57, 202, 220, 249, and 308-10; see also Carr 1952, pp.233-36, and 
Rogger 1983, p.260.
As Rutland puts it, the question 'How do Soviet planners arrive at 
prices for their industrial goods?' is "not as crucial as it may first 
appear" since
few decisions are made on the basis of these prices. If the prices 
for a particular firm's goods are set too low it will turn in 
losses, but so long as it is fulfilling its plan targets for principal 
products no one will complain. (1985, p.l27).
 ^ In chap. 5 Simis describes the role of cash bribery in industry; and in 
chap. 6 he describes black-market production. He points out, though 
(p.103), that "private industry  in the Soviet Union does not 
manufacture machinery or automobiles...."
12 Rutland observes that whereas the total number of product plans was 
in excess of 60,000, the number of different types of product was over 
10 million. (1985, p.ll6).
13 For an earlier reference to the role of "commercial travellers" in 
negotiating inter-enteiprise deals, see Hubbard 1942, pp.5 and 239.
14 Goldman ignores the fact that the consumption of consumer goods is 
indeed productive, since it reproduces labour-power. But it is true that 
in the sphere of reproductive consumption — of food, for example — 
there is more flexibility in terms of substitute goods.
1® In Lenin's words: "Unquestioning subordination to a single will is 
absolutely necessary for the success of processes organised on the 
pattern of large-scale machine industry." (1918a, p.35).
18 In preparing this brief description of Soviet economic management I 
have found the following sources invaluable: Berliner 1957, Nove 
1980b and 1982, Lane 1985a, and Rutland 1985.
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17 That this is a highly compacted model is amply illustrated by the sort 
of administrative changes which occurred throughout the Soviet 
period. Thus in the early years the Supreme Council of the National 
Economy (VSNKh) functioned as a kind of super-ministry; but in the 
late 1920s the powers of its glavki were handed to 'associations' 
(ob'edineniia) based upon the State-sector wholesaling syndicates which 
had previously shared their function with the Nepmen, Then in the 
1930s, as division and subdivision rapidly expanded the num ber of 
industrial ministries (commissariats), and the importance of the 
ob'edinenie faded from the scene, the role of Gosplan as a central 
coordinator rapidly increased. In Gosplan, however, the autonomy 
previously enjoyed by 'former Menshevik' economists was stamped 
out, and indeed every official's scope of operation was increasingly 
circumscribed by the GPU/NKVD, which spread fear and competition 
simultaneously. The head of Gosplan from 1938, Voznesensky, was 
arrested in 1949 and executed in 1950.
Then in 1957, once the security service's reign of terror was over, a 
proposal was made to re-establish an economic 'super-m inistry.' 
Khrushchev responded to this by abolishing even the existing 
economic ministries (or most of them) and handing over most of their 
functions to newly-created regional economic councils {sovmrkhozy) 
subordinate to republican Councils of Ministers. This represented a 
move from division by industrial branch to division by region. 
Resultant autarkic tendencies were initially counterbalanced by an 
ascendant Gosplan, but then the latter organ itself had part of its 
plan-implementation function removed and given to a kind of central 
coordination of the sovnarkhozy.
Eventually in 1965 the branch ministries were reintroduced, albeit 
with much of their former role in organising supplies now taken over 
by Gossnab. But although the proclaimed aim was an increase in 
autonom y for the m anagem ent of each enterprise, this proved 
impossible to achieve in the framework of existing relations between 
m anagers, m inistries, and planning authorities: relations which 
included, for example, the ratchet effect, the shortage economy (or 
'seller's market'), and the central setting of prices and gross output 
targets. Even the merging of enterprises in the 1970s into 'associations' 
or 'combines' — behind which lay the more specific aim of increasing 
managers' independence from ministries — failed to remove the 
weight of these factors. Such is the story of the development of Soviet 
economic management. (Hutchings 1982, Munting 1982, Nove 1982).
18 It is worth pointing out that Marx recognised unambiguously that 
capital accumulation could and sometimes did take place in a way not 
mediated by the market. (1905-10, pp.486-92). Whilst I do not argue 
here that he anticipated later developments under Lenin and Stalin, it
_________
CHAP.3 - NOTES 170
is in teresting nonetheless that his context, nam ely tha t of 
machine-building, industrial raw materials, and the communications 
infrastructure, is not wholly unsuggestive of the massive growth of 
Soviet heavy industry after 1929.
18 Indeed, even goods such as stockpiled nuclear weapons do not 
constitute an exception. Not only did they serve a purpose in 
preparation for an intensification of international competition, or in the 
maintenance of the existing competitive balance; but even those which 
were hypothetically never meant to be discharged at all would still 
have been either kept in good condition or left to go to ruin. In either 
case, we can speak of purposive consumption, albeit partial. And any 
product thought by its end-user to have any kind of utility is a product 
with a use-value. It does not matter that the use-value is subordinated 
to the need or drive to compete, or to snobbery, or to the tendency of 
bureaucrats to build empires: the im portant point is that the 
subjectively perceived utility of the product depends at least partially 
upon its physical characteristics. Similarly, if a worker buys a suit 
solely because he needs it for a job interview, it still has a use-value, 
because something that was not a suit would not be suitable. Use-value 
subordinated to exchange-value is still use-value.
This is a point obscured by Roland, for two reasons. First, in his 
model of capitalism he describes exchange-value as a "form of 
mediation" of use-value. (1989, pp.43-46). But, as Debord puts it:
exchange value could arise only as an agent of use-value, but 
its victory by means of its own weapons created the conditions 
for its own domination. [...] Exchange value is the condottiere of 
use-value who ends up waging the war for himself. (1967, 
p.46).
In other words, since exchange-value is necessarily abstracted from 
use-value, its history is the history of the development of its opposition 
to use-value. (The translation here would better read "ends up waging 
war for himself.") Since exchange-value is opposed to use-value, it is not 
the capitalist form of 'instrumentality' as opposed to 'autotelicity' 
(Roland 1989, pp.25-26), for instrumentality can often be an aspect of 
use-value. Moreover, from capital's point of view it is actually 
use-value w hich is instrum ental and the accum ulation  of 
exchange-value in its general form — that is, value — which is the 
main aim. Roland's position that the USSR knew exchange in the 
absence of exchange-value (pp.61-62), and his view that 'm aterial 
remuneration' and incentives involve an "anthropological invariant" 
(p. 149), serve to demonstrate further his insufficient grasp of the 
meaning of the concept of exchange.
CHAP.3 - NOTES 171 -s.;
Second, it makes little sense to hypostatise in the Soviet context a 
specific form  of "m ediation" defined as "ind icator value" 
("valeur-indice," or pokazatel'naia stoimdst'). (pp.45-102). Once we recall 
that use-value is properly defined only in terms of the subjective 
consideration of a product's physical characteristics, we realise that 
"indicator value" is also so definable, and hence it cannot be opposed 
to the category of use-value in any fundamental way. If, for example, a 
car is produced simply so that an enterprise can pu t out a greater 
quantity of tonnes of steel, then this is still a consideration of use-value, 
and in this sense I should have to agree with Ticktin (see Chapter 6 
below) against Roland. The point of the present chapter is to look 
behind such considerations in terms of the control over the productive 
forces.
28 Cliff goes so far as to write that "in essence, the laws prevailing in the 
relations between the enterprises and between the labourers and the 
employer-state would be no different if Russia were one big factory 
managed from the centre, and if all the labourers received the goods 
they consumed directly, in kind" — a truly remarkable counter-factual 
avoidance of the issue. (1955, p.209). To be fair to Ticktin, it is necessary 
to accept that unlike Cliff he does consider the internal contradictions 
of Soviet economic administration. But he omits to look at competition 
in any profound fashion in the context of control over labour. His 
theorisation of production and labour in the USSR are criticised 
extensively in Chapter 6 below.
21 It is necessary to add a rider here to take into account the prohibition of 
voluntary labour turnover which was in effect from 1940. If this had 
become the basis of the system, then it is doubtful whether one could 
m aintain the view that there was a labour market. (Ditto with the 
system of labour allocation overseen by Bevin in the United Kingdom 
from 1941). But it did not become that basis, being eroded in practice in 
the early 1950s and abolished in 1956, when labour turnover reached 
38%. (Brown 1966, p.l6; M. McAuley 1969, p.47). Moreover, the fact 
that labour-power is exchanged does not mean that it has to be 
exchanged on a free market, and even under a system of State direction 
there is still class tension over the wage. But this argument must not be 
taken too far; and if the system of labour camps had become the 
predom inant form of expropriation of labour-power, or m ode of 
production, then one w ould rightly speak of slavery rather than 
wage-labour. (On labour camps, see for example Wheatcroft 1981).
22 In a press conference held by the putschists on the day they seized 
power. Acting President Gennadii Yanaev stated that "above all, we 
will direct our actions towards the stabilisation of the economy. We 
will not renounce reforms intended to move us in the direction of the 
market. We feel, however, that there will be a need to be more precise
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in defining and organising the management of our actions on a higher 
level." (Pravda, 20 August 1991, p.2)
23 The references are to kabbalah (1867, p.l95), alchemy (pp.208 and 229), 
the Delphic temple (p.229), and the Holy Grail (p.230). In the previous 
chapter, referring to money as the universal equivalent, Marx has 
already quoted a piece from the biblical Book of Revelations 
concerning the "name of the beast, or the number of his name." (p.l81).
24 Of course there has never been such an uncontradictedly free market. 
Hence it is absurd to posit such a market as the essence of capitalism.
25 In the theoretical presentation above, I have tried to anchor the 
argument as solidly as possible upon the fundamental concepts of 
privative appropriation, exchange, wage-labour, and surplus value. 
Chen Eijin takes a very different approach, ascribing major significance 
to concepts such as revisionism, historical necessity, and the division 
between the economic and the political; but nonetheless it is worth 
mentioning that one of his formulations in certain ways parallels my 
conclusions. Considering the system of "revisionism" which he sees as 
an actuality in the USSR and a possibility in China, he writes that
Such ownership [by the bureaucrat-monopoly privileged class] 
forms an immensely competitive system of capital accumulation 
[emphasis added].... It is an enhanced, privilegized form of the 
private ownership system. For the bourgeoisie pools its capital 
for investment purposes, and derives profits in proportion to 
the amount of capital individually invested; exploitation is 
carried out through the capitalization of the m eans of 
production. But the bureaucrat-monopoly privileged class 
bands together for political purposes, and enriches itself 
through the sweat and toil of tiie people in proportion to the 
amount of power individually possessed; exploitation is carried 
out through the 'privilegization' of the concentration of power 
demanded by social production under public ownership, and 
through the subsequent capitalization of privilege [emphasis 
added]. (1979, p.72).
Even if Chen Erjin argues that "revisionism" is a quite different "mode 
of exploitation" from capitalism (p.85), this last concept of the 
capitalisation of privilege would seem quite compatible with my own 
understanding of Soviet hlat as a form of money. Unfortunately, 
though, Chen Erjin's work is characterised by great theoretical 
imprecision: assuming that it  is sensible to refer to the existence of 
capital accumulation in the absence of capitalism, he is clearly not in a 
position to develop this concept in any profound way. It might be said 
that he describes Soviet-type privilege as capital w ithout paying
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attention to what capital actually is: self-expanding value. His concept 
of capitalisation, a term he applies to both East and West, is seemingly 
full of promise, but remains dismally underdeveloped.
But all the same, it m ust be noted that the concept of the 
capitalisation of privilege is still much more advanced than the vague 
view given by Horvat that in terms of 'the Marxian analysis of 
alienation' the concepts of 'money,' 'buying', and 'ownership' can be 
replaced in the context of the USSR with those of 'office,' 'doing,' and 
'incumbency,' and the concept of 'commodity fetishism' with that of 
'office fetishism.' (1982, p.96). Unlike Horvat, Chen Erjin does relate 
bureaucratic privilege to social production.
26 Clearly capitalism, a mode of production which became a world 
society, and which is founded on wage-labour and the M-C-M" cycle, 
can utilise a number of different systems of competition and control— 
ranging from South African and Israeli apartheid to the Islamic 
republic of the ayatollahs, from the Ecuadoran military hierarchy to the 
German Bundesbank, from the British old boy network to the Chinese 
triads, from Peronism to parliam entary committees. The precise 
characteristics of these systems depend upon the nature of past and 
present class and intra-class struggles, the role and importance of each 
area or power within world capitalist society, and factors inherited 
from pre-capitalist societies.
27 On the 'Russian question,' see the list of works m entioned in the 
Introduction.
26 Castoriadis eventually comes to open an article (1982a, p.l7) with the 
following sentence: "Clearly [sic], stratocratic Russia's aim is the 
expansion of its empire and, ultimately, w orld dom ination." His 
position, which changed little even after Gorbachev came to power in 
1985 (Castoriadis 1988), has led him to be viewed in some circles as a 
'libertarian cold-warrior.' (A.D.1985.). In view of his eventual 
'Europeanism ' (see n.38 in Chapter 2 above), one m ight query the 
direction of the logical link he makes between the position that the 
USSR is the most advanced superpower and the position that it is the 
'main enemy.'
28 If a currency were to be viably established as the basis of Russian 
capitalism, then it would of course have turned into bourgeois market 
capitalism.
CHAPTER 4
The Class Struggle: A Critique of Sovietological Theories
Since the social production relations in the USSR were exploitative, it 
follows from the concepts given in section 1 of Chapter 1 above that there 
was necessarily a fundamental and radical antagonism between the working 
class and the system. This antagonism is understood to have involved not 
just a conflict of 'interests,' or a 'contempt' for the elite's claim to represent 
the working class (see Ralis 1981), but continuous actual conflict. In other 
words, it is held to be impossible to reach a full understanding of the nature 
of the system, whether or not that nature is held to be capitalist, in the 
absence of an understanding of the nature and forms of the class struggle.
But before focusing critically (Chapters 5-6) on the relevant works 
of those who define their approaches as Marxist, and before discussing the 
matter positively (Chapter 7) on the basis of the ideas presented in Chapters 
1 and 3 above, I consider in the present chapter the relevant aspects of the 
'mainstream ' literature. In other words, I deal with the considerations of
1.1 Politics: 'Totalitarianism ' and Interest Groups
A consideration of the most influential theories will suffice to show that 
their authors have ascribed little importance to the role of class struggle. 
W orking within the confines defined by 'political science/ they have
p o licy ;4  and consequently they have either ignored the subject or else 
approached it merely tangentially.
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Soviet class struggle offered by a selection of scholars adopting 
'sovietological' approaches. 1
In the first section I consider how the topic has been dealt with by 
the authors of influential 'political' theories about the nature of Soviet 
society (Inkeles and Bauer, Friedrich and Brzezinski, Skilling and Griffiths,
Hough, and S. C o h e n ),2 as well as by a number of those who have published 
influential works on the economy (the Birmingham school, Nove, and 
K o rn a i).3  More precisely, I show how they have failed to relate to it. I then 
focus in the second section on the works of sovietological scholars who have
■ -I.
dwelt at greater length upon the nature of the Soviet working class: either in 
specific contexts such as the workplace (Grancelli) or perestroika (Connor, 
and D. Mandel), or in a relatively broader relationship to the nature of the 
system (Lane and O'Dell, Pravda, and Zaslavsky).
1 GENERAL THEORIES
li
»preferred to focus on the decision-making process and the formulation of
t
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The view that it would be mistaken to attribute much importance to 
class conflict, since the form it took was not 'political,' is thus highly 
apparent even in the work of the sociological sovietologists Inkeles and 
Bauer. In their chapter on 'Social Class Cleavage' in The Soviet Citizen (1959), 
they thus suggest (p.304), given that the "salient social cleavage" was the 
one which operated between "party and non-party segments," that a 
treatm ent of class m ust necessarily be parenthetical. Indeed, after 
recognising that "workers and peasants [i.e. kolkhozniks] quite often [saw] 
themselves as sharing common interests in opposition to the nonm anual 
classes," and after showing how substantial numbers of émigré intelligent}/ 
and workers considered the others' class to be 'harmful' to their own, they 
remark that the responses to their investigators' questions may have given a 
false impression, since the "very wording might have aroused or excessively 
stimulated class consciousness." (pp.307 and 310-12).
Assuming, though, that the level of class hostility in the USSR was 
as high as that expressed verbally by their émigré informants, these early 
'totalitarians' argue that even so it would not have been a critical problem 
for the system: firstly, since such sentiment was unlikely to find "a political 
channel for expression," and secondly, because of the restrictions on free 
discussion within the CPSU. In response to the anticipated objection that, 
denied formal political outlets, "class feeling" would then become all the 
more explosive in potential, "or at least a consistent major drag on 
organised, unified efforts in pursuit of the common political goals [sic] of the 
society," they give the view that it was in fact "much less intense than 
political sentiment, and much less likely to produce cleavage than the 
Communist vs. non-Communist dichotomy." (p.317). Backing this up with
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reference to comparable opinion studies showing similar levels of class 
feeling in the US, Inkeles and Bauer then state that they "no more expect the 
Soviet Union to cleave asunder along this 'fault plane' than the United
States," Since in their approach they make no use of any concept of 
exploitation, or of resistance to it,® in making such an observation they are 
stating in effect that the social significance of class conflict was minimal.®
Writing slightly later, but putting a similar emphasis on the role of 
the CPSU, the more classically political-scientific 'totalitarians' Friedrich and 
Brzezinski concentrate above all on the absence of political rights. In their
work Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1961) they thus conclude the 
chapter on Soviet labour by giving the view that
it seems very clear that labor has lost its freedom  and 
independence, that its [sic] organizations have become bureaucratic 
agencies of the government, and that not only in his working hours, 
but in his leisure time as well the worker has become a cog in the 
totalitarian centrally directed economy. To complete the paradox of 
his workers' paradise, any worker who fails to live up to the 
standards set by the regime is in danger of being made a slave in
one of the many labor camps of the regime, (p.224).
In other words, the working class was 'totally' oppressed: it could not create
■îl:independent organisations, and was therefore unable to struggle.^ It is 
worth noting in this regard that a 'paradox' in this context is something that 
is contrary to received opinion. An 'over-determined' interest in debunking 
the supposed 'paradox' of the Soviet 'workers' paradise' — which was 
hardly a 'paradox' for the Soviet working class — leads to a concentration 
on the brutality  of oppression, rather than on the contradictions of 
exploitation as a social production relation.®
In Survival is Not Enough (1984), Pipes, a leading successor to the 
'totalitarians,' holds that the essential feature of the Soviet political system
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was "absolute rule by an oligarchy of Party officials who not only 
monopolize political authority but literally own their own countries and 
everything that lies within their own boundaries." (p.l3). Since there is in 
fact nothing in his book about the Soviet workers apart from his view that 
they had poor living standards, it can be taken as read that he agrees with 
the original 'totalitarians' that the class struggle was non-existent or at least 
irrelevant to an understanding of the nature of the system.
The 'totalitarian' school began to decline in the 1960s owing to the 
rise of ideas about Soviet 'interest groups' after the onset of 'peaceful 
coexistence' and the end of the Cold War. In their edited volume Interest 
Groups in Soviet Politics (1971) Skilling and Griffiths thus focus their attention 
on the role and interplay of sectional interests within the elite. But their 
concern is exclusively with 'political interest groups' (pp.24-27), and so they 
too fail to deal at all with class conflict. Making what amounts to the same 
criticism, Ticktin remarks (1991c, p.7) that the 'interest groupers' "left 
unexplored the crucial question: How does the elite rule?"
The 'revisionist' Hough also focuses on 'interest groups' in order to 
develop the concept of 'institutional pluralism.' He thus rejects the idea that 
the USSR was, in essence, an 'ideological system' wherein the leadership 
sought to remould society on the basis of 'ideas and aspirations' (1972, 
p p .30-41 ),8 and emphasises (1972, 1976) the post-Stalinist diffusion of 
decision-making pow er and the increased 'participation ' of various 
groupings within the system. Unlike Skilling and Griffiths he does not 
restrict his attention to groupings within the elite. When he turns away from 
institutional matters, however. Hough simply describes the increasing
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willingness of the leadership to "listen to policy advice from 'society'," 
rather than conceiving of working class struggle as a real force. (1972, p.30). 
Although later he draws up a list of problems faced by policy-makers 
vis-à-vis the workers (1979, pp.368-72), he never reaches the point of 
theorising an overall relationship between the working class and the system. 
Instead, he prefers to give management-labour conflicts equal weight with 
problems arising between economic branches (p.373), on the grounds that 
for individual bodies and committees they are just as important.
Whereas Skilling, Griffiths and Hough base their rejection of the 
'totalitarian' approach on a discussion of post-Stalinist changes, Cohen's 
attack is altogether more savage. In Rethinking the Soviet Experience (1985), he 
notes the politicisation of Anglo-American sovietology during the 'cold wari 
period, and explains (chap.l) how the polarisation of w orld politics 
probably ruled out any other development.
A prom inent figure in liberal sovietology, Cohen discusses the 
"sustained struggles between reformist and conservative groups inside the 
high political establishment," but accepts (pp.132-33) that "authentic 
reformism and conservatism are always social as well as political." 
Developing the point, he criticises the "untenable and persistent notion that 
the Soviet party-state officialdom is somehow remote and insulated from 
society and its outlooks." For him.
Such a conception makes no sense in a country where the state 
employs almost every citizen and the party has 18 million adult 
members. In fact, there is every reason to think that virtually all the 
diverse trends in society,...from far right to far left and including 
those expressed by dissidents, also exist inside the political 
officialdom, however subterraneanly. (p.l33).
CHAP.4 - CLASS STRUGGLE: SOVIETOLOGICAL THEORIES 180
But even if Cohen is aware of the inherent lim itations of a 
concentration solely on the political, to the exclusion of the social and 
historical (p.24), he nonetheless assesses the importance of social trends in 
terms which remain essentially political (reformism, conservatism, left, 
right). Summarising his thesis, he states that
the main obstacle to further reform...is not one or another 
generation, institution, elite, group, or leader, but the profound 
conservatism that seems to dominate almost all of them, from the 
family to the Politburo, from local authorities to the state nachalstvo.
Put simply, the Soviet Union has become, both 'dow nstairs' in 
society and 'upstairs' in the political system, one of the m ost 
conservative countries in the world. Indeed, public opinion polls in 
recent years suggest that ordinary Soviet citizens — or at least the 
Slavic majority — are even more conservative than some segments 
of the ruling elite. (p.l46).
W hilst it is, of course, possible for a Marxist to agree w ith this on an
empirical level, it is not possible to share Cohen's 'point of view,' which
leads him to assert that "to use the language of the official press, the
antagonistic forces of 'innovation and tradition' have formed 'two poles' in
Soviet politics, culture and society." (p. 128). Whereas for Cohen the terms
'reformism' and 'conservatism' are "plain, historical and universal, as well
as social and political" (p.l29), and provide the key to an understanding of
the basic conflict, for the Marxist all evidence on, for example, conservative
trends in the working class or reformism in the elite is considered in very
different terms. Two political tendencies each disposing of cross-class
support cannot possibly be construed as polar opposites in any socially
fundamental sense, since their opposition cannot be equated with — and
indeed, fails even to express — the class contradictions of the social
production relations.
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1.2 Economics: Technical Development, Indicators, and Shortage
N um erous sovietological works have been published on Soviet 
economics, economic development, industry, and so on, but a consideration 
of some of the best-known will suffice to show that there has been a minimal 
theorisation of even the role and form of the relationship between the 
working class and the political-economic system, let alone the class struggle.
An important place in the development of empiricist sovietology is 
occupied by the scholars of the 'Birmingham school.' In particular, these 
researchers have looked in detail at the technical level of various sectors of 
Soviet industry and at the pace and quality of industrial research, 
development, and innovation. (Amann, Cooper and Davies 1977, Amann 
and Cooper 1982, Amann and Cooper 1986). Their main finding is that there 
was a lag behind the West which was not being reduced.
On the whole this work is extremely empirical, but if there is a 
theoretical element within it of political-economic significance then it is 
perhaps most evident in Davies's early conclusion that
important changes clearly need to be made in a planning system of 
the Soviet type, if it is to be flexible enough to allow for large-scale 
innovations and economic experiment at factory level; and if 
consumer demand is to find adequate expression in production 
planning. This does not, I believe, mean that a direct planning 
system is inappropriate for an advanced economy; but it does mean 
that the equation of direct planning with 'extreme centralisation' is 
a vulgarisation of the concept. (1958, p.327).
"Direct planning" is then defined as a system of planning in which growth
is regulated by conscious aims "embodied" by a central authority and
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formulated on a basis of "realistic knowledge." In short, the implication is 
that growth was necessary but conceptual vulgarisation to some extent 
impeded it. Similarly, the implication of the later work is that technological 
development was also necessary, but was taking place only slowly and in a 
limited fashion. In regard to explanation, Amann states that "we do not yet 
know why Soviet technology is on the whole backward" (1978, p. 71), 
whereas Cooper briefly mentions the difficulty of introducing m odern 
western management techniques in the face of "overriding departmental 
interests and the incessant pressure for output," and also the burdensome 
(cultural?) requirement that concepts developed abroad m ust first be 
'sovietised.' (1982, pp.507-08 and 511).
If such essentially marginal comments at least show a recognition 
that a question exists as to why technological development was problematic, 
there is no recognition at all of the existence of more fundamental questions 
as to why growth and technological development were necessary in the first 
place. And since there is no conception of the existence of a surplus product, 
there can be no consideration of the category of exploitation, let alone class 
struggle. Thus even when Hanson comes to consider full employment he 
blames labour shortages simply on inefficient labour allocation, and 
inefficient labour allocation on the existence of the centrally-administered 
system, without considering how workers' "cynicism, apathy and larceny" 
might be causes as well as effects. (1986, p. 105).
Another important sovietological analysis of the economy has been 
produced by Nove. (See especially Nove 1958a, 1980b, and 1982). As well as 
writing on a more historical level than the Birmingham scholars Nove has
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also written more theoretically, being the first person to introduce into 
sovietology the concept of the 'success indicator.' The usefulness of this 
concept cannot reasonably be contested, and indeed it is now part of the 
general background knowledge of the field. The im portance of an 
understanding of the role of targets, whether for gross output, sales, 
productivity, quality, net output, or rouble profits, need not be repeated 
here. W hat needs to be stressed, though, is that in emphasising the category 
of the success indicator (pokazatel'), Nove is undoubtedly m aking a 
contribution to political economy.
Unfortunately, though, he does not make use of this contribution in 
such a way as to shed light upon a set of categories underlying and indeed 
constituting the political economy itself. Instead, w hat he does is to ask 
questions about the 'necessity' or otherwise of Stalinism in the context of an 
assumed necessity of economic growth or 'development.' Towards the end 
of his article "Was Stalin Really Necessary?", he writes that
the serious problem for us is to see how far certain elements of 
Stalinism, in the sense of purposefully-applied social coercion, 
imposed by a party in the name of an ideology, are likely or liable 
to accom pany rap id  econom ic developm ent even in 
non-Communist countries.
And furthermore,
unless we realize how complex are the problem s w hich 
development brings, how irrelevant are many of our ideas to the 
practical possibilities open to statesmen in these countries, we may 
unconsciously drive them towards the road which led to Stalin. 
They cannot be satisfied with 'the pace of a tortoise.' (1962, 
pp.32-33).
Noting in passing the identification with 'western goals,' we notice that he 
takes as givens not only the existence of a national economy and a State, but
■il
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also the categories of development and growth. Hence he is evidently 
unable to explain their basis: he does not contribute to the critique of political 
economy.
In similar fashion he prefaces a discussion of w hether or not 
"Marxist 'class' analysis" can be applied to the USSR with the statement that
few will disagree that the Soviet system has evolved into a 
hierarchical society within which status and pow er depends 
decisively on rank.
Indeed, one could, without too much exaggeration, fit Soviet 
society into a 'universal civil and military service' model. (1975, 
p.616).ii
Towards the end of the same text he states without qualification that Soviet 
society was indeed "based on a civil and military service." (original 
emphasis). Having adopted such a view he evidently disbars himself from 
analysing the class relations in political-economic terms: that is, in terms of 
the categories defining the relations of production. It follows that he cannot 
theorise the class struggle.
To some extent, though, such assumptions have been disregarded 
by the French 'Novian' theorist Roland, who has endeavoured to place the 
'success indicator' at the centre of a much more profound political-economic 
analysis. (1989). Although not a Marxist in that he sees 'remuneration' and 
economy as anthropological 'invariants' and denies the possible existence of 
the category of abundance (pp.27-28 and 149), he is clearly influenced by 
Marx as well as by Nove when he theorises the existence of an important 
contradiction in the USSR between the category of use-value and the 
category of 'indicator value.' At the same time, however, he makes it clear 
that he is not arguing anything other than that
. y / ' - ' - i  I  ' , r  ~ .I,...--   - :
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the simple contradiction between use-value and indicator-value 
expresses in germinal form a large proportion [porte en germe une 
grande partie] of the inherent contradictions of the Soviet mode of 
production.
And he goes on to say that what this means is simply that the contradictions 
of the mode of production appear "most starkly" when the analysis begins 
with the contradiction between use-value and indicator-value. (p,82).
I have criticised the concept of indicator-value in Chapter 3 above 
(Note 19), but now the point to be made is that it is part of a concept with 
which Roland describes the contradictory form of the product. It does not 
necessarily imply a concept of wage-labour, and indeed it is not Roland's 
view that the USSR was capitalist. Indeed in his chapter on labour and the 
workers (pp.146-69) he simply states that the workers are subordinated and 
alienated, and does not discuss the form of the surplus product. Instead, he 
simply explains that the shortage economy corresponding to the inherent 
inefficiency of calculation by indicator-value necessarily leads to an endemic 
shortage of labour at enterprise level. In response to this state of affairs, a 
great premium is placed upon workers' marginal productivity, defined as 
their co-operation in ensuring nominal plan fulfilment as opposed to 
underfulfilm ent (the 'Micawber effect'). Marginal production is thus, 
generally speaking, highly 'labour-power elastic.' (pp.164-65). Consequently 
there is a tendency towards wage-levelling, as the low-paid are motivated 
by their less agreeable work to take more advantage of their own utility at 
the m argin. Meanwhile, the "extra-economic means" of compulsion 
employed in the 1940s and early 1950s were bound to be of no long-term 
usefulness since their efficacity depended above all on "surprise."
On one hand, then, Roland does bring in workers' subjectivity, 
albeit vaguely, and albeit in terms of a 'natural' taking advantage of
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arhythmic production. On the other, he refers to the withering effectiveness 
of certain means of control as a 'natural' development dependent essentially 
on the regime's inability to ensure the "intrinsic moral motivation" of the 
"individual." (pp .l61-67). Since the form of labour is not an issue which he 
tackles with the same kind of attention with which he theorises use-value 
and indicator-value, there is little discussion of the wage-form and no 
explicit reference to actual struggle, or even indeed to a conflict of interests.
The discussion of the shortage to which Roland refers has been 
associated especially with the Hungarian 'm arket socialist' economist 
Kornai, who has developed a theory of the so-called 'socialist' economies in 
which shortage appears as a major category. (See especially Kornai 1979, 
1980a, and 1992, chaps. 11-12). The main features of this theory are the 
description of firm-level decision-making constrained by resource 
availability and 'vertical bureaucratic bargaining' rather than by demand, in 
an environment where budget constraints are 'soft' rather than 'hard.' 
(1980a, vol.2, p p .299-322; 1980b).i2 This work is certainly useful to a critique 
of the relations of distribution, but since Kornai's basic optic is the 
economist's one of 'firms and households' he pays but brief attention to the 
underlying form of the relationship between the workers and the overall 
political economy. Indeed the main question on which he concentrates in 
regard to the workers is the relationship between workers and 'employers,' 
by which he means enterprise managers. Thus he writes that
the same can be said of bosses as of employees: the relative weights 
of the two opposing groups of motives vary according to the 
country, period, and individual concerned. But ultimately, it is 
typical of classical socialism for the bureaucratic interest of firm and 
factory managers to prevail. (1992, pp.220-21).
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In relation to the allocation of labour and the setting of wages he 
considers two sets of factors. First, there are the bureaucratic factors, among 
which he counts the power of production managers to dictate tasks, the 
compulsory assignation to particular enterprises, the official "political 
propaganda activity in the workplace," and the connections which 'leaders 
of firms' enjoy with the local police. In summary, he states that "a firm 
becomes a cell of totalitarian power, not merely a scene of work." 
(pp.221-22). Secondly, In the specific context of wage-setting he mentions 
that there is considerable "bargaining between employed workers and their 
immediate superiors," which puts the worker in a position which is all the 
stronger according to the urgency of the assignm ent and  the 
indispensability of the employee. Workers may 'convey their dissatisfaction' 
verbally or by 'withholding performance'; or they may leave a worse place 
of work for a better one, (1992, pp.225-26; see also 1980a, vol.2, p.401). But he 
does not state whether or not this has any political-economic effect other 
than the determination of wages at a higher level than would otherwise be 
the case. And even in this context he asserts that wage-setting remains 
merely "by and large" in the hands of bureaucracy. He thus omits to explain 
how the workers' position can be at all strong in the context of the firm's 
'totalitarianism.' He is aware of wage drift as an empirical reality, but he 
does not give adequate meaning to his view that "how the average wage 
finally develops depends on the prevailing power relations." (1992, 
pp.225-27).
His conclusion is that the official ideology that labour — 
presum ably he means labour-power — is not a com m odity under 
"socialism" is invalid, at least in such a "strongly worded form." Market
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coordination does have a certain influence on labour allocation and 
wage-setting. On the other hand, the official assertion is true "insofar as the 
market influence is secondary" in relation to the influence of bureaucratic 
coordination. The analysis can thus be seen to be very far removed from a 
consideration of underlying political-economic categories such as the form 
of labour. Indeed the view of workers' struggle essentially reduces to the 
idea that to the extent that labour (sic) is sold, workers have some 
bargaining-power; but to the extent that it is not, they are subject to a form 
of oppression which is "graver" than market-based dependence, (1992, 
p.227).^® This might easily be said about any society that is exploitative, but 
unfortunately Kornai gives no greater theorisation than this of the workers' 
actual position and struggle.
2 THE WORKING CLASS
2.1 Descriptive Studies
2.1.1 Thematic Studies: A Summary
Given the views of sovietology's leading theorists on the negligible 
im portance of an understanding of the fundam ental class relation 
underlying the nature of the political economy, it is perhaps not surprising 
that many of the scholars who have studied matters affecting the working 
class have ignored class struggle altogether. This is not only true of works 
by those such as Berliner (1957), Conquest (1967), and Schapiro and Godson 
(1981), who — by reason of their 'totalitarian' influence — are predisposed
— ;:rh s ' __________
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to conceive of the 'conflict' between the system and the working class as
;primarily one-way: it is also true of other studies. Thus Deutscher (1950) and 
Lowit (1971), in considering Soviet trade-unionism, fail altogether to 
consider workers' conflicts; as does Yanowitch in his study of inequality and 
management reform, despite describing conditions a Marxist would view as
highly confrontational. (1977, 1985; see also his edited volume of 1982). 
Others have focused simply on various aspects of the 'function' of the 
official unions in mediation and policy formation. (Kahan and Ruble 1979, 
chaps. 4-7).
A number of scholars have considered inequality without analysing 
either class conflict or even class itself.'*'* Thus Matthews, who writes with 
considerable interest on numerous aspects of working class life (1972), fails 
in an explicitly 'illustrative' book (p. xvii) even to mention the empirical 
reality of class conflict either in the workplace or elsewhere. And when he 
considers the link between poverty and crime (1986, p p .109-12), he 
understands the former purely quantitatively, thereby ignoring questions of 
class altogether, to say nothing of the relationship between class and law. 
(1986, 1989). Connor adopts a similar approach when w riting about 
deviance and inequality, considering class-based cultural 'bias' only in
S
passing. (1972, pp.238-40; 1979a, pp.211-13 and 291-92). So does A. McAuley,
who writes about "poverty, living-standards, and inequality," but not about 
class. (1979). Perhaps the most extreme position is occupied by Kahan, who 
not only understands "economic differentiation" solely in term s of 
quantitative wage and income differentials (1979, pp.296-99), but denies the 
relevance of the term 'class' altogether, (pp.308-09).*® Since w ithout a 
concept of class it is hard to reach an understanding of how one society can
1
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have replaced another, for such theorists the need to refer in the Soviet 
context to a 'society would seem equally encumbering.
This is not to say that some scholars have not studied various 
aspects of working class assertion. But those who have have usually done so 
in isolation from an overall understanding of society. Thus Roberts and 
Feingold (1958), Brown (1966), M. McAuley (1969), Ruble (1981), and 
Tampert (1986) each give consideration to working class pressure, but 
exclusively in terms of its formal structural mediations with the authorities, 
either with the unions or in the courts. Haynes and Semyonova (1979), 
meanwhile, assuming that the essence of opposition is to push towards
Isocial-democratic reform, devote most of their attention to the dissident 
minority and the miniscule 'independent trade unions' of the late 1970s.
And whilst Ruble accepts that there may be a relationship, albeit 'indirect,' 
between workers' 'unofficial' activities and the official efforts to 'upgrade' 
union performance (1981), he unfortunately stops there and leaves the point 
theoretically undeveloped. In relation to "worker dissatisfaction" Gidwitz 
goes significantly further (1982), but even she limits her considerations to 
causes which are above all contingent: first, the "direct" ones, namely 
"actual working conditions" [sic], compensation, and "unsatisfactory 
labor-management relations brought about party and state manipulation of 
the trade-union function" (pp.26-29); and second, the more "indirect" ones, 
such as the general "'quality of life' issues" relating to m atters of health, 
morality, and rights, (pp.30-32). Seeing conflict as no more than a sum of 
disputes, she fails to theorise any sort of underlying cause relating to the 
workers' position as a class.
I
a
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Recent analyses of labour relations under perestroika, w hilst 
informative, have similarly tended to omit a more general theorisation of the 
natu re  of class and exploitation. (Friedgut and Siegelbaum  1990, 
Oxenstierna 1990, Rutland 1990, Aves 1992, Temkina 1992), Typically, Aves 
(1992) gives much empirical information on the institutional development of 
the labour movement between 1989 and 1991, but cannot be said to employ 
any approach of a theoretical kind. For him the conditions which the 'new' 
labour movement "grew out of and reflected" were nothing more than the 
disillusionment with socialist ideology, the difficulty under "authoritarian 
communism" of forming independent organisations, and the "unimportance 
of nationalism." (p. 138). By listing these three negatives, he is clearly 
separating himself by a very great distance from the standpoint of 
materialism.
Even D. Mandel, who — from an explicitly left-wing point of 
view — has gone considerably further in emphasising workers' subjectivity, 
fails to achieve theoretical depth. Thus after running through some of the 
well-known characteristics of the relationship betw een workers and 
management — wage-levelling, labour shortage, and a relatively substantial 
social wage, as against poor conditions and frequent violations of labour law 
(1988, pp.139-43; 1989, pp.10-12) — he fails to put the elements together with 
any materially-based theoretical coherence. Instead, underlying his work 
there is the idea that worker-managem ent relations were ultim ately 
determined by something abstract called the 'system.' Workers enjoyed job 
security simply because there was a 'command economy; and meanwhile 
they derived a certain bargaining power from a labour shortage created and 
m aintained by the 'command system.' (1989, pp.10-11). (The inverted
I
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commas are MandeTs). Predictably, Mandel is led to underestimate the 
power that workers exercised in opposition to this system (see also Mlandel 
1988, p.l48): not explicitly, because nowhere does he ask how  substantial 
this power actually was; but implicitly, because by assuming the system as a 
sort of given, at least in the pre-Gorbachev period, he drastically 
overestimates its health. In stating that in return for their advantages 
workers "helped management meet plan objectives" (1989, p. 12), Mandel 
misses the fundam ental point demonstrated by Ticktin (1973a; 1991c, 
pp. 116-29) and others (for example, Wilhelm 1979 and 1985, and Rutland 
1985): namely, the Soviet economy was never successfully planned at all.
If the economy had been planned, of course, the question as to why 
it entered crisis would become even thornier. But progress m ight 
nonetheless be made if 'planning' theorists were to tackle this problem, 
especially in its aspects relating to labour relations. Mandel, however, fails 
to oblige.
Some workers...only half-ironically refer to the last half of the 
Brezhnev era as their 'golden age' — because it was relatively easy 
then to reach a working agreement with management. But it is 
im portant to emphasize that the extreme development of this 
system was the direct consequence of the regime's refusal to reform 
the economy, a refusal dictated by the corporate interests of its 
bureaucratic base as well as by a more general fear of the popular 
forces a structural reform of the economy might unleash. (1989, 
p.l2).
Any notion of a historical development of the class relation has been 
replaced here by the completely unsupported view that the central 
contradiction was that which operated between the tendencies for and 
against reform. We are thus left with the tautology that the system entered 
crisis because it resisted reform.
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In looking at the movement for reform as it actually arose, Mandel 
consequently finds himself unable fully to cut through the official reformist 
propaganda. He may accept that the reform aims to "tighten things on the 
shopfloor," increase differentials, lower the social wage, and so on; but at 
the same time he asserts that
another goal is to link the workers' well-being more closely to the 
performance of the enterprise,...to create a common motivation 
among managers and workers to discover and to release productive 
reserves, to increase individual and enterprise efficiency, and to 
produce quality goods that meet the needs of clients and 
consumers. (p.l4).
Still standing on ground marked out the previous year (1988), Mandel goes 
so far as to approve of Gorbachev's avowal of support for this goal (1989, 
p. 15) when others m ight take it for little more than 'participationist' 
managerial rhetoric. And whilst he eventually decides that the government 
has gradually abandoned "producers' self-management, originally a central 
part of its reform" (1990b, p .100), Mandel remains anxious to relate the 
contradictions of labour market reform and labour conflict to the extent to 
which the authorities fail to live up to their word. (1989, 1990b). One can 
summarise Mandel's analysis by observing how it focuses above all upon 
the potential for realisation of Union-level economic and political reforms 
which are truly democratic. In this view, the 'essence' of the underlying 
anti-bureaucratic tendency of workers' self-assertion, were such a tendency 
to ripen, would manifest itself as follows. On one hand, initiative would 
flow 'upw ards' from an independent movement of workers; on the other, 
the expression of that initiative would — at its most radical — involve the 
"coherent linking" of the interests of workers and managers with each other 
as well as with the "overall interests of society" (1989, p.35), in the context of
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a controlled and gradual expansion of market relations (1990b, p .l l l ) .  The 
difference between this aim and that of a capitalistic "monopolism based 
upon workers' self-management" would rest primarily on the placing of 
'accent' upon "the collective power of the workers" rather than on the 
m arket mechanism which that power would supposedly make use of. 
(1990c, pp.143-49). Applied to specific struggles (1991a), MandeTs theory 
has no real explanatory value, and indeed appears as little more than a 
statement of political ideology.
2.1.2 Two Diachronic Descriptive Studies
Of the 'empiricist' scholarship perhaps the most 'historical' extreme is 
occupied by Grancelli and Connor, whose works appear much more useful 
even in the absence of an overall view of society. Thus, even if Grancelli has 
collected most of his material prior to perestroika, he is fully aware (1988) that 
the conditions from which labour relations emerge are always none other 
than the material and contradictory labour relations of the previous era. 
Tracing such phenomena as absenteeism, turnover, theft, and poor 
productivity all the way through from Tsarism to the daw n of the 
Gorbachev period (pp.3-73), he looks at how they continued to manifest 
under a variety of management strategies. He consequently insists on 
studying trade-unionism in terms of the actual labour relations (pp .l06-42), 
rather than — as is more usual — the other way around. But whilst his 
analysis undoubtedly provides a very rich 'background' for the study of 
perestroika, its utility remains empirical rather than theoretical. Grancelli's 
empiricism might be described as 'diachronic' rather than 'synchronic':
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showing little interest in questions of class, he fails to study the degree to 
which the imperatives of systemic development are obstructed by workers' 
action. Having no theory of the nature and aims of social production as a 
whole, he fails to identify the necessity of this obstruction as a fact which 
translates to the immanent possibility of crisis.
Connor too attempts to focus on the role of the workers in historical 
fashion. After pointing out that throughout Soviet history workers were the 
objects of "tumultuous change," he recognises very early on that control, 
while "pervasive," was never total, and that in the long run there occurred 
"much autonomous development." (1991, p.8). Unfortunately, though, he 
fails to build on this idea with sufficient coherence, and the points he makes 
about the phenomena of wage drift, wage-levelling, rising aspirations, and 
increasing discontent during and after the Brezhnev period appear 
unanchored to any overall view of active historical process.
Although one of Connor's main preoccupations is to draw  
connections between 'autonomous development and matters of class, his 
grasp of the former suffers greatly owing to his 'idealist' and sociological 
view of the latter. Thus all of the 'class characteristics' he looks for either 
relate primarily to consciousness (p.lO; see also 1979b, pp.314-16) rather than 
to activity, resistance, or power; or else they derive from notions of 
collectivity and 'self-regulation' (1991, pp.41-42) which have little to do with 
any shared relationship, either objective or subjective, to the means and 
mode of production. The resultant effect on his work is severe. In making 
statements such as that over-qualification and 'unattractive jobs' provide 
"ample grounds for alienation," as does work which is hard, dirty, or boring
kff
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(pp.167-68), Connor fails to escape the tautological, since people who are 
socially forced to engage in activities they find disagreeable are by definition 
'alienated' both from the activities and from the enforcement. If alienation 
exists, Connor has done little more than to register its existence. His 
approach to workers' subjective action is similarly faulted, in that he 
considers a num ber of causes of discontent and a num ber of types of 
workers' resistance but remains unable to theorise what unites them. By 
looking at what workers thought so as to discover whether or not they 
formed a class, he misses the wider significance of what they did precisely as 
a class.*® In these terms, their becoming more 'class-like' under Brezhnev 
and eventually a full-fledged class by 1989 appears purely "accidental." 
(pp.316-18).
There is perhaps more theoretical substance to his analysis of 
'negative control,' which he considers in terms of ease and mass of turnover, 
the structural microeconomic shortage of labour, and absenteeism correctly 
considered as "the 'recapture,' or theft, of time from the employer."
Workers' 'negative control' practices certainly show some capacity 
to act, as workers, in opposition to what m anagement does to 
impinge on workers' interests, (p. 172).
Connor undoubtedly provides a great deal of empirical evidence to support
this view. But nonetheless he omits completely to theorise the subjectivity
whose existence as force one might have inferred from the very use of such
terms as 'recapture.' Showing absenteeism as something "imposed" by
awkward opening hours in the service sector and "abetted" by managerial
laxity "in the area of 'unenforceable' rules" (p. 172), Connor seems to forget
that such a widespread practice represents a historical choice, on the part of
millions of workers, to assert their interests as workers. Choices are made. I s
I , S ' - ;
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not imposed. Second, in relation to the workplace itself, whilst Connor 
accepts (p.l97) that "workers' negative control practices" in general exerted 
pressure for 'e a s /  norms, higher wage bonuses, and lower differentials, he 
neglects to make a proper assessment of their impact at the level of the 
economy as a whole.
Negative control, in this sense, seems a lim ited b u t clear 
manifestation of elements of working-class identity and opposition, 
if only at the level of the shop, the section, or the plant. (p.l97).
Connor is certainly aware that the strikes and protests which took place
prior to the onset of open crisis in 1989-90 usually occurred in defence of the
normal or 'contractual' understanding between workers and the authorities
(pp.220-25), but behind his theory of that 'contractuality' there lies little
conception of an overall balance of power. In places he does argue that
'w age drift' eventually caused the authorities major problem s, bu t
ultimately he sees this phenomenon as no more than one of the standard
"rules and operating procedures" which begat problematic results "almost
automatically." (p.223).
2.2 Three Theoretical Positions
I shall now turn to three theses to which, in general, the above criticisms do 
not apply. Although the correspondence with general theories of the USSR 
is stressed to varying degrees in each case, I would argue that it exists in 
such a fashion as to allow each thesis to escape the more common 
'empiricism.' The theory of 'incorporation' (Lane) may be in irreconcilable 
contradiction w ith communist theoretical precepts, but it undoubtedly 
relates very strongly to a certain view of the overall social formation. So do
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the theories of the 'social compacf (Pravda) and the 'historic compromise' 
(Zaslavsky), and these I have found to be of a certain instructive value.
2.2.1 The Incorporated Worker'
In his article on "Dissent and Consent under State Socialism" (1972) Lane 
states that the "entities" known as social classes were not major "actors" in 
w hat he terms the "state socialist" societies, and that these "societies" 
consequently appeared to be 'revolution-proof.' In later works he has 
developed his theory of one of these 'minor actors' and expounded his 
thesis that the Soviet industrial worker constituted a specific 'type': he or she 
was the 'incorporated' worker, as distinct from other 'types' which exist 
elsewhere. In his view, Soviet workers did not have an adequately 
homogeneous culture to qualify as 'traditional' proletarians. Nor were they 
respectful enough of their bosses to be counted as 'deferential.' Finally, they 
did not belong to the 'privatised' type either, since 'Marxism-Leninism' was 
the dominant ideology and workers were guaranteed jobs. (Lane and O'Dell 
1978, pp.45-50). The Weberian nature of Lane's approach is self-evident.
Of interest in the present context is the way that Lane and O'Dell 
define the working class and understand workers' conflicts w ith the 
interests of the regime. I shall deal with these two matters in sequence. First, 
their approach to class is not Marxist, but sociological. For them, the Soviet 
working class included both manual workers and technicians and engineers; 
and 'non-manual workers' themselves formed a group which also included 
"employees of trade union and Party, officials in the Soviets, and 
professionals." Although this latter 'stratum ' may have had a "specific
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cultural role," it was not 'disjunct' from the working class "in a Marxist 
sense," since the Soviet Union was a "politically unitary class society" which 
did not know any "class domination." (pp.4-6). Consequently, far from 
being an exploited class producing a surplus for appropriation by others, 
the working class was simply a set of occupational strata. It should further 
be mentioned that from this point of view, the concept of class is not at all 
fundamental: 'sodal inequality' appears as a matter not of class exploitation, 
nor even of any other class relation, but primarily one of 'stratification,' 
status, and differential 'occupational prestige.' (Lane 1971,1976, chap. 7, and 
1985a).*7
Second, whilst they recognise that workers acted in ways which 
were problematic for the 'elites,' this is explained without reference to the 
necessity of struggle. Thus at first Lane and O'Dell perceive low productivity 
simply as a "cultural artefact" — a sort of leftover from the traditional 
peasant life-style — and as that alone. (1978, p.20). In this view absenteeism 
and drunkenness represent nothing more than " 'deviant' attitudes," 
similarly derived and without "significant political implications." Since they 
do not conceive of social production relations as having been the foundation 
of Soviet society, it is not surprising that they view even "intense industrial 
conflict" — from strikes to the Novocherkassk uprising of 1962 — as having 
been "essentially economistic" and therefore devoid of antagonistic 
significance on the general social level, (p.48).
Although Lane changes his view slightly in his later works, the 
basic approach remains the same. Thus he accepts that lax work discipline is 
also conditioned by "the absence of structural unemployment, and by 
generally rising standards of living" (1985a, p.l59); and further argues on a
______
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m ore general level that full em ploym ent streng thens 'labou r's  
positioni?/s-â~î7fs management/ (1987, p.3). But when he traces back the chain 
of cause and effect, though, he is constricted by his approach to find that 
what actually causes full employment in the first place is the ideology or 
'ethic' of the regime, rather than material factors.*® Rather than theorising 
full employment as a class relation determined by struggle, he understands 
it as a 'social policy' brought about by a 'legitimating ideology' and 
promoted by "three main interests: management, labour and Party." (p.231). 
Thus he continues to neglect the significance of a state of affairs where 
workers resist their rulers' need for them to work harder.
Such an approach to the nature and struggles of the Soviet working 
class leads directly to the concept of 'incorporation.'
The authority  structure is accepted. [Incorporated] workers 
participate in improving production, and they are closer to the 
adm inistration both socially and politically than workers in 
capitalist society.... The trade union developed under the political 
authorities rather than against them. It is more an aid to 
m anagem ent than a defence of strictly workers' interests. Its 
manifold social and welfare activités further the integration of the 
worker in the factory. (1985, pp.165-66).
H av ing  thus iden tified  "w orkers" w ith their S tate-recognised
representation. Lane goes on to opine that "the structural features of Soviet
society undoubtedly inhibit [class] opposition." This was so because "the
threat of sanctions for anti-state activity has been effective in binding the
worker to the system." As further support for this view — which is
strikingly reminiscent of Friedrich and Brzezinski's a generation before —
Lane quotes an American journalist's observation that Soviet workers spoke
proudly of their own chief as 'a strong boss': indeed, workers "like[d] the
feeling that someone above them [was] firmly in charge." (p.l66).*® It is also
#
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averred that the Soviet working class had "a general conception of serving
the national interest."
Writing in 1985, Lane foresees that from the mid-1980s on there
would be a "greater maturation" of the working class. (He does not explain 
what this means in a country supposedly without class domination). He 
then makes two predictions which have since been proven manifestly false. 
The first is that any major upheaval "can only come if there is association [of 
the working class] with other social groupings — say [sic] intellectuals or the 
scientific intelligentsia — and possibly if it is linked to a wider unifying 
theme like the question of national integrity." The second is that, since "the 
values of Soviet society [gave] the working class a leading role in its political 
organization," and "the ideology of state socialism [gave] the working class
a legitimacy to press its claims," the authorities "[were] likely to respond to 
grievances and to compromise with the workers." (1985a, p.l67). It is now, 
of course, common knowledge that working class standards of living have 
fallen more or less continuously since 1985, and that economic reform means 
mass unemployment.
It is clear from his book Soviet Society Under Perestroika (1992) that 
Lane has now updated his analysis in accordance with developments in the 
late 1980s. But the underlying theory remains the same. Thus he asserts that 
"labour productivity has declined because standards of punctuality, 
workmanship, and labour discipline have been poor" [emphasis added], and 
argues somewhat unconvincingly that a change in workers' attitudes to 
work resulted from "greater acquisitiveness and the rise of a consumer 
mentality." (p.161). Still neglecting to theorise the necessary struggle 
between classes, he keeps to the view that the manual working class was a
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"major support" for previous governments, and that it stopped being so 
only under pressure from economic reform. (This position is tenable only if 
one believes that the sole function of a government is to stay in office, and 
ignores its role as the administrator of capital accumulation.) Under the 
heading "The Rise of an Independent Workers' Movement," Lane then 
focuses exclusively on the (Russian-nationalist) United Workers' Front, and 
concentrates particularly on its demand for more workers' representation in 
the soviets. The term 'incorporation' no longer appears, but it would seem 
that Lane's basic conception is that whereas the workers used to be 
incorporated via politics, after a 'period of transition' they will eventually be 
incorporated via the market and the law. (p.l84).20
2.2.2 The 'Social Compact'
Like Lane, Pravda too adopts a Weberian approach. In his article 'Ts There a 
Soviet Working Class?" (1982) he thus announces without explanation that 
"traditional Marxist class criteria seem unlikely to be useful in a society 
where the state owns the means of production," and proceeds to make use 
of the concept of the 'class group,' a sort of cross between Weber's notions of 
'class' and 'status group.' A class group is defined as a 'm ultibonded' 
product of "converging dimensions of differentiation."^* The social 
attributes necessary for membership of such a group relate to educational 
resources and 'prestige' as well as to work and the "material economy." 
(pp.2-3). But nonetheless, since Pravda focuses to a far greater degree than 
Lane on actual and potential areas of conflict, his work appears more useful 
in terms of the present study.
CHAP.4 - CLASS STRUGGLE: SOVIETOLOGICAL THEORIES 203
In the aforementioned article Pravda begins by looking at working 
class composition. He shows how, although there was no clear-cut divide 
between blue-collar and white-collar workers in terms of pay, among 
blue-collar workers as a group there were substantial differentials. 
Coalminers and skilled metalworkers could earn three times as m uch as 
factory or hospital cleaners, and the salaries of the m ost highly-skilled 
overlapped with those of middle-ranking engineers and managers, (pp.6-7). 
Moreover, in income and housing terms, the standard of living of skilled 
m anual workers often outstripped that of the 'worker-technicians' who 
spent most of their time supervising automated machinery, and even that of 
the ITRs (inzhenerno-tekhnicheskie rahotniki, or semi-professional technical 
employees), (p.9). After further considering job complexity, education, and 
especially 'class identification,' Pravda discovers a 'working-class group' 
and a 'working-middle-class group,' both of which were distinct from the 
intelligentsia. By the criterion of self-identification the 'working class group' 
was comprised almost exclusively of blue-collar workers, whereas the other 
group (self-identifying either as 'employees' [sluzhashchie] or as 'middle 
class') included most of the ITRs, most white-collar workers, and those 
manual workers with a specialist secondary education, (pp. 14-16).
Travelling 'forward' to the issue of contentment, behaviour and 
conflict, Pravda looks for differentiation by 'class group.' In terms of 
contentment, or lack of it, "on the pay or general material front," he finds 
little to distinguish the two groups; but in terms of national politics he 
discovers clear differences. Unskilled manual workers formed the least 
'interested' and 'literate' group, whereas skilled workers, particularly those 
in the 'working-middle-class group,' seemed as "attentive to political events
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as their semi-professional middle-class counterparts/' albeit less likely to 
understand what was going on, (pp.20-23).
Pravda finds that the indifference, caution and scepticism displayed 
by members of the 'working class group' at the national political level were 
not at all evident inside the enterprise. Indeed, at the workplace workers in 
both 'class groups' showed a high level of assertiveness. (See also Pravda 
1981b, pp.58-59). But rather than reconsidering his category of 'class group' 
— which did not feature in his earlier work (1979a, 1979b) — Pravda prefers 
to state that this separation of the 'shopfloor' level of conflict from national 
politics made it unlikely that the working class would subject the political 
system to serious strain, since contentious issues were simply resolved 
'informally.' For him it follows that it was the 'working-middle-class group/ 
or the 'new ' (educated and skilled) working class which was the more 
"volatile." As a 'middle-class' group [sic], it had a "general vested interest in 
change," unlike the 'old' working class, which shared the 'upper-class' 
groups' taste for political and economic immobility. (1982, pp.22-24). The 
assumption on which such conclusions rest is clear: namely, if working class 
assertiveness does not consciously aim for reform, then it m ust be 
conservative. It is worth restating the opposite, communist view that faith in 
reformist politics acts against the only tendency in struggle which really 
challenges society 'at the roots': proletarian autonomy.
When Pravda begins with an analysis of the underlying relations 
between the top and bottom of society, however, his work appears from a 
Marxist viewpoint to be much more useful, even if at no point does he bend 
tow ards such a view point himself. In his article on "East-W est
 :
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Interdependence and the Social Compact in Eastern Europe" (1981a) he 
states that
People's relationship to the regime is conditioned by the 
authorities' satisfaction of w hat are largely economic welfare 
expectations. These expectations constitute what may be called a 
social compact between rulers and ruled, between those who run 
the workers' state [sic] and the workers t h e m s e l v e s . . . . ( p . l 6 3 ) . 2 2
Although Pravda restricts his consideration here to Czechoslovakia, the
GDR, Hungary and Poland, the idea is equally applicable to the analysis he
has published of workers' activities in the USSR. (1979a). He shows how
workers expected what they had learnt to expect: namely, in production, full
employment, job security, slack labour discipline, and fairly 'egalitarian'
wages regarded as welfare payments rather than related to performance;
and in consum ption, the availability of basic commodities, a slow
improvement in the range of goods on sale, and stable prices. Moreover,
whilst the "authoritarian and paternalistic state" demanded a high level of
form al compliance, it required "minimal com m itm ent of any real
significance." (1981a, p. 163; see also 1979b, pp.214-15).
Pravda presents a picture where the economic developm ent 
necessary for producer and consumer growth was increasingly requiring a 
revision of the 'sodal compact.' He begins with production:
Three sets of problems affecting labor productiv ity  are 
connected with the social compact production norms: absenteeism, 
full employment and job security, and the pace and quality of work. 
(p.l66).
Pravda identifies both poor discipline (taking such forms as absenteeism, 
slack work and malingering) and worker-led mobility (moonlighting as well 
as upping and leaving one's job) as severe restraints on 'productivity.' He 
shows how, as attempts were made to circumvent such restraints, new
" 3
CHAP.4 - CLASS STRUGGLE: SOVIETOLOGICAL THEORIES 206
'
problems such as burgeoning deficits and debts followed in their wake. In 
regard to consumption he cites rising consumer expectations and an 
aversion to the removal of subsidies as further problematic corollaries of the 
'social compact.' (pp.170-74).
The basic problem facing the proponents of price rationalisation is 
the workers' tendency to conceive the relationship between prices 
and the standard of living in zero-sum terms.
A nd linking production to consumption, Pravda w rites that talk of
productivity-linked wage-rises to match price increases "arouses rather than
allays workers' suspicions." (1979b, p.217).
Writing from a pro-reform point of view, Pravda concludes that the 
development of more open and more complex economies in Eastern Europe 
will necessitate not only a replacement of the 'traditional' social compact 
w ith one where higher rewards are on offer for harder work and less 
security, but also the introduction of political reform. In his view,
in the final instance, the public's, and specifically the proletariat's, 
actual response to government measures depends on Ûiat regime's 
record and credibility, (1981a, p.l78).
W hereas Lane implies that what he calls the "economistic" nature of
industrial conflict distinguished it from class struggle proper, Pravda takes
the opposite view that political participation — and, more specifically, a
degree of independent workers' representation — is highly advisable
precisely in order to control such conflict and divest it of its general
objective antagonism in relation to the development of the economy. His
insights into the 'social compacT — and into the need to change radically
"the traditional social compact passivity of the population as citizens"
(pp .178-80)23 — clearly suggest an intensification of the elite's struggle
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against an 'obdurate' working class and a growth of political mediation as a 
safety-valve.
Pravda's analysis is very coherent. Having identified working class 
economic behaviour — he does not actually write 'struggle' — as a major 
problem for economic development (that is, what I have shown above to be 
capital accumulation), he considers ways to push back if not to vault the 
barrier it represents,24 After describing (1979b, pp.233-34) how in the 
industrial sphere the Party was of negligible use in the articulation of 
workers' economic grievances and the mediation and resolution of conflicts, 
and before considering (pp.237-40) how w orkers' participation  in 
management seems similarly unable to "provide a satisfactory solution to 
the problem of workers' dissent" he states starkly that
in a more positive vein [sic], there is some evidence to show that 
more effective unions can help prevent workers' collective protests. 
(p.236).
As he explains elsewhere, the reason for this is that
if they gain workers' confidence at the shopfloor level, unions can 
help divert conflicts into more controllable institutional channels. 
(1981a, p.l80).
This is by no means a trivial point, but unfortunately Pravda does not go on 
to discuss the conflict between, on the one hand, the efficacy of such 
diversion — by unions or by other means — and, on the other, the resilience, 
force and dynamic of workers' autonomous struggle.
To summarise, it should first be noted that at its most rigorous 
P ravda 's view of the social compact is usefully centred upon an 
understanding of a relation of force between the exploiters and exploited, 
based on a fundamental division of interests. But its main weakness is that
I
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he fails to theorise the nature of economic growth, and still less its necessity, 
in terms of political-economic categories. Thus whilst in places he does 
recognise, from a reform ist point of view, the 'aw kw ardness' of 
uninstitutionalised workers' resistance, he does not explicitly refer to the 
need for its institutionalised control as a need felt exclusively on one side of 
the class divide. Since economic growth has entered as an unexplained, 
untheorised necessity, it follows that the revision of the 'social compact' 
appears in terms which are similar: he does not discuss it explicitly as a 
developm ent, or possible developm ent, of the underly ing  class 
antagonism.2®
2.2.3 The 'Historic Compromise'
Writing, like Pravda, towards the end of the Brezhnev period, Zaslavsky 
presents a theory of a 'historic compromise' between, on one side, the 
political regime, and on the other, the "populace." According to this view, 
the "existing distribution of power" is accepted, but only on three 
conditions: first, that prices stay low; second, that em ploym ent is 
guaranteed; and third, that people remain "free to seek individual ways to 
improve their living standards." (1982, p. 133).
In relation to Pravda's theory, Zaslavsky's theory appears more 
historical. Delving back further, Zaslavsky thus explains the Brezhnev 
period against the backdrop of the contradictions of Stalinism.
When various groups of people pursue a similar course of action, 
spontaneous social movements are often formed. Political power at 
first attempts to suppress these outcomes but eventually ends up 
tolerating them. Even in the Stalin era, consent was only partially 
w rung from the population by the coercive apparatus: to a
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considerable extent it was voluntarily granted by members of some 
key social groups in exchange for actual or future benefits.
He continues:
this holds even truer for the Brezhnev period as well and is, indeed, 
its distinctive feature. Soviet society is far from being a lump of clay 
that yields to any pressure from above; its internal policy does not 
merely depend on the whims of the party leadership. Brezhnev's 
period is characterized by a continuous dialectical interplay of state 
and society, which is not limited solely to governmental initiatives 
and the population's mechanical reaction but also incorporates 
mass popular actions that occasionally compel the state to yield. 
(p.l35).
Thus he shows how the authorities were unable to enforce the 1940 ban on 
job-changing and eventually had to repeal it in 1956 (1979-80, p.47; 1982, 
p .135); and how the Kosygin reforms of 1965 were scuppered by 
semi-skilled workers among others. (1979-80, pp.48-51).
Evidently Zaslavsky ascribes great significance to the actual class 
struggle; and it is from a clearly classist perspective that he studies such 
phenomena as alcoholism (a double-edged "weapon" [1979-80, pp.53-54]), 
job-changing (pp.46-48), and migration (1982, pp.137-46). Of special interest 
is his analysis of the employment in closed cities of 'guestworkers' from the 
countryside (1982, especially pp .144-47). As regards the lack of work 
discipline he takes pains to point out that it
clearly indicates a conflict between the party-state machine and 
large segments of the working class. It is important not to ignore or 
underestimate this conflict just because it is not accompanied by 
open and organized struggles. (p.l60).
In his first prognosis, however, Zaslavsky fails to define actual 
antagonistic polarities. In an article originally drafted in 1978 he thus 
predicts that the "1960s type of economic reform will be resumed, since by 
the mid-1980s it will have become absolutely necessary" (1979-80, p.64), but
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does not really explain why the latter suggestion might be the case, or what 
it means for something to be necessary. Whilst arguing that the "equilibrium 
between workers' discontent and support may be seriously disrupted," he 
also takes the view that full employment will definitely continue, even 
under conditions of reform. Reform may come from 'above' or from 'below,' 
but working class living-standards will rise regardless, (pp.64-65). Thus 
reform no longer appears as a classist concept.
By 1982 — after the invasion of Afghanistan, the election of Reagan, 
and the acceleration of the US-Soviet arms race, albeit not towards the 'Cold 
W ar' bipolarity of the 1950s — Zaslavsky puts forward a view which is 
somewhat different. Like Pravda, he now argues that the 'compromise' only 
works as long as it can guarantee a steady improvement in workers' 
conditions, and that since such an amelioration can no longer be ensured, 
"the economic basis of organized consensus is shrinking." (1982, pp.155-56). 
Inefficiency is growing, the disproportion between heavy industry and the 
consumer sector is becoming increasingly dysfunctional, and the "semi-free" 
labour market gives both workers and enterprise managers scope to exert 
substantial pressure on the central planners. No longer is Zaslavsky 
convinced that living-standards will improve: he now argues that "workers 
themselves are the first to experience food and dwelling scarcity, [and] the 
first to be victimized by queues and black markets." (p.l60). From the point 
of view of the system, work discipline and work incentives are becoming 
ever greater problems, and maintenance of the status quo — the Brezhnev 
compromise — no longer seems an option.
But whilst Zaslavsky now holds that a restructuring attack on 
working class living-standards, either through firmer centralisation or
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through 'technocratic reform/ is inevitable (pp.161-63), he fails completely 
to specify the extent to which he attributes causation to internal factors, such 
as the position and action of the working class, rather than to externalities 'such as diplomacy and security.26
i
In this brief chapter I have shown how a range of sovietological works have 
fallen short of relating a view of class struggle to a theory of the political 
economy.
In short, his concept of the 'historic compromise' seems to be a more 
social-democratic version of Pravda'syof the 'social compact,' Initially 
endeavouring, perhaps, to adopt the viewpoint of the working class, he does 
not do so with a sufficiently profound view of the basic antagonism. At first
■■■he turns economic reform into a key category which will coincide with 
improvements for everyone. Then, having rejected this view, he paints a 
deterioration of working class living-standards as a sort of necessary result 
of the growing (general?) need to combat inefficiency. The unstated position 
seems to be that the workers' resistance, or indiscipline, has eventually 
turned out to their own disadvantage.
3 SUMMARY
Thus the theorists of 'totalitarianism' (Inkeles and Bauer, Friedrich 
and Brzezinski, Pipes) assume that the absence of 'independent' workers' 
organisations meant that the workers were unable to struggle as a class; and 
the 'revisionist' students of 'interest groups' either concentrate on divisions
I
"'ft'/
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within the elite (Skilling and Griffiths, Hough) or else explain social tensions 
more broadly but on what is still a political basis (Cohen).
I have looked at a number of 'economic' analyses focused around 
concepts such as technological development, success indicators, and 
shortage. If the Birmingham scholars (Amann, Cooper, Davies) produce no 
political-economic explanation of the technological Tag' they describe, nor 
has Nove tackled the question of the form of labour which underlies the 
category of the success indicator. Indeed, Nove has assumed a priori that 
Soviet society is reasonably accurately characterised in terms of universal 
conscription into civil and military service. Both the Birmingham school and 
Nove assume that growth was necessary without explaining why this was 
the case; and both eschew any theoretical concept of exploitation.
Roland, meanwhile, focusing on the inherent inefficiency of the 
indicator system, describes how workers took advantage of a state of affairs 
which was Tabour-power elastic.' But he does so only in terms of 'natural' 
factors such as the individual lack of 'moral motivation' and the end of the 
effectiveness of brutal methods once they were no longer a 'surprise.'
Interested above all in firm-level decision-making, Kornai does 
write, albeit confusedly, about the factors affecting wage-setting. But failing 
to offer a coherent theory to explain both the 'bargaining' power of the 
workers and the 'totalitarianism ' of the enterprise, he neither deals 
consistently with the sale of labour-power nor points to any alternative form 
of its alienation. Like Roland, he too omits to discuss theoretically the 
conflict of interests between social groups.
I
Î
’
I
i
I
a
I
I
_________ ___________
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Of those scholars who have written specifically about the Soviet 
working class, most have produced empirical studies of such matters as 
relative hardship, the mediation of disputes, or the rise of organisations 
during perestroika. Even Grancelli and Connor, who have produced studies 
w ith an undoubted historical basis, and have further focused upon 
widespread labour indiscipline and slack work, have omitted to relate their 
observations to a theoretical consideration of either the nature of the 
production relations or the subjective force of the working class.
Finally, I have considered three theories which, while not Marxist, 
nonetheless relate an understanding of the working class to a theory of the 
system. These are those produced by Lane, Pravda, and Zaslavsky. Where 
Lane, however, following the Soviet propaganda that the ruling officials 
were not 'disjunct' from the working class, minimises the importance of lax 
discipline and holds that workers were incorporated into the system, both 
Pravda and Zaslavsky emphasise workers' opposition.
After first describing how the working class was divided between a 
'm iddle class' group with an interest in change and and an 'old' group 
sharing the rulers' 'conservatism,' Pravda later explains that workers in 
general were involved in a 'social compacP according to which security was 
received in return for poor work. And he shows in particular how the need 
for economic development (itself left theoretically unexplained) caused 
workers' resistance to productivity to become an ever greater problem. 
From the point of view of the controllers of labour he suggests that more 
effective unions might help to divert workers' assertiveness and reduce its 
antagonistic effect.
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On a slightly more historical basis Zaslavsky also studies the 
decline of what he calls the "historic compromise." If at first he suggests that 
reform will benefit the workers, he eventually reaches the view that it will 
involve a deterioration of their living-standards. But like Pravda he fails to 
define antagonistic polarities.
The relationship between the position of the working class and the nature of 
the political-economic system does not feature greatly in sovietological 
scholarship. Whereas the 'political' theorists either deny the existence of 
class struggle or else interpret conflict in general in terms of the interplay of 
Statist interest groups, the 'economic' theorists fail to explain either the form 
of exploitation or the basis of the need for growth. Indeed these latter two 
factors are not discussed with theoretical profundity even by those who 
write of a 'com pact or 'compromise' between the workers and the rulers. 
And since there is little theoretical consideration of the nature of 
antagonistic resistance to systemic imperatives, the basis of the need to 
revise relations with the workers remains to be properly explained.
*****
Î
NOTES
1 For more general discussions of the history of sovietology, see Laqueur 
1967 and Ticktin 1994b.
There are, of course, numerous works on Soviet politics which have 
dealt with one aspect of the 'polity' or other, or with several aspects in 
sequence. (See for example Schapiro 1967, M. McAuley 1977, G. Smith 
1992, Ponton 1994). But only those which suggest a view of the nature 
of the society which lies behind the polity are of interest in the present 
context.
A similar point to that made in relation to studies of Soviet politics 
m ust also be made in relation to studies of Soviet economics. (See for 
example Schwarz 1951, Bergson 1964, Gregory and Stuart 1981, 
Wilczynski 1982, Bergson and Levine 1983). Bergson's book on the 
economics of Soviet 'planning' (1964), for instance, is an empirically 
useful w ork on the functioning of the system  of economic 
decision-making, but it does not offer a theory of the basis of the 
economy, let alone of class relations.
In his presidential address to the 85th annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association (2 September 1989) Pye discusses the role 
of political science faced with what he describes as the "crisis of 
authoritarianism." In his view, what "with modernisation and the 
inevitable growth in the complexities of societies, the only hope for the 
long-run stability of any society [emphasis added] is learning how to 
manage the disorderliness of politics." (1990, p.l6). Associated with the 
view that politics and the State are natural and eternal there is thus a 
classic avoidance of the fact that the nature of any society is determined 
by its social production relations.
In a later work — but one based on substantially the same research 
material — Inkeles describes the USSR as a society with a "relatively 
open" class system, in which the differences between social class 
groups...[were] not defined by sharp discontinuities in income." (1968, 
p. 106.) It is worth mentioning that he places the United States in the 
same category. See also Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn 1956, where it is 
held (p.l88) that "the Soviet worker appears to take the factory and its 
special form of organisation for granted and as the natural way of 
doing things." From here it is but a short step to Schapiro's view that 
Bolshevik 'totalitarianism' "draws response from the fear of freedom, 
the envy, the anti-intellectualism, the chauvinism...of mass man...with 
his own mass morality, his crude egalitarian and levelling aspirations 
and his herd paranoia." (1971, p.276).
_____________
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® In an empirically rich work on the management of Soviet industry, 
another participant in the Harvard project avoids discussing class 
altogether. (Berliner, 1957). Other such studies include Granick 1961, 
Conyngham 1973 and 1982, and Berliner 1988.
7 This is also the view expounded in Conquest 1967.
8 A similar preoccupation is also evident in Schapiro's work on The 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although admittedly he does accept 
that his aim is purely "to tell the story of a political party." (1960, p. ix). 
See also Armstrong 1961.
® Marxist theory makes it clear, of course, that no society can ever be an
essentially ideological system.
Cohen describes how all contributors to the US government journal 
Problems of Communism were subjected to prior vetting by the FBI. 
Although the editor managed to have the relevant ruling relaxed, it 
remained in force until 1977.
11 Nove has also described the Politburo as being the board of directors of
the "USSR Ltd." (1980a, p.83), thereby echoing M eyer's earlier 
reference to the "USSR, Incorporated." (1961), The essential point 
which Meyer offers in opposition to the 'totalitarians' is that economic 
decisions, in both the USSR and the United States, are generally made 
by professional managerial executives. Rather than being part of a 
critique of Soviet production relations as capitalist, however, this view 
is founded instead upon a sort of economic version of the political 
functionalism of the 'interest groupers/ Thus there is simply a desire to 
describe the operation of a 'modem industrial' economic system, and 
no definition is given of the underlying social forms of production, 
consumption, and distribution. In this context it is not surprising that 
Nove has stated his agreement with Wiles's classic empiricist view that 
there is an "extremely obvious" connection between size (of a 'society') 
and alienation (of what, exactly, is not specified) (Wiles 1977, p.585, 
cited in Nove 1978, p.233); nor that he regards the free distribution of 
resources, along with other aspects of communism, such as the 
abolition of the "commanders and the commanded," as simply "cloud 
cuckoo-land." (1980a, p.78). A key empirical study associated with this 
kind of 'managerialisF empiricism is Granick's work The Red Executive, 
subtitled The Organization Man in Russian Industry. (1961). Granick's 
analysis is quoted approvingly in Galbraith's equally non-classist work 
The New Industrial State. (1972, pp.l 17-20).
2^ Although in places Kornai does write of underlying categories, he does 
not really discuss the nature of Soviet production. Meanwhile Wiles,
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who like Kornai aims to produce a work on 'political economy' (1962), 
has written little more than an economics textbook based on numerous 
'models' influenced by official Soviet ideology. Its distance from a 
political-economic theory — and a fortiori from a critique of political 
economy — is amply illustrated by the comments that "to say that 
'really Stalin was a capitalist because he liked to accumulate capital' is 
just an idiotic play on words" (p.3); and that Stalin had to 'rely on the 
labour m arket' because "formal labour direction is indissolubly 
connected with the name of Trotsky." (p.l32).
Kornai's confusion as to whether or not labour-power is sold is also 
evident in his statement that "wage costs are unrealistically low by 
comparison with what the labor is actually costing society." (1992, 
p.225).
1^  The sociologist Parkin, meanwhile, assumes from the outset in a 
well-known comparative work that class itself is precisely a matter of 
'stratification' and 'inequality'. Endeavouring to define the specificity 
of the Soviet context he writes that the "political values underlying the 
command system are part of a broader social philosophy in which the 
commitment to egalitarianism occupies an important place," and that 
"consequently, the powers available to leaders within this system have 
generally been used to combat tendencies towards inequality, not to 
encourage them." (1971, pp.182-83). These remarkable statements are 
predicate upon a lack of recognition of the reality of class in terms of 
production relations.
12 Kahan sees the term 'class' — along with 'stratum ' — as generally 
inapplicable to hierarchical societies, except "perhaps"  to 
n ineteenth-century  Europe, (p.309). His view that "the only 
proletarians [in the USSR] are the working women" (p.305) should 
probably be read as an ironic reference to the term's literal meaning in 
Latin.
1® The artificial separation that Connor presents in such comments as that 
"being a class cannot determine how to act as a class" (1991, p.319) is 
famously avoided by Thompson in his work on the working class in 
England (1963).
17 Lane's sociological approach to class, and his consequent arrival at the 
concept of the incorporated worker, might be seen as parallel to the 
essentially functionalist approach to the Soviet economy employed by 
the Birmingham sovietologists.
1® Another sovietological scholar to study full employment is Granick, 
who perceives it (1987) as in many ways the determining characteristic 
of the Soviet economy. Concerning himself, however, exclusively with
________
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its consequences, he considers conflict only in passing, and then — in 
the same way as M. McAuley (1969) and others — only in terms of the 
official mediation of disputes.
1® The reference is to H. Smith 1976, p.305. Lane's extract is preceded in
Smith's work by two lines of equally impressionistic character: "In 
their most admiring moments, Russians praise Stalin as the krepki 
khozyain [sic], the strong master. He held society together in his grip 
and they liked that feeling." Smith's work is one of m any such 
journalistic accounts. Despite providing a wealth of not uninteresting 
empirical material, though, it is burdened with many such prejudiced 
simplisms, and is in my view inferior to Walker 1986 and even Binyon 
1985, if not perhaps to Shipler 1983. All of these works rem ain 
overshadowed by the earlier Journey Into Russia (1964) by van der Post, 
an explorer with a British 'special military' background.
20 The precise terms used are those of a 'reconciliation' of interests.
21 A similarly Weberian approach, although nominally 'M arxist,' is 
adopted by Zukin (1978).
22 The concept of a 'social compact had previously been used in Pravda 
1979b.
22 In Marxist terms, one might suggest that the ruling ideology, unlike
those of western liberal democracies, possessed minimal internal 
efficacy and existed mainly for reasons of foreign policy. The 
ubiquitous hammers and sickles and the large hoardings displaying 
slogans such as "Proletarians of the World Unite!" were of a less 
marked significance even than the symbolism which in Britain appears 
to be the nearest semiotic equivalent, namely the royalist and often 
Christian symbolism similarly displayed on coins and banknotes and at 
key judicial, executive, and legislative locations and occasions. 
Whereas the latter relates to real organisational aspects of the admitted 
hierarchy and privilege system of the specific British State, and at the 
same time reinforces national unity around the rulers' really-existing 
parliamentary-democratic regime ('constitutionality') — w ith major 
problems only where it confronts a rival in Northern Ireland — die 
'socialist' ideology of the USSR could never hide the obvious fact that 
the Soviet system was not ruled by the workers. In other words, the 
official picture was self-evidently false. Indeed, since it was neither the 
"the sigh of the oppressed creature" nor in any real sense the 
"universal basis of consolation and justification," it cannot even be 
likened to religion. (See Marx 1844, p.244). Slogans such as "Glory to 
Work," meanwhile, are best seen as a parallel to the "Work Liberates" 
slogans erected at the gates of concentration camps in Germany: in 
other words, as little more than an affirmation that might is right, and a
______
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threat of violence against those who would develop a language of class 
opposition towards a conceptualisation of the possibility of revolution. 
(This is something which Orwell describes brilliantly in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four [1949], especially in his appendix on "The Principles of 
Newspeak." [pp.312-26]) In short, the 'passivity' of the 'citizens' to 
which Pravda refers is less basic an issue than the exploiters' lack of an 
effective State ideology.
24 In comparison, Yanowitch's brief consideration that portions of the 
working class might resist the imposition of 'work reform ' appears 
merely 'political' or 'sociological,' his main focus being upon political 
resistance and the resilience of the administration. Rather tiian theorise 
a deal, 'compact', or relation with the workforce of a general nature, he 
alludes instead to parts of a 'divided' working class which "have 
obviously found their niche in the network of privilege." (1985, p.l63).
25 These criticisms apply equally well to the recent work by Cook entitled 
The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed. (1993). Although Cook 
inexplicably fails to refer to Pravda, she uses a concept of social 
'contract' which, in this context at least, would seem identical to that of 
a social 'compact.' Although she brings the analysis up to the early 
1990s, she does little to aid the removal of the m ain theoretical 
weaknesses and perhaps even increases them. Thus in her initial 
definition of the "social contract thesis" she states that
the contract thesis is based on the assumption that what the 
Soviet state delivered was precisely what its society most 
valued, that is, that party and people shared a conception of 
distributive and social justice that gave central place to 
material welfare and egalitarianism, (p.3).
In what follows, although she looks more specifically at the thesis of a 
"contract" between the "regime" and "Slavic blue-collar" workers (p.4), 
she often lapses into somewhat less classist (albeit less nationalist) 
terminology of a "trade-off" between 'State and society.' And this she 
considers principally in terms of the government's policy of allowing a 
rise in living-standards in return for "political quiescence." (pp.80-81).
W hilst she does show in some empirical detail how  under 
Brezhnev the central bureaucrats kept consumer prices down, 
employment relatively full, and 'social security' relatively secure, she 
avoids any substantial usage of a concept of actual labour indiscipline. 
Instead, she simply notes that the rise of working class unrest — 
mainly strikes — and eventually of independent workers "activism" — 
that is, 'independent' trade unionism — coincided with the erosion of 
the social contract in a process which began around 1980 and came to 
fruition in 1987-90. (pp.75-81 and 150-79). As inadequate explanation.
_____
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she gives little more than a description  of the governm ent's 
predicament, its policies and its skills, faced with the emergence of 
'labour politics,' and against a background of w hat is once again 
sim ply assum ed to be an objective social need for economic 
development.
26 In more recent analyses of both perestroika and the Yeltsin period, 
Zaslavsky has made minimal reference to the interests of the working 
class, concentrating above all on potential developments towards 
western-style democracy. (1987,1993). The retrogression which such an 
approach represents in relation to his previous work has been amply 
shown by Rittersporn (1993).
CHAPTER 5
The Class Struggle: A Critique of 'Marxist' Theories
In this chapter I consider the most important 'Marxist' theories’* of the 
nature of the Soviet system from a single standpoint, namely focusing on 
how they approach the matter of the working class. In each case, I am 
interested in particular in how the overall view of the system relates to a 
theoretical understanding of working class struggle.
I divide the theories into three sets, according to whether they view 
the USSR as a 'degenerated workers' state', a 'capitalist' formation, or a 
'mode of production sui generis/ The third group I subdivide further into 
early 'collectivist' theories. East European 'd issident' theories, later 
'collectivist' theories, and a more recent 'mode of production' theory.2
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1 THE ■'DEGENERATED WORKERS'STATE'
i f
The first position to be considered is the one formulated by Trotsky, the 
former War Commissar and rival to Stalin expelled from the Communist 
Party in 1927, In exile Trotsky arrived at a 'Bonapartist' explanation of the 
origins of Stalinism: in the present context, though, it is not that which 
interests us, but rather his ideas about the role of the working class within 
the society as a whole.
In The Revolution Betrayed (1936), subtitled What is the Soviet Union^ 
and Where is it Going?, Trotsky makes a number of statements about the 
working class which to the Marxist ear sound quite contradictory. At one 
point he scorns the announcement in Pravda that the Soviet worker "is not a 
wage slave and is not the seller of a commodity called labour power," and 
asserts that "the transfer of the factories to the State changed the situation of 
the worker only juridically." (p.228). Given his subsequent explanation that 
what characterises classes is "their position in the social system of economy, 
and primarily...their relation to the means of production," one would 
therefore be forgiven for thinking that what he sees as a purely juridical
change in workers' conditions has left the working class as a class exploited
■by capitalism. But such is not his view, and only a few pages later, having 
argued that
3«
.m
i
the nationalization of the land, the means of industrial production, 
transport and exchange, together with the monopoly of foreign 
trade, constitute the basis of the Soviet social structure (p.235),
he goes on to assert that these relations were sufficient to establish the
"nature of the Soviet Union as a proletarian State." His confusion deepens
_________
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when he then proceeds to describe how, if the means of production 
belonged to the State, "the State, so to speak, belongs' to the bureaucracy." 
(p.236). We are thus left with a State that was proletarian even if it was 
owned by a bureaucracy, and even if that bureaucracy was "in the full sense 
of the word the sole privileged and commanding stratum" in the society. 
(p.235). Accepting that the source of the bureaucracy's power and income 
was the State property under its command, Trotsky argues (p.236) that it 
was precisely this aspect of its activity which preserved it as "a weapon of 
proletarian dictatorship."
If we concentrate on his view of the conditions endured by the 
working class, we see that he accepts that workers are obliged to sell their 
labour-power, and that property relations are such that the surplus product 
is extracted by a bureaucracy. But nonetheless, in his opinion, "the character 
of the economy as a whole depends on the character of the State power" 
(p.237), and the character of the latter is "proletarian" owing to the allegedly 
"proletarian" nature of the Bolshevik coup and the nationalisation measures 
introduced after 1917.® The only possible conclusion to draw  from this is 
that workers' conditions are of minimal importance to the underlying nature 
of the system, which remains, at bottom, proletarian.^ This is not to say, 
however, that Trotsky is not critical of those conditions, for in fact he makes 
no bones about criticising injustice, oppression, differential consumption, 
and so on, even if he had supported them when he himself was in the elite. 
Indeed, he even reaches the point (1939b, pp.30-31) of condemning the 
Soviet "workers' state" as "counter-revolutionary." But the only explanation 
he gives of the extent of workers' hardships is in relation to the 
"degeneration" of the Party he once helped lead — itself supposedly caused
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by scarcity (1936, pp.87-112) — and it cannot be said that he pays attention 
to forms of working class resistance — that is, struggle — at any level. 
Instead, he restricts himself to issuing calls to Soviet workers to defend the 
Soviet State (the 'Fortress of the Toilers'), and to deal with their problems by 
forming a new but traditional party, the legitimate heir of Lenin's, which 
would re-establish Leninist norms and clear out the 'parasites.' (1940, 
pp.281-84).
Trotsky's most important follower in the 'degenerated workers' 
state' camp has been E. Mandel, who also identifies Soviet conditions as 
'transitional' between capitalism and socialism. (1974). Like Trotsky, Mandel 
bases this thesis (pp.8-9) upon the nationalised nature of the means of 
production and the 'proletarian' nature of the Bolshevik seizure of power. 
As a consequence of his 'workers' statist' position Mandel creates an 
absolute theoretical division between, on one side, the interests of the 
bureaucratic elite, and on the other, the concrete relations of that elite with 
the working class. Thus he explains the massive growth rates of Stalinism 
with reference only to the "absence of the rule of the law of value" (1979, 
p .ll9 ) — which, for him, means the presence of some kind of planning — 
and proceeds (pp.120-2) to assert that the "material privileges of the 
bureaucracy are essentially restricted to the sphere of consumption."® We 
are thus left w ithout any consideration of accumulation in term s of 
production relations, as well as confused about in whose interests the 
accumulation actually took place, since it clearly did not take place in the 
interests of the workers. In other words, Mandel has no objective theory of 
the accumulation of the surplus product and its re-em ploym ent in 
production, w ithout which the elite could not have adm inistered any
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growth at all. The category of control over the working class — as a necessary 
feature of an economy which was founded upon accumulation but was not 
run  by the workers — is completely absent. It follows, therefore, that 
Mandel has no theory either of workers' obstruction of this control.
When Mandel turns his attention to the crisis of the system, he can 
only be said to adopt a class perspective in the most superficial sense. 
W orkers' organisation and struggle in the Gorbachev period thus appear 
simply as the result of poor living-standards, and their development is 
identified above all with activity within the political space opened up by 
glasnost'. (1989, pp.1-16, 68-84, and 167-81). Failing to analyse how the 
nature of the system was determined by the nature of class struggle, Mandel 
explicitly denies (p.8) that the malfunctioning of the system had anything to 
do with workers' 'laziness' or 'lack of drive.' For him, waste resulted 
exclusively from bureaucratic mismanagement. He is consequently able to 
write about the historical roots of the crisis (1991) without mentioning class 
struggle at all.
2 'CAPITALISM'
Having already considered the views of the main 'capitalist' theorists upon 
the nature of the Soviet system, I shall now consider their understanding of 
the Soviet working class. With allowance for the fact that contributions 
made by the council communists, Buick and Crump, Johnson-Forest (all 
'state capitalist'), Gorter and Castoriadis ('capitalist) will be considered in 
Chapter 6, the order in which the remaining analyses will be considered is 
the same as in Chapter 2. I shall take first the 'state capitalist' theories
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produced by the SPGB, Wildt, Munis, Cliff, Bettelheim, Chavance and Sapir; 
and then the 'capitalist' theory argued by Bordiga.
2.1 'State Capitalist' Theories
Many theories of 'state capitalism' give hardly any theoretical consideration 
to the position of the working class, other than to record its exploitation and 
subjugation.® Thus the SPGB, after commenting on the absence in the USSR 
of political democracy, simply assert without further evidence that the 
Soviet rulers have "hoodwinked" their subjects into believing that rule by 
secret police, concentration camp, and executioner" is the "best of all 
possible worlds." (1946, p .101). Meanwhile Wildt takes a similar view, 
holding that Soviet 'totalitarian state capitalism' m ade "all effective 
opposition" impossible. (1979, p.54). In other words, subjugation was 
absolute and the class struggle did not exist.
2.1.1 The Leninist Theories of Munis and Cliff
Even Munis, whose overall analysis of the political-economic conditions is 
somewhat more profound, proves unable to go beyond political rhetoric 
when writing about the working class. Thus for him.
The extreme poles have for years been as follows: on the extreme 
right, the bureaucracy; on the extreme left, the proletariat. (1946, 
p.l2).
His understanding of these 'poles' never becomes any more substantial than 
this, and a few pages later he avers that the proletariat's part in social
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distribution, which presumably includes the determ ination of its own 
income, is "precisely that of the slave." (p.l5).
The view defended by Cliff is somewhat similar, even if he uses 
different words. Perhaps the best way to begin a discussion of his type of 
'state capitalist' view of the Soviet working class, though, is to recognise his 
clear defence of the use of force over the workers, albeit mediated through 
the 'workers' state.'
In the transition period [between capitalism and 'socialism'] [labour 
discipline] will be the outcome of the unity [sic] of the two elements 
— consciousness and coercion....
...Whereas the workers will be both a disciplining and a 
disciplined factor, a subject and an object, the technicians will serve 
in reality only as a transmission belt, this time of the workers' state, 
even if tiiey remain formally disdpliners of the workers. (Cliff 1955, 
pp.128-29).
It is, however, only when considering the few years after 1917 that 
Cliff is led by such a Leninist and non-Marxist approach to defend the 
Bolshevik regime as a 'workers' state.' When discussing the Stalinist period 
he always uses the term 'state capitalism,' and draws a crucial connection 
between, on one hand, the subordination of consumption to accumulation, 
and on the other, the subordination of the workers to the means of 
production, (pp.34-38). This in itself undoubtedly indicates a rather more 
profound theorisation than is evident in Trotsky and Mandel's critique of 
'parasites.' Furthermore, having identified the Soviet elite as a ruling class 
(pp .l66-68), Cliff does at least devote a chapter to the class struggle.
But it turns out to be the concluding chapter and to consist of a 
mere twelve pages. Whilst referring to a "relation of forces between the 
proletariat and the bureaucracy," Cliff fails to ask what for the Marxist is the 
crucial question: what form did the workers' struggle take? Instead, he looks
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at how the "more experienced and intelligent" workers were often able to 
travel upw ards in the bureaucratic hierarchy; how the working class 
underw ent a "dilution by raw  elements"; and how these two factors 
combined to obstruct the rise of an independent — read: politically 
represented — workers' movement, (pp.255-56). No attem pt is made to 
build on his brief earlier reference to sabotage as a weapon used against 
Stakhanovism. (p.22). Ultimately the picture Cliff paints is similar to that 
painted by the 'totalitarian' sovietologists: we can read of "unlim ited 
egoism," a bureaucracy that spreads lies without limits, and even "the 
absolute suppression of the masses." (pp.254,257, and 258). The whole idea 
of a 'relation of forces,' a struggle, not being fleshed out, seems simply to 
vanish. What we are left with are merely comments on how improvements 
in the standard  of living and culture w ould lead to increasing 
self-confidence and a growing impatience with the lack of bourgeois rights; 
whilst the absence of such improvements would lead sooner or later to 
"revolts of despair." (pp.259-60). Cliff summarises his position in the 
following terms: one day, a spontaneous explosion; for the time being, 'the 
volcano seems extinct'(p.264),7
After the eruptions in the USSR and elsewhere in 1989, Cliffs ideas 
were applied to the changing state of affairs by Harman. In "The Storm 
Breaks" (1990) Harman suggests that the Soviet system entered crisis 
because it was unable to keep up with the worldwide shift towards 
'multinational capitalism,' (pp.44-52). The crisis of the "old forms of rule" 
consequently brought about "enormous popular discontent," and that in 
turn created pressure for a transition to a new form of capitalist rule.
'B O ' , . ;  . .B ... B  B  3 ' v
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Yet the transition itself involves disruption to the mechanisms 
which have kept the discontent in check in the past — the political 
and ideological apparatuses of the ruling class. The greater the level 
of accumulation and the levels of repression needed to sustain it, 
the greater the possibility of the mass of people taking advantage of 
this disruption to give expression to accumulated bitterness in a 
huge explosion of anger and action, (p.67).
i
Thus it cannot be said that Harman is unaware of there being a relationship 
between crisis and class struggle. But what exactly is that relationship? What 
caused the crisis in the first place? By asking these questions we can see that 
Harman is a long way away from hypostatising the antagonism between 
classes. In fact, when writing about the proletariat as the 'gravedigger' 
which had undermined Soviet capitalism throughout its history, he refers 
only to its growth in size and the rise in its level of culture and education, 
and completely neglects even to mention its practice, (pp.41-43). It is 
therefore logical, since he views things from a Leninist 'p a r t /  point of view 
rather than from a class one, that faced with the crisis Harm an ends up 
calling for support for political and even national reforms, (pp.83-84).®
2,1,2 Bettelheim's Theory and Related Work
'4:
The author of the other best-known 'state capitalist' theory alongside Cliff's, 
namely Bettelheim, provides Just as little analysis as Cliff does of the actual 
conditions of class struggle under 'state capitalism.' Thus m ost of his 
references to the working class are either statements concerning negatives — 
such as the non-subordination of the State to the labouring masses (1971, 
pp.58-59), or the absence of an adequate 'ideological revolutionisation' of 
the workers (1970, p.89); or else they take the form of rare asides concerning 
ideologically reinforced social immobility, other 'ideological relations,' or
I
I
CHAP.5 - CLASS STRUGGLE:'MARXIST THEORIES 230
the power of managers to "invoke means of repression" and sack their 
employees, (pp.88-89). Although Bettelheim does not explicitly say that 
workers do not or cannot resist the conditions of exploitation, nor does he 
ever say that they can and do.® Hence the question of how they do is one that 
he does not even approach.
Chavance, meanwhile, whose work follows on from Bettelheim's, 
does not let this omission stand in his way. Unlike Bettelheim he thus 
understands fully that the "pressure from the base for wage-rises" is a 
phenom enon which is "inherent in the social contradictions of 
wage-labour." Although hardly a breakthrough in Marxist thought, this is in 
fact quite a breakthrough in terms of the 'capitalist' theories of the USSR. 
Chavance is aware both of the gap between 'planned' wages and the wages 
actually received, and of the rise in consumption levels up to the 1970s. 
(1989, pp.24-26). In this connection, he then points to the poor quality of 
goods as being a sort of countervailing factor, (p.26). Underlying such 
phenomena Chavance identifies exclusively the absence or near-absence of 
unemployment, which he relates to the microeconomic shortage of labour. 
(pp.29-32).
Although Chavance undoubtedly strives here to form ulate a 
class-based critique of the overall Soviet political economy, the weakness of 
his account is quite straightforward: he omits to consider class struggle at 
the point of production. As a consequence, he neglects to consider the 
quality of goods precisely where it first appears: in the labour process. Apart 
from giving the observations noted above, he thus finds himself unable to 
analyse labour relations in such a way as to enhance the overall critique. The 
tension between workers and their conditions of exploitation — or between
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workers and the bureaucratic centre — appears sim ply as another 
characteristic of the Soviet system, alongside such phenomena as passive 
money, inconvertibility, and the shadow economy. It is considered only in 
terms of a structure-related 'conflict of interest,' not in terms of struggle; as 
something inherent but not fundamental.
Sapir also adopts Bettelheim's view of 'state capitalism,' but for his
part has written more extensively on the workers. Having described the
:initial 'suppression' of unemployment as a means by which the authorities 
crushed labour turnover as a form of resistance, he proceeds to show how 
inside the factories there persisted a 'partial' or 'technical' unemployment as
s
an intrinsic part of the 'shortage economy.' This unemployment witliin the 
workplace formed a contrasting backdrop to the well-known practice of 
end-of-period 'storming.' (1980, pp.163-65). In a subsequent work devoted 
specifically to "work and the workers" Sapir then considers mobility and 
storming in finer empirical detail. More importantly, he also pays notable 
attention to 'skiving' (progul), lateness, unofficial breaks, black work, and 
pilfering. (1984, pp.58-69). Having concentrated earlier upon how workers 
are constrained to act, he has thus progressed to a consideration of how they 
choose to act.
If this undoubtedly marks a development in his thought, though, it 
unfortunately remains an analytical and theoretical step of which Sapir 
himself seems completely unaware, and upon which he altogether fails to 
build. When we look for a theoretical conception of the overall relationship 
between class relations and the nature of the system we find that his work 
displays a consistency of the most 'objectivist' kind. In 1980 he does relate 
the strikes of 1962-63 and 1969-70 to the government's reform attempts
I
CHAP.5 - CLASS STRUGGLE:'MARXIST'THEORIES 232
(pp.179-85); but he nonetheless places a general emphasis primarily upon 
the problems caused by an economic institutionalisation of forms which are 
best suited to the period of intensive accumulation, and which from the 
rulers' viewpoint have become increasingly dysfunctional, (pp. 162-71). With 
such an approach any dynamic of class relations will appear as merely 
epiphenomenal.
This becomes clearer when Sapir considers the world of Soviet 
work in greater detail. In describing rising labour turnover, alcoholism, and 
systematic breaches of labour discipline as products of "problems born from 
the crisis of regimentation [encadrement]" (p.96) he thus notably fails to 
consider how such behaviour on the part of the workers m ight have 
contributed to creating such a crisis in the first place. In this view, the 
"dysfunctions of the Soviet economy, whose consequences are felt especially 
in the area of work and its rhythms," are "inherent" in the existence of a 
high degree of competition for resources, both at enterprise level and 
between enterprises and ministries, (pp.72-73). In the conclusion of his book, 
Sapir explains that these two "competing forms of economic logic" 
determine both the existence of full employment and the absence of a 
harmonious workplace rhythm, (pp.l 17-18). In the empirical consideration, 
then, he may refer occasionally to the class struggle; but in his overarching 
understanding of the Soviet political economy this struggle is not a basic 
factor. In considering the place of the workers he does refer to contradiction 
and to conflict, but the only "poles" which he defines in this connection are 
those of "integration" and "mediation." (p.lOl; see also 1989, p.32). Since 
these latter two terms properly relate to what happens between polarities, 
Sapir's formulation appears to be deprived of substantive meaning, but it
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serves to demonstrate his lack of attention with regard to the consequences 
of the fundamental class relation. More recently he has expressed a view of 
the influence of the labour shortage upon workers' behaviour which is 
self-evidently mechanical, the prime connecting factor ostensibly being 
constituted by the "permissiveness" of the enterprises (that is, of the 
enterprise directors). (1992, especially pp.95-97).
2.2 Other 'Capitalist' Theory
. 1
■iCI:
Bordiga shows a level of interest in the Soviet working class which is quite 
as low as Bettelheim's. Despite underlining throughout his work that Soviet
workers are exploited by capital — in relation to which the State, like all 
States, occupies a subordinate position, the government being just one 
committee of the world capitalist class (1956-57, p.l23)i® — he shows little 
desire to look at the specific conditions workers endure and the forms of
:resistance which arise in opposition to those conditions. Thus in Dialogue 
avec Staline he writes of factory despotism and its Stakhanovist form, but 
confines his consideration of the workers' reaction to it to a mere 
half-sentence (1952, p.l8) — which is sufficient space to mention 'storming,' 
but insufficient to give any sort of analysis or explanation. Even such a 
reference, though, is extremely rare.n
3 'MODE OF PRODUCTION s u r  GENERIS'i 2
The final set of 'Marxist' positions to be looked at involve the theory that the 
USSR was neither a 'socialist' (workers') state nor a capitalist state, nor even
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a transitional or hybrid formation, but represented rather a new mode of 
production with its own contradictions and its own dynamic. First pu t 
forward in the late 1930s, this view has since been espoused and developed 
by a num ber of different theorists. First I consider the work of Rizzi, 
Burnham , and Shachtman; then the views of Djilas, K uron and 
Modzelewski, and 'Rakovski'; then the 'collectivist' views of Carlo and 
Fantham  and Machover; and finally a recent contribution by Clarke. 
(Various other views are commented on in the notes)."*®
3.1 Early 'Collectivist' Theories
The 'bureaucratic collectivist' thesis originally arose in connection with the 
idea that capitalism was giving way on a world scale to a new social 
form ation, and the argum ents focused on developm ents in H itler's 
Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and Roosevelt's United States, as well as on 
those occurring under Stalin in Russia. In the Soviet context, Rizzi thus 
makes it quite clear that he sees the system as having resolved the 
contradictions which made capitalism 'unprogressive,' and he even leaves 
open the question (1939, pp.51-52) as to whether it might, in the long term, 
"improve the masses' conditions of life." Although he takes the view that 
the system was based on the exploitation of one class by another (p.63), 
however, he does not refer to any sort of struggle between the two classes, 
and ultimately his view of the powerlessness of the working class is as 
extreme as Friedrich and Brzezinski's.
Members of the Russian working class are no longer proletarians,
they are slaves, both economically speaking and in terms of
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behaviour. They kneel when 'the little father' passes and deify 
him....
...The Russian worker, together with his union, has become part 
and parcel of the state...He is made to turn up, sheep-like, at 
political meetings; he is simply an unthinking element of a mass 
which is there to be manipulated by the bureaucracy. (p.81).
Two years after Rizzi's work appeared, Burnham published The 
Managerial Revolution, in which he argues that capitalism  is being 
superseded by 'managerial society,' or rule by a class of managers who 
control production by means of the State. (1941, pp.69-71). For Burnham, 
'Russia' is the country which has progressed furthest along this path  
(pp.151-52), and so his view of the problems faced by the Stalinist system is 
therefore instructive. He writes of a "triple problem" for managerial society 
(p.l97): defeating the capitalists; "curbing the masses" so as to eliminate the 
threat of a classless society; and internal competition, by which he means 
national competition among 'managerial states.' In his view, only the third 
can never be solved. The masses, for their part, have already been curbed, 
and
their obscurely felt aspirations towards equalitarianism  and a 
classless society were diverted into the new structure of class rule, 
and organized in terms of the ideologies and institutions of the new 
social order. (p.l98).
It is sufficient to point out that this assertion, made almost a quarter of a
century after the defeat of the workers' revolution, is not backed up with
any evidence as to what Soviet workers were doing, what they were not
doing, or even what kind of ideas they had, at the time when Burnham was
actually writing the book. Nonetheless, Burnham refers repeatedly to the
"masses" as having been "curbed."
The third main early 'collectivist' was Shachtman, author of The 
Bureaucratic Revolution. Unlike Rizzi and Burnham, Shachtman does not
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apply his view of the new collectivist mode of production either to national 
socialism in Germany or to the New Deal in the United States, and 
consequently does not make comparison a crucial part of his argument. 
(1940-61, pp.2 and 53-55). A second difference, more im portant in the 
present context, is that he denies the capacity of 'bureaucratic collectivism' 
— or its reform — to undermine the growth of what he sees as its basic 
contradiction: the conflict of interests between the exploiters and the 
exploited. But whilst recognising (p.l6) that a "fundamental revolution" 
remains "inescapable," and underlining the inadequacy of reforms for 
shoring up the system (pp.18-19), Shachtman nonetheless gives remarkably 
little consideration to the actual conditions of struggle in the USSR at the 
time he was writing. Thus when looking at the post-Stalin period he 
identifies the fear of discontent as a major factor motivating the granting of 
concessions (pp.346-55), and even goes so far as to opine that after Stalin the 
successor regime could not "even think of m aintaining itself w ithout 
popular support" (p.346), but he fails altogether to relate such insights to 
any study of exactly how workers resisted 'bureaucratic collectivism' in 
practice. His view of the class relation consequently rem ains purely 
one-dimensional.
3.2 East European 'D issident' Theoriesl4
The 'mode of production sui generis' theory has also received support from 
various East European dissidents, beginning with the scholar who should 
perhaps be classed as the very first dissident of major importance, namely 
Djilas. A former Vice-President of Yugoslavia who left the League of
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Communists in 1954 after being stripped of his official posts, Djilas 
proceeded to develop the view that the Soviet-type systems were based on 
the rule of a class which was non-capitalist but still exploitative. The most 
useful passages of his seminal work The New Class (1957) are those where he 
writes of the 'lim it to exploitation," but unfortunately he fails to delve very 
deeply into the matter. Thus his account of how slave labour had to be 
scrapped because it was proving too costly for the regime (1957, pp.111-12) 
is all too brief. He further mentions concealed imemployment, but considers 
it only in terms of inefficiency, not as a class relation amounting to paying 
workers to do nothing, (pp.l 12-13). Third, he touches on how the system 
"leads inevitably to lack of interest on the part of the actual producers...to 
low quality of output [and to] a decline in real productivity," but the lens 
through which he examines the system is one marked 'Dogmatism in the 
Economy' (p. 108), rather than 'Really-Existing Class Relations.' Ultimately, 
even as he recognises that the working class is "the class upon which 
production depends" (p.llO), Djilas forgets the primacy of social production 
relations and eventually reaches the view (p. 122) that "in the Communist 
system...economy has become concentrated politics; that is, politics play an 
almost decisive role in the e c o n o m y B y  concentrating on politics and 
ideology, Djilas is consequently more denunciatory — especially of 
'one-party rule' — than he is theoretically critical in a 'Marxist' sense."*®
Kuron and Modzelewski's Open Letter to the Party, first published in 
Poland in 1965, represents an altogether more radical critique. Being 
among the very few East European intellectuals even to call for a working 
class revolution,"* ® these two theorists undoubtedly stand out from other 
'dissidents' in terms of the amount of attention they pay to the position of
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The problem, however, is that in their conception of the working 
class as subject they do not go far enough. When they come to discuss the
I
the working class. Taking the view that the working class is exploited by a 
ruling dass in the form of the central political bureaucracy, they argue that 
the form this exploitation takes is wage-labour. In other words, the only 
productive force which the ru ling  class does not already own is 
labour-power, which it is therefore forced to buy en bloc in return for wages. 
The goal of production is the accumulation of the surplus product on a 
correspondingly "national" scale. (1965, pp.25-27).
Kuron and Modzelewski proceed to relate the contradictions of the
bureaucratic system, as manifested in economic crisis, to the dass relations 
of production. Arguing that "production for the sake of production" means 
a tendency toward a disproportionate growth in Department One (means of 
production), they give the view that the logic of the system is to restrict the 
growth of consumption. Consumption needs, meanwhile, grow regardless, 
owing to "full employment,...the development of an industrial dvilization, 
and...an improvement in the general level of sodal culture." (p.38). In the 
context of this contradiction, and unlike any of the 'M arxist' theorists 
considered so far, Kuron and Modzelewski describe workers' efforts to 
lower efficiency and product quality as amounting to a "massive social 
initiative."
Like all sodal initiative, it is a consdous activity to realize the aims 
and interests of the people concerned....
...What we have here is...a contradiction between the class goal 
of the bureaucracy (production for production) and the interests of 
the basic groups who achieve the production (m aximum  
consumption). In other words, it is a contradiction between the 
class goal of production and consumption, and it results from 
existing conditions, not from mismanagement, (p.44).
I
. . .
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nature of the 'social initiative' antagonistic to the bureaucracy they fail to 
draw  a clear enough line between the obstructiveness of managers and 
technocrats on one hand, and that of the workers on the other. Moreover, 
they fail to spell out the fundamental point that sloppy work and upward 
pressure on wages are both forms of the same struggle, and even of the 
same demand: less work and more pay both mean a lower rate of 
exploitation. These confusions ultim ately lead them  to adop t the 
'underconsum ptionist' view (pp.38-39 and 44-45) that the low level of 
consumption actually inhibits the growth of production. In arguing that the 
scarcity of consumer goods in relation to nominal wage growth creates an 
'inflation barrier' and the danger of falling real wages, and therefore 
constitutes a major barrier to growth (pp.39-40), they are neglecting two 
fundam ental points: first, that the needs of the exploited are something 
imposed on the exploiters, to whom they are simply costs; and second, that 
the 'crisis' is something imposed back on the working class in the interests 
of exploitative society. Rather than seeing the crisis as a class — that is, class 
struggle-determined — relation, Kuron and Modzelewski prefer to view it 
as a manifestation of a sort of 'decline' of production relations based upon 
production for the sake of production.
If Rakovski's^ ® work is less radical than Kuron and Modzelewki's 
Open Letter, where the matter of class structure is concerned it is rather more 
scientific than Djilas's New Class, Like Djilas, though, Rakovski shows little 
interest in the working class as a 'really existing' subjective class force.
The closer the two systems ['capitalist' and 'Soviet-type'] resemble 
each other at the level of the everyday life of the working class, the 
more difficult it is to avoid asking the question, w hy has the 
working class succeeded in having an organised influence on its 
conditions of life in only one of the two systems? Why is it only
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W estern capitalism that has a workers' movement, w hether 
reformist or revolutionary? There can be no doubt that this is the 
key question for every marxism.... (1978, p. 14).
In fact, of course, this is the 'key question' only for those 'marxisms' which
do not fully espouse the view that the history of class societies is the history
of class struggles; and it reveals an assumption that the representation of the
working class by the unions and the left is the same thing as the working
class 'm ovem ent' itself. Consequently, even as Rakovski accepts that
changes in the situation of the working class are difficult to interpret, he
keeps to the view that workers' resistance in the Soviet-type countries is
confined to the level of 'individual behaviour.' (p.38). And, like so many
others, once he has mentioned such behaviour he fails to ask what the
contradictory forces are which determine it.
All the same, Rakovksi does cautiously predict a growth in "the 
relative autonomy of the oppressed class," even if on the basis of a spread of 
intellectual non-conformism as well as on the basis of an objectively 
strengthened position of the workers' household. Since he links the latter 
factor to a growth in the strength of the individual worker's position in the 
labour market (p. 103), it would be unfair to say that he neglects to consider 
class relations. Given that he further predicts that any future political crisis 
will also give greater scope to the workers, there is clearly a level at which 
Rakovski seems to describe fairly accurately the events which took place at 
the end of the 1980s. But theory should be more than description, and it is 
worth pointing out the theoretical weakness of his approach: namely, his 
drawing of a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, developments 
centred around the objective strength of the working class — benefiting, 
according to Rakovski, from the ideological assistance supposedly offered it
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by the lower ranks of the intellectuals — and, on the other, the economic 
collapse of the system, which on the contrary he does not see as a possibility.
3.3 Later 'Collectivist' Theories
If the 'bureaucratic collectivist' theories of the Stalin period — especially 
those of Rizzi and Burnham — were in many ways rather simplistic, the 
newer version pu t forward in the 1970s was, despite its weaknesses, 
undoubtedly  som ew hat more nuanced. The reason for this is quite 
straightforward. Having a better vantage-point from which to view Soviet 
economic problems, not to mention access to eastern European theoretical 
works such as Kuron and Modzelewski's Open Letter to the Party, Carlo and 
Fantham and Machover were much more interested than their 'collectivist' 
forebears in looking at Soviet society's contradictions.
In his article on "The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR," Carlo 
centres his attention on one contradiction in particular, namely that which 
exists between the forces and relations of production. This contradiction he 
finds expressed in three ways: the disproportion between the capital goods 
and consumer goods sectors; the impossibility of total coordination; and the 
low level of labour productivity. (1971, p.52).
Considering the first of these problems. Carlo argues that unlike in 
'capitalism,' where "if machines for producing shoes are built, it will sooner 
or later be necessary to produce shoes," the growth in the Soviet primary 
sector has "assumed pathological dimensions that threaten the very 
foundations of development." (p.53). Under 'capitalism' consumption levels
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Ihave risen due to an increase in absolute wages, the appearance of a sizeable tertiary sector, and the expansion of credit; but under Soviet 'bureaucratic 
collectivism' they have stayed low, and as a result the system is in trouble. 
This trouble is so severe that ever since 1965 Soviet 'bureaucratic 
collectivism' has found itself gradually metamorphosing into capitalism. 
(pp.58 and 73). By arguing in this way. Carlo is repeating the mistake made 
by Kuron and Modzelewski, namely the assumption that consumer growth 
necessarily helps an exploitative system by providing a demand.^® In fact, of 
course, producing shoes simply to sell to the workers is not in itself 
beneficial to any group of exploiters, since what the working class consumes I
is derived from the necessary part of the product, whereas the exploiters are 
only interested in the surplus. An increase in workers' consumption can
only benefit the exploiters if it buys or enables a large enough growth in 
productivity.
When Carlo addresses the second problem, his terms continue to 
vary between the 'classisP and the 'non-classist' In response to the question
'Why can't the system be planned?' he begins by stating that working class 
opposition has asserted itself in the plan-execution phase ever since the 
system came into existence, but follows this by considering technical 
problems of calculation and forecasting. He then suggests (pp.55-57) that the 
introduction of advanced techniques of computerised surveillance would 
bring its own problems, namely an increase in waste combined with the 
possibility of explosive opposition from managers, workers and farmers. 
W hat has happened here is that the earlier mention of workers' opposition 
in connection with the prevention of (bureaucratic) planning, after being 
followed with a discussion of mere technical problems, has ended up being
I
:
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considered in purely hypothetical (and cross-class) terms of an 'Orwellian' 
future.^"*
The same lack of theoretical depth is evident when Carlo comes to 
consider the third aspect of the contradiction, namely labour productivity as 
a specific phenomenon. In stating that it is by means of low productivity 
levels that "the workers' rejection of the system expresses itself" (pp.62-64), 
he is going a lot further than previous 'Marxists,' but even so he ultimately 
does little more than to affirm what is obvious: workers are disinclined to 
w ork well just so that bureaucrats can get better off. Meanwhile, even 
though he identifies the system's acceptance of a "moderate work rhythm" 
as being a concession to the working class that "is not exceptional but 
organic and normal," his political approach demands that he view the 
frustration of productivity as 'negative' as well as 'positive' in terms of the 
objective interests of the workers, since it lowers the chances of winning "the 
'peaceful coexistence' race." (p.64).
If the strength of Carlo's work is that unlike the earlier 'collectivists' 
he brings into his understanding of the problems of the system a clear 
recognition of the importance of working class opposition, its weakness is 
that like Kuron and Modzelewski he fails to do so in a resolute enough 
manner. At best, his approach leads to an empiricism where issues of actual 
class antagonism appear but are not given a central place; at worst, he loses 
sight of exactly what is a problem for whom, for which class. Through 
confusion, he obscures exploitative society's basic contradiction, namely that 
which exists between the most important 'productive force,' the proletariat, 
and the most important 'relation of production,' the 'system' as a whole. 
Moreover, his implicit identification of the forces of production with the
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material means of production, combined with his explicit taking of sides in 
"the 'peaceful coexistence' race," show s an unden iab le  basic 
accommodation with the official ideology of the system he is endeavouring 
to criticise.22
In a later text concerning bureaucratic collectivism's crisis. Carlo 
similarly fails to draw adequately clear 'class lines.' Arguing that Soviet 
growth under the bureaucratic collectivist system had to remain 'essentially' 
extensive (1979, pp.6 and 9), he describes some of the problems faced by the 
bureaucracy in trying to develop efficiency. Thus he shows how military 
technology cannot be transferred into the civilian economy as in the 
bourgeois countries, owing to high costs and the structural innovation 
problem (pp.l 1-12), and how buying technology abroad is also no real 
solution, because sooner or later "the economy as a whole" will have to bear 
the costs, (p.8). (See also Carlo 1988-89, pp.32-33). Before reaching a far too 
superficial definition of crisis as a "difficulty in achieving the most 
im portant and central ends of the plan" (1979, p.26), he does explain his 
ideas in terms of class antagonism, but fails to trace the development of that 
antagonism as an actual rapport deforce, seeing it rather as a mere underlying 
fact. Hence he totally rejects the idea that 'Russian' workers are "opposed to 
an increase in the production of consumer goods since this would mean an 
increase in their working load," on the grounds that the black market and 
the 'consumer boycott (constrained saving) show that worker-consumers 
"do not readily accept the system's delivery of consumer goods." (p. 19) 
Here he is not saying anything untrue, but he is drastically missing the 
point, which is that the reason why the system was incapable of establishing 
a new deal of 'more goods for harder work,' was that workers' resistance to
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work was too strong. If workers had no objection to 'more goods/ they were 
nonetheless not prepared to work harder to get them. Carlo 's only 
counter-argument here, namely that the kolkhozniks worked hard on their 
private plots, and that they were in no way "biologically different" from 
other workers (p.l9), fails to hold, since the plots he mentions amounted to
privately-owned productive forces which were clearly unavailable to the 
majority of the proletariat. Carlo rightly stresses that higher quality
production is impossible without workers' collaboration, but rather than 
explaining the root cause of the problems the bureaucracy faced in achieving 
such a deal, he simply blames them on the "system," which is "organically 
antagonistic." (p.24). Since he fails to identify the actual forms this 
antagonism takes, his view of it remains highly abstract.
Carlo's work ten years later on the "contradictions of perestroika" /
m arks little theoretical advance, and may even be considered a move 
backwards. Failing to mention class antagonism (or resilience) even as one 
underlying cause of crisis among many, he focuses still more clearly upon 
the systemic bias against technological innovation as the prime determining 
factor. Consumer sector weaknesses and future unem ploym ent and 
underdevelopment are understood solely on this basis. (1988-89, pp.32-33,
40-43.)
A 'collectivist' view of the USSR has also been presented by 
Fantham and Machover, who state in a one-off pam phlet of 1979 that 
conditions prevailing in the 'second world,' together with those established 
or emerging in parts of the 'third w orld/ justify reference to a new mode of 
production running "parallel to capitalism." (1979, p.4). This 'state 
collectivist' mode of production they see as fulfilling a precise "historical
•I
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role": namely, that of developing the productive forces and creating an 
industrial infrastructure wherever capitalism proves incapable of doing so 
owing to its global decline, (p .ll). This is thus a repetition, with slight 
alterations, of the thesis first argued by Carlo.^®
Fantham and Machover's originality lies in the extent to which they 
stress that Soviet conditions conform to a 'generally applicable model' of a 
mode of production bound to experience both 'progress' and eventual 
'decline.' (Trotsky's view of necessary instability is emphatically rejected, 
[p.19].24) In relation to the working class the implications of such an 
alternative 'orthodox Marxist' approach would thus seem clear. Under the
heading "The Historically Progressive Stages of the System," Fantham and 
Machover quote Kuron and Modzelewski on how from 1945 to 1960 "the
achievements of Polish industrialisation...meant the realisation of a general 
social interest"; and they proceed to imply that class antagonism during that 
period was of little significance. In the next section, entitled "The Period of 
Crisis," they then point (pp.15-16) to the chronic problems experienced by
the Soviet elite and the consequent ineffectiveness of 'planning' as shown by 
Ticktin.
The idea here would appear quite straightforward: namely, that in 
the 'progressive' phase of 'state collectivism' — that is, during extensive 
industrialisation — workers participate, but once that phase comes to an end 
they stop. Having earlier promised, though, that much of their discussion 
will revolve around the USSR (p.5), Fantham and Machover stop short of 
explicitly applying this thesis to that country. Instead, examples — as they 
see them — of 'participation' and 'working class identification with the 
system' are taken from elsewhere: and the USSR is used exclusively as a
--------
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source of examples of antagonism, such as resistant labour rigidity and 
avoidance of hard work. (pp.l7-18).2s
All in all, what Fantham and Machover have to say about the Soviet 
working class is so confused that it does not lend itself to being summarised 
in coherent fashion. On the one hand, Soviet 'state collectivism' is seen as 
'progressive' in relation to the capitalist conditions which pertained prior to 
1917, and Kuron and Modzelewski are quoted as drawing a link between 
the mode of production's 'progressive' phase and genuine working class 
participation; on the other, Ticktin is referred to approvingly as 
demonstrating the low quality of work which has been there for as long as 
the system itself. Admittedly, after quoting the Open Letter Fantham and 
Machover do say that the contradictions may take very different forms and 
proceed at a very different pace outside Poland; but the gap between, on one 
hand, Kuron and Modzelewski's view as generalised here and, on the other, 
Ticktin's view as quoted, would seem logically unbridgeable. For the rest, 
one is presented w ith a series of points which are left theoretically 
unconnected. The working class suffers because consumption levels are 
'comparatively' low — comparative to what? — but on the other hand 
employment is full, which means that dismissal is rare and productivity 
'sticky upwards.' The only effective sanction against the working class is 
"repressive administrative control," but at the same time there is a "high 
degree of ideological control [which is] extended, even more strongly than 
in advanced capitalism, through the media, education and the family." 
Apparently in absolute contradiction with this last point, however, it is 
asserted in the very next sentence (p.l8) that "state collectivism shares with 
all non-capitalist class systems a relative transparency of exploitation and
i
_________________
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oppression." Ultimately we are left with little more of substance than two 
basic points: first, low productivity conflicts with the bureaucrats' need to 
accumulate; second, there are no trade unions.
3.4 Recent 'M ode of Production' Theory
The most recent contribution to m erit consideration is that m ade by 
C larke.26 Although in 1990 he argues the 'Makhaevist' view^? that
the social base of state socialism [i.e. Soviet society] lies in the 
stratum of intellectual workers [such as] managers, administrators, 
scientists, technicians, engineers, social workers, and teachers [,]
(p.20).
by 1992 he has switched his allegiance to the view that Soviet society was 
based instead on the material relations of production. Attempting to analyse 
current economic contradictions in terms of production relations and class 
struggle, he outlines a view of the USSR which has a num ber of original 
aspects.
But unfortunately the theoretical underpinnings of his new view of 
the "Soviet mode of production" appear to be highly confused. Thus for him
the Soviet system was based on a form of wage labour, but it was 
not based on social relations of capitalist production. (1992, p.3).
Clarke clearly believes (p.5) that the sale of workers' labour-power does not
necessarily imply the existence of the category of abstract labour; but since
he has not actually argued for this view it is sufficient merely to observe that
this would necessitate a major — and definition-based — revision of Marx's
categories which has yet to appear. Two further positions will serve to
demonstrate Clarke's confusion even more sharply: first, his statement that
■ .
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the "basis of the Soviet enterprise was not capital, but the productive 
activity of the labour collective"; and second, his view that "the surplus was 
appropriated from the direct producers in kind." (p.7). Both are used to 
illustrate the non-capitalist nature of the system; but insofar as they apply 
equally well to the capitalism described by Marx, both fail. In the absence of 
coherent definitions, Clarke's assertions that "capital did not exist in Russia" 
and that economic transactions were "essentially non-monetary" remain 
insupportable.
It is notable, however, that Clarke does not go as far as positing a 
non-capitalist mode of production based not only upon wage-labour but 
also upon the need to accumulate the material productive forces. Instead,
the task of the enterprise administration was not to secure the 
expanded reproduction of capital, but the expanded reproduction 
of the labour collective. Any profits [sic] which remained to the 
enterprise, once it had met its obligations, were not appropriated as 
capital, but were generally spent on improving the working and 
social conditions of the labour collective, (p.7)
Certainly, production was not "subordinate" to the needs of the "collective"
— indeed, the latter were "subordinated" to the production  and
appropriation of a surplus — but what in Clarke's view determined
production was not any need of the system to expand the social product, but
rather its "need to secure the expanded reproduction of the labour
collective." (p.7) However much negotiation took place between enterprises
and the centre, there was thus a clear correspondence between the 'task' of
the enterprise managers and the needs of the system: the main aim of both
sets of interests opposed to those of the workers was to expand the size of
the working class.
Clarke proceeds to state in more 'classical' fashion that
î | ; ;
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the development of the forces of production was constrained by the 
exploitative social relations of production, and it was this specific 
co n trad ic tio n  th a t u n d e rp in n e d  the collapse  of the 
administrative-command system, (p.8).
Two criticisms should be made of this view. First, the expansion of the
working class which Clarke identifies as 'determ inant of production would
seem very clearly to constitute one type of development of the forces of
production. Thus while demographic factors are important it is hard to see
which production relations m ight have constrained such development.
Second, if Clarke is right, there would seem to be immense problems in
identifying the "irrationality" of the system in the difficulty it faced in
developing productive forces in general. For Clarke the system's nature and
dynamic were determined by the need to expand the labour collective, not
the other productive forces, whose growth would seem to have been
peripheral or at most a by-product of higher employment figures. In what
term s, then, can the failure to produce a peripheral effect appear
"irrational," let alone critical? The answer could lie either with externalities
or with some abstract 'law of historical progress' derived elsewhere than
from a theory of Soviet reality — but once again Clarke does not follow the
theory through this far.
A year later, in 1993, Clarke changes to a third view. N ot only does 
he now refer to 'Soviet production' rather than to a Soviet 'm ode of 
production' (1993a, p.7, n.l), he also moves away from his previous position 
on the need of the system to expand the 'labour collective.' The aim of 
production is now seen simply as the provision of surplus use-values to 
satisfy 'the Politburo and the m ilitary'; and the "specific form  of 
exploitation" is associated with the effort of the centre to extort such a
CHAP.5 - CLASS STRUGGLE: 'MARXIST' THEORIES 251
surplus by maintaining control over supplies. (p.l5). In seeking to analyse 
the contradictions inherent in such a model, Clarke then describes how, 
since the managers are not subject to the law of value, their main problem is 
not that of controlling the labour process, but precisely that of acquiring the 
supplies over whose allocation the centre retains administrative control. As 
a consequence, in terms of the control of the production process the workers 
are allow ed substantial leeway: their w ork m ight be subject to 
intensification, but how they work remains largely unsubject to external 
control, (p.l6).
The question now arises of the form actually taken by the workers' 
control over the labour process, this control which is considered to 
contradict the interests of the rulers. Unfortunately, though, this is a 
question to which Clarke fails to give an adequate answer. Somewhat 
confusedly, he asserts that
The fact that Soviet workers had a high degree of control over the 
way in which they produced [i.e. over the labour process—NCF] does 
not mean that they had power. Workers could try to escape from 
their oppression in individual ways, in the form of absenteeism, 
labour turnover, alcoholism and poor 'discipline' and 'motivation,' 
but they had little possibility of collective resistance. (p.l7).
Soon he adds that
the limits of workers' power were set by the norms and targets 
handed down from above." (p.l9).
These two statements clearly contradict each other. Moreover, in analysing
the class relations which correspond to the Soviet system , Clarke
concentrates primarily on the limits imposed on workers' power, which he
sees as enforced by means of piece-rates, stratification, union-administered
benefits, and the enterprise-level labour surplus, (pp.19-26). What he does
______________________
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not theorise is the actual assertion of this power in course of struggle. 
Indeed, where he does not deny that Soviet workers had any power, he 
clearly implies that they managed to acquire some power without struggling 
for it, as a sort of by-product of the nature of the system.
Despite his interest in the workers' struggles which have unfolded 
since 1989, Clarke seeks to explain the causes of the crisis of the system in 
terms which are remarkably non-classist. He begins by criticising the Soviet 
reform ist view, associated w ith Gorbachev and others, that the 
administrative-command system had proven "well adapted to the economic 
priorities of heavy industrialisation in the 1930s," but by the 1980s had 
become increasingly irrational. (p.30). For Clarke,
If the system was economically irrational from its inception, we 
cannot explain the crisis of the system by its economic irrationality 
alone. The system did not meet the needs of the Soviet people in the 
1980s, but the system had not met the needs of the Soviet people in 
the 1930s, and it was never designed to meet their needs. The 
system  was designed to meet the political needs of the 
nomenklatura... The crisis arose because the mechanisms which had 
kept a grotesquely repressive, exploitative and inefficient system 
going, despite its irrationality, for almost sixty years, had reached 
their limits, (pp.32-33).
The analysis here would seem to be largely rhetorical. It should be noticed,
for example, that the term 'nomenklatura,' which might be applied to
everyone from the Patriarch to a provincial newspaper editor, but not to the
members of the Politburo, appears highly inappropriate. In addition, it is
fairly obvious that Stalinist industrialisation did prove to be 'rational' in
terms of the goal Stalin famously ascribed to it in 1931: namely, rapid
enough economic development within 10 years to permit the avoidance of
outright military destruction. (See McCauley 1981, pp.72-73).
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Even if Clarke goes on to specify that by the 1960s it was the 
'strategy' of extensive development which was beginning to 'reach its 
limits/28 he approaches only in passing the questions of w hat these limits 
were and how they came to be reached. The problem would simply be the 
continuing irrationality of the system, as manifested by the exhaustion of 
easily exploitable resources and by the "neglect of the reproduction of the 
technical, natural and hum an forces of production." (1993b, p.37). Low 
levels of workers' motivation are now brought in as one result among others 
of the low level of 'reproductive investm ent in general. The sloppiness of 
this analysis is apparent once it is remembered that extensive growth is by 
definition precisely not dependent upon the reproduction of existing 
resources, but upon the mustering of new ones; and that the USSR can 
hardly be said to have exhausted the massive reserves of coal, oil, uranium, 
etc., which were so important to its economy. (See for example IMF et al.
1991).
Seeing high m ilitary spending as the main contingent factor 
threatening to turn stagnation into economic collapse, Clarke is ultimately 
led to stress that the 'timing' of the crisis was determined not by internal 
factors at all, but by "the relationship between the Soviet system and 
international capitalism." (1993b, pp.33-34). He then proceeds to discuss the 
effects of changes in the international terms of trade, especially the price of 
oil. In this view, the oil price rise provided an important breathing space 
after 1973, but the subsequent fall, together with the global debt mountain 
and rising grain prices, is seen as precipitating the onset of full-scale crisis in 
the late 1980s, W hat Clarke notably fails to discuss is the relationship 
between the underlying causes either of the crisis itself, or of its timing, to
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the specific relation of the workers to the labour process. And as if to 
underline this omission, he states clearly but without argum ent that the 
crisis was in fact not one of surplus production at all, but simply one of 
"surplus appropriation" and distribution, (p.47).
Clarke's desire to theorise the relation t>etween the "development of 
class struggles over the social relations of production" and the "dynamics of 
the transformation of the Soviet mode of production" (1992, p.3) remains 
necessarily unarm ed. He may have produced a useful analysis of the 
problems of privatisation (1992) and co-written informative accounts of the 
development of the 'workers' movement since 1989 (Clarke and Fairbrother 
1993b-f; Clarke, Fairbrother, and Borisov 1994), but since he has a theory 
neither of the class struggle in the previous period, nor of the accumulation 
of the productive forces, he cannot really relate class struggle to crisis in any 
profound, historical, or dynamic way. Above all, this would dem and a 
preliminary recognition of the working class as a historical subject with 
'radical chains,' and a quest to understand its self-assertion as the tendential 
negation of the existing order. (Marx 1844, pp.256-57). Whilst displaying a 
profound interest in the working class, Clarke appears very far from such an 
approach.
Given his non-recognition of class struggle prior to Gorbachev, it is 
hardly surprising that Clarke does not attempt to identify the nature of the 
force of the workers in terms of any sort of polarity or singularity. As a 
result, he gives far too much credence (1992, p.40) to the "management's 
identification of the enterprise with the labour collective," and eventually 
reaches the view that the most radical aspect of workers' struggle is its 
tendency to push  for enterprise dém ocratisation at m eetings of
CHAP.5 - CLASS STRUGGLE: 'MARXIST' THEORIES 255
worker-shareholders. (pp.40-41; see also Clarke 1993c, pp.240-41). Workers' 
actual practice at the 'point of production,' when they are actually working, 
is left out of the picture altogether. He undoubtedly does deserve credit for 
stating that it was the miners' strikes of 1989 and 1991 which brought the 
system down (1992, p.40), even if he excises this opinion from a later rewrite 
(1993c), but he imbues this statement with virtually no theoretical or 
historical force. Among the other weaknesses already m entioned, his 
democratism, limited theory of accumulation, and lack of critique of either 
the enterprise-form or the wage-form prevent him from achieving a 
profound grasp of the real antagonism involved.
4 SUMMARY
In considering what various 'Marxist' theories of the nature of the Soviet 
system have had to say upon the nature of the working class and its 
struggle, I have pointed to considerable weaknesses, and, in many cases, a 
remarkable level of superficiality. I shall now summarise the criticisms 
made.
I have shown how the understanding of Soviet political economy by 
the proponents of the 'workers' state' theory touches upon class conflict 
solely in terms of a static 'conflict of interests' in the abstractly differentiated 
sphere of distribution. It should therefore come as no surprise that there is 
no real consideration of the actual class struggle between the workers on 
one side, and the exploiters and their State on the other. Neither Trotsky nor
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E. Mandel have any real interest in any form of class struggle which might 
correspond to the overall political economy.
It is considerably more surprising that very much the same criticism 
can also be made of almost all the numerous 'capitalist' theorists who have 
also worked within 'Marxism/ from the SPGB and Wildt to Cliff and Munis, 
Bettelheim and Bordiga, I have shown above how they too have done little 
more than to rhetoricise about the workers' total powerlessness. Harman, of 
course, can hardly ignore the struggles which have taken place since 1985, 
but aside from a few remarks about the growth of the exploited class since 
the 1920s, he paints a picture wherein the class struggle became 'actual' 
rather than just potential only under Gorbachev.
A welcome exception here is Chavance; but even as he describes the 
inherent tension between workers and the exploitative system, he fails to 
devote any attention to the struggle at the point of production. Sapir, 
meanwhile, pays greater attention to labour conflict — but he paints its 
forms as being unilaterally determined by capitalist competition, both 
between enterprise directors and ministries, and among the enterprise 
directors themselves. In this view, workers do struggle, but they do so only 
in mechanically determined ways which stem from causes but lead to no 
significant effects.
For their part, the first collectivist theorists fail to study the issue of 
class struggle in much the same way as Cliff and Munis. Where Rizzi and 
Burnham refer directly to workers' powerlessness in so m any words,
■
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Shachtman makes little effort to fit the concessions of the mid-1950s into his 
general theoretical critique.
Later 'sui generis' work by 'dissidents' is of som ewhat greater 
interest. Thus Djilas pays some attention to low-quality production, even if 
he sees it ultimately as a product of the overly 'dogmatic' orientation of the 
controllers of the economy. But the clear implication is that a less 'political' 
style of economic m anagem ent would smooth over any problems of 
workers' lack of interest in economic efficiency. W riting later under the 
name 'Rakovski,' Bence and Kis have no such illusions, but they are 
nonetheless unable to consider working class struggle in any more profound 
terms than those of individual behaviour and the 'objectively strengthened' 
position of the worker's household as a consumer.
Kuron and Modzelewski go much further, conceiving of the 
lowering of efficiency and product quality as a matter of a 'massive social 
initiative' rather than as an accumulation of individual reactions. But even 
as they scorn the idea that such a class relation depends on mismanagement, 
insisting instead on its roots in 'existing conditions,' they too display an 
over-determined interest in market demand and virtually end up arguing 
that higher workers' consumption would help the economy.
Subsequent 'collectivist' work by Carlo also has the m erit of 
emphasising the importance of workers' opposition. Stating outright that 
low productivity is an expression of the workers' rejection of the system, he 
understands that the system must organically concede a 'moderate work 
rhythm.' But he fails to isolate the relation between the workers and the
exploiters and home in on it with adequate rigour. As a result, when he
» » » » *
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comes to consider the crisis, he gives great weight to such factors as the 
petering out of extensive growth, and the structural innovation problem, 
rather than attempting to trace any material lines of determination from the 
class struggle.
'Fantham  and M achover's analysis, m eanw hile, being very 
m ixed-up, represents a step backward. They m ay em phasise low 
productivity, but their confusion over the essence of control (taking forms 
which are administrative, ideological and transparent) prevents them from 
formulating any coherent framework for understanding class struggle.
,Writing about aspects of labour conflict since 1989, Clarke presents 
a theoretical analysis which is equally confused. Having moved on from his 
previous view focusing on the systemic need to expand the 'labour 
collective,' he admittedly points to the strength of the workers' position in 
relation to the labour process. But he fails to relate this to any dynamic 
consideration of the system 's internal contradictions, and ultim ately 
portrays class struggle as little more than a product of perestroika.
Of the many 'Marxists' who have presented theoretical views of the 
political-economic nature of the Soviet system, few have brought into their 
theorisation a consideration of the working class struggle. And even those 
who have done so, such as Kuron, Modzelewski and Carlo, have failed to 
trace through the class polarities with consistent historical and theoretical 
resolution.
1NOTES
For an explanation of the significance of the inverted commas around 
the word 'M arxist/ see Section 3 of Chapter 1. M arxist work is 
considered in Chapter 6.
In the present context it is impossible to cover the full gam ut of 
'Marxist' works mentioning the USSR, many of which — for example, 
Marcuse's 'immanent critique' of the reigning Soviet ideology (1958) — 
have dealt only peremptorily, if at all, with actual Soviet production 
relations and the actual working class. I have therefore restricted 
consideration to the various critical theories of the material reality. 
Reasons for excluding 'Eurocommunist' and official Soviet and Chinese 
works are given in the Introduction.
It is earlier argued in the Platform of the Left Opposition (1927) that "the 
appropriation of surplus value by a workers' state is not, of course, 
exploitation." (p.l3). This is in total contradiction with Marx's critique 
of political economy, which famously links surplus value, value, 
abstract labour, wage-labour, and capitalist exploitation. (1867, chaps. 
1-6). But it is quite in keeping with the view Trotsky put forward when 
he was near the helm of the State, when he was keen to portray labour 
m ilitarisation, one-man m anagem ent and the generalisation of 
piece-rates as weapons wielded in the interests of the working class 
and socialism. (1920, chap.8).
Interestingly, this view is echoed by the Soviet 'd issident' Roy 
Medvedev, who in his largely empirical tome on Stalinism states his 
opinion — in agreement with "most Soviet historians" — that "Stalin's 
personal dictatorship did not completely abolish the dictatorship of the 
proletariat." In his view, "Stalin introduced m any bureaucratic 
distortions into the system of the proletarian dictatorship, but he could 
not completely destroy the system. He received his mandate from the 
proletarian Leninist Party, after the victory of a socialist revolution. He 
did a poor job of carrying out the historical mission assigned to him, 
but he did carry it out to some extent, not only in the twenties,...but 
also in the thirties and forties — in the struggle against imperialism, for 
example...Unlimited personal power was a form, the worst possible 
form, of the proletarian dictatorship; it was clearly inconsistent with the 
nature of the regime [emphasis added] and severely checked progress 
toward communism." (1971, pp.555-56.) In another equally empirical 
work, Medvedev views Stalinism in terms of "excesses," and asserts 
w ithout elaboration that "m any achievements of the October 
Revolution were not totally destroyed by Stalinism; pseudo-socialism 
has not managed to root out all elements of socialism from our social.
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economic, and political life." (1979, pp .196-97). Here too he gives no 
consideration to the conditions of the working class.
For the Trotskyist view of "the contradiction between the non-capitalist 
mode of production and the bourgeois norms of distribution," see 
E. Mandel 1968. The contradiction that Trotskyists see between the 
relations of production and the relations of distribution simply cannot 
exist for those adopting a Marxist viewpoint. As Marx puts it (1903, 
p.95), "The relations and modes of distribution...appear merely as the 
obverse of the relations of production....The structure of distribution is 
completely determined by the structure of production."
Not surprisingly, this criticism can also be made of the various sources 
which refer to Soviet 'state capitalism' without giving the term any 
substantial theoretical foundation. (These are considered above in 
Footnote 1 of chapter 2). Thus the Menshevik lugov writes of low 
wages and poor labour conditions, but not of resistance and struggle. 
(1929, chap.15); and the same is true of lurevskii writing a few years 
later. (1932). The social democrat Kautsky, meanwhile, who also for a 
time writes of Soviet 'state capitalism,' focuses mainly on political 
despotism and terror, rather than on the specific contradictions of class 
relations. (1919). The (communist) Workers' Group and Workers' Truth 
group, for their part, although they participated in the strikes of 1923 
(Daniels 1960, p.210), are not known to have produced any theoretical 
work on the class struggle. And the anarchist Voline writes little, about 
working class conditions ^ TTtK ëoretic^lîH i^ than t d ^ ^ r  that
the State's role as the only employer means that the worker is a "slave." 
(1947, pp.360-61). His consideration of class resistance under Stalinism 
is restricted to a brief reference to the sabotage and revenge attacks 
which occurred in response to Stakhanovism. (p.363).
Writing in 1971, Harman too restricts his consideration of class struggle 
to events that might happen in the future (p.66).
"Part of taking advantage of the political crisis of the transition is 
pushing  to the lim it the democratic dem ands of the radical 
democrats..." (p.83) "The majority workers, or at least the conscious 
socialists among them,...have to stand by the right of the national 
minority to form its own state if it wants to, regardless of the form of 
state the minority chooses to establish...The only way workers among 
the minority nationality will break from...[petty-bourgeois or petty 
bureaucratic] leadership is if they see a socialist workers' movement 
among the majority nationality which is prepared to fight, in a more 
effective way than these leaders, against the reality of national 
oppression." (p.84).
____
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8 Concerning earlier periods, though, he is confused rather than silent. 
Thus he refers to the 'blocking' of any organised action by the 
proletariat 'to transform the production relations,' but gives the main 
reason as being the adoption of incorrect ideological theses by 
officialdom. (1974, p.25). Meanwhile, when discussing the tightening of 
labour discipline in 1918-20 he still asserts that "this resort to coercion 
was only the secondary aspect of a situation whose principal aspect 
was the constitution of the proletariat as the dominant class." Workers 
who resisted were selfish and "strongly influenced by bourgeois and 
petty bourgeois ideas and practices" (pp.188-90). The same lens is also 
used to look at the struggles of the winter of 1920-21, including the 
uprising at Kronstadt (pp.361-66). Bettelheim is less negative about the 
growth in workers' resistance to managerial authority in 1928, but 
blames the defeat of the 'mass movement mainly on its lack or loss of 
support from within the Party. His failure to identify workers' struggle 
'in itself' is shown by his very 'Maoist' attribution to General Secretary 
Stalin of an 'ambiguous' attitude, on the one hand genuinely calling for 
a continuation of 'mass criticism from below,' and for 'cultural 
revolution,' whilst on the other 'hesitating' to advocate a new form of 
'really authoritative leadership.' (1977,228-33).
"* ° See also the discussion of Bordiga's work in Camatte 1974, pp.7-8.
Bordiga stresses above all that Soviet capitalism at the time he is 
writing is still in its 'developing' phase, and it is in this connection that 
the reason for his lack of interest in working class resistance becomes 
clear. For Bordiga it is not the onset or re-establishment of this phase 
w hich m arks the v ictory  — or even the process — of 
'counterrevolution,' but on the contrary it is the establishment of its 
permanence and its labelling as (national) 'socialism' under Stalin. In the 
previous period, even if Lenin had seen the development of capitalism 
as a necessity — and denounced those who thought otherwise as 
'childish' and 'petty-bourgeois' — he also saw it as temporary and did 
not call it 'socialism.' (See for example Lenin 1918b, especially 
pp.13-22). From Bordiga's point of view, then, the key to the distinction 
between a developing transition and a counterrevolution is not the 
presence or absence of the categories of capitalism, nor yet the force of 
workers' actions against them, but "the dictatorship of the international 
communist party." (1957, p.482).
12 Whilst Bahro refers to Soviet society as 'industrial despotism ' (1977, 
pp.83-119), his theory is so far removed from a class analysis as to 
exclude itself from consideration in the present context. "The concept 
of the working class no longer has any definable object in our social 
system, and, what is far more important, it has no object that can 
appear as a unity in practical action...Our society is no longer 
characterized by a 'horizontal' class division, but rather by a 'vertical'
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Stratification, even if one which still has sharp transition points..." 
(pp.183-84).
*•3 Ticktin's theory, which denies the existence of a 'mode of production' 
in the USSR, is considered to be Marxist rather than 'Marxist,' and is 
considered in the following chapter.
On the grounds that they see Eastern Europe and the USSR as socialist, 
if not also for the fact that they use the terminology and methodology 
of Weberianism at least as much as they do those of 'Marxism,' Konrad 
and Szelenyi (1979) do not merit consideration in the main text. But by 
dint of their denial that those countries were 'workers' states,' and their 
use of at least some Marxian terms, they deserve parenthetical mention: 
for even while asserting that "the social structure of early socialism is 
organized in keeping with the principle of rational redistribution,'' and 
that "in line with the rational principle on which its economy is based 
[emphasis added], we regard this as a class structure, and indeed a 
dichotomous one" (p. 145), they also recognise that "the interests of the 
workers are diametrically opposed to those of the redistributors not 
only in respect to wages and other shop-floor issues, but also in matters 
of macroeconomic planning as well" (p.229). But since their focus is 
almost exclusively on the intellectuals, their analysis of working class 
interests is linked only tenuously to their theory of the nature of 
'rational-redistributive society.' They thus argue that workers have an 
interest in technocratic reform insofar as it would create a link between 
productivity and wage-scales (p.230), but back this up somewhat 
unconvincingly with reference to the impetus it would supposedly give 
to consumer growth and the space it would make in the state budget 
for faster wage increases. Denying that labour-power is sold, they 
claim that it would be in workers' interests if it were, since removing 
the determ ination of the surplus product from "politics" w ould 
necessarily mean a rise in relative wages (p.226). Why this is so they do 
not say.
The Romanian theorist Campeanu is equally W eberian, and 
indeed owes a further debt to Parsonian structural functionalism. But 
despite expressing a preference at the beginning of his work The 
Syncretic Society (1980) for the tools of sociology over those of 'political 
econom y (p.4), he too employs a modicum of apparently 'Marxist' 
terminology. In presenting a theory of a sui generis (and anti-capitalist) 
"Stalinist mode of production" containing both 'capitalist' and 
'pre-capitalist' elements, he thus proceeds to relate both kinds of 
element to the appropriation of labour-^power. In this view, workers do 
sell their labour-power, but always to the State as a monopsonistic 
purchaser, (pp.25-26; see also Campeanu 1988, pp.119-22). Completely 
ignoring questions of labour mobility and of the influence of enterprise 
directors over wages and norms (see, for example. Kirsch 1972, chaps. 3
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and 7; Filtzer 1986, chap.8; and Filtzer 1992b, chap.4), Campeanu then 
asserts in highly vague fashion that the price of labour-power, since it 
is fixed solely by the "subjective decisions of the regime," does not 
correspond to its value. (1980, p .17). The "power of value" has thus 
given way to the "value of power." (p,31). Consequently, even if the 
"articulation between production and consumption" is affected largely 
by "capitalist mechanisms" (namely, the wage relation), the "status" of 
labour-power in the economy — in terms of the allocation of work and 
the determination of the magnitude of the wage — remains affected by 
a political "regime" of "pre-capitalist complexion." (pp.52-53). In short, 
the sale of labour-power is real but its purchase is a sham. (p.81). Since 
Campeanu's rejection of the 'tools of political economy has necessarily 
led throughout his work to a methodological separation of the critique 
of politics from the critique of economics, his attem pt to bring them 
back together again must necessarily lead to such 'phenomenological' 
positions which to the materialist critic appear literally nonsensical. 
Since class struggle is a matter of political economy — and its critique 
— it has no place in Campeanu's work; but he clearly holds the view 
that workers in the USSR are completely powerless.
Third, mention must also be made of the Croatian scholar Horvat, 
who has described the Soviet-type countries as 'etatist.' While aiming 
to write a 'Marxist theory of political economy,' he too has adopted a 
Weberian optic in that his principal discussion of class has been 
focused upon 'stratification' and the fact that members of the 'masses' 
have less power than people higher up. (1982, pp.57-83). In discussing 
the alienation of labour, though — which he does not link to class — he 
states somewhat more profoundly that, just as in capitalism, the 
worker was both an object of bureaucratic political rule and an 
individual constrained to sell his labour-power. (pp.87-90). However, 
after then stating that unlike in the bourgeois world the source of 
reification under 'etatism ' is "not the universalization of m arket 
rela tions bu t [rather] the un iversalization  of bu reaucra tic  
relationships," he goes on to give what seems to be the contradictory 
view that "man is not reduced to a commodity but to the office he 
holds." (p.95). Unfortunately none of these ideas is discussed in terms 
of the class relation, let alone in terms of class struggle.
Chen Erjin later presents a similar view, in the context of his portrayal 
of the Soviet system as a prime example of the 'revisionist mode of 
exploitation.' (1979, pp.72-87). His view of the worker under such a 
system as a "mere slave" (p.73), however, echoes the opinions of Rizzi 
and Burnham rather than those of the East European 'dissidents.' It 
should perhaps be added that his brief consideration of the USSR 
serves principally as a backdrop to what he has to say about China, and 
he does not study the former country in any depth.
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The Soviet emigrant Voslensky writes at greater length but even 
more starkly of the fundamentally 'political' aims and basis of the 
ruling group. (1980, p. 166). Arguing throughout his book that the 
"nomenklatura class" enjoys unlimited power, he suggests that the 
working class, although it produces surplus value, "has been plunged 
back into a system of extraeconomic forced labour as in the age of 
slavery or feudalism." (pp.146-75; see also pp.70-74). Hence there is no 
class struggle.
Of marginal interest is the fact that the publication of The New Class 
received backing from the CIA. (Blum 1986, p .128). Djilas has since 
renounced 'Marxism': see Djilas 1969. More recently, Djilas has 
described the Soviet crisis — somewhat expectedly — in terms which 
reduce it to a crisis of 'one-party rule.' (1988). In this view, everyone 
outside the CPSU has a need for democratic pluralism.
Although Kuron and Modzelewski deny that the USSR and the Eastern 
European countries were capitalist (1965, pp.26-28 and 35), they 
nonetheless theorise the existence in those countries of both 
wage-labour and capital accumulation; and even if they seem to 
portray a society that developed sui generis rather than just a system, 
they still avoid writing explicitly of a new mode of production. Their 
theory would thus appear to be rather confused. If they had written 
under different political conditions, however, and if they had written 
more on the world-historical context of their subject-matter, it is 
probable, I would argue, that they would have adopted a 'capitalist' 
theory. But since this point cannot be argued in the context of the 
present thesis, I have chosen instead to refrain from ascribing a theory 
to them which they themselves did not make explicit.
IS If from a communist viewpoint one has to remark upon a level of 
radicality in the Open Letter which was absent in the works of other 
d issident intellectuals — and which in light of the au thors ' 
anti-parliamentarism (p.75) and class-based internationalism (pp.65-72) 
might well be described as revolutionary — it should also be pointed 
out that when the period of sustained and open mass struggle began in 
Poland Kuron and Modzelewski changed camp completely. While 
Modzelewski was writing approvingly in the official press that "the 
only role to which Solidarity aspires is to be a recognized and respected 
social partner," Kuron put forward similarly nationalist ideas of a unity 
of interest between workers and rulers, and his role — alongside other 
leading figures in Solidarity — in encouraging workers to end their 
strikes m ade him  an active and direct p a rtic ipan t in the 
counterrevolution. (See Simon 1982, pp. 31,45,52-53 and 85.) Whereas 
in 1965 Kuron had called for the arming of the working class (1965, 
p. 77), in 1981 he even opposed a strike demanding the release of
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workers who had publicised secret government plans for a repression. 
(Simon 1982, p.38).
1 ® Marc Rakovski was the pseudonym of the two Hungarian writers 
Gy orgy Bence and Janos ids.
By making use in the Soviet context of a category remarkably similar to 
the capitalist category of 'demand,' it would seem that Carlo is leading 
his theory of the non-capitalist nature of the society onto very weak 
ground.
21 The reference to 'Orwellian' controls is Carlo's own.
22 This is also evident in Carlo's support for Mao's dictatorship in China, 
which prevents him from seriously envisaging w hat kind of society 
revolutionary workers might conceivably want instead of the USSR. In 
Carlo 's view (p.58) "the Chinese model has proved that the 
bureaucratic road is not always inevitable."
23 "Bureaucratic collectivism can...arise naturally and develop only in 
underdeveloped countries." (Carlo 1971, p. 70). Or it can arise from the 
"degeneration" of a 'socialist revolution' (p.71). Carlo gives only one 
example of the latter, namely Russia, but even in that case he 
underlines relative economic backwardness as a factor (pp.49-52). 
Leaving aside their mention of decline, then, a point which Fantham 
and Machover do not develop, we see that their disagreement with 
Carlo appears to be limited to specific examples such as China and 
Egypt. The former see these countries as respectively 'state collectivist' 
and 'state capitalisF; the latter views them as respectively 'transitional 
to socialism' and 'bureaucratic collectivist.' (Fantham and Machover 
1979, pp. 6 and 13-14; Carlo 1971, pp. 57-58 and 70-72).
24 For comparison, see Trotsky 1939a, pp.16-17.
25 The only exception is a one-sentence reference to working class 
organisations in Poland.
25 Omitting to theorise struggle, Roland has done little more than to state 
that full employment and the labour shortage, against a background of 
alienation, have led to poor discipline. (1989, p.146-69). Nor need 
Bayar's recent work on the 'party-controlled' Ipartitique) mode of 
production (1992) be considered, since no more is said about the actual 
class relation other than that it is exploitative and non-capitalist. 
(pp.222-24). Burawoy, meanwhile, has produced collaborative work 
which from a Marxist perspective is undoubtedly of greater interest, 
since he has analysed in some detail the shopfloor effects (and 
non-effects) of post-1991 economic reform attempts in two specific
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Russian enterprises. (Burawoy and Hendley 1992, Burawoy and Krotov
1992). But my focus here is primarily on the theoretical views which 
have been expressed concerning the nature of the economic system 
during the preceding, Soviet period, and in particular on the way these 
views have been related to overall conceptions of the conditions and 
activity of the working class as a class. In this connection it is clear that 
Burawoy follows Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) in that even while he uses 
elements of Marxian terminology he adopts an approach which is 
primarily Weberian. Thus in terms of any view of die nature of the 
Soviet system, his theorisation has revolved principally around the 
construction of an 'ideal type' of 'state socialism' now being replaced 
by one of 'merchant capitalism,' (See Burawoy and Krotov 1992, 
pp.18-21, and 1993, pp.52-54). He does, of course, utilise a concept of 
'w orkers' control' of the labour process; but, as he and Krotov 
acknowledge (1992, p. 19), this is largely derived from the work of 
Connor and Ticktin (see Chapters 4 above and 6 below, respectively), 
and explained in terms of the 'full employment constrainP theorised by 
Granick. (1987). It would be unfair to suggest that Burawoy omits to 
relate this concept to a consideration of workers' struggle, for in places 
he does indeed do precisely this (Burawoy and Krotov 1993, pp.60-64) 
— but the context in which he does so is solely that of the period of 
'transition' since 1991, and that is not our concern here.
27 On Machajski see Avrich 1965 and Shatz 1967 and 1989; for a similar 
perspective see also Konrad and Szelenyi 1979.
25 In fact, this is precisely the accepted Soviet reformist view of the late 
1980s which Clarke supposedly rejects. See for example Gorbachev 
1987, pp.20-21, and Aganbegian 1988, pp.100-09.
CHAPTER 6
The Class Struggle: A Critique of Existing Marxist Theories
In this chapter I give critical consideration to the views of the Soviet 
w orking class which have been developed w ithin Marxism. After 
commenting on the paucity of work produced by those adopting a 
com m unist approach, I analyse the positions of the Johnson-Forest 
tendency, Castoriadis, and Ticktin. My own theorisation is given in the 
chapter following.
1 THE NEED FOR A COMMUNIST THEORY
In the previous chapter I have offered a critique of a number of 'Marxist' 
views of the Soviet working class, showing how they fail to grasp the polar 
nature of class antagonism and its centrality in the development of social 
contradictions. It follows that they offer very little that can be used to enrich
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a com m unist theory of the class struggle as it has underm ined the 
conditions of exploitation in the USSR.
The first place to look for useful insights would now seem to be the 
texts of those who have consistently stressed proletarian autonomy and the 
subversion of wage-labour, such as the council communists, Situationists, 
and Autonomists. Working within the general political and theoretical area 
described above as communist, these tendencies' most influential theorists 
have always kept in sight the importance of practical class antagonism. It 
would therefore be unfair to describe them as being unaw are of the 
existence of class struggle in the USSR as a reality: for, in the abstract at 
least, given their general approach towards political economy, they quite 
clearly are not. On the other hand, though, the theoretical material they have 
published on the subject is very scanty, and it has to be said that they fail to 
consider the specific types of struggle engaged in by the Soviet working 
class with adequate theoretical rigour.
Various communist writers have, of course, published theoretical 
studies of the structure and functioning of Soviet capitalism, and I have 
criticised their works above in Chapter 2 along with non-communist works 
on the same subject. But they remain very few, and it is notable that they do 
not include among their num ber any Situationists or Autonomists. 1 
Moreover, the works which do exist have exclusively focused on the nature 
of the system rather than on the nature and vicissitudes of working class 
struggle. This gives rise to a certain incongruity; and council communists, 
usually anxious to stress workers' own experiences, have commented on the 
unfolding of working class struggle in the USSR in a fashion which is 
evidently wholly inadequate. Thus Gorter mentions the "urgent, clamouring
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demand of the Russian proletariat for independence/' but only as an 
explanation of what lay behind the contribution made by the W orkers' 
Opposition to the Bolsheviks' "trade union debate," (1921, p,4). At first 
glance, tliis would seem to be a very strange idea for a council communist to 
adopt; but when he later suggests (p.8) that revolutionary workers in Russia 
will eventually construct the equivalent of the council communist (and 
anti-trade unionist) General Workers' League of Germany (AAUD), Gorter 
makes it clear that his access to any hard information on the actual class 
struggle in Soviet Russia is minimal. He is simply not in a position to 
theorise about it.
Subsequent council communist analyses are similarly incomplete.^ 
Thus Riihle, writing in the 1930s, may be able to describe the system put in 
place under Stalin (1931,1939), but he omits to ask how the workers resisted 
its imperatives. Much the same is true of the councilists of the GIK. This is 
particularly striking given the thoroughness of their analysis of the events 
leading up to and immediately following 1917: for in that earlier context, 
rather than simply opposing workers' class struggle to Bolshevik Jacobinism 
and opportunism, they show how Bolshevik State policy not only interacted 
w ith the workers' movement but also grew out of the historical class 
relations, political structures, and global situation of the region. The method 
here is very reminiscent of Marx's decriptions (1850, 1852a) of the period 
around 1848 in France. Once they begin to consider the developments which 
took place in the 1920s and 1930s, however, they fail to inform their critique 
w ith any such nuanced consideration of workers' struggle. As I have 
commented in Chapter 2, their reference to some kind of 'tendency' of 
proletarian struggle (GIK 1934, pp.24-25) is hopelessly muddled; and not
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surprisingly, they do not show why it is that the State was unable lastingly 
to 'master' it.
In theorising about the nature of Soviet capitalism, even Buick and 
Crump only touch on working class struggle — or potential for struggle — 
in two places. First, in referring to the massive expansion of the proletariat 
in the Soviet period, they write that
as the working class grows in strength [i.e. in size], and as it 
becomes more educated, so the threat it poses to the rule of capital 
is potentially increased. (1986, pp.55-56).
Since they do not explain why 'education' should bring with it any potential
threat to capital, they are doing little more than to make the observation that
increasing numbers of people have an interest in revolution. This is not a
statement about actual conflictuality. Later on, they describe the enormous
turnover rate in 1956 as showing that the previous restrictions on labour
mobility had caused a substantive build-up of ''counterproductive social
tensions." (p.76). There is undoubtedly a reference here to a relation of force,
but Buick and Crump do not develop it as such, preferring to use it as
evidence merely for the existence of wage-labour.
It is quite evident that the task of formulating a communist theory 
of working class struggle in the USSR has yet to be accomplished.
2 EXISTING MARXIST THEORIES
If above I have rejected 'M arxist' theories and called instead for a 
theorisation upon a communist basis, there remains another category of 
critiques yet to be considered: namely, those which, while not communist, 
should still be considered Marxist by dint of their clear prioritisation of the
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contradictions of the class relations of production. It is true that both 
Castoriadis and Ticktin have expressed strong support for democracy: the 
former advocates wage equality in a socialist 'transitional society' (1957, 
pp.125-27), while the latter not only suggests that the proletariat might come 
to power peacefully, but also states that in any case transition would involve 
large-scale nationalisation, secret ballots, and the gradual phasing out of the 
market, finance capital, and unemployment. (1990-92, pp.24-26). Neither 
Dunayevskaya nor James breaks completely with Bolshevism, and Ticktin 
remains heavily Trotsky-influenced (1992b) and sees nationalisation and the 
welfare State as constituting forms of the negation of capitalism, even as he 
understands that capitalism uses them and they are not socialist. (1983a, 
p.26). At the same time, however, Dunayevskaya and James, Castoriadis (in 
a certain period) and Ticktin have each managed to underline in no 
uncertain fashion the im portant disruptive role necessarily played by 
workers' power against the Soviet system. In many ways this realisation 
represents a major theoretical advance, and it has allowed them to make 
substantial contributions to Marxist critique. It is to their works that I shall 
now turn.
2,1 The Johnson-Forest Tendency's Theory
In Chapter 2 I showed how the Tendency's work on the functioning in the 
USSR of the categories of capitalist reproduction, within its limitations, 
represents a notable theoretical step forward. It is further the case that in her 
critique of the Soviet economy published in the 1940s Dunayevskaya 
becomes the first theorist to insist in the Soviet context on the importance of
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class struggle: not as an abstract goal, but in terms of a necessary actuality 
corresponding to the nature of the system. For this reason, her work is 
outstanding: in refusing to view the workers as mere objects, she once again 
breaks new ground.
In looking at the period of the first three five-year plans (1928-41) 
Dunayevskaya attempts to understand the class struggle by looking first at 
its specific pushes and pulls. It is from such a standpoint that she considers, 
for example, the law of 1932 by which workers' ration cards were 
transferred into the hands of the factory directors. Describing this decree as 
an attem pt by the rulers to "turn wage slaves into outright slaves through 
legislative enactment," Dunayevskaya insists on the point that the statute
failed to fulfill the desired end. Labor would not come to industry 
and when it did come, it left soon, after producing as little as 
possible. Since industry needed labor[,] the factory director 'forgot' 
to fire the worker for absence and slowups in production. (1946-47, 
p.316).
More generally,
neither [the official] appeal [against competition among managers 
to hire labor,] nor the anti-labor legislation^] nor the fact that the 
proletariat was deprived of the use of trade unions[,]which had 
become part of the adm inistrative machinery of the sta te [,] 
accomplished the trick of straight-jacketing [sic] labor. (1942-43, 
p.54).
In short, as industry expanded apace, workers continued to take advantage 
of the increased demand for labour. Despite the desired aims of the ruling 
elite, it proved impossible to introduce 'slavery by decree.'
Dunayevskaya then describes how the agricultural crisis of 1933, 
and the consequent famine and unemployment, caused an increase in the 
influx of workers into the cities, which in turn allowed m anagers to
"I
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discipline workers by means of the more 'natural' and 'bourgeois' method 
of the reserve army of labour. From 1935, this method was then replaced by 
Stakhanovism, another mainly 'natural' m ethod based prim arily on 
incentives for efficiency. Conceived of as a response to the ineffectiveness of 
the labour legislation of the foregoing period, this new policy was designed 
to avoid the failure which had beset the previous attem pts to 'end 
depersonalisation' (or 'egalitarianism') by more despotic means. (1942-43, 
pp.53-54).3 But
these "natural" methods brought about natural results: the class 
struggle. The simmering revolt among the workers...only produced 
further chaos in production and a mass exodus of workers from the 
city.
In 1938, the State grew desperate.
The 1932 law was revived and 'improved upon.' This still proved 
fruitless. In 1940 came the creation of the State Labor Reserves, and 
w ith it came the institution of "corrective labor": w orkers 
disobeying the laws were made to work six months with 25 per 
cent reduction in pay. (p.316).
-, :
But resistance continues even after this, as labour too shows "ingenuity." 
W here it cannot revolt openly, it either 'disappears,' or it slows up  
production, thereby preventing a rise in productivity. After the second 
w orld war, the rulers' demand for labour once again becomes very high 
relative to the available supply, and the rapidity of demobilisation makes a 
dead letter of "all" previous labour laws. The planners are forced to make an 
"unplanned declaration": an amnesty for all labour offences committed 
during the war. (p.316; see also Dunayevskaya 1958, p.246).
There are, of course, certain factual errors in this analysis. 
Unemployment did not rise in 1933: in fact, having risen throughout the 
m iddle and late 1920s, it starting falling at the turn of the decade and
I
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vanished altogether in 1931. (Davies 1986). Meanwhile, the working class 
response to Stakhanovism (Filtzer 1986, chap 7) did not involve a 'mass 
exodus' from the cities: such a strategy had last been employed during the 
civil war. (Nove 1982, pp.66-67). And the law against resigning from one's 
job without permission did not lose its force altogether until 1951, according 
to Brown and Helgeson (1966, p.l6 and 1986, p. 148, respectively), or until its 
repeal in 1956 according to M. McAuley (1969, p.47). But such inaccuracies 
are insufficient to undermine the overall strength of Dunayevskaya's work, 
which is twofold. First, there is her method: she constantly seeks to 
understand capitalist labour policy in terms of the power exercised by the 
workers in antagonism towards its implementation and efficiency. Second, 
on a more general level, she identifies a
constant pull and tug between the needs of production for highly 
productive labor[,] which means 'free' labor, and the resort to 
legislative enactment to bring this about in hot-house fashion. 
(1946-47, p.316)
In relation to this second idea, it is im portant to realise that 
Dunayevskaya is not saying that excessive usage of 'despotic' means of 
discipline m ust in itself prove counter-productive, leading to the 
introduction of more 'natural' methods. On the contrary, she emphasises 
above all the resistance raised by the workers, and she explains the changes 
in labour policy precisely in reciprocal relationship to this resistance, rather 
than in fundamental terms of 'internal contradictions.' She stresses this 
point very clearly in her work of 1958, when she writes that
[the] draconian anti-labor legislation [of 1940] records the terror of 
the ruling bureaucracy in the face of the revolt of the workers.
The millions in forced labor camps are the true measure of the 
never-ending resistance of the Russian [sic] masses to the Russian 
rulers in the State, in the factory, and in the fields. Had the revolt
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not been so persistent, the terror would not have been so violent.
(1958, p.237).
It is against such a background that Dunayevskaya explains the strike and 
uprising by slave labourers in Vorkuta in June 1953, whose significance she 
compares with that of the workers' movement in Soviet-occupied Germany 
the same year and those in Hungary and Poland three years later, 
(pp.249-57). For Dunayevskaya, the death-knell of Stalinism is sounded by 
nothing other than the actions of the workers.
Since, however, there were no revolutionary workers' councils in 
the USSR as there were in H ungary, these com parisons w hich 
Dunayevskaya makes at the beginning of her 'Marxist-Humanist' period are 
of little theoretical use. By conflating different manifestations of the 
workers' fight against Stalinism, she simply insists that such a fight existed 
and was important. Whereas in the 1940s she analyses the history of the 
Soviet system through the lens of the interplay between economic policy 
and working class self-assertion, when Stalinism comes to an end in the 
mid-1950s she falls back upon the mainly political and ideological concept 
of 'Russian totalitarianism,' pitted against the forces of 'freedom.' (p.248). As 
a result, she fails to focus on the specific characteristics of class struggle as 
acutely as she has done with reference to the previous period.4
The second main criticism to be made is that even in her work of 
the 1940s she fails to relate the specific characteristics of class struggle to the 
specific characteristics not just of labour policy, but of the Soviet political 
economy as a whole. This is not to belittle her achievement in insisting on 
the necessary and permanent nature of the workers' struggle against the 
imperatives of the system; it is simply to note that such considerations do 
not illuminate to any significant degree her work on the functioning of the
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political-economic categories of capitalism in the specific Soviet context. 
(1946-47, p.314, for example). As a result, her theoretical grasp of the effects 
of workers' class struggle remains on a general level, concerning little more 
than its adverse influence on the growth of productivity.
It is now necessary to consider the work of her longstanding 
CO-theorist James,® who in 1950 penned what was presented as the 
Tendency's most important document, namely State Capitalism and World 
Revolution. Perceiving that
the whole tendency of the Stalinist theory is to build up theoretical 
barriers between the Russian [sic] economy and the economy of the 
rest of the world [,]
James declares early on in this work that he intends to help break down 
such a separation by explaining Soviet development in the context of 
capitalist development globally, (p.39). In addition, he states very clearly 
that the key to understanding the nature of the Soviet system m ust be based 
principally upon a 'concrete analysis of labouP both inside the USSR and 
without. He thus sets himself theoretical tasks whose solution w ould 
undoubtedly represent a major advance.
Unfortunately, though, in seeking to explain the development of the
USSR
by the development of world capitalism and specifically, capitalist 
production in its most advanced stage, in the United States (p.39)
James does not quite achieve his goal. Whilst his work on American
Fordism, the workers' reaction to it in the sphere of production, and the
bourgeoisie's forced creation of the welfare State (1950, pp.39-44) is
undoubtedly pathbreaking and highly important,® it is not matched by any
correspondingly profound analysis of the labour process and the
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development of class relations in the USSR. He gives instead an account 
which is both rudim entary and very schematic. According to this, the 
"Russian Revolution in 1917 [first] substitutes for the authority of the 
capitalist in the factory the workers' control of production"; next, after the 
'blip ' of labour militarisation on the railways is rectified by Lenin in the 
'trade union debate,'^ "mass activity" begins to be alienated and production 
"bureaucratised" in the years 1924-28. At the end of the 1920s abstract mass 
labour then comes into its own when government policy dem ands the 
creation of "lots" of it in the race to "catch up w ith capitalism."® The 
introduction of Stakhanovism in 1935 constitutes "the counter-revolution of 
state-capital"; and Molotov's speech in 1939 about increasing production per 
capita rather than just gross output marks a further change in the "mode of 
labor." (pp.44-47).
We can say that 1937 [when elaboration began of the third five-year 
plan—NCF] closes one period. It is the period of "catching up with 
and outdistancing capitalism" which means mass production and 
relatively simple planning. But competition on a world scale and 
the approaching Second World War is the severest type of capitalist 
competition for world mastery. This opens up the new period of 
per capita production as against mere "catching up." Planning 
must now include productivity of labour, (pp.47-48).
This analysis may seem impressive but in fact it is offered without 
any strong empirical basis. Its main inadequacy is not simply, however, 
James's apparent ignorance that productivity growth was always an aim of 
every plan; nor even his omission to consider the actual progress of 
productivity, which fell during the first five-year plan period (1928-32) arid 
seems to have risen during the second and third. (1933-41). (See Nove 1982, 
chaps. 8-9). It is this: unlike in his consideration of American Fordism, James 
makes no reference in his consideration of Soviet Stalinism to any reaction
I
:
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by the workers against the moves of their exploiters. His comparison of 
Soviet Stalinism both to conditions under Ford before unionisation (1950, 
p.40) and to what conditions would be like if Ford was totally successful 
(p.48), therefore, rather than being based on an analysis of w orkers' 
struggle, is based largely upon the assertion that the worker in the USSR is 
"reduced to an appendage to a machine and a mere cog in the accumulation 
of capital." (p.48).
From ascribing less weight than Dunayevskaya does to the force of 
Soviet workers in production, James later jumps to ascribing more, thereby 
becoming able to consider Soviet conditions in a much more stimulating 
way. But it is nonetheless evident that the theoretical consideration of the 
USSR in Facing Reality, published under the joint signatures of Janies, Lee, 
and Chaulieu (Castoriadis)® in 1958, is influenced most of all by earlier work 
by Castoriadis rather than any by the Johnson-Forest tendency, (pp.29-34 
and  51-54). Moreover, whereas Castoriadis, notw ithstanding certain 
weaknesses criticised below, later builds upon the ideas about the USSR 
which are expressed in this book, James himself produces no subsequent 
work on the subject of any substantial theoretical depth. For these reasons 
I leave over dealing with this text until the following section.
■I
2.2 Castoriadis's Theory
After first writing that in the USSR "the proletariat is completely reduced to 
mere raw material in the production process" (1949a, p.85), and before 
returning to an even more 'totalitarian' view of Soviet "slave capitalism" 
(1977, p.8), Castoriadis similarly succeeds for a time in focusing with some
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acuity on the real struggle of workers against the Soviet system. Once he has 
decided in May 1949 that "the class struggle [in the USSR] exists" (1949a, 
pp.139-40), the importance he attributes to its effects grows steadily over the 
following several years.
Recognising that working class 'counter-influence' on production is 
a result of class struggle Castoriadis forages further into ground first opened 
up by Dunayevskaya in the mid-1940s. He points to two forms of struggle in 
particular, both of which are "tied, more or less indirectly, to the 
distribution of the surplus product." The first is theft — of tools, products, 
semi-finished goods, raw materials, and machine parts — which "assumes 
massive proportions" and provides a relatively large proportion of the 
working class with a means to make up for their "terribly inadequate 
wages." The second is what Castoriadis terms an "active indifference" 
toward the results of production, manifested on a qualitative level as sloppy 
work and on a quantitative level as a slow production rate. (pp.139-40).
W hilst in 1949, though, Castoriadis declines to criticise such 
struggles, he has yet to view their impact on the system as being particularly 
great. For him they may be "subjectively sound class reactions," but their 
"point of view" is nonetheless "objectively retrograde." Still a Leninist, he 
takes the view that
in the long run, if the class struggle of the Soviet proletariat is not 
afforded a different way out, these reactions can only bring with 
them  this class's political and social deg radation  and 
decomposition, (p. 140).
Ultim ately he understands their "point of view" as being one of
desperation, similar to that ostensibly possessed in a previous epoch by
'machine-smashers.' The ideological nature of this opinion, according to
 :__________________________
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Russia's [sic] low productiv ity  results from  the w orkers' 
nonallegiance to a system of production that cheats them as well as 
from a miserable standard of living combined with terror. The
' f
.-i
which real forms of struggle lead to degradation (Castoriadis does not
'actually write 'lumpenisation') — unless, that is, a different outcome is 
"built" upon "revolutionary struggle" — is self-evident. W hat Castoriadis 
fails to recognise here is that struggle is always a struggle of power against 
power: any form it takes can be recuperated, incorporated, or defeated, but 
so long as it retains a force antagonistic to exploitation it cannot be 
'retrograde.' It is only possible to hold otherwise if one has a concept of 
'p rogress' as some kind of class-neutral term outside of the basic
antagonism. (See Perlman 1983).
,Castoriadis's assessment of Soviet workers' struggle soon changes,
"and after the death of Stalin he commits himself much more (1953) to the 
view that working class opposition carries considerable power: not only as
manifested in the strike movements in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, but
ft::also in the USSR itself, as permanent pressure on the needs of exploitation. 
Analysing and explaining the changes in the USSR in the spring and 
summer of 1953, he points in particular to the amnesty granted in March to 
m any of the inmates of the camp system, and to the major price-cuts 
announced on 1 April. In his view such concessions cannot fully be 
explained by the conflict between dictatorial centralism and the need for 
internal bureaucratic stability: whether they are "apparent" or "real," a 
"second factor" is at work:
This is the need to attenuate the fundamental social contradiction of 
this system of rule, the workers' opposition to the regime.
‘He continues:
f t ' ; :
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resulting permanent economic crisis becomes much more serious as 
the technical and economic level of the country rises. Canals can be 
dug with concentration camp prisoners controlled by the whip as 
long as some of their skin is left on. But modern industry requires 
that the worker maintain at least partial allegiance to his job, and 
this allegiance cannot be obtained by terror pure and simple; to 
obtain it, he must be given some interest in the economic results of 
production...We m ust think that Russian workers' opposition has 
become sufficiently strong to initiate some specific concessions, (emphasis 
added), (p.248; see also Castoriadis 1954, pp.278-80)
In The Proletarian Revolution Against the Bureaucracy (1956) he goes 
still further, becoming the first person to argue that it is working class 
resistance that is the "ultimate cause of the failure of the TlanL" (p.65).^i In 
this text Castoriadis no longer focuses simply on concessions, but on crisis. 
Workers refuse to work hard and to participate in work organisation, they 
work sloppily or even stay away from work altogether, and the 'plan ' 
simply collapses, (pp.68-69). For the exploiters it is impossible to establish a 
set of aims and then see them realised.
Using quotes from the Soviet leaders at the Twentieth Congress of 
the CPSU, Castoriadis shows how
neither production bonuses nor Stakhanovism, neither the GPU nor 
prison camps, provide the Russian factory director with the means 
to discipline workers and to impose on them a set of norms and pay 
rates. He is obliged to come to terms with them. (p.72).
Thus although the eradication of wage levelling has been an official aim of
the 'plan' (and of reform) ever since Stalin came to power, it has always
proved impossible, because workers are simply too strong to allow it. As a
result, the workers' struggle against wage differentials goes "as far, if not
further," than it does in factories in France or the United States, (pp.70-72).
Summarising the Marxist view, he then states very simply that the Soviet
dictatorship
#
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cannot now and never will in the future be able to prevent the 
workers from struggling against exploitation with means that the 
exploited always have at their disposal; the refusal to cooperate in 
production, which can be manifested in an infinite number of ways. (p.76).i2
This view is then restated in the text published jointly with James and Lee in 
1958, and similar references are made to Khrushchev's complaints at the 
same congress about wage-levelling and the receipt of inordinately high 
wages by certain categories of workers. The First Secretary is shown to be 
blatantly aware that the system's achievement of its aims is constantly being 
problematised and disrupted by pressure from the workers in production. 
(1958, pp.31-33).i3
Having understood, though, that the working class enters into 
revolt not just
against the low standard of living as such, in the absolute — a 
notion that indeed hardly makes any sense...[but rather] against 
the stagnation of its living standards.,.(p.75) [,]
Castoriadis is unable to take the next step, namely that of explaining how
various forms of struggle are part of the same autonomous movement, and
how they tend to undermine the production of surplus-value and hence the
bureaucratic system. Instead, falling back on his libertarian political
approach, he arrives at the confused theory that the basic 'dynam ic'
contradiction in Soviet society — and capitalist society generally — is that
which operates between 'exclusion' and 'participation.' Whilst this is not, of
course, a Marxist view, paradoxically the terms in which Castoriadis
conceives of this contradiction approach those of the traditional 'Marxism'
he rejects. Thus rather than taking a proletarian 'point of view' (the struggle
being about everything that can be got hold of, now), he takes the view that
the basic contradiction is somehow dialectical (capitalism needing both to
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solicit participation and forbid initiative, simultaneously). (1960-61, p.282). 
The polarity so sharply visible in his writings of the mid-1950s becomes 
much hazier. 14
Thus Castoriadis is never able to use his insights to help produce a 
theory that might explain fully the relationship between workers' struggle 
and the breakdown of the system; nor the reason why the first industrialised 
economic system to break down was highly bureaucratic, rather than 
bourgeois and based on the market. In 1977 he still m entions the 
"permanent implicit struggle of workers against the system in production," 
and points to 'Russia' as being of all the industrialised countries the "prime 
candidate for social revolution." (1977, pp.13-15; see also 1981a, p.8). And he 
even makes a reference to the "permanent crisis of production" which 
results from workers' resistance. (1977, p.9). But he simply makes this 
assertion and fails to develop any materialist critique much further than 
that. He is consequently able in the very same text to describe the Soviet 
'social regime' as being a "slave capitalism" or "bondage capitalism" whose 
totalitarian oppressiveness and control outdoes even those of the Nazis, (p.7). 
Betwixt these two assertions, he suggests that the supposed inability of the 
working class to influence events "openly" leaves the way open for 
full-scale "bureaucratic irrationality." (p.8). This highly undeveloped usage 
of such terms as 'resistance' and 'control' (which one might conceive to be 
inversely related to each other), 'openness' or the absence of it (from whose 
viewpoint?), and 'irrationality' (by what criteria?) only demonstrates how 
the critical materialism of his earlier works is no longer present.
'  f t . - ' . f t  -
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2.3 Ticktin's Theory
The third body of work to be considered is that developed by Ticktin since 
the early 1970s. If he is clearly not the first theorist to emphasise the 
connection between the nature of Soviet exploitation and the role of the 
workers in the production process — this having been done before him by 
Dunayevskaya, James, and Castoriadis, and to a lesser extent by Kuron and 
M odzelewski and Carlo — he undoubtedly does so in a much more 
thoroughgoing way than is evident in previous efforts. (See Figure 3). A 
second aspect of his work is that even despite his denial that the Soviet 
system  is capitalist, he binds his analysis of it very closely to an 
understanding of capitalism's historical development and the contradictions 
of th a t developm ent. (See, for exam ple, 1994a, pp.92-93; or 
1987a, pp.20-24).i® In the present work, of course, it is the former aspect 
w hich concerns us most; bu t in view of the in terrelation  and 
'interpenetration' of the two aspects, it is necessary to consider first the more 
general theoretical context which he has constructed.
2.3.1 The Idea of Capitalist Decline
Taking Ticktin's work as a whole, we see that behind his theory of the 
nature of the USSR there is one idea which is more basic than all the others: 
namely, that capitalism is in decline. Closely associated with this idea — so 
closely, in fact, that it often appears as a restatement (1994a, pp.80-83) — 
there is the idea that the present epoch, considered historically and globally.
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is one of transition to socialism.
We live in a world where the old order is dying, where capitalism is 
in decline, and the world is in a transition to a new m ode of 
production that has not yet been born. In this epoch three sets of 
laws are operating: the laws of capitalism itself, the laws of a 
declining capitalism, and the laws of transition. This book [about the 
USSR—NCF] has really been concerned w ith the last. The 
fundamental law of the transition period is that of the growing 
conflict between incipient arid often distorted forms of planning 
and the market. (1991c, p.l85).
It is no surprise that in epochs of transition
there can come into existence...unstable combinations of forms 
deriving from capitalism, and attempts to overcome it. They are not 
simply bits of one formation and bits of another but new forms 
altogether which are like unstable chemical compounds which may 
decay into their component parts but are not themselves the 
component parts and may have few properties in common [with 
them]. (1976, p.28).
Rather than being, say, a development of — or a successor to — the 
geographically specific 'Asiatic mode of production' (1978, pp.39-42), the 
Soviet social formation is just such a "compound." On one hand, as a 
symptom of decline, it represents a (temporary) "victory of capitalism in 
preventing a move to socialism." (1991c, p.l86; see also 1987a, p.23). On the 
other, as a monstrous symptom of the transitional epoch defined by that 
decline, it contains forms neither of planning nor of the market. Neither 
capitalist nor socialist, it is not transitional and it is not even hybrid. It is 
instead 'non-historical,' a non-mode of production with no 'essence' and no 
'mature form.' (1991c, p.l4; see also 1978, p.61).
In order to be able to discuss the issue of capitalist decline it is first 
necessary to realise that it is not straightforward. In fact, four separate 
statements can be associated with it. These are as follows: 1) capitalism is 
declining at the present time; 2) capitalism must eventually enter a decline.
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because of its very nature; 3) capitalism is bound eventually to disappear; 
and 4) communism cannot be prevented forever and is historically 
inevitable. (See Figure 4). In the present context, of course, it is 1 and 2 
which are the most relevant; but in criticising Ticktin's arguments I have 
found it necessary to draw important distinctions both between 2 and 3 and 
between 3 and 4. By arguing in support of 2, Ticktin evidently feels he is 
strengthening the case not only for 3 but also for 4, so it is worth pointing 
out at the outset that the criticisms which follow are directed solely at the 
arguments in favour of 1 and 2. The historical certainty of an irreversible 
victory of communism (statement 4) is not in question; and indeed its 
recognition is considered to be intrinsic to the entire communist theoretical 
approach. (See Chapter 1 above, where it is accepted that the overall 
movement of history paves the way for future communism. [Marx 1852b, 
p.64, and 1932, pp.90-91]. See also A. Cohen 1990.) It is not capitalism's 
disappearance which is in dispute, but rather its putative decline.
2.3.1a 'Current Decline'
First to be considered is the idea that capitalism is declining now, since this 
is the idea which crucially underpins Ticktin's entire explanation of why a 
non-capitalist social formation could exist in the USSR for so long. In 
defence of this thesis he cites the development of one capitalist form in 
particular: namely, finance capital. More particularly, he focuses on its 
increasing tendency to abstract itself from long-term productive investment 
in industry; and in so doing he has undoubtedly produced useful and 
important work on the subject, which among other things has pointed up
.'
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Figure 4: Capitalist Decline:
Four Statements and Two Necessary Links
1. CAPITALISM IS DECLINING 
2. CAPITALISM MUST DECLINE
il
3. CAPITALISM MUST DISAPPEAR
1Î
4. COMMUNISM IS INEVITABLE 
(Note that neither link is reversible in direction.)
IIf
i
I
'Ii
II I
Î
__
CHAP.6 - CLASS STRUGGLE; EXISTING MARXIST THEORIES 289
very clearly the uselessness of Lenin's. But nevertheless, the argum ent 
leading from the contradictions of finance capital to the decline of capitalism 
remains highly faulted. (1986a, pp.1-4). In this view, capitalism declines 
because of the tendency of money-capital (M) to strive towards (but never 
reach) autonomisation from production. This striving contradicts the basis 
of capitalism, namely the production and realisation of new value. (1983a, 
1986a, 1994a), And since the tendency must necessarily grow, the society 
itself is eventually bound to decline. As a result, in the absence of the 
subjective condition of a conscious revolutionary movement, there is thus a 
growing likelihood of the rise of (bastard) 'forms of the negation of 
capitalism,' and an increasing occurrence of historical 'accidents.' (1983a, 
1991c chap. 10; see also 1987a, pp.23-24).
But if the contradiction which Ticktin identifies indisputably exists, 
and in terms of the expansion of global money m arkets is indeed 
intensifying (Davis and Davidson 1991, pp.89-95) — and is indeed probably 
bound to intensify further — this does not in itself provide adequate proof 
of decline.^® The matter of whether or not capitalist society is declining 
raises an obvious epistemological question: how w ould we know? If 
increasingly irrational financial conditions are a cause of decline, then what 
are its symptoms? First, then, there is the view that the actual performance 
of capitalist production is falling further and further behind its 
potentialities. (Ticktin 1994a, p.69). In this connection I shall simply point 
out that any objective verification of this highly subjective assertion would 
depend among other things on a profound study of the history of capitalist 
science, which Ticktin fails notably even to call f o r .  ^ 7 the second place, he 
argues for the existence of decline, as indeed he should, on concrete
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empirical grounds. He mentions, for example, the rise of unemployment 
and the run-down of British manufacturing industry in the interests of the 
City (1986a, pp.12-15), the enormous expansion of the non-value producing 
military industrial complex in the United States (1991c, p. 185), and the more 
general rise of irrationalism, drug use, and the mafia. (1994, p.75).''® He 
further cites the growth of what he terms 'needs-based' sectors such as 
'education,' health, and public housing, even if they are currently being 
reduced. (1983a, pp.40-41; 1987a, pp. 21-23 and 27; 1994a, p.83; see also 
1991c, chap. 10). He also points to forms such as nationalisation and central 
economic administration, which he describes as inherently non-capitalist, 
even if highly useful to capitalism; and as non-socialist too, even if such 
"intermediate forms" are supposedly socialism's necessary prerequisites.
(1987a, p.21-24). More recently he has added to the list, citing increasing 1Iracism as evidence of the "progressive removal" of commodity fetishism; State intervention and the "nationalisation of money" as evidence for the 
decline of value; the "break-up of the production unity of the workers" as 
evidence for the decline of abstract labour; and the limited usefulness of the 
rulers' traditional tool of unemployment as evidence for a decline in the 
labour market. (1994a, p.83).
The logic of this argument would clearly imply that at some time in 
the past capitalism existed in a relatively pure, mature, healthy state. In
short, if capitalism's vigour is declining then it must once have been at a 
maximum. In this golden age of capitalism, two conditions would have been 
apparent. First, labour would have approximated much more closely than it 
does today to the capitalist ideal of abstraction and interchangeability; and 
second, unemployment would have functioned smoothly across the entire
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labour market. (Any search for a period when capital dominated labour 
using forms which were exclusively non-racist would clearly be quite 
fruitless). Whereas the first condition, then, was obviously not the case prior 
to the organisational developments associated with Sloan, Taylor, and 
Ford, the second was clearly no longer the case during the implementation 
of the policies associated with Hitler, Roosevelt, the second world war, and 
Keynes. In seeking to specify a period when both conditions were satisfied, 
then, we thus arrive at around the year 1930 — hardly the best of times to 
pick as capitalism's peak moment of health.
In the final analysis, though, Ticktin's theory of current decline 
m ust stand or fall according to an appraisal of the present. It then appears 
that decline's most important empirical indicators can be grouped under 
two main headings: first, the granting of concessions in the area of social 
expenditure and the control of institutions, at least in the 'first world'; and 
second, the growth in several areas of the general economic role of the State, 
in terms of both unproductive consumption and administrative control. 
These two factors are held to be highly contradictory to the nature of the 
system, and form the nub of the argument.
Let us take first the issue of structural concessions. The first 
question we should pose is this: since the larger proportion of government 
health spending, for example, whether it goes to pay the salaries of general 
practitioners or the bills of tranquiliser suppliers, ultimately pays for the 
reproduction of lahour-poioer, what does it actually represent other than a 
socialised form of the wage? Since the value (not including surplus value) of 
any commodity is its average cost of production, there is no reason why this 
should not also apply to labour-power (which by definition contains no
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surp lus value, but produces it); and indeed Ticktin provides no 
counter-argument to the definition of the wage as the cost (or price) of the 
reproduction of the worker. (Dalla Costa 1971), It should thus be evident 
that the introduction of 'public' health provision, social security benefits.
and subsidised housing, which together constitute the main parts of the 
social wage, amounts above all to a wage-rise, or at least to a change in the 
form of payment. In short, structural concessions are made in the course of 
class struggle: and from capital's point of view this is a struggle to offset 
them — along, of course, with any other forms of wage-rise — against an 
increase in productivity: that is, against the production of relative surplus 
value. (See Marx 1867, chaps. 12-15). They can hardly be described as 
inherently non-capitalist in any sensible way, since they do not demand a 
revision of what is most fundamental in the basic capitalist category of the 
wage. Any "measure of power" supposedly conceded to the working class 
in the form of the right to vote, meanwhile (Ticktin 1994a, p.75), would seem '
to be wholly illusory and at any rate of no political-economic importance.^®
Nor is the military economy necessarily critically problematic for 
capitalism. It is true that at least in the short term State military expenditure 
is consumptive of surplus value. But the part of it paid to the sector's
'workers still takes the form of a wage; and it is surely bizarre Marxism to
argue that the wage-form of the price of labour-power is real or illusory 
according to the character of the commodity produced. Of the remaining
expenditure, the arms which are actually 'consumed' are used to rule,
'
divide, and kill proletarians (always), as well as to bolster particular capitals 
against their competitors (almost always); while even those which are 
stockpiled indefinitely tend to spin off competitive technologies such as
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nuclear power or satellite communications. Neither of these uses is exactly 
unprofitable, and so it is only superficially meaningful to classify them as 
simply 'unproductive consumption.' The final part of the arms economy 
involves weapons which prove to be totally useless, thereby amounting only 
to a drain on surplus value. But even if the often politically-determined 
expense were to become too high, the world's rulers would surely find it 
much easier to economise in this area — witness the signing of treaties on 
conventional forces in Europe (CEE) and strategic arms reduction (START) 
in 1990 and 1991 — rather than reducing their expenditure on more 
straightforward (and cheaper) forms of luxury consumption such as, say, 
first-class air travel or privileged access to healthcare.
There remains the issue of State administrative control, and in fact it 
is this that forms the basis of Ticktin's principal argument. In short, the 
growth of various forms of State intervention is understood to express a 
tendency towards the organisation, concentration, and centralisation of 
capital which necessarily undermines it. But this too is faulty. Thus it is not 
at all clear why increasing capitalist organisation should perilously 
underm ine capitalist competition — or why the bourgeoisie's use of the 
State should backfire. Competition has never been totally free, so why 
should even the future rule of One World Government necessarily involve 
its elimination? Restriction, even severe, is not abolition. Indeed a move to 
centralised policy-making at a global level would not only seem to enable 
capitalism to cope more efficiently with its problems; but would in fact be 
undertaken for precisely this reason, since the modern State is nothing but 
the form in which the capitalist ruling class asserts its common interests. 
(Marx and Engels 1846, p.78). It is a weapon wielded by the ruling class in
it
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advance of those interests, and there is no fundam ental contradiction 
between the State form and the value form. Policy/politics is essentially an 
arm of economic rule,
Ticktin's inadequately critical view of the State form, which is 
perhaps the clearest weakness of his theory of decline, leads him to ignore 
some of Marx's most important observations. A critic agreeing with Marx's 
critique of the capitalist State form as the "illusory 'general' interest" (1846, 
p.46), for example, could hardly assert, as Ticktin does, that "the 
introduction of annual parliaments with the right of everyone to vote would 
make any capitalism unviable." (1994a, p.75). And instead of arguing that 
arms production is "geared for public use, rather than private or corporate 
consumption" (Ticktin 1987a, p.21), they would surely view the very word 
'public' as an ideological term which expresses very neatly precisely that 
illusory representation to which Marx refers.
I would further argue that it is only possible to view the advance of 
the State as being in inherent contradiction with the nature of capitalism if 
one holds that among the main features of a future 'socialist society' would 
be, first, the continued existence of money and commodities; and second, 
the 'hindrance' by the State of the accumulation of capital in 'private hands.' 
(See, for example, Trotsky 1936, pp.55-56). That Ticktin shares Trotsky's 
view is evident in his position on the "gradual" elimination of finance 
capital in a context where nationalised firms operate for a time within a 
market.21 (1990-92, p.24). From this standpoint it is quite reasonable to see 
any expansion of the role of the State in contemporary capitalism as serving 
to increase the possibility of a move to 'socialism' in the future. Apparently, 
then, the 'laws' of a declining or late capitalism progressively weaken all the
CHAP.6 - CLASS STRUGGLE: EXISTING MARXIST THEORIES 295
manner, and seems positively to reach out for the 'anti-capitalist' role which
Î
main capitalist forms except the State form, which they only serve to
strengthen. This form comes to function in an increasingly 'non-capitalist'
supposedly lies in store for it in 'early socialism.' The problem with such a 
view is that by reclassifying the State as some sort of 'contradictory' form it
involves a rejection of the necessity of destroying all capitalist forms by 
revolutionary means. It is a social-democratic view founded on a grave 
misunderstanding of the polarisation of class subjects.
It would hardly be unfair to draw a connection between Ticktin's 
work and the more 'orthodox' a priori identification of 'normal' or 'mature'
Is
capitalism not with the capitalism of 1930 but with the 'classical' capitalism 
which lasted from Marx's time until the first world war. For most intents 
and purposes, then, the changing conditions of present-day capitalism — or 
indeed capitalism since the mythical 'October 1 9 1 7 '2 2  — might just as well 
be termed 'post-classical.' On this assumption, virtually all 'non-classical' 
forms (nationalisation, pension funds, even universal suffrage) appear to be 
non-capitalist, or at least symptomatic of a capitalism which is somehow 
warped in relation to the supposed 'ideal form' of generalised laissez faire. 
Capitalism is assumed to have flourished most in the period which followed 
the Industrial Revolution, only to have become bogged down in a mire of 
problems prior to the twentieth-century rise of mass production, mass 
consumption, and 'mixed economy.' The social-democratic view that 
nationalisation and political democracy will also be features of a future 
'socialist revolution' (Ticktin 1990-92, p.24) can subsequently serve as an 
indicator that the analysis is on the right lines. For those locked into such a 
view, it is then but a short step to explaining away the extraordinary
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2.3.1h 'Necessary Decline'
replaced with "some new kind of despotic and exploitative society with a
idevelopment which capitalist production has undergone since 1945 in terms 
of an epochal "strategy of delay" on the part of the bourgeoisie. (Ticktin 
1994a, p.88). But in the face of this developm ent — in aeronautics, 
chemicals, electronics, and plastics; in entirely new industries such as 
genetic engineering, information technology, and the nuclear and space 
sectors; and involving fundam ental changes in consum ption and the 
ideology of consumption — such a non-historical conceptualisation is 
signally unconvincing. Indeed it fails to lend itself to any substantial use 
other than the Trotskyist struggle to declare a 'rotten' capitalism moribund 
after nationalising the monopolies.
;
:
iQuite apart from the view that capitalism is in decline now, the second aspect of Ticktin's theory of decline is the view that capitalism must decline, 
owing to its very nature. Regardless of whether or not this has already 
started to happen, it is understood to be a matter of historical certainty. This 
aspect of the theory, then, concerns the objective reasons which will bring 
about capitalism's final demise at some point in the future. But in this area 
too the theory invites criticism. Indeed, the problem is more than simply the 
'essentialist' assumption that capitalism's decline, just like its 'maturity,' is 
implied by its nature, as if it were a biological organismes or physical entity. 
In criticising 'declinism,' Tillium has recently argued as follows. If 
capitalism disappears then there are two possibilities: either it is destroyed 
by proletarian revolution and replaced with communism; or else it is
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non-value basis yet to be defined." (1994, p. 13). In the first case, the 
strengthening of revolutionary forces prior to their victory would obviously 
have corresponded to a weakening of capitalist forces prior to their defeat. 
In other words, the capitalist system would have experienced the 
exacerbation of severe problems in the run-up to its overthrow. These 
problems, or weaknesses, can be considered from two points of view. From 
a proletarian point of view, since the build-up of the revolutionary 
movement would be experienced as primarily subjective and assertive in 
nature, it would surely make little sense to conceptualise the underlying 
tendency in terms of any external factors of objective decline of the 
opposition. On the contrary, the historical tendency of the period would 
appear principally as a communist advance, and there would be no reason 
to understand capitalism's disappearance in terms of its decline. Only from 
capital's point of view might such an understanding appear reasonable. But 
even then, the possibility of a forestalling of communist revolution by forces 
organised around an embryonic non-capitalist form of exploitation is 
sufficient to show that even severe problems for capital do not necessarily 
make revolution more likely. In practice, of course, such a possibility may 
well remain remote, and capitalism's weaknesses may indeed make a 
revolution more likely — but this does not follow necessarily from the 
nature of capitalist society.
Mention of the second case is, of course, highly subversive of 
received opinion: but in considering it we might first picture a future which 
brings the most 'monstrous' forms imaginable, so 'monstrous' — rule by a 
single neurocomputer, perhaps, or technetronic slavery, or both — that they 
prove incompatible with the continued existence of a society based on value.
i
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I would argue that it is only possible to discount the possibility of such a 
future if one occupies the ground of dogma. As Tillium has suggested, there 
is no way that it can be shown that such forms might not in fact herald, on a 
world level, the creation of an exploitative society of a wholly new kind, a 
'higher form' of exploitation wherein the control over labour is more 
effective than it is under capitalism. If this, then, is what the future brings, 
capitalism would surely not have 'declined', like some m odern version of 
ancient Rome. On the contrary, it would have s u c c e e d e d . 24 (Tillium 1994, 
pp.13-14). To speak of monstrous accidents or barbarism — in effect, of 'the 
end of history' — is no effective counterargum ent. From a classist 
perspective, this only has to be a very faint possibility for Ticktin's 
arguments for 'necessary decline' to be shown not to hold.
The sole remaining possibility is that the new system's control over 
labour would be intrinsically weaker than capitalism's. In that case, since 
capitalism would have failed itself, we should be quite justified in speaking 
of an objective capitalist decline. But to show that the decline of capitalism is 
a possibility is not at all the same thing as showing that it is a historical 
certainty. And besides, it is clearly impossible to judge now the ease or 
otherwise of undermining or overthrowing a future system which at the 
moment does not even exist. One could, of course, conceivably argue that 
the USSR was just such a system, but even if one managed to show that its 
control over labour were of qualitatively unparalleled inefficiency, this 
would not yet be sufficient to show that it was non-capitalist in nature. And 
even if it were such a system, in the present context this would not be a 
sufficient basis on which to argue for an actual capitalist decline, for one
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should further have to show that there operated a global tendency towards 
the rise of formations of a Soviet type.
These, then, are some of the weaknesses in the basis from which 
Ticktin argues, first, for capitalist decline; then, for the increasing likelihood 
of the rise of bastard formations; and finally — given a Leninist view of the 
Bolshevik coup as a 'major blow' against world capital, and a Trotskyist 
view of 'Stalinist counterrevolution' — for the possibility that the political 
economy of the world's largest country, although crucially supportive of 
capitalism, might itself be non-capitalist in nature. Given this basis, and in 
particular the characterisation as non-capitalist or potentially non-capitalist 
of various forms which are really capitalist, Ticktin's explanation of the 
global context of Soviet non-capitalism must be adjudged to be seriously
inadequate.25
2.3.2 Soviet Political Economy and the Class Struggle
If when studying western countries Ticktin seeks principally to identify the 
law s of decline and transition' whose existence he has first derived on the 
basis of a philosophical concept of capitalism as quasi-organism, when 
studying the USSR he adopts an approach which is altogether very 
different. Since he does not see the USSR as a 'historical' society — as one 
which, in orthodox terms, was 'necessary' — he is completely disburdened 
of any Engels-type concepts of the growth, maturity, and decline of such 
societies.26 As a result, he is able to focus very tenaciously upon the 
contradictions of the production relations: and in particular, upon the form
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: ■ ■of the surplus product, the relations between classes (or between workers 
and the 'elite'), and — underlying everything even if in a capitalist context 
he pays them little real attention^^ — the contradictions of the labour process.
The pioneering force of his analysis lies to no small degree in his insistence 
on the linkage of these three areas.
2.3.2a The Form of the Product and Control Over Labour
Influenced by works by Baran and Sweezy (1966), and by Baran alone 
(1957), as well as by Marx's Capital, Ticktin adopts as his main initial concept 
that of the surplus product. This is defined as that portion of the social 
product in excess of the part used to meet the "immediate needs of those 
engaged in productive work." (1991c, p .10). In case the concept of 
productive work, which usually denotes work productive of surplus value, 
might prove confusing, Ticktin hastens to define it as work productive of 
the surplus product itself; and it becomes clear in the course of his critique 
of the USSR that in fact he makes no distinction between 'productive 
workers' and the working class as a whole. (Again, this is not a view he 
would express about capitalism. But it is, of course, the view of Dalla Costa 
[1971] and Negri [1979, pp.63-65, 182-84].) In the Soviet context, then, the 
surplus product is the part of the product in excess of what becomes the 
income of the workers: it includes the privileged consumption of the ruling 
elite, the allocation of State resources to the armed forces and the KGB, and 
the accumulation of stocks and means of production. If the nature of 
capitalism flows from the fact that the workers (or, for Ticktin, the 
'productive' workers) produce a surplus product in the form of surplus
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value, the nature of the USSR must correspondingly be explained in terms 
of the form of the surplus product there.
Before analysing the form of the surplus product, it is necessary, of 
course, to discuss the form taken by the control over its extraction, and this 
means looking at production, at labour. In Marx's words, quoted by Ticktin 
(1978, p.38),
the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is 
pum ped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of 
rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in 
turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. (1894, p.927).28
But one m ust start with a general framework. At the outset, then, Ticktin
holds two ideas to be self-evident. The first is that Soviet workers are
exploited: in other words they produce by alienating their labour. Obvious
to all reasonable observers, this scarcely requires lengthy derivation. Soviet
society is clearly exploitative. As a result, there can be no real planning,
since that could only occur in the absence of antagonistic interests setting
social group against social group: that is, in socialism. Since in the USSR
there is an antagonism between groups or classes, and hence struggle, the
rulers find it impossible to gather all the information they need and are
therefore unable successfully to realise their formulated objectives. (1973a;
see also 1978, pp.44-48). The well-known empirical evidence Ticktin refers to
in the course of his analysis provides, as we shall see, overwhelming
support for this basic thesis.
His second tenet is quite another m atter. This is that the 
"all-important" form of the product is use-value. (1991c, p .11). In other 
words, Soviet society is not founded on the production of exchange-value, 
and is therefore non-capitalist in nature. Regardless of the weaknesses of the
■■I'
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'capitalist' positions argued previously, however — two of which at least 
Ticktin has criticised in convincing fashion (on Bettelheim, see Ticktin 1976; 
on Cliff, see the remarks in Ticktin 1973a, p,20, n.l) — I would suggest that 
this can scarcely be justified as a preliminary assumption. If he is certainly 
correct in holding that the concept of surplus product is more basic than that 
of surplus value, since the latter is a form of the former, I would argue that 
he is not so entitled to grant an unopposed place to the concept of use-value.
Admittedly, he has presented arguments against the idea that the USSR 
knows the existence of exchange-value (1973a, pp.36-38,1976, pp.23-25, and 
1991c, pp.l33-34),29 rather than just leaving the assumption undefended.
But the problem is that he has accepted as the best opposing argum ent 
Bettelheim's view which is based upon formal rouble transfers between 
enterprises. (Ticktin 1976). (See the discussion of Bettelheim's work in 
Chapter 2 above, where I refer to Ticktin's critique). The nettle which he has 
not grasped successfully is the larger issue of inter-enterprise competition 
and of competitive relations among the elite in general. On one hand, he 
holds that the members of the elite "are eternally atomized in a more 
competitive environment than under capitalism" (1991c, p.37), and that 
bargaining within the economic administration "has always been the nature 
of the system." (p.l69). On the other, in relation to the price-system he has 
written that "the point is that there is no competition whatsoever." (1976, 
p.25). These statements are not, of course, contradictory: w hat Ticktin is
•v',arguing is that competition is not mediated by the setting of prices. But he 
has yet to trace the form of competition properly through to its economic 
b ase .2® This weakness is most glaring when he writes that "w ithin 
production itself, w ithout competition, profit is nothing other than a 1
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technical phenomenon." (1973a). The problem here is that he has not first 
shown the absence of competition in order subsequently to explain that 
rouble profit does not play the role of a competitive mechanism: on the 
contrary, it is clear from the context that he is really arguing the converse, 
nam ely that competition is not a fundam ental economic relation of 
production because rouble profit is not its mechanism. This is not a logically 
tenable argument.
When Ticktin considers the internal nature of the USSR, he is thus 
no longer weighed down with the m atter of the necessary decline of 
capitalist categories. Paradoxically, this means that once he assumes that 
control over labour does not take the characteristically capitalist form of 
commodity fetishism (on which, see Perlman 1968), he is able with 
impressive theoretical rigour to unpack aspects of the fundamental form 
which it actually does take. (See especially 1991c, chap. 7). Identifying in 
particular a specific form of the atomisation of the worker, he proceeds to 
show how it is highly contradictory. On one hand, it involves a 'totaT 
bureaucratic dependence, negatively definable as the absence of economic 
independence at any level; on the other, it involves a politically enforced 
"individualisation."®^ The Soviet form of the atomisation of the worker can 
then be defined as the process by which these two poles interact; and it is 
the enforcement of this atomisation which has determined the entire nature 
of the "Soviet regime" since the late 1920s.
Soviet atomisation as a form of control is further contradictory in 
that it has no firm roots in the socialisation of labour: for Ticktin it is not 
enforced by internal economic means such as the domination of a universal 
equivalent. As a result, it obstructs and indeed prevents the rulers from
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attaining effective control over the labour process. Insofar as the worker is 
constrained, in this model, to work where, when, and for how much the 
authorities dictate, he is certainly controlled. But insofar as he "relates to his 
own work process rather than to other workers" (1991c, p. 12; see also 1978, 
p.45), rather than to the "factory" or "society as a whole" (1991c, p.l20), he 
retains a partial control over the process of his own work on an individual 
level. (See especially Ticktin 1976, pp.41-43). In exercising direct control over 
the division of labour through means which are essentially administrative 
(and originally terroristic), the Soviet ruling group finds it impossible to 
exert full control over the actual labour process on the shopfloor, and is led 
to undermine the conditions of its rule by conceding a limited degree of 
'negative control' to the workers.®® From its point of view, atomisation is 
productive in that it forces the workers to work; it is counter-productive in 
that not being economic (that is, firmly rooted in the socialisation of labour) 
it inadequately dominates how they work. From the workers' point of view, 
on the other hand, this individualised and partial control over the pace and 
quality of work reduces the onerousness of their employment; but it remains 
the most that can be conquered so long as the system of bureaucratic 
dependence remains in existence. And what is more, it results in the 
production of shoddy or rarely available consumer goods which do not 
match up to their requirements.
This highly contradictory form of control over labour defines the 
"relations within production in general" (1973b, p. 15); and relying on 
Marx's Grundrisse (1939, pp.94-98) Ticktin explains how these relations 
necessarily imply a corresponding form of distribution of both workers and 
means of production within the production process. In other words, they
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imply a structure of production wherein "because the elite does not control 
the means of production, its control over appropriation is imperfect." 
(1973b, p.l5). The result is chronic inefficiency throughout the economy, 
which manifests itself as waste. Defining this phenomenon theoretically as 
"the use or lack of use of the surplus product in a manner that fails to lead 
to a product" (1991c, p .11),®® Ticktin deserves credit as the first critic to 
explain this phenomenon in terms which are fundamentally class-based and 
political-economic.
Waste takes several forms. (Ticktin 1973a, pp.27-32). First, there is 
the low quality of production. This can take the form of the production, in 
both Departments, of goods which wear out or break down very quickly, 
leading to the rise of a gigantic repair sector. More workers are employed in 
mending machines, for example, than in manufacturing them. It can also 
take the form of the output of goods which are simply unsuitable for the 
purpose for which they are made, (See for example Nove 1980b, pp.98-99). 
Second, there is the slow coming on stream of new technology, a problem 
which has been shown by many observers to be an endemic and increasing 
problem for Soviet policy-makers. Aspects of this include slow diffusion and 
innovation, slow integration of technological imports, and to some extent
iproblems further up the technological cycle too. No measure introduced by a Soviet government was ever able to circumvent fully the well-known 
obstacle of 'success indicators,' which always disfavoured the option of 
undergoing the re-tooling, teething problems, and other shake-ups 
attendant upon the introduction of new equipment and processes. (See 
Berliner 1976, Hanson 1981, chaps. 3-4, Amann and Cooper 1982 and 1986, 
and Gomulka 1986; see also Nove 1980b, pp.166-72 and Aganbegian 1988,
CHAP.6 - CLASS STRUGGLE: EXISTING MARXIST THEORIES 306
p.144-46). The third form of waste is the high level of under-employment, 
which is also usually accepted as being a major feature of the Soviet 
economy. (See for example Lane 1987, pp.136-40 and Granick 1987). And 
fourth, there is that which could be called "the underutilisation of capacity, 
existing or potential." Under this heading can be counted the stockpiling of 
unused parts; the stoppages due to bottlenecks and to breakdowns in 
supply either of raw materials or of machinery; and the slow pace of plant 
construction. In short, the 'system' of incentives for efficient production and 
accumulation is itself utterly inefficient. Vast quantities of resources, 
including labour-power, stand idle, are poorly utilised, or otherwise go to 
waste. Soviet use-value is defective use-value.
The next point is that the overall context is one where the economy 
must necessarily grow. For those who see the USSR as capitalist, of course, 
this does not cause any great theoretical problem. Since value growth is part 
of the definition of capital in the first place, capitalism without accumulation 
would be like fire without burning. But once the capitalist nature of the 
economy is denied, the empirically evident systemic need for growth comes 
to demand a full consideration of its own, and Ticktin m ust therefore offer 
an explanation as a crucial part of his overall theory. Thus he writes:
The dynamic in the society is provided by the movement of the 
process of socialized production. The more socialized the nature of 
labor and so production (i.e., the more integrated the division of 
labor), the more difficult it is for the worker to be atomized around 
his labor process and the more difficult is it for the elite to obtain 
compliance w ith their commands. Democracy becomes an 
ever-present necessity. The elite are driven by their position as 
organizers of the economy to expand it, in order to buttress their 
own control. This is done both by assuaging the demands of the 
workers for more consumer goods, more jobs, more creative jobs
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(i.e., social mobility), etc., and by their own needs to maintain 
control. (1991c, p.l21).
It should be noted here that Ticktin is not presenting the demands of the
workers as a cause of the increasing socialisation of labour. On the contrary,
not only has he earlier described the socialisation of labour as a method of
control over the workers (p. 121), but he also takes the increase of this
socialisation effectively as a given in the context of "modern industry."
(p.l25). Nor are the workers' demands being presented as the underlying
reason for the need for growth, since that place is allotted to the increasing
socialisation of labour, and the greater leverage acquired by the workers
operates as some kind of m ediating term. (See especially p .ll7 ) .
Unfortunately, though, since the increasing socialisation of labour would
also seem to be predicate upon growth as a prior assumption — or at least
upon some kind of economic development — the analysis is somewhat
incoherent.
A few pages later, he writes that
the elite are themselves based on the necessity of growth precisely 
to avoid the disintegrating nature of the society. Growth is the only 
means whereby some consumer goods can be produced, some 
mobility ensured, and stagnation avoided, (p. 123).
Leaving aside the avoidance of stagnation, which is a synonym for growth
rather than an explanation, and ignoring the assurance of mobility, reference
to which is similarly redundant, we note that growth is held to be necessary
not simply for the production of consumer goods in greater quantities, but
for the production of any consumer goods at all. Indeed, a lack of consumer
goods is built into the system since they are "the end-product of a process of
production that never reaches its logical end." (p.l23). This, then, is the
crucial point. On a more general level, in the production of producer goods
I
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as well as in the consumer goods sector, the ruling elite is constrained to 
perform the "juggling act" of effectively employing each period's surplus to 
patch up the endemic inefficiencies of the production system. Ticktin 
describes how
the defective nature of the Soviet product is both a cause and a 
result of the system of production in the USSR. It results in the 
formation of an enormous spare-parts sector and a hypertrophied 
construction sector developed to supply parts that have failed in 
one form or another or to complete construction projects that seem 
never to reach their natural conclusion. Additionally, more raw  
materials are required both to supply the expanding industry as 
well as to supply the defective goods that unnecessarily guzzle 
inputs. The vicious circle is developed further with the need to 
have an ever-expanding producer goods industry, as the defective 
producer goods absorb ever more resources, most particularly in 
the spare parts and construction industries. As a result, the 
consumer goods sector is starved of those resources. The worker 
receives a below-subsistence wage and has even less reason to work 
to capacity, and every reason to permit the over-absorption of raw 
m aterials and to produce shoddy goods. The bureaucratic 
apparatus is then expanded to control all these features, which is in 
turn a further drain on resources.... All of these qualities of the 
Soviet product lead, therefore, to two immediate consequences: a 
massive waste of resources and an immense shortage of goods. 
(p .l37).® 4
By means of the concept of inefficiency he has now explained many of the 
main characteristics of the Soviet economy.®®
If we might have expected to read, though, that the need for growth 
exacerbates the problem of inefficiency, the suggestion is actually the other 
way around:
In the final analysis, then, the elite are based on growth because of 
the inefficiency of the regime. Its instability and  constant 
destruction of use values requires ever more use values. If the 
product were not contradictory in having use values that are.only 
partially useful, then the elite could have a much lower growth 
rate. (p.l25).
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The argument runs like this. The increasing socialisation of labour gives the 
workers more leverage, but this is only a subsidiary factor in the systemic 
need for growth. A stronger factor is the endemic inefficiency of the entire 
Soviet production system, which leads not simply to the need for growth, 
but to growth which is inefficient. Spare parts and construction sectors 
mushroom. As a necessary consequence — and this is pivotal to the entire 
analysis — inefficiency itself grows.
The question which Ticktin has now arrived at concerns the kind of 
growth which is actually achieved, and the meaning of inefficient growth in 
terms of the social product, (chap.8). In other words, we are now  in a 
position to deal directly with the nature of the surplus product. If the 
country were seen as capitalist, of course, one would look to explain both 
growth and inefficiency in terms of both the fundamental class relation and 
the opposition between use-value and exchange-value. In that context, 
use-value is personified by the proletariat and exchange-value by the 
controllers of capital. Exchange-value dominates, and its necessary growth 
provides us with a definition of the essence of the capitalist system, of 
capital itself. But since it is assumed that in the USSR use-value does not 
interact or even co-exist with any contradictory opposite of any kind, the 
problem, while remaining one of theorising the class relation, is on quite
I
another plane. It can only be one of theorising a division within the category 
of use-value itself.
Inefficiency implies, of course, a certain degree of efficiency, and so 
Ticktin starts by conceptualising actual utility, or "real use-value." The 
rem aining aspect of the product — that is, of the defective use-value 
produced — concerns things or aspects of things which are not as they
CHAP.6 - CLASS STRUGGLE: EXISTING MARXIST THEORIES 310
should be, not as they conceivably could be if production were more 
efficient or carried out according to a different system. Involving as it does 
the expenditure of real labour-power and the investment of real resources, 
this part cannot rightly be characterised as illusory or fictitious. Since it does 
exist as a material possibility, Ticktin thus defines it as "potential" and 
"imagined or intended" use-value. (pp. 12 and 134). In rapid succession, he 
describes inherent contradictions between the product's "imagined nature" 
and its "actual nature," its "bureaucratic or organized nature" and its "real 
form," and its "apparent" form and its "real" form. (p. 134). (It must be 
noted here that the Aristotelian terminology adds little in the way of clarity.) 
Having pointed to a contradiction in the case of machine tools between 
"ostensible function" and "actual operation" he then uses mathematical 
term inology to identify the underlying contradiction as being the 
contradiction between the "imaginary" product and the "real" product. 
This, then, is the contradiction to which
all categories are subject, in the same way that the contradiction 
between use value and exchange value governs capitalism. (p.l36).
But the categorial analysis does not stop here, for this contradiction 
itself arises only "on the basis of a prior contradiction": namely, the 
contradiction between, on one hand, an administered form of the product, 
and on the other, use value. (p.l36). The bureaucratic administration of 
use-value is necessarily contradictory in a most fundamental sense since
there is no way that a center of any kind can have either the 
know ledge of the nature of use values or the m eans of 
implementation of decisions over use values that corresponds to 
real situations. The direct producer m ust have a degree of 
autonomy to produce a good that conforms to needs. He must also 
have an incentive to do so. Direct instruction does not provide such 
an incentive, unless accompanied by a democratic process of
"'I'M
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iIdecision-making. Put differently, behind the administered form of 
the product lies a form of control over labour, (pp.136-37).
There is, of course, a hint here of the Trotskyist position that the key to the
'transitional period' is provided by 'nationalisation under workers' control'
— what other meaning might be attributed to the penultimate sentence of
this extract? (see also p.39) — but I would argue that it is of much more
importance to underline the strength of Ticktin's theoretical approach.
Above all, this lies in his uncompromising insistence that all of the Soviet
system 's problems "go back to labour" (p.ll6): in other words, to the
specifically Soviet form of control over labour. In relation to the work of
Dunayevskaya and Castoriadis (and a fortiori Sapir), it is apparent that
Ticktin's theory of the resulting political-economic contradictions, and in
particular those relating to the wasteful form of the product, marks a
substantial theoretical advance. Admittedly, there is a failure to explain the
economic significance of the 'intended' or 'imaginary' form of the product at
the level of bureaucratic competition and the related field of the distribution
I.
of the surplus. (In Chapter 3 I have given considerable weight in this same 
context to the concepts of bureaucratised money and bureaucratic 
exchange-value.) But at the same time it m ust be noted that the concept of 
"potential use-value" is much more concretely rooted in the real conditions 
of production than it is in the work of Baran, where it denotes merely the 
productive potential which currently goes to waste in market capitalism but 
which would be pu t to good use in a future socialist society. (1957, 
pp.132-134 and 142-55).
Since Ticktin's foundation of his critique of the nature of the Soviet 
product upon an understanding of the contradictory production relations is 
not in dispute, the question becomes one of assessing the extent to which the
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corresponding antagonism between exploiters and exploited remains 
evident once the analysis reaches the categories which define the 
contradictions of the product and surplus product. Taking up the explicit 
analogy which he himself makes with the division under capitalism 
between use-value (human need) and exchange-value, we arrive at the 
following question: in whose interest does the imaginary product, the 
apparent or intended form of the product, exist? If this question sounds 
inadequately materialist, it can be rephrased as follows: in whose interest is 
potential use-value actually produced — or, rather, wasted? The answer is 
fairly simple. In terms of the Soviet economic system, the production and 
wastage of potential use-value is not in the interest of any particular social 
group. It is not only not in the interests of the workers, it is also thoroughly 
dysfunctional to the system of their exploitation. No-one needs it. It is a 
by-product of a class relation where the rulers can neither unproblematically 
m ake concessions nor successfully impose discipline and viable 
productivity bargains. Faulty use-value is not even a way of ensuring that 
w orkers' consum ption — that is, the wage — is partly  fictitious in 
magnitude or character, since illusion is not an issue. Poor-quality goods are 
not a sop to the poor. Nor are they a disciplinary instrument, since it is in 
the rulers' interests to maximise the extraction of the relative surplus, which 
means spending no more of the workers' labour-time on producing 
labour-reproductive goods than they have to according to the state of the 
underlying relationship of force. They do not then, serve the interests of the 
exploiters. Nor, evidently, can faulty use-value be in the interests of the 
exploited, since it needlessly expands the amount of time they have to work 
and be at the workplace. There is thus not even any substantial struggle
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over the issue, since all social groups are opposed to its existence. In short, 
we have a third term, a non-class term, a term which although derived from 
the class relation is somehow squeezed out of it to take on a highly 
significant role of its own.
It m ight be argued, of course, that even in countries which are 
generally recognised as capitalist the class-based contradictory nature of the 
product allows the growth of types of waste which are injurious to all 
classes. Regardless of whether this point should be conceded in terms of 
empirical reality — and stated this simply it is certainly disputable — it 
should surely be conceded as a hypothetical possibility. But be that as it 
may, the description of Soviet waste as a social relation which actually 
defines the nature of the social product is quite another matter. The issue is 
not merely a problem which the system experiences, but rather it is the 
system's fundamental political economy, the very nature of Soviet society. 
While one form of the social product, namely potential use-value, is not 
personified by any class or group, and is in no-one's interests, the opposing 
form, namely actual use-value, is personified by all classes or groups, and is 
in everyone's interests. In other words, unlike in capitalism the exploiters in 
the USSR do not 'personify' a specific form of the social product. What they 
personify at this level is surplus actual use-value. When the analysis is put 
like this, the appropriation of the surplus product seems to be a matter of 
little more than parasitism. And indeed it is but a short step to identifying 
the "fundamental law" of the regime as being one of a conflict between the 
"law of organization" and the "law of self-interest" of each individual unit. 
(1973a, pp.35-36; 1991c, p.118-19). Whatever Ticktin's intentions are, by this 
time the theory has become far removed from the class contradictions of the
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Ticktin's theory of the contradictory form of the Soviet product is not as 
'classist' as Marx's theory of the contradictory form of the commodity under 
capitalism can no longer be avoided.
2.3.2b The Issue of Class
i
real control over labour, and to present the former law as a description of 
the movement of a contradiction between central control and the specific 
interests of the elite, and the latter law as describing the development of a 
contradiction between the atomised worker and socialised labour, would
.appear to be merely a cosmetic exercise. (1991c, p .ll8). In short, the fact that
■i,
:
In fact it is evident from Ticktin's writings on the meaning of class (1978, 
1987a, 1991c, pp.86-88) that this last assertion is not one that he would 
dispute. In his view, the ruling elite of the USSR does not constitute a class, 
and nor does the working class in that country, except in a "non-scientific" 
sense. (1987a, p.2 0 ).^ G This is principally because there is a total lack of 
"forms of collectivity" (p. 18), whereas the existence of classes is predicate 
not only upon a communal environment, but also upon the possibility of 
combination and the existence of class consciousness. A class relation is 
"more than the simple existence of a relationship in production": it has to be 
both collective and dynamic, (pp.11-12).
Regarding the Soviet ruling elite, one must of course agree that
i
under Stalin there was immense instability and mobility across the entire 
privileged part of society — not to mention the other part, and indeed the 
promotion of workers — and that prima facie this is a fair basis on which to 
argue that that group did not constitute a class. But nonetheless, by the time
Î
.
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of the Brezhnev period — the 'time of stagnation' {zastoinye vremena) — the 
accession to membership of the privileged section (elite plus the higher 
intelligentsia) took on a much more hereditary character, even as social 
mobility continued. As far as many graduates were concerned, there was 
thus an increasingly evident bottleneck or glass ceiling to social promotion. 
(Ticktin 1991c, p.62). Hence even if one were to concede that under Stalin 
the rulers did not form a class, a strong case could be made that eventually 
there came a time around the 1960s when they did. By this time the system 
for generational transmission of ruling group membership attained a degree 
of relative stability. Ticktin's reference to the necessary individualism and 
brutal competition within the elite is of little relevance in this context, 
especially when it is recalled that the bourgeois class is also necessarily 
internally competitive at one level. (1978, p.43; 1987a, pl7). Moreover, whilst 
he argues that the elite is bereft of collectivity, he in fact also argues that it is 
precisely the absence of individualised private access to the means of control 
over the surplus product which demonstrates that the Soviet ruling group 
takes a non-class form. (1987a, p.l7). If control is partial, rather than 
non-existent, then he should not have it both ways by asserting that it is 
neither collective nor individual. And since the crucial question relates to 
the control which really is exercised over the extraction of the surplus 
product, rather than that which is not, it is thus not very convincing either to 
rely on the point that this control is chronically partial. (1973b, p.l6; 1987a, 
p.l8,1991c, p.61).
Moreover, if there is to be any meaning in the term 'political 
economy' at all, political competition must also be understood as economic 
competition: that is, in this context, as competition among those who
_________
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exercise a degree of control, however limited, over the surplus product. For 
this reason, any explanation of control over the extraction of the surplus 
product w ith reference simply to the security service, the State, and 
administration is bound to be inadequate. I would further argue that in 
assessing 'collectivity,' one should look at the stability or instability of 
composition rather than the forms of control based on 'direct dependence,' 
or the mediation or even brutality of rivalry within the elite. It would seem, 
then, that since the 1960s the strongest remaining argum ent against 
classifying the rulers as a class is simply this: that part or much of the elite 
often finds it difficult to prevent the downward mobility of its offspring into 
less privileged places in the intelligentsia. (Ticktin 1973b, pp.15-18; 1991c, 
pp.60-61; see also Hosking 1985, pp.381-82). But one m ight equally well 
describe this state of affairs in terms of the tendency of numerous sons and 
daughters of the ruling class to fall down into intermediate strata, or, more 
vaguely, into the middle class.
It is further possible to argue that the question of stability of 
composition should be tackled primarily in terms of the relationship of the 
ruling section as a whole to the extraction of the surplus product, regardless 
of membership turnover or rapid expansion or even Stalinist terror. A 
group, of course, is greater than the sum of its members. Agreeing that there 
has to be more than a simple relationship to production, one might hold that 
the ruling group forms a class only on condition that it exercises sufficient 
power to ensure its own self-reproduction. Under the internal reign of 
terror associated with Stalinism, then — from which the security service 
itself was not immune — there was never any great threat to the important 
functional positions within the ruling group. Perhaps even more importantly.
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the institutional means of reproduction of ruling group membership, such 
as educational institutes and officer training, were never pu t in danger 
either of abolition or of a removal of this kind of function. The growth of 
party, union and army bursaries in higher technical institutes after 1928, for 
example, may have involved a major shake-up, but in no way did it change 
the function of advanced formal education in preparing students for 
positions of hierarchic control. (Hosking 1985, pp.174-77). If this is of notable 
significance, as I would argue that it is, then the exploitative ruling group 
which had centred around the Bolshevik elite since 1917 first took on the 
characteristics of a ruling class as early as the early-mid 1920s, once the 
economic and military aspects of alienated order became relatively less 
unpredictable. This was, of course, the position of the Workers' Truth group 
at the time. (1922).
But regardless of the position that is taken, the issue of whether or 
not to call the rulers a class is actually secondary, and Ticktin is mistaken in 
giving it such importance. The main point is that a ruling group existed that 
benefited from the exploitation of the workers: that is, from the extraction of 
an alienated surplus product, even if control over it was only partial. As he 
himself has shown, the political economy of the country can only be fully 
understood in terms of the nature of the control over this extraction, and this 
necessarily means theorising the opposition between, on one side, the 
exploitative system and the group or groups who control it and benefit from 
it, and on the other, the workers. Thus it is no accident that Marx did not 
write at length about the exact meaning to be ascribed to the term 'class' 
with reference to such groups taken individually. Instead, in a passage cited 
by Ticktin (1987, p.l2), Marx and Engels write that
------------------
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the separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to 
carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are 
on hostile tenns with each other as competitors. (1846, p.68).
The context here is the formation of the bourgeoisie, but what is crucial is
the use of the term 'class' to explain the necessity of struggle. In other 
words, since the concept of class struggle is prior to that of class, the 
question of class must be tackled by first looking at how the social groups 
stand opposed to one another. I show below how Ticktin's main argument 
that the ruling elite is not a class — namely, the limited extent of its control 
over the labour process (1991c, p.61) — leads to considerable confusion on 
this issue.
There is, though, a difference between the question of whether or
not the rulers are a class, and the corresponding question concerning the
workers. On the side of the rulers, clearly there can be numerous different
kinds of control over the extraction of the surplus product, over its 
distribution, and over alienated labour, and hence different kinds of 
controlling group even within market capitalism, (Hitler, for example, used 
means of control other than the reserve army of labour). But whatever its 
form of control, an exploiting group is necessarily deprived of the chance of 
achieving a final victory, since owing to its nature it can only have as the 
essential aim of its struggle the maintenance of the exploitative system. Prior 
to the categories of form of control and of role within the control system, 
and therefore of more importance in understanding the contradictions of the 
system, there is thus the category of the workers' alienation of their labour.
For their part, the working class produces everything, but at the same time it 
is totally dispossessed of the means of production. By achieving victory in 
its struggle, then, it negates the entire exploitative political-economic
j |
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system. In other words, if it does struggle as a class then that struggle is 
potentially universal, potentially communist, and posits the perm anent 
abolition of all classes. (Marx 1844, p.256). The 'essence' of this struggle is 
thus necessarily of a higher order, since in comparison with the 'essence' of 
the struggle of the ruling group it calls more into question. It follows that 
the m atter of whether or not the working class is a real class is more 
important than that of the precise term to be allotted to the ruling group. By 
denying that there has been a process of working class self-formation, 
Ticktin is in fact denying the necessary material reality of working class 
struggle in the USSR.
His argument is as follows: given that the control over the working 
class takes the form of a special kind of atomisation, and that corresponding 
to this the workers have a limited and individualised form of control over 
the labour process, then consequently the working class does not have the 
requisite degree of (subjective) collectivity to be called a class. (See 
especially Ticktin 1987a, pp.16-18; and also 1991c, pp. 86-87). Unfortunately, 
though, whilst he formally praises Thompson (1963) — if not his followers 
— for using a dynamic concept, the imprecision of Ticktin's thought on the 
subject is evident when he writes that
the problem with just seeing the formation of the class as a process 
is that it ignores the nature of the process and so its political 
economy. All too easily then class is transformed into a woolly 
concept, which is ultimately entirely subjective since consciousness 
and conscious struggle play the only role left to play. (1987a, p. 12).
This may well be a useful critique of the Thompson school, but Ticktin's
confusion of the subjective with the conscious constitutes a major weakness
in his understanding of the working class.
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If a process or force is subjective then that does not mean that it is 
necessarily conscious. On the contrary, it means that people are acting in 
their interests. And it is not in dispute that members of the working class are 
acting in their interests in a fashion which is antagonistic towards the 
interests of the ruling group. Their actions are necessarily subjective. What 
Ticktin is suggesting, then, is that workers in the USSR act in their 
individual interests rather than in their class interest, and hence do not form 
a class subject, a class in struggle with an effect on the forms of political 
economy. He does, of course, recognise that it is the opposition between the 
workers and the ruling group which helps to determine the nature of the 
political economy in the first place: he is simply arguing that there is no 
dynamic at all by which the two social groups, as opposed to the political 
authorities and the individual worker, enter into actual conflict with each 
other. But if this were true, one would hardly expect the agglomeration of 
individual behaviour-patterns to have any great political-economic effect 
over a period of time, or at least not on the general conditions of the main 
social groups as social groups. If there is such a thing as a working class 
interest, then it is reasonable to expect working class people to act in that 
interest, even if the extent to which they do so is then open to question. On a 
theoretical level, it is hard to see how the opposition could fail to take an 
antagonistic form unless it were purely 'structural' and synchronic, or in 
other words purely static. And if this were the case, then the system itself 
could hardly be based as it is upon the necessity of growth. No specific form 
of growth actually achieved would negate the fact that if groups stand in 
opposition to each other, and at the same time there is growth, then the 
relationship between the groups must be dynamic. But it is precisely this
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dynamic, or antagonism, between groups with a specific shared relationship
to production which defines the class struggle. This is the first main point.
The second point involves the empirical evidence for collectivit}'', 
and is best illustrated with reference to sloppy work. (See for example 
Berliner 1957, pp.136-48, Nove 1980b, pp.194, 259, and 357, and Lane 1987, 
pp.102-09). Let us take, then, the oft-quoted practice of 'storming,' by which 
workers work relatively very quickly towards the end of each plan period, 
with highly detrimental effects on the quality of work. (See for example 
Nove 1980b, pp.227-28). In the context of interconnected modem industry, it 
would surely be stretching the concept of non-collectivity too far to suggest 
that the general speed-up and fall in work quality were together simply the 
result of a summation of individual choices within the parameters of the 
bonus system. When it is realised that a refusal to co-operate w ith the 
speed-up by even just a few workers would affect the rate of speed-up by 
most of the other workers, and hence the nominal fulfilment of the plan, it 
becomes apparent that there must be some sort of collective approach if the 
word 'collective' is to retain any meaning at all. The general level of work 
quality m ust similarly vary within collectively determined limits. N ot only 
m ust there not be a state of affairs where some workers are too 
conscientious, thus slowing down the overall speed-up, but similarly nor 
can there be a minority of workers who are so unconscientious as to allow 
an excess of breakdowns in production. Overall, this collective approach not 
only affects the form of the product, but also, as a factor in the state of 
relations between workers and management and between management and 
the bureaucratic centre, it leads to the payment of larger bonuses than 
would otherwise be conceded. Meanwhile the corresponding slowdown of
______________________
CHAP.6 - CLASS STRUGGLE: EXISTING MARXIST THEORIES 322
Ï
production early in the next plan period must also in some way be read as 
evidence of a collective operation. (And indeed the time gained during 
breakdowns m ust enhance the collectivity of the workplace atmosphere.)
The worker's relation to his work is clearly not, as Ticktin has it (1978, p.52), 
purely an individual one.
Ticktin would be right, of course, if he meant simply that the 
workers in the USSR do not yet form a consciously revolutionary class, a 
fully collective class-for-itself, since this could evidently only exist at the 
poin t at which the exploitative system was overthrow n. Equally 
importantly, it could only exist on a world scale.^^ But the fact that he 
means more than this is clear from his arguing that the working class as a 
class has already come into being (albeit not "fully") in the advanced 
countries under bourgeois rule. (1987a, p.l3).®® He has not written at length 
in support of this view, and his view of some sort of correspondence with 
supposedly 'transitional' forms such as nationalisation and State-sector 
employment, not to mention 'capitalist decline,' has rem ained largely 
implicit, (pp.14-16). If one assumes though, that the critique of both the 
USSR and market capitalism should be based upon an understanding of the 
opposition between workers and rulers, Ticktin's theory should surely lead 
to the conclusion that since the Soviet rulers have, considerably less control 
over the labour process than the bourgeoisie, and are therefore not a class, 
then the workers in the USSR m ust have more control over the labour
process than their counterparts in market capitalism, and therefore are a
.class. On the question of whether or not the workers constitute a class, it is 
certainly quite reasonable to look at the actual character of the control that 
they m anage to exert; but it w ould still seem that if the lim ited
' 3
'11
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political-economic extent of the rulers' control is cited as a sufficient 
condition for the non-class nature of their group (Ticktin 1991c, p.61), then 
to concentrate in the workers' case upon the form of control involves a clear 
case of moving the analytical goalposts.
It is instructive nonetheless to consider why it is that Ticktin holds 
that the workers in market capitalism do constitute a class. In this regard he 
has made it clear that his underlying empirical argum ent concerns the 
significance of the 'western' model of the trade union. Despite being highly 
critical of its evolution, then, and although he accepts that it is a 'ruling 
class' form which has to be replaced,^® he still presents the trade union form 
as being a 'form of proletarian organisation.' (1987a, pp.10-11). But any 
preliminary impression that this is compatible with a communist opposition 
to trade unionism can hardly be sustained once it is realised that the only 
real evidence that he cites for the existence of a degree of workers' control 
over the labour process in the 'West,' and indeed for its fundamentally 
collective form, is the existence of union membership and union negotiation.
(p.l7).'*o Correspondingly, the main empirical evidence that he alludes to for 
the absence of working class collectivity in the USSR is precisely the absence 
of 'genuine' trade unions. (p.l6). Thus at some level he evidently holds the 
view that working class collectivity outside of a revolutionary period must 
necessarily take a union-type form. But one only has to introduce a critique 
of trade unionism as false consciousness and false collectivity, as a means of
'3capitalist control over the workers, to see that such an understanding of 
collectivity is not at all based on the 'objectivity of the subjective' — that is, 
not on that of the working class subjective — but rather on forms of 
in stitu tiona lisa tion  rep resen ted  by un ion-m ediated  negotiation .
CHAP.6 - CLASS STRUGGLE: EXISTING MARXIST THEORIES 324
I
'1productivity deals, and formal 'social c o n tra c ts .T h e  fundamental mistake here, derived from his theory of decline and transition, is the failure to 
recognise that if the concept of working class collectivity is used to define 
the class nature of the working class rather than, say, a shared culture, then 
it is quite meaningless unless it is understood as denoting a form of class 
assertion. Formal deals, mediation, and institutionalisation are not the 
crucial issue, and nor is representation. Since Ticktin's concept of currently 
existing class subjectivity is dependent upon its current m ediation by 
western-type social democracy and trade unionism, and since his view of its 
potentially revolutionary significance outside of these forms is primarily 
constructed in terms of its future politicisation in a hypothetical struggle for 
a Statist transition (1993, p.l31), his denial of its existence in the USSR is not 
at all compelling. W hat is missing from the entire analysis, both political 
and ecomomic, of both the USSR and the 'West,' is any concept at all of class 
autonomy.
The great paradox of Ticktin's work is that despite this omission he 
does, like Thompson, have a concept of workers' power — and, in effect, of 
working class power — as a force which is independent of politically 
institutionalised 'consciousness.' (1991c, pp.149-51). Unlike most of the 
'collectivist' and 'state capitalist' theorists Ticktin is thus in profound 
disagreement with the view of the 'totalitarian' sovietologists that workers 
in the USSR are mere slaves or quasi-slaves. The third main point to be 
made, then, is that without a concept of class antagonism, and therefore of 
class autonomy and class subjectivity, such a disagreement is of little 
meaning. In short, what is missed is that regardless of the existence or 
non-existence of western-style unions, or of any form which is similar, no
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measure of power can be conceded to the dispossessed group w ithout a 
struggle.
2.32c The Issue of Workers' Power
It is now necessary to deal with Ticktin's theoretical discussion of the issue 
of workers' power. This he looks at from two viewpoints in particular: 
firstly, in terms of the labour indiscipline which corresponds to the Soviet 
elite's lack of effective control over the labour process; and secondly, in 
terms of the gradual increase in workers' power which has corresponded to 
the elite's increasing problems in achieving viable growth.
The first consideration concerns the underlying facts of the Soviet
economy. Here Ticktin has pointed to five specific factors which give the 
worker (and the use of the singular person here should be well noted) a 
certain degree of "latitude." (1976, pp.35-38). These are as follows: the
nature of mechanisation, which has involved low tolerance levels and ’frequent breakdowns; the growth of a large repair sector, mechanised even
I
Iworse than the industry it services; the lack of rhythm  in production 
b rough t about by breakdow ns in equipm ent and supply ; the 
underem ploym ent contingent upon the inefficiency of technological 
introduction; and, fifth, the regime's allowing of "slack norms and slack 
discipline" for "historical, political and technical reasons." (p.38). As a result 
of all these factors, enterprise managers find themselves dependent upon 
the "goodwill" of the workers in ensuring nominal fulfilment of planned 
targets, and m ust therefore permit a "lower rate of work and poorer
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performance to make up for the special calls required." Indeed, a "necessary 
wage" is allowed to be established by 'spontaneous pressure' (inverted 
commas in the original), at a level above which there is "no point in going." 
The rate at which the workers work is similarly determined "from below." 
On one hand, then, managers concede to the workers so as to safeguard 
their own positions in relation to the bureaucratic centre (pp.35-36); and on 
the other, there is slack production discipline because "the working class 
will tolerate nothing else." (1973a, p.41).
The task now surely arises of drawing a distinction between the 
causes of poor discipline which lie in the workers' objective environment, 
and those which are brought about subjectively and assertively by the 
workers themselves. Since workers act within and upon their environment, 
and indeed are part of that environment, it is evident that the causes 
interact: but to use this as a reason to avoid making a distinction would only 
be to beg the question, for "latitude" clearly implies a scope of action. But 
unfortunately Ticktin's analysis of the latter set of causes has remained 
insufficiently thought out. Thus towards the close of his earliest major text 
on Soviet political economy, he writes with little real theoretical attention 
that
w hat the working class maintains [in terms of slack production 
discipline in the USSR] it does almost in the same way as trade 
unions do in the West: through non-co-operation or direct action: 
strikes. (1973a, p.41).
It should be clear from the above references to his later writings on class that
this is not a view which he cares to retain, let alone develop. Indeed in his
recent full-length work he categorically rejects it, writing that the (partial)
control which the workers exert over the work process
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is not the same control as in mass production in the West, where 
workers can resist through unions or collective sabotage. (1991c, 
p.85).
But by doing so he merely presents a highly abstract and simplistic contrast 
w ith the 'West,' constructed above all upon his unshakeable view that the 
USSR is not a capitalist country and the working class is not a real class as it 
is elsewhere.
Regarding the subjective aspect of the static side of the control 
exerted by the workers the analysis is highly insubstantial. Admittedly he 
has mentioned that some workers take advantage of full employment to 
change their jobs, but even this observation is parenthetical and at any rate it 
can hardly be developed given his continued insistence that such voluntary 
job-hopping does not imply the existence of any kind of labour market.
(1991c, pp.83-84). The statement that "where labour is increasingly scarce, it
■
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becomes more powerful" is thus left without a proper explanation. (1990, 
p.98). Furthermore, since he depicts the wage not as a real wage but simply 
as some kind of ration, Ticktin deals only very confusedly wâM the wage as 
an object of struggle. On one hand, writing in the middle of the Brezhnev 
era, he depicts the worker's possession of roubles as a secondary and 
poHtically-economically almost negligible factor in his or her access to food, 
clothing, and other goods (1976, p.34), such that "a bonus of an extra five or 
ten roubles a month for most workers is meaningless" (1973a, p.37). On the 
other hand, he later cites precisely the rise of wages under Brezhnev as 
evidence that the workers did very well during the 'years of stagnation.' 
(1990, p.98). Nor does he deal with the refusal of work any more clearly, 
since for ideological reasons he finds it impossible to reach the preliminary 
point of recognising that this refusal — which hardly tends towards a
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dialectical supersession based upon the progressive development of the 
productive forces — might actually be positive, to whatever degree, from the 
point of view of the workers. We are thus left without a useful discussion 
not only of the forms of working class self-assertion, but also of its aims.
At the same time, though, in turning to the second consideration, 
namely that of the dynamic aspects, we must recognise that his work on the 
position of the workers does have the great merit of being founded upon a 
theory of the development of the contradictions of the production relations 
over time. Indeed, it is this theory of the dynamic of Soviet accumulation, 
and of the endemic contradictions and weaknesses in the nature of that 
dynamic, which has come to underlie and inform his entire analysis. Other 
theorists, such as Carlo and Sapir, have also produced works with a strong 
'historical' orientation, but Ticktin's work stands out from these not simply 
by dint of its rigorous foundation upon Marxist categories such as surplus 
product and accumulation, but also — and this is crucial — in terms of the 
central place given in the discussion of accumulation to the changing 
position of labour.
He has thus been able to cut completely through a widely held view 
of the problems of Soviet accumulation, namely that which explains the 
underlying difficulty as being the need to shed forms which were once 
sufficient to allow 'extensive' growth but which have increasingly become a 
burden now that what is needed is growth of an 'intensive' nature. (See for 
example Carlo 1979, pp.6 and 9, Sapir 1980, pp. 162-71, and Clarke 1993b, 
p.37; Nove 1982, pp.378-89; and also Gorbachev 1985c and 1987a, pp.20-21, 
and Aganbegian 1988, pp. 100-09). Ticktin rightly holds that this view
___________________ _
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m inim ises or even ignores the total difference in nature betw een 
labour-power and other resources. In other words, it is little more than a 
theory of diminishing returns which, by eschewing the concept of surplus 
product, fails to vouchsafe exactly "what it is that is supposed to be 
diminishing." As he points out, there has been a shift from agriculture to 
industry since at least 1930, and machinery per worker rose enormously 
even in the early Stalin period. And there is no evidence that there was a 
greater objective shortage of energy resources in the 1980s than there was 
before. Since the USSR "has always worked on the basis of ignoring the 
consequences of exhaustion of men, materials, land, and equipment," the 
theory of extensive and intensive growth can hardly explain why it has 
reached "a new stage of absolute exhaustion." (Ticktin 1983b, pp.113-16;
1990, pp.98-99).
The first factor which he points to in formulating an alternative 
explanation is the erosion of the available sources of new labour. Most 
women were already working by 1940 (one might add, outside the home as 
well as within it); the use of labour from the satellite countries after 1945 
was of limited importance;^^ and, most importantly of all, the inflow of
,labour from the countryside to the towns began to dry up under Brezhnev 
and came almost to a halt by the mid-1980s. (1990, p.98; 1991c, p.l38). Up to 
a point the elite was able to use this inflow to skew the economy towards 
the construction of new plant, thereby circumventing the inherent systemic 
problems in introducing new technology; but eventually the reduction in 
the supply of new labour could only mean that fewer new factories could be 
built and thus less technology introduced. The necessary result, correctly
predicted by Ticktin from 1973, was chronic economic stagnation and crisis.
■ I
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But these too are best explained in terms of labour. As Ticktin puts it.
There should be no doubt that the basic thesis of the Critique journal has 
been proven true.
,:3 :.
The second factor he gives concerns the more general context of 
'modern industry.' Thus
the weaknesses inherent in the nature of the system have now 
attained their developed forms, which were only embryonic in the 
earlier phase. The more industrialised and intensively developed 
industry becomes, the more im portant become questions of 
reliability, suitable technique, punctual delivery and overall high 
quality....
...when the task is simply carrying bricks from one point to 
another a policeman can ensure its successful completion. But no 
policeman can ensure that the wall of bricks is built straight, or that 
complex, specialised, and interconnected industrial operations are 
carried out as they should be. (1983a, pp.114-15).
Where labour is more specific, and production more integrated (1991c, 
p. 142), the usefulness of the former, purely adm inistrative means of 
controlling labour must necessarily decline.
W orking from such an understanding of Soviet economic 
development Ticktin introduces two related concepts at a more abstract 
theoretical level. These are the absolute surplus product and the relative 
surplus product. Before discussing their application, though, it is necessary 
to make two preliminary points. First, it is worth recalling that for Marx the 
concept of surplus product denotes a general category of which surplus
■value is the specific capitalist form. (1894, chap.51). In other words, if it 
exists in societies not based on value then it must take forms which are quite 
different in nature from the form of surplus value. Second, the distinction he 
makes in the context of capitalism is that which differentiates absolute from
II
_______
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relative surplus value. (1867, pp.283-667). W hat he does not do is to 
distinguish between absolute and relative forms of the more general 
category of the surplus product. This is because the fact that surplus value is 
a form of the surplus product does not in automatic fashion imply that 
absolute and relative surplus value m ust be the forms taken under 
capitalism of the more general categories of the absolute and relative 
surplus product. To posit the existence of such general forms is to make a 
theoretical step of sizeable proportions. Even if he omits to make it clear, 
then, Ticktin's introduction of these concepts in 1978 is wholly original.
Second, since the concepts are derived by analogy with their 'value 
equivalents' under capitalism, it makes sense to recall what these capitalist 
forms actually are. Absolute surplus value, then, is the aspect of the rate of 
surplus value which relates to the increase in the working day. (Marx 1867, 
pp.283-426). The rate of surplus value itself, also known as the rate of 
exploitation, is defined as the result of dividing the mass of surplus value by 
the size of the wage, assuming both quantities to be expressed in terms of 
average socially necessary labour-time. As long as surplus value can be 
expanded only by increasing the working day, and capital has simply taken 
over a previous mode of labour, the subsumption of labour under capital is 
said to be purely formal. (p.l021). Only when formal subsumption begins to 
be "differentiated within its e lf  by means of an expansion of the scale of 
production — and this leads to another kind of increase of absolute surplus 
value, namely an expansion of the workforce — is the foundation 
constituted of w hat Marx calls the "specifically capitalist m ode of 
production." (p.1022). The immediate process of production can then be 
transformed on a specifically capitalist basis, and
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a complete (and constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the 
mode of production, in the productivity of the workers and in the 
relations between workers and capitalists, (p.1035).
This is known as the real subsumption of labour by capital, and is founded
upon the reduction of necessary labour-time: that is, of the value of
labour-power. Capital no longer simply subordinates the labour process, it
continuously transforms it. Or, as Marx and Engels pu t it earlier in the
Manifesto, it constantly revolutionises production. (1848, p.36). There is now
a production of relative surplus value, which means that the quantity of
surplus value produced per hour increases even if the num ber of hours
worked stays constant. (Marx 1867, p p .429-639 and pp. 1034-38). Indeed,
since "the production of relative surplus value completely revolutionizes
the technical processes of labour." (p.645), the length of the working day can
even fall. But given that characteristics of absolute surplus value extraction
can and do continue into the period of relative surplus value extraction, the
concepts of formal and real subsumption are the more fundamental.
It would now seem that if one is arguing that the mode of 
production in the USSR is capitalist, as I have attempted to do in Chapter 3 
above, then the application of these concepts to the history of the Soviet 
economy is not especially problematic. (See Chapter 7 for an explanation of 
the specific functioning of the categories.) If, however, one holds, as Ticktin 
does, that it was non-capitalist, and then proceeds to create more general 
concepts of relative and absolute surplus product, then theoretical problems 
arise as to what exactly the distinction between these forms is supposed to 
mean. On one hand, of course, the definitions appear straightforward: the 
absolute surplus product is raised "through the extension of labor time or 
the reduction of the standard of life"; and the relative surplus product
I
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iiappears as a result of the raising of productivity through the application of 
the new machinery and technology acquired as part of the existing surplus. 
(Ticktin 1991c, p.l45). It is quite simple to understand that
the workers resisted the introduction of forms of extraction of the 
relative surplus, as a method of reducing the extraction of the 
absolute surplus. They worked poorly or took action to contain the 
effects of the introduction of new technology. The result was 
overm anning, technology tha t was ou tdated  even w hen 
introduced, high costs of installation, and little savings from the 
introduction of the new machinery. On the other hand, had the new 
machinery not been installed, noüiing would have been produced. 
The growth in the absolute surplus then masked the failure to raise 
the relative surplus by itself or even in itself for considerable 
periods of time.
As long as costs of inefficiency could be contained through the employment 
of more labour to construct new factories, "the question of costs was 
secondary." (pp.145-46). But the method and conditions of extraction of the 
absolute surplus product led to the extraction of a relative surplus product 
which was not only systemically inefficient, but also quite incapable of itself 
becoming the basis of the system.
On the other hand, the clarity of the theoretical foundation vanishes 
once the supporting definition of the system as value-based is removed. 
First of all, there is a small problem with the concept of the absolute surplus 
product. It is perhaps quite clear what it would mean in the context of 
ancient Egypt, where production was relatively uncomplex — two 
pyramids being twice as many as one pyramid — but in the context of the 
USSR, given the complex plethora of industries and products and the weft 
of interconnected paths of distribution, it is not so clear at all. Since the 
concept involves the theorisation of the size of the overall surplus product in 
objective terms, one should surely have in mind some substance or other
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Iwhich is embodied in all products. Otherwise, the concept becomes impossible to pin down in a complex economy where all the sectors are 
growing at different rates and indeed the production of some goods is 
declining. But the one substance which fulfils this role is labour-time. 
Superficially, of course, it would appear reasonable to assume that an 
expansion of the overall product predicate upon an expansion of the 
labour-force m ust be 'absolute' as opposed to 'relative'; but theoretically 
that would mean that one is theorising in terms of a rise in the number of 
labour-hours expended. Given especially a context where the rates of work 
exhibit a notable variance, that could only mean relying upon a concept of 
average labour-time, or an hour of labour-time in the abstract. But by this 
time one has already arrived at the expansion of value as the essence of 
growth.
The problem is greatly exacerbated when the discussion moves to 
the concept of the relative surplus product, for in this connection one should 
surely posit from the outset some kind of overall social indicator founded 
upon the average working-day and some kind of line that can be draw n 
within it between necessary and surplus labour-time. And that, of course, 
regardless of how the line moves, implies abstract labour and surplus value.
The only way around this problem, it would seem to me, would be to keep
Ï:the analysis at the level of the individual enterprise — or, better still, the 
individual workshop — for only at this level might it be considered 
reasonable to conceptualise an increase in hours worked as against an
i
increase (or lack of increase) in output per worker in the absence of a
concept of value. This could then be tied up w ith the concepts of 
atomisation and the absence of planning. But this way out is in fact illusory.
s
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since, given that the resources consumed by workers at each workplace are 
produced at countless other workplaces across the country, it is quite absurd 
to conceive of the category of necessary labour-time as limited in operation 
to the level of the workshop. Moreover, at some workplaces, no necessary 
use-values are produced at all: how many Kalashnikov assault rifles or Zil 
steering-wheels per day can be counted as one w orker's necessary 
production? And how many soles made for inferior-quality shoes by a 
worker in a footwear plant can be counted as part of the social surplus? One 
could, of course, argue that the system of surplus production was completely 
fragm ented and unintegrated, but this could hardly be m arried to an 
application of specific concepts of the absolute and relative surplus product 
(and indeed the rate of exploitation) at a macroeconomic level. It is not 
surprising that Ticktin gives no full definitions.
The most one could argue would be that more and more surplus 
labour has been employed in producing a social product which in a large 
number of specific workplaces is inadequate to ensure the fulfilment of a 
large number of the specific growth requirements of the ruling group; and 
that when the inflow of new workers dried up the problem grew critical. In 
other words, it was easier for the system to have new plant constructed than 
to raise productivity; and by this means the rulers met most of their growth 
requirements for a certain period of time.'^ But whilst it is not denied that 
Ticktin's explanation of this process in terms of labour relations is an 
im portant theoretical achievement, it would appear that the concepts of 
relative and absolute surplus product are only sustainable at a macro level if 
the theory of the Soviet system as non-capitalist is discarded. And at that 
point they reduce to the concepts of relative and absolute surplus value.
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It is now necessary to consider the aspects of the theory which link 
the relationship between labour and growth to the specific issue of workers' 
power. Once more we are looking for a differentiation betweeen objective 
and subjective aspects, but this time on a historical or dynamic level. 
Objectively, then, there is the clearly expressed view that as the rate of 
increase in the labour supply has declined, and labour has become more 
scarce, "the control over surplus labour, and hence over the worker, has 
been reduced." More specifically, the possibilities for directing labour were 
lessened as the workforce grew more attached to specific skills and 
locations. (1983b, p .113-14; 1986b, pp.126-27). The shortage of labour 
increased the need to concede to labour. Wages had to rise, and under 
Brezhnev they rose considerably. Workers' control over the labour process, 
albeit negative, was reinforced. A second factor cited as strengthening the 
workers' hand is the large size of Soviet enterprises. (1991c, p.87).
The subjective side is dealt with in relation to three stages. In the 
first, during the 1930s, the workers wrested a large degree of control over 
the labour process. (See Filtzer 1986). Next, under Stalin, it is simply 
mentioned that they were controlled "through forms of force" (Ticktin 
1991c, p.85) and that the "rate of exploitation" rose. (1978, p.58). Then under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev they increased their control once more. (1991c, 
p.85; see also Arnot 1981 and 1988, and Filtzer 1992b). Over time, then, 
"workers have acted in a more collective way to establish their norms." 
(1991c, p.87). Blue-collar wages in industry rose considerably, and workers' 
consumption demands have become more pressing, (pp.87 and 149). In 
addition, "the nature of performance in the labor process has deteriorated,"
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and the propensity to strike increased dramatically at the end of the 1980s. 
(p. 144). As a result of the workers' increasing strength, the rulers have been
forced to make concessions. Ever more urgently, they need to control the 
w orkers through the m arket, which necessarily im plies the use of 
unemployment,
IBut despite the undoubtedly impressive classist nature of the 
analysis, the theory retains the overall weakness that the strength of the 
workers is depicted as both actual (witness the above examples of its effects) 
and "potential." (1991c, p.87). The key idea here is that the increased power
of the workforce was consequent upon the "increasing socialisation of 
labour," (p. 146) which implies a kind of philosophical position that it started 
out as a potentiality which became ever more intense until it had to become 
actual. W orkers' subjective self-assertion, then, appears as a necessary 
product of the integration of the division of labour in an advanced modern 
economy. As a result, the 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects of workers' 
power are considered to be intertwined to such a degree that class conflict 
appears as simply an aspect, albeit the most significant aspect, of some kind 
of mystical movement of the socialisation of labour. Workers' struggle is 
separated from workers' power.
Under Brezhnev the power of the workers increased, and helped 
bring about a rise in wages; but since the late 1980s it has served most of all 
to scare the rulers away from imposing mass unemployment, and has 
prevented the extraction of the relative surplus from becoming the basis of 
the economy. (In Ticktin's terms, the elite cannot establish capitalism.) The 
question thus arises as to whether or not the power of the workers is still
increasing. If it is, then why is the workers' position not being objectively
iS:
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enhanced in terms of real wages and conditions? And if it is decreasing, 
then why is the system not entering a phase of better health? Once such 
questions are posed, the fundam entally dichotomous nature of the 
exploitative society becomes far less apparent, and it is evident that the 
category of the increasing power of the workers is not conceived of in the 
rigorous sense of class autonomy, permanently outside of and opposed to 
the development of the Soviet economy. To assert that "the whole dynamic 
of the system is toward its own demise" would make sense so long as it is 
taken to mean that the system is increasingly inefficient; but the same 
cannot be said once Ticktin adds the words "and overthrow by the 
workers," since that is virtually to equate the dynamic of the system with 
the dynamic of the workers' struggle. (1991c, p.87).
The weakness is in fact especially evident when he comes to 
consider the tendency of the workers' struggle towards the overthrow of the 
system. Thus he writes that once
the social nature of production forces its way through society the 
power of the workers will not be unmediated and hence there 
would not be even the temporary existence of a working class 
movement: there would be the simultaneous establishm ent of 
workers' control with the elimination of the elite. (1987a, p.l9).
One's first impression might be that this amounts to an understanding that
the autonomy of workers' struggle is totally antagonistic to political
mediation, but in fact that is very far from being the case. Indeed, Ticktin
has asserted quite openly that "the workers cannot blindly develop their
own theory, in the absence of intellectuals" (that is, according to context,
non-worker intellectuals) (1991b, p .ll) , and that if their struggle is to come
to full fruition they first need a party. (1993, p.l31). He has also argued that
whereas
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some elite members are entirely useless and others are merely 
policemen, ...its [the elite's] predom inant membership w ould 
remain in position, stripped of rank, privilege and power, in a 
socialist society. (1976, p.43).
On a political-economic level he has even stated in so many words that if the
working class comes to power in the USSR the market would actually be
restored. (1979, p.l3).^^ Presumably the territory could then play its proper
part in a global reformist transition wherein market relations were abolished
gradually in the 'classically' conceived fashion. Such 'orthodox Marxist'
positions, I would suggest, leave traces in the overall theory of the USSR
and ultimately ensure that his consideration of the antagonistic nature of
class relations remains necessarily incomplete.
3 SUMMARY
The first point to be made in summary is that the number of substantive 
Marxist contributions to an understanding of the relationship between the 
history and nature of Soviet political economy and the history and nature of 
working class struggle is very small. One might have expected communist 
theorists especially to have shown a great interest, but in fact they have paid 
it minimal attention.
On the other hand, the same cannot fairly be said of Dunayevskaya 
and James (until the later 1950s), Castoriadis (ditto), or Ticktin (since the 
mid-1970s). Material is evident in the works of all four, and especially those 
of Ticktin, which stands well apart from the non-classist or inadequately 
classist material considered in Chapter 5.
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Credit for being the first to insist that the nature of the Soviet 
system necessarily implies the reality of class struggle m ust go to 
Dunayevskaya in the 1940s. In considering the Stalin period and its 
immediate aftermath, she breaks new ground in her attempt to define Soviet 
labour policy in terms of the vicissitudes of the class struggle. It is thus 
unfortunate that she fails to link the analysis to her work on the specific 
functioning of the political-economic categories of Soviet capitalism. Her 
one-time collaborator James, meanwhile, produces work which is somewhat 
less theoretically refined before eventually reaching agreem ent w ith 
Castoriadis, From the 1960s onwards neither Dunayevskaya nor James 
produces work of similar interest.
During the 1950s Castoriadis also stresses the importance of 
workers' opposition to the Soviet capitalist system, in his case with special 
reference to the Khrushchev period. Significantly, in a landmark text of 1956 
he becomes the first person to identify working class resistance as the 
ultimate cause of the failure of the 'Plan.' But he fails to theorise the 
underlying nature of this resistance. In the 1960s he rejects Marxism and 
adopts the view that the essential contradiction of the Soviet system (and 
capitalism in general) is that which opposes its bureaucratic nature to its 
need to solicit initiative from below. Eventually he reaches what is virtually 
a 'totalitarian' theory of Soviet 'slave capitalism/
A further significant contribution to the theory of the relationship 
between class conflict and the nature of the Soviet system has been that 
produced by Ticktin since the 1970s. I would argue that the advances he has
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made on previous work are quite outstanding. His central achievement has 
been to identify an underlying contradiction between the ruling elite's 
limited control over the surplus product and the workers' limited control 
over the labour process. Despite denying that the USSR knew either history 
or real classes, he has developed an understanding of this contradiction in a 
resolutely historical and classist fashion.
Since, unlike the others considered in this chapter, he holds the 
position that the USSR is non-capitalist in nature, he is then faced with 
theoretical problems concerning the system's need for growth and the 
nature of the growth achieved. These, though, he has dealt w ith in 
meticulous fashion. In particular, he has developed a theory of a defective 
form of social product, determined by the specific forms taken by the elite's 
control over labour and the workers' partial control over the labour process. 
Actual use-value stands in opposition to potential use-value and waste. 
With these concepts he has undoubtedly explained the various well-known 
characteristics of the Soviet economy with a materialist profundity which 
has not been evident in the works of previous theorists.
Certain problems remain, though, in his insistence that the system 
is riven by the contradictions of an administered form of use-value rather 
than an administered form of exchange-value. In particular he has proposed 
the existence of forms he describes as the absolute surplus product and the 
relative surplus product which he has insufficiently distinguished from 
forms based on value. This has meant that in the final analysis his view that 
the USSR was non-capitalist does not stand up. And in denying that the 
working class is a real class he has made the focus on class struggle blunter 
than would otherwise be the case. He has thus developed what is essentially
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a theory of class antagonism (or at least a theory of the movement of class 
opposition) in the absence of a concept of class autonomy. In addition, his 
theoretical achievements remain rather obscured by an 'orthodox Marxist' 
theory of transition, based on a somewhat mystical view of the necessary 
movement of the socialisation of labour.
I would conclude that although a certain amount of work has been done on 
the importance to Soviet political economy of the dynamic opposition 
between classes, there remains to be constructed an adequate theoretical 
framework for understanding working class autonomy and subjectivity. 
This, then, is the issue to be dealt with in Chapter 7.
NOTES
The Situationists make no references to the class struggle in the USSR 
apart from superficial comments as to future prospects. In addition, in 
early years they seem to have been signally over-positive about the 
intelligentsia. Making what by any standards is a facile parallel, 
Vaneigem in 1962 thus places the role of the "Eastern bloc's" 
intelligentsia in the same category as "the workers' struggles presently 
beginning in England [presumably, wildcat strikes—NCF]," of both of 
which "much can be expected." (1962, p.93). It would certainly be 
inaccurate to see the early writings of this highly voluntarist thinker as 
containing the most precise elements of the Situationist critique, but 
nonetheless in 1969 even the more historical-materialist Khayati could 
write, without argument, that "the courageous isolated protests voiced 
in Moscow after 21 August [in 1968: the day of the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia—NCF] herald the revolution that will not fail to break 
out soon in Russia itself," (1969, p.264).
Nor have the Autonomists ever studied this area. For his part, 
Negri simply writes a few years after the Polish events of 1980-81 that 
in the 'socialist societies' the processes of real subsumption (of labour 
by capital) "have not yet been fully developed," and that "there still 
exists a margin within which class struggle of a traditional kind can 
take place." In this regard, the Polish case is held to be "typical." More 
generally, the 'socialist societies' seem to be tending "towards the 
predominance of military structures in the supervision of exploitation." 
(1986,pp.l79-80). Those knowledgeable in the field, however, would 
hardly see Poland, with its mass union, prevalent Catholicism, and 
army coup, as having been typical even at that time.
At the end of 1989 Negri produces some comments about the 
events then taking place in 'the East,' but in terms which are arguably 
actually opposed to those of an Autonomist critique. Proposing that the 
'question' in the Soviet-type countries is that of "understanding what 
m ight be the rules for the democratic m anagem ent of economic 
entrepreneurship," he goes on to assert that "in the East, within the 
revolution, people are experiencing a new form of democracy: the 
democracy of work, a communist democracy." By this time the rebels 
against the Soviet order in whom Negri is most interested are "the 
students, scientists, workers linked to advanced technologies, 
intellectuals, and in short, all those who deal w ith abstract and 
intellectual work," whom he sees as representing a new kind of 
producer: "a social producer, manager of his own means of production 
and capable of supplying both work and intellectual planning, both 
innovative activity and a cooperative socialization." (1990, pp.171-72). 
Such a view makes Vaneigem's praise for the intelligentsia of the late
■ - ' -I' ■
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Khrushchev period seem comparatively moderate. Not a specialist in 
Soviet affairs, Negri appears to be completely unaware of the contempt 
the Soviet intelligentsia in general harbours for the proletariat (and 
peasantry) (on which, see for example Ticktin 1973a, pp.39-40, 1973b, 
and 1991a, chap. 5); not to say theoretically completely unconcerned 
with their material place in society and the historical forms of 
proletarian struggle. His view represents Gramsciism taken to an 
extreme, where the concept of 'organic intellectuals' (see Grams ci 
1929-35, pp.5-23) is replaced by 'intellectual workers' as virtually a 
distinct productive class. It is hardly distinguishable from the position 
taken by Bahro. (1977)
For a recent completely empirical councilist 'dossier' on class struggle 
in the Yeltsin period, see Echanges et Mouvement 1993-95.
For a much fuller discussion of the intricacies of the attem pts to 
introduce more labour competititon, both before and by means of 
Stakhanovism, see Filtzer 1986, pp.91-115.
Dunayevskaya's later work is of much less critical interest. In her 
introduction to the 1963 edition of Marxism and Freedom, she writes as 
follows:
After the Russian admission, in 1943, that the law of value 
operates in Russia, there was no further point to continue the 
detailed analysis of their State Plans. My analysis of the Five 
Year Plans, therefore, stopped with W orld W ar 2, and 
thereafter focused on the Russian assault on Marx's Capital and 
his Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, (1963, p.20).
This statement clearly illustrates the weakness of 'Marxist-Humanism.' 
See also Dunayevskaya's later, largely journalistic declaration that the 
coming to power of Andropov in 1982 "reveals the state of the 
degeneracy of state-capitalism as a whole"; and the support she lent to 
Solidarnosc in Poland. (1982).
It should be remembered, of course, that James's book of 1950, like 
Dunayevskaya's early articles of 1942-43 and 1946-47, formulated the 
ideas of the Johnson-Forest tendency, not just those of one individual. 
Indeed the former text, which was presented as the summation and 
culmination of the tendency's theoretical work, did not originally bear 
James's signature. (See Dunayevskaya 1958-72, p.3; and Cleaver 1979, 
p.46). Since we now know, though, that James was the author, I have 
chosen to present the material in such a way as to point up the various 
strengths and weaknesses of the Tendency's critique in relation to 
those of the two authors' later works, which were notably rather 
discordant. (James, Lee, and Chaulieu 1958; Dunayevskaya 1958).
 ■ -
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® As Cleaver has rightly pointed out (1979, pp.45-48 and 54), this work 
anticipates Autonomist work of a decade later.
7 This is not quite an accurate representation of Lenin's position. In fact 
he had defended labour militarisation whenever he perceived it to be 
necessary in the interests of the regime. Thus at one time he drafted a 
decree imposing "martial law for labour militarisation" in a belt 
stretching 30-50 versts (20-33 miles) either side of the railway lines. 
(Nove 1982, p.73). Arguably one factor in the 'trade union debate' 
which came to a head in 1921 was a power struggle between the head 
of the government and the War Commissar.
® The inverted commas in this sentence are James's.
® Although, according to Dunayevskaya (1958-72, p.3), Chaulieu
(Castoriadis) denied having written or signed this work, nonetheless in 
the second half of the 1950s James's group d id  enter into a 
rapprochement both with Castoriadis's group Socialisme ou Barbarie 
and with European council communists such as Brendel and Maasen. 
(Johnson et al. 1956). Whatever precise role Castoriadis played in its 
production, it is readily apparent that he exercised a substantial 
influence on its content; and one only has to read the texts he wrote in 
1954 and 1956 (q.v) to realise that in relation to the critique of the USSR 
it was his influence which was overriding. In other words, by 1958 
James had adopted Castoriadis's position on the class struggle in the 
USSR rather than the less considered position of the Johnson-Forest 
tendency. (See also note 13 below).
By 1963 James's overriding interest is to defend the role of Leninism. In 
highly tendentious fashion, he thus endeavours to separate Leninism 
from the "theory and practice of the vanguard party," which he denies 
was ever its "central doctrine" or even a 'special' one. (1963, p.327). 
Such an apparently bizarre position marks perhaps an even greater 
theoretical abdication than D unayevskaya's fo rm ulation  of 
'Marxist-Humanism.'
11 He also mentions bureaucratic 'cliquism' and the technical problems of 
hierarchical supervision, but understands them to be less important 
and less basic.
12 This translation has been slightly tidied up.
Although the elaboration of the fundamental position on the class 
struggle in the USSR should be ascribed mainly to Castoriadis, the 
depiction of the USSR in this collective text is som ewhat more 
rhetorical than it is in Castoriadis's writings as sole author. Thus it is
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argued that, since the workers know their work better than anyone else 
does, even at gunpoint they retain a certain say in the setting of norms. 
As long as capitalism lasts, "modern industry cannot be run in any 
other way," (pp.31-33). These comments apply to the entire capitalist 
world, but unfortunately in the limited space allotted to Soviet 
conditions several uncritical and blanket comparisons are made with 
shopfloor relations in the United States which detract from the critique 
of the former. It is stated, for example, that "workers in Russia have 
created shop floor organizations which control production and 
discipline management in much the same way [sic] as American 
workers." Unrigorous comparisons like this clearly fail to provide 
convincing support for the assertion that the ^Russian working class' is 
"the most powerful in the world except for the American." Since it 
does not follow either that it is the former which is "far more 
dangerous to the ruling class," this is explained instead with reference 
to the alleged occurrence in 'Russia' in the last fifty years of "three 
great revolutions," in each of which "the workers took the lead." (p.34). 
Such an argument is, of course, largely dogmatic; and, in view of the 
rather more considered analysis applied to conditions in the United 
States (pp.20-29), which follows on from the earlier work of 
Johnson-Forest, can almost certainly be ascribed to James or Lee rather 
than to Castoriadis. This inference would seem to be further supported 
when it is understood that according to context the 'third revolution' 
apparently denotes de-Stalinisation, whereas the first two presumably 
occurred in 1905 and 1917. Such a formulation is hardly illuminating. 
The assertion that "long before Khrushchev spoke of de-Stalinization, 
the workers in the plants had de-Stalinized themselves," (p.34) is 
undoubtedly interesting, but it is unfortunately made w ithout any 
substantial consideration being given to the forms taken by either 
'workplace de-Stalinisation' or indeed Stalinism itself. In short, it 
would appear that in support of Castoriadis's (profound) work on the 
USSR, James is offering comparisons with his own (also profound) 
work on the United States which themselves, being crude, remain 
weak.
I'* See the distinction drawn between Castoriadis's approach and that of 
Autonomist Marxism in the first section of Chapter 1 above. See also 
the criticisms of Castoriadis in Aufheben 1994, pp.25-27.
12 "There is indeed one world but that world is governed by the law of 
decline not the law of value, by the decadence of value not by its 
apogee. That necessarily implies that in different times and different 
places value exists in different degrees, or not at all." (Ticktin 1987, 
p.24).
1® In addition, while Ticktin is right to begin a discussion of finance 
capital with Britain, developments in that country m erit no special
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weight in any argument that the problems of finance capital have led to 
a decline of capitalism globally. Britain, and indeed the United States, 
are quite evidently in 'decline' in a number of ways (see Ticktin 1994a, 
p.73); but, more importantly, a theory of the decline of the global 
capitalist system should explain what is happening in countries which 
are rising. The tendency of financial outflows from Japan, for example, 
to take the form of direct investments as well as investment in shares 
and bonds, which apparently contradicts Ticktin's argument, should 
not be written off in a single sentence. (1986a, p.lO). In South Africa the 
'fracturing of abstract labour' has indeed come to ham per capitalist 
efficiency (Ticktin 1991d); but in Japan the effect is quite the opposite, 
and there the 'dual labour markeP has proven to be very good indeed 
for business. (Crump 1989). (For a pro-capitalist 'geopolitical' 
description of Japanese economic growth, see Kennedy 1988, pp.537-40 
and 591-608).
A second point, which I shall simply note, is that theorists of 
decline should be able to show convincingly that what appears to be an 
ongoing technological revolution is in fact som ething else. The 
communist theorist Tillium has recently argued the opposite view. 
(1994).
17 For the moment I am making general criticisms of Ticktin's idea of 
decline in order to probe weaknesses in the overall basis of his 
'exceptionalism.' The question of potential and actual surplus, first 
theorised by Baran (1957), is a complex one, and I shall deal with it in 
greater depth below in a specifically Soviet context.
1® A more astute critic would surely see irrationalism as directly implied 
by commodity fetishism; drug abuse, whether legal or illegal, as an 
advanced form of social control which expresses such fetishism — as 
do fashion, television, cinema, and numerous kinds of home, personal, 
and indeed 'collective' consumerist entertainment; and the mafia as 
expressing in a number of ways the very essence of capitalist society 
(the ideology of honour in business, the subordination of politicians 
and public officials to the cause of profitability, and so on).
1® On the role of the Taylorist 'scientific management of work' in the 
dissociation of the labour process from workers' craft skills, and hence 
in the increasing abstractification of labour, see Braverman 1974, chaps. 
4-5, No subsequent re-skilling or creation of 'quality circles' and so on 
should detract from the force of Braverman's analysis of capitalism's 
second industrial revolution.
20 As Marx realised, political democracy is connected principally with the 
expansion of the power of the bourgeoisie against previously dominant 
property interests, (1843b, pp.232-33.). In the present century there has
1
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also become apparent a strong — and I would argue unbreakable — 
relationship between enfranchisement and the bourgeoisie's use of its 
mass media, and hence with the capitalist struggle against the class 
self-assertion of the proletariat.
21 Ticktin's critical stance towards 'market socialism,' founded on his 
insistence upon an absolute incompatibility between planning and the 
market (1979, 1990-92,1991c, p p .l75-80), wears somewhat thin once it 
is realised that the 'socialist' government he envisages would in no 
way refuse to print money.
22 "Only in this [present] epoch, and this is the nature of the epoch, could 
a real alternative to exploitative society be contemplated. It is real 
because a real revolution conducted in the name of this alternative has 
taken place." (Ticktin 1978, p.53). No substantiation is offered for any 
of the three distinct assertions within these lines.
23 It is possible, of course, especially in view of Engels's work (1877-78, 
1896-1925) to interpret some of Marx's work as being based solely 
upon a philosophical and 'natural-scientific' view of the interplay of 
'objective laws.' (See, for example, Marx's postface to the second 
edition of Volume 1 of Capital in 1873). It is, after all, an undisputed fact 
that Marx wanted to dedicate Volume 2 of Capital to Darwin, author of 
the work On the Origin of Species Through Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1866) *— even if, as 
McLellan has shown (1973, pp.423-24), Engels's speech at Marx's 
graveside in which he equated the views of Marx and Darwin is highly 
misleading. Given, though, Marx's rejection of philosophy (1844, 
pp.249-50), his insistence on the unity of theory and practice (see, for 
example, Marx 1845), and his insistence in the Manifesto on the 
centrality of class struggle (Marx and Engels 1848), it would seem 
much more useful to be wary of any 'objectivist' self-commentaries 
written under the later influence of contemporary capitalist science, 
and to reject them accordingly. (See McLellan 1973, and Levine 1975 
pp.423-24). As Debord puts it,
what closely links Marx's theory with scientific thought is the 
rational understanding of the forces which really operate in 
society. But Marx's theory is fundamentally beyond scientific 
thought, and it preserves scientific thought only by 
superseding it: what is in question is an understanding of 
struggle, and not of law. (1967, para.81).
Discussion of this matter cannot be developed further in the present 
context.
i.
CHAP.6 - NOTES 349
24 It should be recalled that, just as the disappearance of capitalism is not
a sufficient condition for the inauguration of communism, the 'success' 
of a capitalism which gives way to a more efficient form of exploitation 
does not undermine the historical certainty of this inauguration.
22 This is not to suggest that it was necessarily impossible in this century
for a large country to have had a non-capitalist political economy, even 
one which underw ent rapid development; bu t simply to criticise 
Ticktin's explanation of the context in which it was possible.
2® As we shall see, though, whilst Ticktin has no concept of the USSR's 
maturity, he does have a concept of its decline. (1990, 1991b). In his 
own terms this would appear to be highly problematic.
27 With reference to the forms of control associated with capitalist decline, 
he writes that "the attempt to control workers on the shopfloor using 
the labour process cannot be dignified with the term strategy. Rather it 
is a particular tactic adopted within the overall social democratic or 
Keynesian strategy." (1994a). This statement appears remarkable given 
that capital is self-expanding value and surplus value is produced by 
labour.
2® This is the translation quoted by Ticktin. My reference is to the Penguin 
edition, in which the translation is slightly different.
2® More precisely, Ticktin's view is that exchange-value was known 
exclusively in the black market (1991c, p.l33), but in the absence of 
value (M-C-MO and hence of the law of value. He recognises that since 
1989 the rouble has also become important in bargaining between legal 
enterprises, but sees this as essentially a matter of mediated barter 
(C-M-C). It follows, in his terms, that Russian money, by which he 
means the rouble, is still not real money, or 'money as money.' (1993, 
pp.125-26; see also Ticktin 1992a).
3® Ticktin is by no means an orthodox Trotskyist, but his view on the 
relationship between Soviet politics and economics reveals a glimmer 
of the Trotskyist position on the 'political' nature of 'S talinist' 
exploitation. (See Trotsky 1936, pp.248-49). "The individual has a 
political relation to his workplace in two senses: firstly in terms of 
control and secondly in terms of the necessity to work." (Ticktin 1978, 
p.53). After writing that "the economic relation can only exist through 
the political relation, so that the economic relation is expressed through 
a political form," he then adds that this political form supposedly 
'limits' the nature of the economic relation, (p.55). Later he writes that
in the West [i.e. capitalism—NCF] the atomisation is economic, 
fundamentally caused by commoditisation of labour power.
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whereas in the East [i.e the USSR and countries with similar 
regimes—NCF] it is fundamentally political, though based on a 
political economy of a kind conducive to this political 
atomisation. (1987a, p. 16).
What he does not recognise properly is that in any exploitative society 
a political relation is at the same time an economic relation. More 
simply, it distributes resources which the society determines as scarce. 
This is because it necessarily concerns the organisation of the scarcity 
which is denoted by the word 'economy' in the first place. There is a 
clear correlation here with an aspect of his work I have criticised above; 
namely, his downplaying of the continuity of the essentially economic 
role of the State in capitalism.
A further relic of Trotskyism is evident in his insistence that the 
USSR was always unstable. It is impossible not to notice the high 
degree of esteem shown for the former War Commissar (and advocate 
of labour militarisation [1920, chap.8]) in the following sentences:
Trotsky, who still regarded the USSR as a workers' state, was 
nonetheless moved to remark in 1937 that the USSR under 
Stalin was politically worse than Germany under Hitler, In 
other words [emphasis added], the absence of a market and the 
strong internal controls reflect extreme instability, not stability. 
(Ticktin 1991c, p.9).
If the Soviet social formation had really been that unstable it would 
hardly have survived the second world war. Even if it were not 
defeated, as Trotsky thought it would be due to its instability (1936, 
p.227), it certainly would not have won. Attempting to rescue the idea 
of 'permanent instability' Ticktin is forced to explain it in the much 
vaguer terms of 'unviability,' and to accept that Trotsky "appears to 
have been wrong in his time frame." (1991c, p.61). On both counts the 
special pleading is self-evident.
The somewhat fanciful notion is also noted that it was the course 
of events in the USSR during the late 1920s — rather than, say, the 
defeat of the international revolutionary movement by 1921, or the 
second world war, or the post-war boom — which determined the 
whole nature of the world-historical epoch in which we now live, 
(p. 185). Connected to this there is the strong but somewhat confused 
view that the ability or inability of the rulers to impose the market and 
therefore mass unemployment is related very closely indeed to the 
overall conditions in die outside world of (market) capitalism. Thus in 
1987 Ticktin describes as "inevitable" the prospect that the Soviet rulers 
will conclude a deal with their counterparts in the US and open up 
their territory to the world market. (198/^, p.l96). As well as fulfilling
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the needs of the Soviet elite, this would also enable the American rulers 
to "shore up" their own position. In 1991 he goes so far as to assert that 
an opening up of the USSR to the world market is a necessity for global 
(market) capitalism too, and would actually enable the latter to escape 
its "crisis." The trouble now, though, is that the USSR cannot get to the 
market because that would mean confronting the workers head-on. 
(1991b, pp.15-19). If for the sake of argument one accepts these two 
points, one might then ask why the big banks would be unable to offer 
large enough loans to key multinationals to enable them to make 
sizeable concessions to workers in the USSR at the same time as 
conquering the country for the world market. These loans could surely 
then be paid back out of the increased profits which would accrue once 
the rest of market capitalism pulled out of its "crisis." Alternatively, 
one might ponder awhile the obvious implication that the workers' 
limited control over the labour process in the USSR is the most 
important factor in the current history of the world. Since the area has 
only around 5% of the world's population, and a similar percentage of 
world output — and considering that even the importance of oil in the 
world economy is bound to decline — the analysis would appear to be 
a severe case of the purest academicism. (Gross output figures for 1988 
in US $ trillion [constant 1988 prices] were as follows: US, 4.8; Japan 
2.9; Germany [East plus West] 1.4, USSR, 1.0; World, 18.7. By 1990 the 
Soviet economy was smaller than the French and about the same size 
as the Italian. See United Nations 1993, pp.232-39.)
31 The choice of terms here appears inappropriate, since etymologically 
the term 'individual' (that which is indivisible) is virtually identical in 
meaning to the term 'atom' (that which cannot be cut). A second point 
is that, as Ticktin recognises, atomisation is not at all a social relation 
unique to the USSR. Through television and other means it plays a 
crucial role in Japan and the countries of the advanced West too. The 
importance of the analysis lies in the critique of its specifically Soviet 
form.
32 In using the term 'negative control' Ticktin doubtless does not mean to 
evoke any cybernetic connotations.
33 For Ticktin, Soviet waste is not directly comparable w ith  the 
'unproductive' sector under capitalism. Indeed it is all the more 
problematic for the Soviet rulers given that within the Soviet system it 
is use-value which is "all-important." (1991c, pp .l 1-12). But in fact this 
insistence on the non-capitalist nature of the USSR adds little extra 
weight to the argument that its inherent wastefulness was an especially 
chronic problem. Capitalism does indeed depend upon the production 
of new exchange-value, but at the same time all commodities — in this 
context, all new production — must necessarily have a use-value as 
well as an exchange-value. Exchange-value certainly dominates;
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use-value even falls, as Debord has rightly pointed out (1967, para. 47): 
but this does not make it impossible to imagine a local form of 
capitalist system in which the production of use-values is so highly 
inefficient as to hinder the production of exchange-value and therefore 
the general interest of capital. If all machine-tools suddenly began to 
wear out twice as quickly, the production of exchange-value would 
obviously be drastically reduced — and not just because of market 
competition. Subject to a more rapid turnover but w ithout any 
quickening of production, fixed capital would become much more 
expensive in value terms.
34 It should be noted that the category of the producer sector is not 
equivalent to that of heavy industry, which indudes, for example, car 
production. Nor is it the same as the defence sector, not even in the 
broadest possible sense. For an example of the type of traditional view 
which Ticktin has successfully and deftly undermined, see Voslensky 
1980,p.l41.
32 Where Ticktin identifies Soviet society's central economic feature as 
being wastefulness, and then proceeds to analyse the categorial 
interactions which make it so, Füredi, who does not employ a 
comparably precise critical m ethod, holds rather that the m ost 
distinctive feature is the overall "lack of any dynamic of development." 
(1986, p.79). Omitting to develop analytical categories in any profound 
fashion, he succeeds mainly in demonstrating that it is possible to 
adopt various aspects of Ticktin's critique while remaining an avid 
defender of political Leninism. It is also worth mentioning that Füredi's 
empirical knowledge of the field is not very great, and he thus makes 
such inexcusable errors as to assert that it was only in the 1960s that the 
law of value was first officially portrayed as "an essential component 
of the transition to communism." (p. 113). (See in rebuttal the 
well-known textbooks by Leontiev et al., 1943, and Stalin 1952).
36 Füredi has adopted an identical position. (1986, pp.179-83).
37 Ticktin, however, writes of individual countries 'going socialist' 
(1990-92, p.l9). In the editorial preamble of the Critique journal, 
meanwhile, there may be a rejection of the "concept of socialism in one 
country" but there is also a denial of "the possibility that a country 
could be both socialist and undemocratic." (See for example Critique 
1994). The clear implication here is that if a country is not an 
undemocratic country then it might be ... a socialist country. He has 
also written that "socialists have to fight for socialism on a national 
basis, even if they are internationalist, simply because the State is 
national." (1990-92). Not only is this logically false, since socialism (that 
is, communism) is not founded on the basis of the State; it is also 
incorrect in content since the State-form is global.
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38 This is a sum m ary of Ticktin's position, which is actually 
self-contradictory. Thus in a single article he asserts first, that the 
working class "came into being over time, threatened the society and 
has since constituted a permanent feature of a society which is no 
longer a classical capitalism"; and then that "classes exist in potential 
or essence all the time but...only when the immediate circumstances are 
propitious can we say that the class has come fully into being." (1987a, 
pp. 13-14). The problem is that by concentrating on class formation in 
the context of 'laws of transition' supposedly now in operation he has 
removed the focus from the class struggle.
39 In the description of the trade union as a 'ruling class' form of 
proletarian organisation, the inverted commas are in the original.
40 Ticktin's actual words are:
[In the USSR] the individual reacts spontaneously and 
individually with disastrous results for the product. In the 
West, the worker is part of a union, which negotiates control 
over the production line. The individual can be controlled 
through the reserve army of labour or through the wage 
system, neither of which are relevant in the USSR. (1987a, 
p.l7).
But in fact many kinds of 'workers' control' over the work process, 
such as hoodwinking time-and-labour specialists, are not negotiated by 
unions at all. Moreover, Ticktin is forgetting that the majority of 
workers in the WesP are not unionised.
41 It is also based upon a serious underestimation of the general level of 
socially-enforced atom isation in countries more capitalistically 
advanced than the USSR.
42 He does not mention war reparations, but clearly the same argument 
would apply.
43 Previous critics have failed to notice this, or at least to comment upon 
it. (See for example E. Mandel 1979 and Molyneux 1987). These 
concepts are criticised here for the first time,
44 On the depletion of available new sources of absolute surplus value, 
see also Amot 1988, pp.59-64.
45 In a different context, part of the basis on which Trotsky criticised the 
Soviet industrialisation drive at the turn of the 1930s was precisely the 
"adventurism" of the rejection of market mechanisms. (1936, pp.66-73).
CHAPTER 7
Marxist Theory
> 1 '
I
The Class Struggle: An Autonomist
'/■T
%
In this final chapter I develop an understanding of the struggle of the 
working class in opposition to the needs of Soviet capital. The overall 
structure is similar to that of Chapter 3. After giving expanded Autonomist 
Marxist definitions of the underlying categories of the class struggle under 
capitalism in general, I proceed to develop an Autonomist understanding of 
the significance of that struggle in the USSR. I
1 DEFINING THE CLASS STRUGGLE UNDER CAPITALISM
The class relation in capitalist society can best be defined as the conflict 
between, on one side, those who do not possess any control over the means 
of production, but who, being the producers, are the sole source of new 
value; and on the other side, those who do possess such control by dint of 
controlling capital. It is fundamentally a relation of production.
_______________ mm
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It would certainly be quite feasible to begin a theorisation of this 
relation on the basis of subjective proletarian experience. But since that
experience necessarily involves struggle, a second route to a theoretical
'understanding involves looking first at the pole of capital (as discussed in 
Chapter 3 above) in order to grasp what it is that proletarian subjectivity 
opposes. It will then be possible to start to understand theoretically why and 
how it does so, and to proceed to look at the pole of the working class on the 
basis of this understanding. And it is this second route which will now be 
taken. Given that working class struggle must to some degree obstruct the 
control of capital — that is, capital's control over itself, its well-being — there 
is a need to understand that control in terms of its temporal field of 
operation, the capitalist production cycle.
ï 'i
1.1 Surplus-Value Versus the Wage
1.1.1 The Capital Circuit
The circuit of capital involves two processes which for analytical purposes 
can be considered separately. The first is investment, or the injection of 
capital into production; the second is sale, or its realisation once production 
has occurred.
In all capitalist production projects capital is invested partly in 
labour resources and partly in means of production. In other words, capital 
divides into two portions. (See the upper half of Figure 5). On one hand, 
there is the capital invested in plant and materials, which Marx defines as
I
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'constant' capital or c; on the other, there is the capital invested in 
labour-power, which modern mystified jargon knows as 'human capital' but 
which Marx denotes as 'variable capital' or v. In the case of the first portion, 
it becomes clear during the course of production that it is simply transferred 
from the plant and raw  materials to the product. Its exchange-value is 
therefore passed from one use-value to another. (Marx 1867, pp.310-16). (If 
this were not the case, one would have either a 'magic machine' or else a 
black hole into which no controller of capital would wish to invest.) The 
second portion, meanwhile, has the unique property of being able to 
generate new value in the course of the 'consumption' of what it has bought: 
that is, labour-power. This is because the upkeep of workers, unlike the 
purchase and upkeep of plant, gives them the strength to produce 
additional value in excess of the value of their own maintenance. 
(pp.316-19).
It follows that the employment of wage-labour cannot be defined 
simply in terms of circulation, nor indeed in terms of the mere consumption 
of a material commodity by its purchaser. The crucial point is that the 
human beings who receive v (wages), being deprived of any control over the 
means of production, alienated from them, and exploited by capital, are 
forced to produce a surplus which takes a value form (s). This surplus is the 
lifeblood of capital expansion and therefore of capital. As Marx puts it,
the production of surplus-value — which Includes the preservation 
of the value originally advanced — appears therefore as the 
determining purpose, the driving force and the final result of the 
capitalist process of production, as the means through which the 
original value is transformed into capital. (Marx 1933, p.976).
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Control over capital is thus necessarily the control, direct or indirect, over 
the extraction of surplus valued
The next step in the analysis is to look at the category of surplus 
value in relation to the end result of capitalist production, and thus in terms 
of the composition of the product sold. (Marx 1867, pp.329-32). As depicted 
in the lower half of Figure 5, this product is divided into three portions, one 
of which is subdivided further. First, there is the reproduction of constant 
capital (c). Second, there is the part of the product consumed by proletarians 
— namely, that which is reproductive of labour-power — which is defined 
here as the quantity of products upon which the wage (z?) is spent (wage 
goods). The third part of the product, the surplus value (s), is itself split into 
two portions. The first of these, constituted by the resources consumed by 
the exploiters, is most easily described as 'revenue.' These resources play no 
further part in the capital circuit, which in fact they leave. The second is 
constituted by the resources which the exploiters use in expanding 
production, and forms the accumulation fund. These resources remain 
capital. Indeed they are necessary to capital's very nature, since the point is 
that they are subsequently reinvested with a view to the production of even 
more surplus value, (pp.738-61).
Since capital's essence is determined by its accumulation, it is thus 
the accumulation of surplus-value, rather than the personal consumer tastes 
or privileged consumption of capitalist investors — or indeed their mythical 
origins in Protestant 'asceticism' — which provides the motive for capital 
circulation. In Marx's well-known words: "Accumulate, accumulate! That is 
Moses and the prophets!" (p.742). For some exploiters it m ay be the
I
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Opulence of their consumption which determines their feelings of well-being 
at any given moment; but it is accumulation which permits the growth of 
capital and nourishes the health of the capitalist system which they control.^ 
More specifically, the accumulation of surplus value provides the 
essential motive for each of the two 'moments' of the capital cycle; that is, 
both for the investment in forces of production (means of production and 
labour-power), or M-C; and for the realisation of the value of the product 
through its sale, or C-M \ Thus from the point of view of capital it is this that 
proletarian class struggle must essentially oppose.
1.1.2 The Labour-Power Circuit
An understanding of the essence of investment and sale — that is, of the two 
sides of the relationship between C and M — does not in itself, though, even 
once the categories are grasped as parts of a single whole, provide a fully 
adequate basis for an understanding of capitalism's class contradictions. 
(See Lebowitz 1992, pp.35-59). This is because, as Marx stresses in the 
Grundrisse, the theorisation of each of these categories involves a 
consideration of capital principally through the lens of circulation, even if it 
is true that the relations of circulation are understood to be a constituent and 
indeed essential part of the overall relations of production. Thus he explains 
(in a style frequently characteristic of the 'Notebooks') that
if we examine the entire turnover of capital, then four moments 
appear, or, each of the two great moments of the production 
process appears again as a duality: we can take either circulation or 
production as the point of departure here. This much has now been 
said, that circulation is itself a moment of production, since capital 
becomes capital only through circulation; production is a moment
_________
We have yet to consider capitalism's class contradictions in direct relation to 
production: in other words, in such a way that circulation is understood 
through the lens of production, and capital through the lens of labour.
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of circulation only in so far as the latter is itself regarded as the 
totality of the production process. The moments are: (I) The real 
production process and its duration. (II) Transformation of the 
p ro d u ct into m oney. D uration  of this operation . (Ill)
Transformation of the money in the proper proportions into raw 
material, means of labour and labour, in short, into the elements of 
productive capital. (IV) The exchange of a part of the capital for 
living labour capacity can be regarded as a particular moment, and 
must be so regarded, since the labour market is ruled by other laws 
than the product market etc. (1939, pp.520-21).3
rather than the other way around. We therefore need to look more closely at 
Marx's 'moments' I and IV,
In parallel to the two moments of the circuit of capital described 
above, these are best understood as the two moments of the 'circuit of 
labour-power.' The first is its exertion, or employm ent in material 
production; the second is its regeneration, or reproduction outside of material 
production.
In a consideration of the actual 'production process' in which the 
exertion of labour-power takes place, it must first be recognised that the 
process has 'unity.' Insofar as production is organised according to the end 
of the extraction of surplus value, it is value which "enters as subject." 
(Marx 1939, p.311). Labour is labour for capital; and capital "appears as a 
force of expansion, as production and reproduction, and always as 
command." Production is not partly capitalist and partly something else. In 
that they produce surplus value, workers are working in the way that 
capital requires them to work. In fact, the quantification of surplus value —
.é
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indeed, its assessment — is only possible insofar as capital commands 
production as a whole. (Negri 1979, pp .75-76). "The process of the 
production of capital does not appear as the process of production of 
capital, but as the process of production in general." (Marx 1939,p.303).
It will readily be seen, though, that class antagonism has not been 
negated. Although use-value and exchange-value are brought together 
within the capitalist production process, another 'determination of labouri is 
to be found "inasmuch as it is separated [from capital] and exploited." 
(Negri 1979, p.70). This is comprised of the categories of necessary labour and 
surplus labour, as shown in the upper half of Figure 6. In Negri's words:
a relation is established which contains a specific measure: the 
measure of labor necessary to the reproduction of the force of labor 
acquired by the capitalist and submitted to the general relation of 
capital. (p.70).
And this 'specific measure' can only be that of necessary labour-time, defined 
as the socially-averaged portion of the working day which workers spend in 
production of the resources that they and their dependants consume. If the 
part of the social product consumed by proletarians takes X labour-hours to 
produce, capitalist exploitation can then be defined on the basis of the fact 
that the physical and mental capacities which are refreshed or 'reproduced' 
in the course of its consumption are themselves exploited for X + AX hours.
Despite occurring within a process of production dom inated by 
capital, and despite defining the value of labour-power, necessary labour is 
therefore the labour that produces products which satisfy the needs of 
socialised workers. From the point of view of the workers these needs, and 
labour's capacity to fulfil them, cannot be seen as a m ere 'residue or 
appendage' of capitalist development. Here, therefore, there is a radical
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dash  between points of view and between interests. As Negri has shown, at 
the very heart of the restoration of the workers^ productive capacity which 
the fulfilment of these needs permits, there is thus
a dynamic relation, an attempt by the working class to reaffirm the 
indispensable consistency and the necessity of its own composition, 
constant counterpart of that capitalist force which tries to 
under-value the workers and their necessary labor. (1979, pp.70-71).
And the form of this relation is the opposition between necessary labour and
surplus labour, between production which meets the needs of the workers
and production of surplus value.
It is precisely in asserting their needs, in expanding them and 
fighting for them — indeed, in just defending them — that workers act 
antagonistically with regard to the production of surplus value. Moreover,
in the struggle between the two classes — which necessarily arises 
with the development of the working class — the measurement of 
the distance between them, which, predsely, is expressed by wages 
itself as a proportion, becomes decisively important. (Marx 1939, 
p.597).
Or, as Negri puts it succinctly, the delation between surplus labour and 
necessary labour' is itself 'the relation between the two classes.' (1979, p.97). 
The value of necessary labour "is the result of the class struggle, when it fails 
to become the dictatorship of the proletariat." (p. 133).
Whilst being productive of goods which fulfil needs, necessary 
labour is, though, just like surplus labour, 'consumptive' of the workers' 
capacity to produce. In short, it tires workers out. Hence labour is only one 
moment of the 'labour-power cycle' which includes not only the exertion of 
labour-power, but also its regeneration, its reproduction.^ Since the value of 
any commodity is precisely the cost of its production (in terms of average
 :_J
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socially-necessary labour-time), and since under capitalism labour-power 
itself takes the form of a commodity, it follows that what distinguishes the 
expenditure of labour-power under capitalism — that is, wage-labour — is 
expressible as the capacity to produce value in excess of the cost of its awn 
production, (See Marx 1867, pp.274-77, and 1939, pp.263). The applicability of 
the term 'production' to the labour-power commodity thus follows directly 
from Marx's theory of value. Such production, or reproduction, constitutes 
the second moment of the cycle, and it is this that we m ust now examine. 
(See the lower half of Figure 6 ),
From a proletarian viewpoint it should be clear that under the 
heading of the reproduction of the worker we m ust place his entire life 
outside of material production. In other words, it involves his consumption 
not only of goods bought in the shops, but also of the resources used up in 
building and repairing his accommodation, in looking after his health, in 
teaching him facts and attitudes at school and college, in producing his car if 
he has one, and indeed in cooking his meals and cleaning his house.^ (Dalla 
Costa 1971). Also included in the worker's reproduction are his leisure 
activities. Moreover, reproductive consumption evidently includes not only 
the consumption of goods which increase the worker's physical, intellectual, 
and emotional strength, such as food, lodging, healthcare, educational 
resources, and various types of games; but also the consumption of goods 
for psychological reasons which are actually detrimental to health or 
intellect, such as cigarettes and propaganda. It includes the engaging in 
activities which in themselves are free, such as sex and face-to-face 
conversation; in those which are not quite free, such as walking; and indeed 
in those which mainly involve giving money away in exchange for illusions.
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such as most types of betting. It is rapidly apparent that the reproduction of 
the worker is a relation replete with its own internal divisions and 
contradictions.®
It is, however, the class contradiction implicit in the nature of 
capitalism which determines the contradiction which is most fundamental 
in the social relation defined as the reproduction of labour-power. Indeed in 
this area the underlying class contradiction appears perhaps even more 
starkly than it does in the form of the contradiction between necessary and 
surplus labour-time. It is as follows. From the point of view of the workers 
the salient characteristic of their reproduction is enjoyment. In other words, it 
is the fulfilment of needs whose importance must necessarily be determined 
subjectively,^ (Lebowitz 1992, pp.125-33). But from the point of view of 
social capital the salient characteristic of the workers' reproduction is its 
cost.
Certainly, for the workers, enjoyment is not wholly reducible to the 
consumption of goods which have come to the end of their circulation on 
the value cycle, or even to the consumption of goods tout court. But since 
virtually all activities outside the workplace are mediated through resources 
which take a commodity form, we are quite justified in stating that the level 
of assertion of workers' needs is manifested in the size of the wage. For the 
controllers of capital, meanwhile, the wage bill appears as a necessary evil in 
relation to the surplus value extracted from the workers. Once the worker's 
income or wage is understood as the ticket to the permitted enjoyment of 
resources, the antagonism between needs and surplus value becomes 
extremely clear in all its profundity.
 ^ ..
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Once the term 'wage' is defined according to this antagonism, 
though — that is, in relation to the labour-power cycle and the underlying 
political economy of capitalism — then it must denote more than just the 
pay-packet received from the employer. Thus many of the resources which 
go to reproduce the worker are in fact paid for by State authorities, either 
centrally or locally. For example, in a number of countries workers are 
allowed access to various limited types of healthcare regardless of how 
m uch they have contributed individually to insurance schemes. And 
children are given some kind of schooling, and thereby prepared for entry 
into wage-labour, even if their parents have been unemployed for many 
years. There are all sorts of resources which working class people are 
permitted to consume in the course of their reproduction which they do not 
pay for out of their salaries according to the quantity they consume: these 
often include certain inferior kinds of healthcare, accomm odation, 
schooling, library services, refuse collection, recreational facilities, and 
sometimes entertainment and contraceptives. As long as these resources are 
consumed as part of their reproduction, from the workers' point of view 
they go to meeting their needs; from capital's point of view, on the other 
hand, they go to building up their capacity, or their children's future 
capacity,® to carry out surplus labour and thereby produce surplus value. 
The lack of congruence between the two viewpoints is determined by the 
fundamental conflict of class interests, and can only reinforce the theoretical 
position that the wage includes the 'social' wage as well as the individual 
wage.
Taxes are evidently raised from everyone, or almost everyone, to 
pay for these resources, but this should not be allowed to obscure the fact
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that no accounting system designed and administered by State bureaucrats 
can alter the nature of the underlying relationship. These resources are 
produced by the workers, and they are consumed by the workers in a 
contradictory way that both fulfils needs and regenerates their capacity to 
be exploited. In other words, the consumption of such resources is a part of 
the necessary-labour-to-wage-goods cycle which defines the circulation of 
labour-power. It cannot but be included within the "small-scale circulation" 
which Marx defines as that part of the capital circulation process involving 
the payment of wages and their recoupment in return for wage goods. 
(1939, pp.673-68).
The 'unity' of the capitalist production process, according to which 
necessary labour is perm itted to be expended solely on the basis that 
surplus labour is also expended, therefore corresponds to a fundamental 
contradiction in the lives of the workers. This contradiction sets production, 
the conditions of which are completely alienated from them, opposite 
labour-power reproduction, the conditions of which are not. Capitalist 
exploitation thus carries antagonism to the level of the very foundation of 
social production relations.
1.1.3 Control Over Capital and Labour-Power
Given the capitalist necessity of controlling the extraction and accumulation 
of surplus value, it follows that a degree of capitalist control m ust be 
exercised not only over the circuit of capital, but also over both moments of 
the circuit of labour-power.
ft
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Control over the circulation of capital (M-C-Ml in general — that 
is, not simply the 'small-scale circulation' of necessary labour and wage
goods — was defined in Chapter 3 as the specifically capitalist function of
■money. At this overall level, money's function can be described as the
. ■
movement of capital in and out of production. It is money which permits 
and mediates control over this movement on a 'generalised' foundation. On 
the 'investment side' money is thus the means for assessing the potential 
profitability of decisions concerning the creation, expansion, or continuation 
of specific productive enterprises; and at the same time it is the generally 
accepted means of implementing such decisions. On the 'sale side,' it is the 
means by which commodities are circulated from one controller to another 
until eventually they reach the 'end-user' or consumer; and it is also the 
generally accepted means of assessing the actual profitability of the original 
investment decisions.
Considered at this level, capitalist control is not immune from class 
contradictions. However, given that the class contradictions of such control 
have yet to be considered in the context of the bureaucratic form of money 
which operated in the USSR, and given that bureaucratic money has been 
identified as the key distinguishing characteristic of Soviet capitalism, little 
more can be added of a general nature until that form is considered in 
specific context below. In short, since the analysis given in Chapter 3 
involves a contribution to the overall critique of capitalist money, it would 
be methodologically wrong to theorise the general class contradictions of 
money before considering the meaning of those contradictions in the USSR.
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;'aControl over the moments of the labour-power cycle, for its part, can be broken down into control over production and control over the 
reproduction of labour-power.
Capitalist control over production involves, of course, control over
a certain kind of investment, namely investment in labour-power. It can also 
be viewed as the investment of labour-power which has already been 
bought. But since labour-power is a special kind of productive force (and 
commodity), being a human ability rather than a property of things or a 
type of thing, capital's control over it involves specific aspects which lead us 
closer to the essence of the capitalist class relation. First, people dispossessed 
of the means of production must be controlled in such a way that they are 
made to alienate their labour-power. In other words, they m ust be made to 
make themselves available for exploitation, for work in return for a wage.
This is not especially difficult, once they have been uprooted from 
subsistence production, and as long as the armed defence of the means of 
production is functioning properly. Second, capital must have some degree 
of control over where workers work: namely, over their mobility. This too is 
related to the function of money. Third, workers must be made to work in a 
m anner conducive to capital's needs. In other words, they m ust be 
controlled once they are actually at work. This does not necessarily mean 
that they have to obey all orders handed down to them, immediately and
'without question, according to both letter and spirit; but it does require the 
imposition of limits on their freedom to behave as they w ould wish, 
especially when this freedom might be used collectively and consciously.
And fourth, they must be made to engage in surplus labour. In other words, 
they must be made to work long enough to produce surplus value.
i
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The second area of capitalist control to concern the working class in 
direct fashion is the control over workers' reproduction. From capital's point 
of view this appears as a special kind of control over sale: namely, the 
control over the sale of wage goods to the working class. In short, it 
corresponds to a degree of control over working class consumption. This 
need not, of course, take the form of a precisely differentiated control over 
exactly w hat the workers consume. But it must be such as to allow the 
reproduction of adequate numbers of workers, and of workers who are 
sufficiently fit, trained, and otherwise prepared for capital's purpose of the 
production of a surplus.
One aspect of this control is straightforward and simple, involving 
the enforcement of the rule by which workers can only take things from 
shops in return for money: that is, for wages. Clearly this specific form of 
the law of private property — or 'privilege,' from the Latin privus, private, 
and lex, legis, a law — requires the availability of force. Another aspect, 
however, is not so directly bound up with consumer choice and the market, 
and concerns the administration of the social wage in all its forms, A 
bureaucrat in an environmental ministry, for example, insofar as he sets 
standards for 'acceptable' levels of pollution, exercises control over working 
class reproduction; and so does a health official charged with deciding on 
the limited delivery of medical services. The same can also be said about a 
senior doctor with power to make decisions affecting a patient's ability to 
work, or the length of time for which he will remain able to work; an 
employment, social security, or probation official with power to pressurise 
someone to take on a specific kind of work; a 'policymaker' in the area of 
official education; and indeed any official, in health, education, housing.
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social work, or elsewhere, with significant influence in determining the 
distribution of resources among the working class.® In effect, forms of 
control over the distribution of the social wage are forms of control over the 
'sale' of social wage goods. Taken as a whole, capitalist control over the 
means of labour-power reproduction, whether 'individual' or 'social,' is 
simply the control over the amount and type of resources that working class 
people are allowed to consume.
In both areas of control over labour-power, capital thus exerts a 
degree of power over the working class: on one hand, by controlling labour, 
or the 'consumption' of labour-power; on the other, by setting wages, both 
individual and social, thereby controlling the regeneration or 'production' of 
labour-power. Insofar as capital controls labour-power for a single end, 
namely capital expansion, we must again notice the 'u n i t /  of the relation.
But although the basis of wage-labour is capital's drive to 
accumulate, which is merely 'personified' by its controllers (Marx 1867, 
pp.739-40), the contradiction between human need and surplus value is 
ineradicably present at each of the moments of the labour-power circuit. 
And since human need is a social category opposed to capital, it m ust itself 
be understood as 'personified' in a generalised way by those who, 
dispossessed absolutely of the means of production, stand opposed to the 
imperatives of capitalist control. Indeed it is this opposition which takes the 
form of class struggle. Workers not only resist capitalist control of 
production; but at the same time, by exerting pressure for wages, both 
individual and social, to be higher than capital would otherwise set them, 
they also resist capitalist control over the reproduction of labour-power.
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1.1.4 Workers' Power Versus Capitalist Growth
In Chapter 3 I described how money and the commodity, once capitalism 
became dominant, took on specifically capitalist forms which are best 
understood in terms of the generalisation of exchange and the establishment 
of a growth drive as the basis of production. It is now necessary to return to 
these latter two categories in order to anchor the points made so far.
Regarding the activity which produces capital, namely the 
specifically capitalist form of labour, two terms were introduced in 
Chapter 3. The first was 'wage-labour,' used to denote the expenditure of 
labour-power which is alienated by being sold: or, in other words, the 
'consumption'of labour-power bought and sold for a wage. The second was 
'abstract labour,' introduced as a way of focusing upon the same form of 
labour from another angle: namely, with reference to socialisation not by 
means of the power of the associated producers, but rather by means of the 
generalised exchange of products. It will be noticed that in both cases the 
consideration concerns exchange: that is, first, of the ability to labour, hence 
'wage-labour'; and second, of the products of labour, hence 'abstract 
labour.' In terms of the nature of capitalism, value-producing labour was 
not discussed in specific relation to the category of capitalist growth.
If neither money nor the commodity necessarily contradicts either 
exchange or growth, it should be clear that wage-labour is different. Since, 
of course, the controllers of capital only employ labour with the intention of 
making an overall profit, we know that it too is based on growth. But it is in 
the nature of the wage relation that it necessarily introduces a tension into
' ' ' ■ . ' : ; ; ' - '■ \ I' - - ' .  - "■■■... . '■..  ' '_________
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1.2 Dynamic Capitalist Control Versus Working Class Struggle
I
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the actual quantitative achievement of growth,"'® This is because successful 
growth, defined as the reinvestment of surplus value, is necessarily 
conditioned by the size of surplus produced. That size, in turn, stands in 
opposition to the size of the wage; and the size of the wage is determined by 
class struggle."'■' Consequently, whereas the proletarian class struggle does 
not, outside of a revolutionary crisis, affect the predom inance of the 
category of exchange, it does tend to pull down the rate of capitalist growth. 
The existence of such a tendency is indeed intrinsic to the entire capitalist 
mode of production.
But of course in capitalism growth does occur. To consider the dynamic of 
the class relation — between control and resistance, between capital and 
need — it is now necessary to introduce further concepts. Particular 
attention m ust be paid to capital's ability to accumulate and develop the 
productive forces without either totalising or losing its control over labour. 
What m ust be discussed is not simply the relationship between wages and 
surplus value, but rather the movement of that relationship in the context of 
capitalist growth.
This is best grasped initially as the movement of the relationship :
between necessary labour and surplus labour. (Marx 1867, chaps. 12-17). If 
the working day is represented by the line from A to C,
A ----------------- B -------— C
I
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where AB represents necessary labour-time and BC surplus labour-time, the 
issue is thus what happens to AB and BC over time.
Capital has three ways of changing this relationship. The first is 
simply to make the workers work at the same pace, for the same wages, but 
for more hours. All of the extra time worked will then be surplus labour. This 
can be represented graphically by a lengthening of the line BC as point C 
moves to the right and points A and B remain fixed. The second is to raise 
productivity, leaving the length of the production cycle, the am ount of 
wages, and the length of the working day fixed. Through introducing 
changes in equipment and technology, the controllers of capital thereby 
raise the rate of surplus-value, or s/v. From a working class point of view 
this ratio is known as the rate of exploitation. Point B moves to the left; and, 
since other things are assumed to be equal, A and C stay put. Particularly 
important to this method are changes in the wage goods sector, since any 
decrease in necessary labour there will lower the value of labour-power, and 
hence the proportion of necessary labour, throughout the economy. The 
third way is to increase the throughput of items produced and consumed: in 
other words, to raise the overall rate of 'turnover.' For the workers this 
appears as an increase in the pace of work. In theoretical terms this can be 
distinguished from a change either in the number of hours worked or in the 
material means of production. This also leads point B to shift to the left, but 
is said to represent an increase not in labour productivity but rather in 
labour intensity.
According to the definitions given in Chapter 6 , the first method 
relies on the production of absolute surplus value, while the second and 
third rely on the production of relative surplus value. It will also be noticed
■a
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that the first method is of limited effectiveness v/hen used alone as a basis 
for accum ulation, since it does no t make a necessity  of the 
'revolutionisation' of the means of production in the interests of capital. 
Thus although, for example, the limitation of the working day was bitterly 
opposed by British industrial capitalists throughout the first half of the 19th 
century — and undoubtedly marked a victory for working class struggle — 
its generalisation actually assisted in the institutionalisation of the capitalist 
drive for 'intensive' development based on the extraction of relative surplus 
value.''®  At the same time, being identical to the move to the real 
subsumption of labour, this institutionalisation also marks the 'adequate 
realisation' of capitalism's inherent tendency to produce "as much surplus 
value as possible." (Marx 1933, p.l037).
For their part, the second and third methods are often employed 
concurrently, as mechanisation and computerisation, for example, tend to 
imply. Nonetheless, it is instructive to distinguish between them for critical 
purposes.
1.2.1 Productivity
A rise in productivity amounts to a reduction in the proportion of the 
working day worked as necessary labour. (Marx 1867, pp.429-38). If no 
workers are laid off this involves, ceteris paribus, an increase both in the 
num ber of physical units produced and in the quantity produced per 
man-hour. (See Kay 1976 and 1979a, pp.72-78). Moreover, since on the given 
assumptions there is a rise in surplus labour-time, there m ust also be an 
increase in the rate of surplus value. In relation to such a straightforward
vKi
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example of the extraction of relative surplus value, it is clear that the 
workers' struggle for higher wages constitutes a counteractive force.
A further important point to be made in regard to productivity is 
that since wages and labour intensity are held fixed, one enterprise on its 
own is unlikely to experience a growth in productivity of substantial 
proportions (unless it successfully monopolises the use of an advance in 
technology). This is because on these assumptions a sizeable reduction in 
necessary labour-time can only result from a reduction of the labour-time 
content of wage goods in general.
But it is precisely by lowering the overall value of labour-power — 
that is, the number of hours of labour spent on producing wage goods — 
that productivity growth creates a certain leeway in which wages can rise at 
the same time as the rate of surplus value. A hypothetical example will 
illustrate the point. Thus let us assume that the initial rate of surplus value is 
60% and the length of the working day is fixed at 8  hours. A growth of 
productivity by 67% will then cause a reduction in necessary labour-time 
from 5 hours to 3 hours. In itself, this represents a growth in the rate of 
surplus value from 3/5  to 5/3: that is, from 60% to 167%. If the workers are 
now able to force a wage-rise of, say, 33%, the time spent on necessary 
labour will increase from 3 hours to 4 hours. The rate of surplus value will 
thus fall back to 4 /4 , or 100%, but it will still be higher than the 60% at 
which it stood originally. Overall, necessary labour-time will also have 
fallen, namely from 5 hours to 4 hours. But the rate of its fall will be lower 
than the growth in its productivity: or in other words, lower than the 
growth in the quantity of goods which a single hour of it can produce. 
Hence the quantity of goods consumed by the workers will rise, even if the ) : ï ï ;I
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value of the wage has fallen. And, to take one last but highly significant 
index, the ratio between the quantity of goods consumed and the total time 
worked, or the 'value of labour,' will also have risen.
By raising the rate of exploitation in opposition to the workers' 
struggle, productivity growth thus creates the potential for capital to make 
concessions to that struggle even as the rate of surplus value rises.
1.2.2 Labour Intensity
The third method, that of labour intensification, involves an increase in the 
pace of work. (Kay 1975, pp.157-67,1976, and 1979a, pp.74-78). This can be 
said to involve the expenditure of more labour by the same number of 
workers in a given time period. There is, of course, a theoretical problem 
with the ascription of meaning to the term 'more labour' in this context, 
given that value is defined upon the basis of labour-time. But nonetheless it 
would seem logical to suggest that given identical enterprises, more value 
will be produced in one subject to speed-up than in one where the pace of 
work remains constant. Ceteris paribus, this too brings an increase in the 
quantity of output, but in this case one which is based on an acceleration of 
turnover. As before, wages are assumed to be constant in a given period, but 
the number of 'projects' or production cycles which occur in that period is 
increased; and it is this which leads to a rise in the rate of surplus value."''*
For his part, Marx considers the category of labour intensification 
only briefly, and in the relevant pages of Capital he does not discuss it in 
detail at the level of the overall social product. (1867, pp.533-43 and 660-62, 
and 1894, pp.339-42). From the point of view of capital, of course, this
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omission would seem quite reasonable, since an overall intensification of 
labour everywhere to the same degree would simply establish a new 
base-line from which further attempts at intensification would then be 
launched by industry and area according to the relation of class forces. In 
many ways the change would appear as indistinguishable from an increase 
in output brought about by an increase in the length of the working day. 
(See Marx 1894, p.340). Apparently, then, the change might sensibly be filed 
together with the extraction of absolute surplus value.
Indeed this would not seem wholly meaningless even from the 
point of view of the working class. Thus in discussing labour intensification 
Kay writes with some justification that a worker subject to rapid speed-up 
can produce a quantity of output in eight hours "as though" he has worked 
for 16. (1976, p.75; Marx 1867, p.534). It can hardly be disputed that working 
hard for a short time is in some ways subjectively comparable to working in 
a more relaxed fashion for longer. On the other hand, it is equally clear that 
between the intensification of labour and the extension of the working day 
there are also quite substantial dissimilarities, not least in terms of limits. 
The basis of these dissimilarities surely requires a theoretical explanation.
On further consideration it becomes apparent that the reference to 
the 'subjective' comparability of the two methods — a comparability which 
is by no means unrealistic — was not accidental. In fact it takes the analysis 
forward. Both in the period of absolute surplus value extraction and in the 
period of relative surplus value extraction the workers resist the hard work 
involved in submitting to capital's control over their labour. But whereas in 
the former the struggle is against a lengthening of the working day and in 
favour of its reduction, in the latter the workers resist capital's tendency to
' V : 'h '
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impose more work by struggling to do less work per given time. The 
opposition of classes thus points up both the comparability and the 
distinction.
A point must therefore be made which Marx did not make explicit 
in Capital:^^ namely that an increase in the pace of work is limited by the 
level of workers' resistance to work. And since the fight to do w hat is 
subjectively determined to be less work is in necessary antagonism with 
capital's striving to increase labour intensity, it is just as intrinsic a part of 
the workers' side of the class struggle as is the fight to raise wages.
A growth in labour intensity can also be compared in its effects 
with a growth in productivity. On one hand, then, it is different, since in 
itself it
does not affect the mass of use-values produced nor their value — 
it merely reduces the time of production. If labour is intensified 
threefold, for example, exactly the same amount of labour produces 
exactly the same amount of commodities embodying exactly the 
same amount of value; only the period of production is reduced to 
one-third. (Kay 1976, p.60).
On the other hand, it is similar. Thus, given that in this example capital can
now extract surplus value from three production cycles in the time it used to
take to extract it from one, it would seem quite straightforward that it can
now 'afford' to concede higher wages in much the same way as it can after
raising productivity.
Once again it is useful to look at a hypothetical example. As before, 
let us take the initial rate of surplus value to be 60% and the length of the 
working day to be 8  hours. A growth in labour intensity of 56% will thus 
determine conditions which are "as if" the workers are working for 12,5 
hours. The analysis can now proceed in two different ways. The first relies
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on the assumption that the figures apply to a single enterprise. Since 
intensification will then be of minimal effect on socially necessary 
labour-time averaged out at the level of the whole economy, it would seem 
reasonable to retain as a value-stick the productiveness of an hour of 
labour-time prior to the change. In these terms the working day may have 
effectively increased, but necessary labour-time stands as if unchanged at 5 
hours. The rate of surplus value has thus gone up to 150%. An enterprise 
wage-rise of 25%, corresponding to an increase in necessary labour-time to 
6.25 hours, will then cause it to fall back, but only to 100%, at which level it 
will still be 40% higher than it was at the outset. Although this rate is the 
same as the one achieved in the example of productivity growth, the 
quantity of goods the workers consume will now have fallen relative to the 
12.5 hours they are thought of as working.
In the second part of the analysis we assume that the intensification 
of labour occurs throughout the economy. At this level, it is apparent that 
we must now use as our value-stick an hour of labour-time after the change 
has occurred. And this means that the final figures for necessary and 
surplus labour need to be adjusted accordingly. Since the working day has 
not really risen to 12.5 hours but is still 8  hours, it would now appear to be 
split between 4 hours of necessary labour and 4 hours of surplus labour, 
which would be a similar result to the one reached in connection with a rise 
in productivity.
Labour intensification is not, however, such a simple matter, as is 
clear from the fact that we must now reconsider our implicit assumption 
that the length of a production cycle is a single working day. In the 
consideration of labour intensification in a single enterprise such a
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simplification was acceptable, since the reproduction both of the means of 
production and of the workers was assumed to be dependent upon the 
consumption of goods produced elsewhere in the economy in enterprises 
which were not themselves subject to speed-up. But it would actually be 
self-contradictory to retain this assumption in any consideration of speed-up 
at the level of the whole economy. The idea that workers work "as if" for 
more hours than they really do will still retain its usefulness as a reminder 
of the real subjective sense in which labour intensification necessarily leads 
to a fall in the Value of labour.' Indeed a change throughout the economy is 
only possible as the summation of num erous changes within specific 
enterprises. But in terms of the value of labour-power it cannot be retained.
The analysis must now centre upon the increased pace of turnover; 
or, from capital's point of view, the difference between the rate of surplus 
value per project and the rate per unit time. This has been studied in 
profound fashion by Kay. (1976, 1979a). In particular he focuses on the 
distinction between 'absolute turnover,' or the overall turnover of capital 
both constant and variable; and 'relative turnover,' or the turnover of 
variable capital relative to that of constant capital. From a resolutely classist 
point of view he thus shows that one of the main aspects of the increase in 
'absolute turnover' is the increasing "colonisation of time by capital." Under 
this heading he counts not only capital's striving to control the production 
process with ever finer precision; but also the phenomenon of "accelerated 
depreciation": the "foreshortening of the life of products, whether due to 
physical reasons or the dictates of fashion," and the general fall in the 
quality and durability of goods made available to the working class. (1979a, 
p.78-85; see also Kay 1975, pp. 165-67). Kay notes in particular the .great
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significance of the car; and how, in relation to this highly im portant wage 
good, "superficial changes and accelerated depreciation have been 
developed into a fine art." (1975, p .l6 6 ).
If the wage per project stays constant as the rate of absolute 
turnover increases, then evidently both the wage and the rate of surplus 
value will rise per unit time. Once again, the rise in the latter will allow 
scope for a rise in the former. Moreover, the growth of the working class 
'market,' as long as it is kept within limits, can actually be used as a support 
for growth in intensity and productivity: and this in fact was the basis of 
Fordism and indeed Keynesianism. As was shown in advanced western 
countries after 1968, however, the antagonism over the wage is by no means 
negated.''® (Kay 1975, pp.167-83; see also Armstrong, Glyn, and Harrison 
1984, p.260). There is no special reason why the wage per project should 
remain constant, and the struggle over its determination does not lose its 
basis in irreconcilable class antagonism.
In the case of relative turnover, Kay stresses that "everything hinges 
on the distinction between capital advanced and capital employed/' The main 
benefit which capital draws from this distinction is the ability to reinvest 
repeatedly what is effectively the same variable capital during the lifetime of 
a single investment in (fixed) means of p r o d u c t i o n . (1 9 7 5  ^pp .63-66). In the 
terms of our example, then, capital can now be considered to fit into a single 
day an additional 56% of the 'working day' originally identified with a 
single production project. This does not mean that workers necessarily work 
objectively as if for longer: thus an office worker who has to punch more 
keystrokes per hour does not acquire a need for proportionately more food. 
But it does mean that the initial variable capital will circulate 1.56 times per
■I
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day rather than only a single time per day. (It is not relevant here that no 
individual enterprise will actually achieve such a rapid turnover, since the 
period of consideration could just as well be six months or a year.) 
Meanwhile the constant capital will only be consumed once. This will raise 
the annual rate of surplus value at the same time as creating conditions of 
production which for the working class will be similar to those resultant 
upon an increase in absolute turnover.
From capital's point of view the key relationship is now that which 
exists between the rate of relative turnover and the rise in the 'organic 
composition of production,' itself defined as the ratio of constant capital to 
variable capital advanced. As this ratio rises — a process which itself 
depends on growing intensity and productivity (Marx 1867, pp.772-74) — 
increasing relative turnover determines a relative fall in the am ount of 
constant capital embodied in each commodity relative to the variable capital 
employed during its production. This ratio has been termed the 'organic 
composition of the commodity.' Kay has shown how within production a 
main result of increasing relative turnover is a fall in current employment, 
or the number of workers employed, relative to long-term employment, or 
the number of workers employed during the lifespan of the fixed capital 
they work with. And on an overall level, even as workers are faced with 
ever greater quantities of objectified labour at the workplace, the 
commodities circulating in the sphere of reproduction now contain 
increasing relative quantities of labour. (1976,1979a, pp.62-69).
Kay does not discuss working class resistance at length, but he 
certainly recognises that the capitalist development of turnover involves the 
development of the opposition of class interests. And, as Negri has stressed
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with reference to capital's 'real subsumption of society/ it m ust always be 
the movement of this opposition which provides the background to the 
critique. (1979, pp .112-18). Thus the labour intensification involved in 
absolute turnover is resisted by means of the fight for slacker work; whereas 
relative turnover, which in terms of the relationship between v and s 
effectively brings together the categories of labour intensification and
productivity growth, is subject in addition to pressure from the struggle for 
higher wages. Even the effects of any unemployment caused by increasing 
relative turnover can be resisted by the struggle to defend the social wage.
I
Î-S;
To conclude: two points are clear. First, as a struggle which is 
antagonistically both rigid and autonomous, working class struggle does 
not undergo a fundam ental change in its nature under conditions of 
advanced capitalist development. As capital extends its domination of time 
throughout society^® — that is, in both production and reproduction — the 
struggle of the workers for less work and more wages necessarily continues 
to undermine that domination. (See Figure 7). Indeed, more than this, the 
expansion of the 'colonisation of time' must also extend the field of the 
antagonism.
Second, whereas the workers' struggle for higher wages, although 
oppositional to capital, can gain limited concessions within contexts both of 
growing productivity and of labour intensification, the struggle for less work 
cannot gain concessions on the basis of any similar 'mediation.' In short, the 
imposition of more work and faster turnover does create space for raising
:
real wages, but does does not in itself create space for concessions to the 
struggle for less work. Since it is closely bound up with the increasing
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Figure 7: Class Struggle: Some Concepts
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capitalist domination of time, it does, of course, involve the advance of the 
capitalist side of the struggle; but since it is based upon the falling 'value of 
labour,' it meets resistance which, however mild or intense in effect, is 
intrinsically less recuperable by means of any development of production.
2 THE CLASS STRUGGLE UNDER SOVIET CAPITALISM
Given that the mode of production in the USSR was capitalist (see 
Chapter 3), it follows that there m ust have been a struggle between the 
working class and the interests of capital. The remaining task is thus to 
consider some of the forms which that struggle took, in the specific context 
of the bureaucratic capitalist relations in that country. A detailed historical 
study would, of course, involve the consideration of all the various 
developments in government policy, economic management, and workers' 
resistance, over the entire Soviet period during two periods of wartime, two 
subsequent periods of limited liberalisation (NEP and de-Stalinisation), and 
during what compared with the rapidity of collectivisation have been 
relatively protracted periods of stagnation and crisis. This topic cannot be 
covered exhaustively in the present context. Within a structure roughly 
similar to that of the previous section, however, I now look at the struggle 
between capital and the working class in the USSR, identifying the areas in 
which it occurred and underlining aspects of its significance.
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2 .1  Surplus Value Versus the Wage
In order to understand the relationship between surplus value and the wage 
in the USSR it is necessary to identify the circuits of capital and 
labour-power in the specific Soviet context. In other words, there is a need 
to point to the class contradiction in investment, sale, wage-labour, and the 
regeneration of labour-power. After briefly doing this (sections 2.1.1 and
2 .1 .2 ), 1 then look at the control over these circuits in specific relation to 
bureaucratic money and the Soviet forms of control over labour. (Section
2.1.3),
2.1.1 The Capital Circuit
The Investment moment' of the Soviet capital circuit involves the ploughing 
of bureaucratic/&/flf money into production projects. Thus a capitalist 
interest, whether an individual bureaucrat or a bureaucratic body, is said to 
'invest' bureaucratic clout. In the case of an enterprise director who 
exercises direct control over an enterprise, this will be done directly, in 
terms of specific directives concerning the use of the means of production 
under his control. In the case of an official in an industrial ministry, 
Gosplan, or a CPSU committee, who holds control w ithin a complex 
bureaucratic web, it will be done indirectly through that web itself.
In Chapter 3 it was argued on the basis of the primacy of the 
categories of exchange and growth that this bureaucratic clout functions as 
capital. It follows immediately from this, given the basing of the category of
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capital on that of value, that this capital is divided between investment in 
means of production and investment in labour-power. And given simply 
the fact of capitalist exploitation, it also follows that workers produce 
surplus value in excess of their own consumption and that of their 
dependants.
Certainly, in view of the largely nominal or passive role of the 
rouble in the producer goods sector, it is an even more striking fact in the 
USSR than it is in western countries that one cannot empirically quantify the 
ratio between surplus value and the wage. But this does not do any damage 
to a theory of the foundation of the categories of value and surplus value 
upon the category of an abstract form of labour. At this level the class 
antagonism in the USSR is straightforwardly that of capitalism as described 
above.
The moment of the capital circuit constituted by sale — the receipt 
or 'realisation' of bureaucratic/hZaf money in return for a product — is thus 
riven by class division. Part of the social product goes to the reproduction of 
the constant capital embodied within it; part is consumed by proletarians 
and goes to reproduce labour-power; and part goes to provide both for the 
consumption of the exploiters and for the accumulation fund. The emphasis 
given to accumulation in Soviet economic policy has already been noted. Of 
course ultimately it will be bureaucratic considerations which determine 
whether or not a project has been completed successfully, and if so, then to 
w hat degree. But these are precisely among the functions of capitalist 
money. In the USSR as everywhere else where capitalist conditions of 
production prevail, the accumulation of surplus value is necessarily
CHAP.7 CLASS STRUGGLE: AN AUTONOMIST MARXIST THEORY 389
■iiopposed by the struggle of the proletariat for its own expanded 
reproduction.
2.1.2 The Labour-Power Circuit
In the production process it is abundantly clear that production as a whole 
is carried out not in the interests of the workers but rather in the interests of 
those who exploit the workers. Those with the power to determine the 
construction or expansion of enterprises, their product range, and the 
disposal of their output, are evidently not those who work in them. The 
people who manage enterprises, run Gosplan, occupy executive office in the 
ministries, or sit on the Politburo, do not themselves produce.
Meanwhile the workers do, of course, consume a portion of the 
total social product. Given the generalised exchange in which mediation by 
bureaucracy and hlat plays a very large part, there is no need to revise the 
concepts of socially-averaged necessary labour-time and its counterpart, 
surplus labour-time. One portion of the working day goes to produce wage -
goods; the other to produce surplus value. Theoretically a ratio m ust be
involved even if empirically its numerical value cannot be discovered. And 
this ratio must be the result of class struggle.
Nor does the second moment of the labour-power circuit, namely 
labour-power regeneration or reproduction, call for any revision of the 
overall theory. The worker is given a ticket to the permitted enjoyment of 
resources; and to the exploiters this ticket is a cost. Part of the ticket takes 
the form of roubles in the pay-packet, and another part takes the form of 
rights to use 'social' resources. The fact that in the USSR the line between
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these two parts of the ticket is often very blurred is not without importance; 
but it should not be allowed to detract from the fact that the ticket as a 
whole corresponds both to the level of fulfilment of the workers' needs and 
to the size of the labour costs incurred by the controllers of capital.
2.1.3 Control over Capital and Labour-Power
2.13a Control over the Capital Circuit
Since control over the investment cycle is the main function of capitalist 
money — indeed its defining function — the statement that throughout this 
part of its cycle money is principally bureaucratic is identical in meaning to 
the statement that control over the Soviet investment cycle takes on specific 
bureaucratic characteristics. And once the moment of investm ent (as 
distinguished from sale) is understood as the taking of decisions concerning 
the instigation or enlargem ent of production projects, its control by 
bureaucratic means appears as a familiar feature of the Soviet economic 
system.
In Soviet enterprises the funds for 'capital investment' (kapital 'nye 
vlozheniia) — that is, the investment of capital in the material means of 
production — are formally drawn from two main sources. These are the 
State budget, the enactment of which is the responsibility of the industrial 
m inistries; and the enterprise's own funds, especially those labelled 
'retained profits' and 'amortisation.' (See Nove 1980b, p.246). Whereas in the 
first case the enterprises receive the go-ahead for production projects 
directly from the ministerial authorities, in the case of investment monies
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drawn from within the enterprises, the usual reality is that they are simply 
allowed to keep funds earmarked for investment purposes in the central 
'plan.' (See Lane 1985a, pp.21-22). This does not, however, mean that the 
enterprise managers are powerless in matters of investment and are simply 
pawns of the ministries and 'planning authorities.' Rather, it means that the 
power that they do have is to a great extent exercised by Mat and by
bureaucratic means in the course of the processes of 'plan' formulation and 
revision. (See above. Chapter 3, section 2).
Control over investment is, of course, control over capital and over 
the means of production in the form of capital. It is not itself shared out 
between exploiters and workers. Within the exploiting sections of the 
population, however, the bureaucratic reward system does reinforce a major 
division between enterprise managers and what for the sake of simplicity 
can be termed the central bureaucratic elite in industrial ministries, Gosplan, 
and the central organs of Party and government. It is not especially 
important whether or not these two social groups are referred to as separate 
classes or as two parts of the same class. What is im portant is the highly 
apparent fact that some controllers of investment (enterprise managers) are 
more directly confronted by the workers than others (the central elite). This 
division within the ruling class thus relates in quite a clear fashion to the 
overall class opposition between the workers and capital.^o
How it does so has been discussed in detail by Filtzer, even if he 
himself denies the capitalist nature of the mode of production and remains 
theoretically restricted by Ticktinist' exceptionalism. (1986, pp.257-61). With 
empirical reference to both the pre-war Stalin period and the Khrushchev 
period he has shown that it was in the nature of the Soviet system for
:
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enterprise managers to make concessions to workers in opposition to the 
objectives and interests of the central elite. (1986 and 1992b; on the Brezhnev 
period, see Amot 1988; on the Gorbachev period see Filtzer 1991 and 1992a). 
In particular he has shown how from the 1930s onwards, not being subject 
to the disciplinary weapon of unemployment, the workers appropriated
considerable control over the individual labour process, most 
notably their work speed, how they organized their work, and the 
quality of the products they produced or the operations they 
performed.
Managers, meanwhile, who were
under their own pressures to meet production targets under near 
chaotic conditions [the context is that of the 1928-41 period—NCF], 
had little choice but to accommodate. Managerial concessions to 
workers were of two types. First were those to do with violations of 
labour discipline. This was a simple function of supply and 
demand: workers were scarce and managers could not afford to fire 
workers who committed grave violations of labour discipline 
regulations. As the regime imposed more stringent penalties for 
absenteeism, lateness, alcoholism, and insubordination, mai^gers 
found themselves having to take a more active role in insulàting 
workers from these sanctions. The second type of concessions was 
more complex and had a more direct bearing on the relations of 
production within the Soviet enterprise, as managers increasingly 
had to accept the workers' partial control over the work process. 
Managers needed not only to hold on to their workforces, but to 
achieve some basic degree of co-operation in order to minimize the 
disruptions to production endemic in the Stalinist system. They 
therefore came to tolerate workers' substantial control over how 
they used their work time, did little to combat the persistence of 
irrational and inefficient forms of work organization, accepted 
relatively high levels of defective or poor quality output, and took 
steps to protect workers' earnings by keeping output norms low 
and inflating their wages. (1986, p.256)
One does not have to accept the utility of the term 'control' to describe the
workers' struggle against the system's need for their engagement in hard
- I ''■•wS-
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point of view lax plans could only mean the obtaining of concessions over 
production targets and norms, as Filtzer has shown with reference to both
,1Î
work to recognise that what Filtzer is describing is precisely the negative 
effect of workers' power on the efficiency of that system.^
The salient point at the moment is that the disposition of forces was 
such that concessions had to be made to the workers; and these concessions 
were made at enterprise level. W orkers' power thus directly affected 
capitalist control over the investment moment. And this was especially 
evident in relation to the division between enterprise managers and the 
central bureaucratic elite.
O utput plans, then — that is, targets for successfully realised 
investm ent — were lax, at least once they were fully 'revised.' More 
specifically, they were lax compared to what they would have been if the 
central bureaucrats had been able to achieve greater prevalence vis-à-vis 
both the enterprise managers and the workers. From the individual 
manager's point of view, this was in fact a prime aim, given that he did not 
w ant to be penalised for not reaching prescribed targets. To this end 
resources were concealed and productive capacity was underestimated in 
negotiations with ministerial and planning bureaucrats.^^ (See for example
Berliner 1957, pp. 160-81, and Nove 1980b, pp. 102-11). But from the workers'
i
",3?the 1930s and the 1950s. (1986, pp.148-49, 222-29 and 229-32; 1992b,
pp.111-17). Moreover, in the sphere of circulation (mediated by bureaucratic
■money) there was chronic inefficiency in terms of both the delivery of 
supplies and the quality and suitability of goods. (Rutland 1985, pp. 120-21, 
128-32, and 135-37; see also Bergson 1964, pp.293-97 and Nove 1980b, p.357). 
In short, the imposition of capitalist control was inefficient to such a degree
Î
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that enterprise managers ended up acting in opposition to the overall needs 
of capital and in 'collusion' with those of the workers.
The question now arises of the extent to which the capitalist control 
over the capital circuit was held down by workers' class struggle, and the 
extent to which it was held down owing to inefficiencies inherent in the 
bureaucratic form of money. In other words, to what extent would it have 
been in the bureaucratic interest of an enterprise m anager to push for 
relatively low plan targets regardless of the power of the workers in his 
enterprise? Was he not necessarily interested simply in the easiest route to 
the overall nominal fulfilment upon which his own bonus depended? In the 
final analysis, could he actually care about the actual physical quantity and 
quality of what was produced?
In answer to these questions it m ust be noted that the entire 
theorisation given so far implies that as a controller of capital the enterprise 
manager was essentially interested in the expansion of the capital under his 
control. The productive forces — that is, both the m aterial means of 
production and labour-power — appear accordingly as a means for the 
accumulated reproduction of money, which in this context means the 
reproduction of bureaucratic clout. It is in these terms alone that the 
controller of capital is interested in production, and it should not be a 
surprise that the physical characteristics of output appear merely as a 
subsidiary consideration. At the same time, though, this does not mean that 
production is unimportant, since the entire capital circuit is essentially a 
matter of the control over labour which is productive of a particular form of 
surplus, namely surplus value. (See Marx 1867, pp.742-43). Hence the actual
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imposition of this control — that is, the control over the operation of the 
means of production — is crucial.
Two points will make it clear that the interests of Soviet enterprise 
managers did indeed depend upon the maintenance and expansion of their 
control over labour. First, once norms and targets had been established, at 
however low a level, it was indisputably in the interests of the enterprise 
managers to see that they were met. The reason why they wanted targets to 
be kept down was precisely so that they could be fulfilled — and indeed 
over-fulfilled — by the labour of the exploited. In such a context it cannot be 
said that the opposition of managerial interests to those of the workers was 
reduced in intensity simply by dint of the making of concessions. Second, it 
is known that whereas enterprise managers usually wished to keep targets 
down, they simultaneously struggled to raise the level of inputs: that is, of 
investment. (Nove 1980b, pp.103-11, Dyker 1983, pp.35-38, and Rutland 
1985, pp.l32-35).23 There is thus a contradiction between this interest of the 
individual manager and the interests of capital as a whole. From the point of 
view of capital as a whole it is evidently preferable not simply to maximise 
output but also, while maximising overall investm ent to this end, to 
minimise the level of investment per output: in other words, to maximise the 
overall ratio of surplus value to investment, known as the profit rate.
Enterprise managers, on the other hand, aimed to maximise investment per 
output. But the socialisation of production makes it quite apparent that
between the interests of managers and those of overall social capital there is
.also an identity. Material inputs do not appear out of thin air: they m ust first 
be produced. As we have seen, the rate of investm ent is first of all
%
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dependent upon the extraction of adequate quantities of surplus v a lu e .24
And this surplus value is extracted precisely in enterprises.
For Soviet bureaucrats and m anagers the interplay of the 
collectivity of interest with the conflict of interest is simply a specific 
example of the existence of the interests of social capital in an environment 
of generalised competition. In the simplest of terms: controllers of capital 
fought among themselves in bureaucratic fashion for the distribution of 
surplus value and control over the productive forces. And the amount of 
control available overall was a function of the class struggle against the 
working class. In a discussion of the problems involved in controlling Soviet 
capital the question of the distribution of emphasis between the power of 
the working class and the 'inherent' inefficiency of the bureaucratic form of 
m oney is really a non-question, since the concept of the efficiency or 
inefficiency of that form — or indeed of the m arket form — is only 
m eaningful with reference to the historical development of the class 
relation. (See section 2 .2  below).
2.1.3b Control over the Labour-Pawer Circuit
■f-
■wThe control over the circuit of labour-power has already entered the 
discussion of the control over the circuit of capital. In this section 1 describe 
some of the apparent characteristics of Soviet control over the labour-power 
circuit in specific relation to the control over the exertion and reproduction 
of labour-power.
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In the section above on the control over labour in capitalism in 
general, this control was described as having four main aspects, and in the 
Soviet context it is convenient to mention each in turn.
First, then, workers must be available for exploitation. Above all, 
this means that they must be deprived of access to the 'reserves' which 
would otherwise allow them the means to live outside of the capitalist mode 
of production. In Russia there were already several millions of proletarians 
at the time of the first world war, but the really rapid expansion of their 
num bers occurred during the programme of rural collectivisation and 
accelerated urban industrialisation imposed under Stalin. Enormous 
quantities of workers were made available for capitalist exploitation with 
unprecedented speed. (See Davies 1980a and 1980b). Soviet figures thus 
describe the doubling of the number of official proletarians between 1928 
and 1932 (from 11 million to 24 million) and in addition the increase in the 
same period of the number of 'collectivised' rural households from a mere 
400 000 to 15 million. (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1958, p.494 and 1917-77, p.461). 
Since kolkhozniki, despite being allowed to keep a portion of their own 
produce, were ultimately proletarians involved in relations of their own 
specific kind, we can rightly speak of a four-year period in which the 
proletariat trebled or even quadrupled in size. What is more, the process did 
not simply involve a massive use of armed force: by means of famine it also 
led to millions of deaths among the dispossessed. (See for example 
Dalrymple 1964 and Conquest 1986). The analogy of the accomplishments of 
this primitive capitalist accumulation with the effects of a policy of war is 
unavoidable.
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Second, it was stated that capital must have a degree of control over 
workers' mobility. In the USSR the way that this control was exercised was 
similarly subject to its own specific development. In short, it involved a 
differing mixture of 'labour conscription' and rouble-based and other 
incentives in the various different periods.
After capital went on the offensive in production in 1918 (Brinton 
1970, Smith 1983, Jones 1984), the main means of ensuring that the workers 
who did not leave the cities worked where they were meant to work were 
despotic. Labour militarisation was imposed under the political leader of the 
armed forces, Trotsky; and Sovnarkom issued a decree on 'universal labour 
service' at the beginning of 1920. (Carr 1952, pp.213-18, and Brinton 1970, 
p.59). Under NEP the form of control then changed to that of the rouble. 
Although industrial management within the factories was by no means 
'liberalised,' the workers who returned to wage-labour in the cities came 
voluntarily. Once around 1928 the working class had regained the numbers 
it had in 1913 (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1917-77, p.461), there came the Stalinist 
upheaval. Although in the 1930s there was a considerable use of slave 
labour in certain industries (Hosking 1985, pp.197-99), which evidently 
involved the forced movement of labour, even in this period the role of 
rouble wages and material incentives was the crucial factor m otivating 
labour mobility in most of the urban economy. (Filtzer 1986, pp.135-44, 
Helgeson 1986, pp .146-47). Voluntary labour turnover was really only 
brought to an end upon the imposition of draconian labour rules in 1940-41. 
(Filtzer 1986, pp.233-53 and Grancelli, 1988 p.45-46). In response to the 
German invasion entire industries were then moved East to the Urals, and 
whole ethnic populations — including Chechens, Crimean Tatars, and
-V- ■' ;
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Kalmyks — were forcibly resettled. The forced m ovem ent of labour 
continued in massive quantities between 1943 and 1946, and many who had 
worked in the German camps under the SS were transported to work in 
Soviet camps under the NKVD. (Solzhenitsyn 1973, pp.81-86). Then in the 
mid-1950s not only was the use of forced labour wound down, but in the 
rest of the economy the ban on voluntary turnover was removed. From then 
on, such capitalist control as there was over the movement of labour was 
mainly effected through the rouble — hence, for example, the higher wages 
in the far North and parts of Siberia (Fakiolas 1962, p.32 and Brown 1966, 
pp.42-44) — and through other employment-linked incentives in areas such 
as housing. (Grancelli 1988, pp.144-50). Organised forms of control, such as 
graduate placement schemes, Komsomol appeals, and the famous system of 
propiski (residence permits) were comparatively m uch more limited in 
scope. (Helgeson 1986, p.l47; Oxenstierna 1990, pp.101-19).
Third, capital must have a degree of control over the actual process 
of work. It is rather simple to demonstrate that it did. Thus not only were 
workers assigned particular jobs, but they were subject to various punitive 
m easures for violations of discipline. These included the issuing of 
warnings, the temporary transfer to lower-paid work, the ignoring of 
w orkers' wishes as to the allocation of time off for holidays, and, 
im portantly, dismissal. (See for example Andrle 1976, pp .71-72). That 
workers could complain to legal authorities and sometimes won (Brown 
1966, p.209, M. McAuley 1969, pp,204-48, Andrle 1976, p.72) should not 
detract from the point, which is not that managers had complete control, but 
simply that they did have some control.
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Fourth, workers must work long enough to carry out surplus 
labour and thus produce surplus value. The easiest way to illustrate the 
scale on which this took place is to point to the official capital investment 
rate and the size of the m ilitary sector. Whereas the rate of capital 
investment, measured in roubles, was a feature of every plan, the size of the 
'defence' sector, as is well known, was substantial. It is thus evident, given 
that the basis of the economy was generalised exchange, that workers in 
general worked for more hours than were necessary to produce for their 
own consumption. High rates of absenteeism (Arnot 1988, pp.75-76, Connor 
1991, pp. 171-74) did not remove the basic fact that enterprise management 
necessarily had a degree of control over the amount of time for which the 
worker worked.
In regard to the reproduction of labour-power, clearly the resources 
which workers in the USSR consumed were passed to them on the basis that 
they had permission to receive them. Either this permission took the form of 
individually possessed roubles, or else it took the form of various 'social' 
rights. From capital's point of view, these resources added up to the cost of 
the workers' reproduction.
In the first instance, the setting of piece-rates, norms, and bonuses, 
and therefore of wages, was clearly in hands which were not those of the 
workers. The role of official trade unions and 'production conferences' 
(Bienstock, Schwarz and Yugow 1944, p.40-46, Andrle 1976, pp. 69-71, 
Kahan and Ruble 1979, and Ruble 1981) should not be allowed to obscure 
the fact that in order to understand the nature of the workers' influence on 
wage-rates it is first necessary to recognise that they themselves did not
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control them (that is, set them). Nor did they control prices, which were also 
set by the controllers of the economy. Many goods, of course, such as milk, 
butter, children's clothing, and housing were formally subsidised (A. 
McAuley 1979, pp.288-89, and Cook 1993, pp.43-44 and 85-87), but this only 
reinforces the point that the function of the roubles in a worker's pay-packet 
was simply to serve as part of her overall reproduction-ticket.25
The second part of the wage includes all the resources consumed by 
the working class which were not given solely in return for workers' roubles 
per unit consumed. In the above section on capitalism in general these were 
described as including limited provision for education, health, and various 
other social services. In the Soviet context it is apparent, however, that the 
distinction between the individual wage and the social wage was not as 
clear-cut as might be inferred. At one end of the spectrum of the 'social' 
wage there were thus the familiar cases of schooling and medical care, the 
availability of which to proletarians did not generally depend on 
employment. (Chapman 1963b, pp.129-38). In the middle there were 'social 
insurance' benefits, the payment of which was sometimes reduced for those 
employees considered to have a poor work record, (A. McAuley 1979, 
pp.284). And at the end of the spectrum closest to the individual wage, there 
were numerous types of benefit which, whilst not freely available to anyone 
with enough roubles to pay for them, were nonetheless distributed to 
individuals whose rights were assigned according to their specific position 
as wage-labourers. (A. McAuley 1979, pp.260-301; see also Grancelli 1988, 
pp.63-64). The prime example here was, of course, housing. Other resources, 
paid for directly out of the enterprise's 'social fund,' included holiday 
accommodation and creches. Many of these resources were distributed by
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enterprise trade union bureaucrats. (Brown 1966, pp .128-35, Ruble 1981, 
pp.87-89).26 At the same time there was often considerable variation in the 
distribution of such 'social services' even within a single large enterprise, 
and Grancelli has pointed out that "those who find themselves at the 'back 
of the line' are usually unskilled auxiliary workers." Together with variation 
according to plan fulfilment, this differentiation can only point up the 
similarity of this type of 'social' provision to that which was mediated by 
roubles in the pay-packet. (Grancelli 1988, pp.144-45).
Since the social wage took such a plethora of forms, it is clear that 
the capitalist control over its setting was distributed among various types of 
bureaucrat, not only in the health, educational, and industrial ministries, but 
also in enterprise management and the trade unions.
2.1.4 Workers' Power Versus Capitalist Growth
Given that the interests of the workers lay in their assertion of their own 
needs in opposition to those of the production and accumulation of surplus 
value, it is now necessary to identify the main forms of assertion of those 
needs in resistance to the forms of control described above.
To start at the beginning, it is necessary to note that the massive 
expansion of the proletariat during the Stalinist 'great leap forw ard,' 
considered by itself, stands out as one area in which capital managed to 
achieve full success. Once resistance to land seizures by the capitalist State 
was crushed with military force, the scope for living entirely outside of the 
capitalist system was effectively eradicated. 27 The main consideration must
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therefore be of forms of proletarian resistance which took place within the 
framework of capitalist domination.
The first of these was worker-led labour mobility, sometimes 
referred to as voluntary or unplanned labour turnover. As Brown has 
shown, workers tended to leave their jobs in a way that was dysfunctional 
for the economic system. The main reasons for such voluntary mobility 
included poor wages, inadequate accommodation, poor working conditions 
and work-related benefits, and sometimes the simple desire to return to the
worker's parents' home town. (Fakiolas 1962, p.23. Brown 1966, pp.32-39;
,see also Kahan 1962, p .19, and Grancelli 1988, p.205). The principal 
dysfunctional effects included the loss to capital of potential work time 
when workers were between jobs, lower initial productivity once they 
moved to their new jobs, and the necessary costs of retraining. (Brown 1966, 
p.34; Romanenkova 1991, p.l74). From capital's point of view the provision 
of enterprise-linked housing and State housing loans tended to a certain 
extent to ameliorate the problem, but it remained an ever-present reality 
(Fakiolas 1962, pp.25-26). Indeed the need to attract and keep hold of 
workers, especially skilled workers, caused enterprise managers both to 
raise basic wages (Berliner 1957, pp.170-78,28 Nove 1980b, pp.207-12, Filtzer 
1986, pp.212-22) and to introduce incentives based on the length of 
continuous employment in one place. (Helgeson 1986, p.l50). Worker-led
At the same time, it was clearly not the case that capital needed to 
fix labour and to restrict turnover altogether. Rather, there was an 
inconsistency between the turnover it required and the turnover it faced. 
(See Standing 1991, p.241). As Fakiolas has shown, this led to the rise of
':>:ss
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special problems in the 'developing' areas of the far North and Siberia. In 
this case, what was particularly problematic was the behaviour of "migrant 
but trained" workers, mainly of urban origin, who were aware of the 
"relative comforts and facilities in the older urban centres." (1962, p.34). 
Their migration back and forth en masse was not the kind of mobility which 
capital needed, which on the contrary was a large one-way movement 
leading to lasting settlement.29 More generally, Helgeson has shown how 
the demographic reality of migration, far from being the result of an 
effective policy of discouraging independent 'job-hopping' while 
simultaneously using official channels to encourage labour to migrate to 
developing regions, was rather an effect of "millions moving where they 
pleased." (1986, pp.146-49; see also Zaslavsky 1982, pp .137-46). From the 
capitalist point of view, of course, the poor housing and inadequate medical 
services in the developing areas were not the essential problem: it was the 
workers' rejection of them that was.^o
The second main form of resistance was low-quality production. 
This very well known feature of the Soviet economy has been discussed by 
Berliner (1957, p p .l36-48), Bergson (1964, pp.295-97), Nove (1980b, pp.l94, 
259, and 357), Hewett (1988, pp.78-86), and others. In sovietological terms 
this is essentially a problem of the absence of a market and the inadequate 
role of consumer preferences as an incentive. It is thus effectively assumed 
that a properly functioning market capitalism would express the 'general 
interest' of the population and would therefore increase the quality of 
output. More concretely, the problem is considered to be an effect of 
excessive administration. In the terms of a fundamental critique, though, the 
inefficiency of Soviet capitalism's administrative system is only meaningful
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iin terms of the inadequacy of capital's control over labour. Thus it stands as the great merit of the Critique school to have discussed poor quality in 
relation to this basic opposition in production. (Ticktin 1973a, 1976, and 
1991c; Filtzer 1986, 1992b, Arnot 1988). Even if Ticktin denies the capitalist 
nature of the production relations, he undoubtedly dem onstrates a 
profound understanding of the methodology of the critique of political 
economy when he insists that all of the Soviet rulers' problems "go back to 
labour." (1991c, p . l l 6 ). Indeed, what else can they go back to? In the terms 
of a critique of Soviet capitalism, the low-quality production constantly 
bemoaned by Soviet authorities and sovietologists alike cannot be anything 
other than a crucial index of the underlying class relation. In short, it is 
describable as the result of the exertion of labour-power in such a way that 
production is of a lower quality than the capitalist rulers w ould have 
wanted. Essentially this meant that the rates of surplus value production per 
project and of project turnover per unit time were lower than they would 
have been had workers worked in greater accordance with the needs of 
capital: that is, had they resisted the imposition of those needs less.
The clearest evidence for the fact that the rulers were forced to 
make a 'structural' — that is, lasting — accommodation with the workers' 
imposition of low-quality production was the large size of the repair sector.
f
ITicktin has described how this became one of the main features of the system, up to the point where more people were employed repairing
broken-down or inadequate machinery than actually making it. (1973a,
■pp.25-28). Given the exertion of labour-power on what in the case of, say, 
machine-tools or tractors was effectively a drawn-out process of production, 
the organic composition of production was lower than it would have been
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otherwise.8  ^ Thus the investment of capital in the highly labour-intensive 
industrial repair sector could only work against capital's need to raise the 
rate of relative turnover too.
The third form of resistance was absenteeism. Although it was in
the interests of managers to under-estimate the number of days lost, there
.
can be little doubt that in the USSR 'voluntary absence' from work was
.widespread. (Standing 1991, pp.247-48). One estimate places the rate of 
"under-utilisation of workers" for this reason at more than 10%. (Seeger 
1981, p.83). A survey quoted by Connor found that only 1 0 % of workers in 
factories and offices were still at work during the last hour of the working 
day. (1991, p.l73). The causes of absenteeism have variously been listed as 
drunkenness, the need to queue, and the excessive role of "non-wage 
benefits" — that is, the enterprise social wage — in the income of the 
worker; but the main point here can only be that the opposition between the 
needs of the workers and the needs of capital accumulation appears in an 
extremely pure fashion in this particular form of resistance. It is, of course, 
quite possible to be an alcoholic and still turn up on time each day for work, 
just as workers and their dependants are quite capable of organising 
queueing collectives where the person actually doing the queueing is not
1
sim ultaneously  supposed  to be at the w orkplace. A p ro found  
understanding of absenteeism must begin with the grasping of the fact that 
by staying away from work workers chose to reduce the amount of time for 
which their labour-power was exploited. They chose to do other things than 
work for their employer. And the fact that absenteeism, along with 
drunkenness at the workplace, was one of the commonest reasons for 
dismissal (Godson 1981, p .117), clearly demonstrates that this choice
■i
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necessarily involved the rejection of disciplinary constraints. Its prevalence 
was one of the measures of the independence of working class struggle.
The forms of working class struggle can be summarised in terms of 
resistance to the specific areas of capitalist control. The first area of such 
control, the making available of workers for capitalist exploitation, or the 
expansion of the capitalist mode of production, was noted above to have 
been one of full success, at least when considered on its own. But the same 
cannot rightly be said of the other areas. The second area, that of workers' 
mobility, was at one time controlled partly by military means, but from the 
1950s onwards principally by means of rouble and benefit incentives. As 
part of their resistance, workers took advantage of the high demand for 
labour-power to push up wages. Overall, they struggled to impose mobility 
according to their own needs rather than those of capital. The third form of 
control was the capitalist control of the production process. Being in general 
the remit of enterprise managers, this was imposed by means of familiar 
rules concerning the allocation of work and bonuses. Workers, however, 
took great advantage of the capitalist 'planning' system by forcing 
concessions at enterprise level concerning wages> norms, and, importantly, 
the quality of production. In effect, they forced enterprise managers to use 
their own positions vis-à-vis the central bureaucrats to make formal 
accommodation to the exercise of workers' power on the shop-floor. Finally, 
the fourth area, that of the working day, was of course controlled by capital; 
but absenteeism, together with the chronic rate of equipment breakdown 
resulting from the poor quality of inputs — that is, of the labour which
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produced those inputs — ensured that workers managed to work for less 
time than the rulers would have preferred them to.
By resisting capitalist control, and thereby tending to increase the 
wage as a portion of the social product and to lower the rate of capital 
accumulation, the workers' struggle necessarily tended to reduce the overall 
rate of capitalist growth.
2.2 Dynamic Capitalist Control versus Working Class Struggle
But despite the problem of workers' resistance, Soviet capitalism evidently 
did experience growth. Indeed, as the figures given in Table 1 show, growth 
rates were enormous for much of the Soviet period. W hat m ust now be 
considered is the political-economic form of this growth, and its significance 
for the working class in terms of labour-time, wages, productivity, and 
labour intensity. As described above, these are the crucial aspects of the 
historical class struggle between the working class and capital.
2.2.1 Relative Surplus Value Extraction
The first question to be asked is whether or not the USSR knew the 
extraction of relative surplus value.® ^ Although m any of the consumer 
goods on sale to the working class — cars, television sets, refrigerators, 
vacuum cleaners, and so on — only became available to proletarians in, say, 
Britain, once capitalism in that country had entered the period of relative 
surplus value extraction, in the USSR there were nonetheless a few factors 
which might conceivably indicate that the same was not true there. Thus it
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Table 1: Soviet Growth, 1913-90
1913 1928 1932 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 1990
CoalVMt 29 36 64 166 261 510 624 716 740 703
Steel/Mt 4 4 6 18 27 65 116 148 161 154
Electrical
Energy/GWh 2 5 14 49 91 292 741 1294 1722 1726
Haulage^/ 126 120 218 494 713 1886 3829 6481 8173 7931Mtkm
Cars/1000 - - - 5 65 139 344 1327 1217 1259
Television - - - 37 1726 6682 7528 9938 10540
Sets/1000 (1952)
Refrigerators - - - 4 1 530 4140 5925 6465® 6499®
/lO^
Housing 4 11 40 83 106 105 129 118
Construction/
lO W
(average1918-28) (average1929-41)
Urban
Workers and 12.9 11.4 24.2 33.9 40.4 62.0 90.2 112.5 115.4 112.9
Sovkhozniks
/lO®
Kolkhozniks^
/lO^ - 0.8 22.5® 29.0 27.6 22.3 16.2 13.5 11.9 11.9
S
«1Î
Source: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1958, pp.242,299, and 494-95; 1962, pp.202-03 and 
501; 1965, p.435; 1917-77, pp.201,206,208,389,460-61, and 495; 1922-82, p.l96, 
217, and 402; 1990, pp .6 ,100,397-98,407,422-23,451 and 582; and Sel'skoe 
Khoziaistvo 1971, p.446.
Notes: ®Coal quality not considered. ^By all means of transport. ^Includes 
freezers. ^Includes fishing 'collectives.' ^Figure not published. Estimate based 
on assumption of 1.5 working kolkhozniki per household, as in 1940. (Ratio 
calculated from figures in Nar. Khoz. 1956, p.l28, and SeT. Khoz, 1971, p.446).
1 Î::ÎI:
*:"t:
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might be recalled that by the time of glasnost'in the late 1980s members of 
the ruling class such as Gorbachev and Aganbegian were referring to the 
need to take the economy into a period of 'intensive growth' and out of a 
period where growth was primarily 'extensive.' (Gorbachev 1987, pp.20-21, 
and Aganbegian 1988, p p .l00-09). It would surely be wrong to ignore such 
serious pronunciations as meaningless. The suggestion might also be made 
that capital did not establish the degree of control over the labour process 
which would allow it to achieve the 'complete revolutionisation of the 
technical processes of labour' which Marx saw as essential to the move to 
relative surplus value extraction. (1867, p.645). Thirdly, it is well known that 
the slowdown in growth in the 1980s did coincide with the fall to a very low 
pace of the migration of workers into the towns from the countryside.
On further consideration, though, these factors can hardly be made 
to stand up in defence of the idea that the country remained enmired in the 
extraction of absolute surplus value. There can be no doubt that the growth 
of production was huge.®^ if this were to have occurred simply as a result of 
absolute surplus value extraction, there would have had to have been a 
considerable rise in the number of hours worked. But the reality is that 
neither the facts on the length of the working day, nor those on the 
quantitative expansion of the proletariat, can support such a thesis. The 
eight-hour day introduced in 1917 was reduced to seven hours in 1927, and 
although it was raised back to eight hours in 1940, it was shortened to seven 
hours once again in 1956-62. (Brown 1966, pp.270 and 304-05, and Conquest 
1967, pp.ll8-22).3^ Moreover, as the data in Table 1 will show, the growth of 
output in principal sectors between, say 1940 and 1970, was much more 
rapid than the growth of the proletarian population. Combined w ith the
'
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facts on the length of the working day, this can only mean that Soviet capital 
did indeed successfully enter the period of relative surplus value extraction. 
The decline and eventual end of growth cannot therefore be explained solely 
by the fact that the number of hours worked stopped increasing.®®
And so the analysis must now focus more specifically upon the 
growth which relative surplus value extraction actually perm itted. In 
particular we m ust differentiate in broad terms between productivity 
growth and labour intensification.
2.2.2 Productivity
On an overall level, a growth in productivity must necessarily depend on a 
reduction of the amount of labour-time expended on the production of wage 
goods. The prime example of this in the development of capitalism in any 
country is, of course, the capitalist revolutionisation of agriculture. This is so 
for various reasons. Thus if peasants who previously spent much of their 
working time in subsistence production are not only to be turned into 
surplus value producers but also to be made productive of surplus value in 
increasing amounts, clearly the time that must be spent in the countryside 
producing food for each proletarian m ust be reduced. (See Marx 1894, 
p.773). The capitalist development of agriculture, and the associated 
expropriation and proletarianisation of the vast majority of the peasantry, 
involves a process of agrarian mechanisation and industrialisation of 
epochal significance. W ithout this, there simply cannot be a successful 
movement into the period of relative surplus value extraction.®®
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In the USSR as in Tudor England, there was a capitalist "enclosure^ 
of agriculture.^^ Unlike in England, however, in the USSR the development 
occurred under the aegis of industrial capital, and led very rapidly to the 
sector's industrially-mediated technical development. There has, as is well 
known, been some controversy among sovietologists over the precise 
contribution made by agriculture to industrial capital accumulation during 
the period of the first Five-Year Plan; but in the present context this matter is 
not especially significant (See Millar 1970 and 1974, Move 1971, and Ellman 
1975 and 1989, p p .l06-10). What there can be no doubt about is that in these 
years the size of the industrial proletariat greatly increased owing to the 
intake of dispossessed peasants. More important are the developments 
which took place over a longer period.
In the long term, one of the most im portant indicators is the 
urbanisation of the Soviet population. Thus as a percentage of the whole, the 
rural population fell from 82% in 1913 and 84% in 1922 to 67% in 1940 and 
34% in 1990. Although it contained the same number of people, 131 million, 
in 1940 as it did in 1913, it fell back to 108 million in 1960 and has been 
around 98 million since 1980. Meanwhile the sown area grew from 118 
million ha in 1913 to 150 million ha in 1940 to 208 million ha in 1990. (See 
Table 2). Given these figures it is not surprising that under Stalin agriculture 
underw ent considerable mechanisation: a process which was generally 
accomplished by the time of Khrushchev. One set of figures will illustrate 
this particularly clearly. In 1932, the use of tractors accounted for 19% of 
tillage, 20% of sowing, and 10% of harvesting; in 1940, the figures were 62%, 
56%, and 46% respectively; and in 1956 they were 98%, 97% and 89%. 
{Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1958, p.491). The figures for agricultural growth in
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Table 2: Soviet Agricultural Development, 1913-90
; 1913* 1928* 1940* 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 1990
Sown Area 
/lO^ha
Rural
Population
/lO*
Grain Yield 
/kg.ha-1
-
118 113 151 146 203 207 217 210 208 
131 -b 131 109 108 106 98 98 98
(1951) (1961)
690 760 860 740 1020 1420 1490 1730
(ave. (ave. (ave. (ave. (ave. (ave. (ave. 
1909-13) 1924-28) 1946-55) 1956-65) 1966-75) 1976-85) 1986-90)
.................................................................................
Source: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1958, p,491:1961. p.311:1967, p .7 :1970. p.27; 1975, 
p.312; 1922-82, pp.9 and 244; 1989, pp. 420 and 434; 1990, pp.67 and 470-71.
N otes: ^Post-1945 borders. ^No reliable figure available (see Lorimer 1946. 
pp .133-37); official American figure for pre-1939 borders is 123.3 million. 
((Zhapman 1963a, p.271).
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subsequent decades show that productivity continued to grow under 
Brezhnev too. In 1990 the rural population was lower than it was in 1960, 
but the grain yield per hectare had increased substantially even if the sown 
area had increased only marginally. In general this was due to 
chemicalisation. (Zh. Medvedev 1987, pp.312-13.). Leaving aside any 
consideration of the specific problems of Soviet agriculture (see for example 
Dovring 1980 and Zh. Medvedev 1987, pp.334-60), we see that in this vital 
wage goods sector, considered in the long term, there was a clear indication 
that products cheapened in terms of average socially-necessary labour-time. 
In value terms, such a development necessarily tended to bring about an 
overall cheapening of labour-power throughout the economy.^s
If productivity growth is to be understood in terms of the class 
relation, then logically the next matter for consideration is the movement of 
workers' wages. As was explained above, the wage is defined by the 
quantity of resources consumed by the working class in the course of its 
reproduction, not simply by dividing the num ber of roubles in the 
pay-packet by the price level of goods in the shops.^^ In order to concentrate 
on the underlying opposition, it is thus best to focus directly on the 
movement of living-standards.
There can be no doubt that in the long term real wages did rise. (See 
for example. Chapman 1963b, pp .165-88, H. Smith 1976, pp.74-107, 
A, McAuley 1979, pp.23-27. W alker 1986, pp.76-78, and Connor 1991, 
pp .l 17-18). This is evident in the growth of consumption in four fields in 
particular: food, clothing, housing, and consumer durables. Thus Chapman 
has noted how the consumption of meat and milk, for example, fell between
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1928 and 1950, but more than made up the gap by 1958. (1963a, pp.238-39). 
In subsequent decades it continued to rise.‘^ ° Thus the figure for per capita 
meat consumption in 1988 compared with 1958 had risen by 74% and the 
corresponding figure for milk by 59%. Similarly, between 1958 and 1988 the 
consumption of fabric of all kinds rose by 54%. Over the same period, urban 
per capita housing space, which Chapman gives as lower in 1958 than in 
1928 — and indeed lower than the official figure calculable from Narodnoe 
Khoziaistvo for 1913 — officially rose by 87%.^1 (See Table 3). A rise in 
consum ption of 'consum er durables' (potrebitel'nye tovary dlinnogo 
pol'zovaniia) is also evident. Thus whereas prior to the war the only such 
good with a widespread distribution was the timepiece, by 1965 there were 
24 television receivers, 21 washing-machines, and 11 refrigerators for every 
100 families. By 1990 the figures had risen to 107,75, and 92. (See Table 4).
Thus the development of Soviet capitalism, especially after the 
second world war, allowed productivity growth to coincide with wage 
growth. In short, there was a 'deal' with the working class of the sort 
discussed above with reference to capitalist development in general. The 
length of the working day fell, and wages rose, as productivity and 
quantities produced increased. Clearly at some point growth came to an 
end, whether that was in the late 1970s, as Ellman argues (1982), or whether 
it was as late as 1990. (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1991, p.7). Given that wages 
continued to rise as growth declined, the 'deal,' endangered for some time, 
was eventually called off under Gorbachev. (See for example Cook 1993).
Since, however, the whole basis of the relationship was that 
productivity and wages would increase simultaneously, this is by no means 
an explanation of why it was that growth actually came to a halt. Nor can
■■ L ' .  ; i i  V - Ü L
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Table 3: Per Capita Consumption of Food, 
Clothing, and Housing, 1913-88
1913 1928 1932 1945 1950 1958 1968 1978 1988
Meat*/kg 29 32 17 15 27 38 48 57 66
Milks’/kg 154 17 113 108 145 224 285 321 356
FabricVm^ 13.4 13.4 12.7 7.5 17.8 26.0 29.5 33.7 38.1
Housing Space 
(Urban) d/m2
6.3 5.8 4.9 3.9
(1944)
5.0 8 .2 ® 1 0 .8 ® 12.9® 15.3®
Source: meat and milk for 1928-58, and urban housing space for 1928-50, 
from Chapman (1963a, pp.238-39), who takes figures for meat and milk from 
official American figures (see p.274); fabric for 1928-58 estimated from per 
capita o u tp u t/m  (Chapm an), converted to consum ption /m ^ by 
multiplication by ratio for 1913 (for 1928 and 1932) and by ratio for 1960 (for 
1945,1950, and 1958). (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1968, pp.286 and 596); all figures 
for 1913 and 1968-88, and urban housing space for 1958, from Nar.Khoz. 
(1958, pp.272-73 and 461; 1968, pp.7, 286, 580, and 595-96; 1917-77, pp.7 and 
511; 1978, pp.7,397, and 412-13; 1988, pp.117-18, and 165);
Notes: ^Includes poultry and lard. ^Includes dairy products, converted back 
to kg of milk, includes fabric made from cotton, wool, linen, silk, and 
synthetics. ^Per head of urban population. ^Official Soviet figures from 
Nar^Khoz. clearly calculated on different basis from those of Chapman, who 
gives a figure for 1958 of 5.5m^.
I
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Table 4: Distribution of Consumer Durables 
Per 100 Families, 1965-90
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Time-pieces 319 411 455 518 530 574
Television Sets 24 51 74 85 97 107
Radios 59 72 79 85 96 96
Refrigerators 11 32 61 8 6 * 91* 92*
Washing Machines 21 52 65 70 70 75
Sewing Machines 52 56 61 65 65 61
Vacuum Cleaners 7 1 2 18 29 39 48
Cameras 24 27 27 31 34 33
Cars b 2 b 1 0 15 19
Source: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo 1968, p.596; 1978, p.413; and 1990, p. 142. 
Notes: ^Includes freezers. ^Figures not available.
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Cook's pointing to the rise of 'independent' activism in the late 1980s 
provide an answer. (1993, pp.150-79). It is not enough to recognise that 
wages were too high to allow the continuation of capitalist growth, because 
it is always true that the level of wages (per project) contradicts the level of 
productivity, whatever the level of growth. In the abstract, given that 
material living-standards in the USSR were considerably lower than they 
were in the advanced West (Connor 1991, pp.125-32), as was productivity, 
one might suppose that the dynamic deal could have lasted a lot longer than 
it did. The present context is not, of course, a comparative one, but the 
contrast makes it clear that in order to proceed it is necessary to look beyond 
the aspect of the capitalist growth dynamic defined simply by productivity 
and wages. It is now necessary to consider the class relationship in terms of 
capital's need to intensify labour,
2.2.3 Labour Intensity
From a working class point of view, labour intensification necessarily takes 
place at an enterprise level, involving the doing of what appears to be more 
work in the same amount of time. Since this often occurs simultaneously 
with an increase in productivity, it is instructive to differentiate clearly 
between the two processes. Whereas a rise in productivity, then, involves a 
change in the means of production, a rise in intensity involves the 
acceleration of the production project, of the speed of project 'turnaround.'
The first point to be noted about labour intensity is that it does not 
lend itself to empirical quantitative analysis and is best discussed 
qualitatively. In relation to the rate of absolute turnover, then, the
Vi
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qualitative dynamic to be considered is that of the intensification of work, its 
speeding up, along with the general speed-up of circulation. This has effects 
both in the sphere of production itself and in the sphere of reproductive 
consum ption. The dynamic of relative turnover, m eanwhile, is the 
acceleration of the rate of investment in labour-power relative to the rate of 
investment in fixed capital, which causes a divergence between the organic 
composition of the commodity and the organic composition of production. 
These areas will now be considered in turn.
Regarding absolute turnover, it is apparent from the above 
dicussion of the control over labour that the level of labour intensity in the 
USSR, considered statically, was low. Stories such as those of workers 
covering screws with glue and banging them in with hammers are well 
known, but the point here is that in the producer goods sector such sloppy 
work necessarily led throughout the economy to two main effects. The first 
was the chronic rate of equipment breakdown, and the consequent high 
level of 'unintended stoppages' in production, including because of material 
shortages. The second was the necessity of a large amount of repair work 
wherever the equipment was used. The combined effect was not, as might 
perhaps be superficially inferred, to increase the rate of turnover at the 
expense of quality; rather it was to reduce the rate of turnover relative to 
what it would have been if workers had worked more 'conscientiously.'
The next area to look at is that of the ramifications of the turnover 
rate in the sphere of labour-power reproduction. A lthough labour 
intensification does not create space for a 'deal' in the same way as a growth 
in productivity, an increase in turnover, as was mentioned above, does 
create the conditions for the rise of a 'consumerism' involving accelerated
a.
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depreciation and what can broadly be termed 'fashion.' The merest glance at 
social conditions during the bulk of the Soviet period is enough to 
demonstrate that this this was not as prevalent there to the same extent as it 
was and is in the advanced West. For most of the USSR's existence, the 
culture of the 'throwaway society' did not achieve a substantial penetration 
into its territory. This was particularly clear in relation to the car. Although 
ownership per family did rise from the very low rate of 1 in 50 in 1970, it 
had yet to reach a figure of 1 in 5 even by 1990. (Table 4). Cars were 
expensive and hard to acquire and there was not the same 'rate of 
consumption' as in the West. (See H. Smith 1976, pp.77-78).
We thus arrive at the position that capitalism  in the USSR 
experienced qualitatively greater problems in institutionalising labour 
intensification and the acceleration of turnover than it has done in the 
capitalistically more advanced West, at least since the 1950s and 1960s. 
Owing to the workers' persistence in offering labour of poor quality, the 
degree of capitalist control over the labour process remained weak in any 
dynamic sense. And this was also evident in the fact that the rate of 
turnover of 'consumerisP consumption was also relatively low. In short, the 
workers' resistance to hard work acted as an important magnet slowing 
dow n the capitalist 'colonisation' of time, both inside and outside of 
production. N ot only did  this resistance indicate the level of 
oppositional 'rigidity' in working class composition; bu t insofar as it 
signified a low level of co-operation with the imperatives of capitalist 
growth it also indicated a substantial 'autonomy,'
Perhaps the clearest indication that Soviet capital also felt the 
problem in the sphere of relative turnover was the size of the industrial
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repair sector. As has already been noted, the investment of capital into the 
repair of machinery is in effect the continuation of investment into machine 
production. Moreover, repair work is evidently highly 'labour-intensive.' In 
Marxist terminology, then, the ploughing of resources into industrial repair 
work involves the investment of capital into labour-power in Department 
One. Thus the famous prioritisation of Soviet heavy industry did not 
involve an automatic and unopposed rise in the organic composition of 
production. On the contrary, the size of the repair sector was a significant 
factor which actually tended to reduce this composition. At the same time, 
though, since repair work — in industry at least — should rightly be 
classified under the heading of production of the means of production, it 
necessarily had an upward effect on the organic composition of each 
commodity. Taken together, these effects could only hinder the acceleration 
of relative turnover.
The conclusion to be drawn is this. As became clear after the second 
w orld war, the degree of control which Soviet capital exerted over the 
workers was quite sufficient to allow an increase in productivity and the 
creation of leeway for the granting of wage-rises. Soviet capitalism did, in 
other words, enter the period of relative surplus value extraction. Its 
development, however, was severely hampered by the fact that the workers 
were strong enough nonetheless to offer significant resistance to the 
intensification of labour and therefore to the acceleration of turnover. It 
would be unreasonable to hope to provide a reliable quantitative estimate 
for whatever degree of intensification was achieved, but it would perhaps be 
less so to state that it is quite possible that at times there may actually have
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been a deintensification. Whether or not there was such a deintensification 
seems to be incapable of verification without a great deal more research. But 
what we can be sure about is that there eventually came a time when the 
'productivity deal' came to depend on a level of labour intensification which 
Soviet capital was simply unable to deliver within the framework of the 
existing economic system. That system can therefore be seen to have been 
based on an inefficient form of the real subsumption of labour.
2.2.4 The Problem of Labour from the Viewpoint of Soviet Capital
If it is indeed the case that labour intensification was the prime need of a 
Soviet ruling class beset by economic stagnation caused by the inefficient 
form of labour's real subsumption, then of course this is something of which 
their principal advisers^be expected to be well aware. Moreover, one would 
expect the problem to have been widely talked about prior to the onset of a 
full crisis. Since economic crisis marks a strategy of a large-scale and severe 
assault on working class living-standards — through means such as mass 
unemployment, formal wage-cuts, inflation, or indeed war (see Cleaver 
1979, pp.87-89) — it does not in itself mark the establishment or renewal of a 
dynamic. In effect, it is simply a rapid redistribution of wealth away from 
the working class. This evidently brings its own policy problems and topics 
for research, but what is more im portant in the present context is the 
longer-term problem of the restoration of a viable dynamic of capitalist growth. If 
the above theorisation is correct, then there should certainly have been an 
indication of its correctness in the research reports of the rulers' clearest
I
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advisers prior to the appearance in the 1990s of shorter-term questions of 
crisis and crisis management.
I w ould argue that a recognition of the need for labour 
intensification was indeed a crucial feature of the most important capitalist 
analyses made in the USSR during tlie Gorbachev period. In fact, this is clear 
even from Gorbachev's own speeches. In his 'accession' speech to the 
Central Committee plenum in March 1985, for example, he refers to the need 
for an 'acceleration' (uskorenie) of economic development. This term, which 
for a time became a buzz phrase in public debate,'^^ was particularly closely 
associated w ith the official thesis that what was required was the 
introduction of a greater role for 'intensive growth.' (See for example 
Gorbachev 1985b, pp.129-30, 1985c, pp.252-57, and 1986, pp.27-68). 
Although it was soon dropped — in favour of the glasnost' and perestroika 
heralded by the world's media from 1986 to 1990 — the original concept of 
acceleration is much more revealing on a political-economic level. A month 
before he became CPSU General Secretary, Gorbachev revealed the 
substantiality of the thinking which underlay the concept when he stated 
that alongside the necessity of rapid technical development there was the 
"no less important" task of the efficient use of means which already existed. 
In short,
we should not put faith in the machines of the future, nor use their 
absence as a screen behind which to hide poor work. To adopt a 
waiting position is to lose time — and time is everything. (1985a, 
p .l2 1 ).
Given his understanding of the linkage of the two economic 'tasks' — 
technological change and 'better,' more intensive work — Gorbachev's later 
announcement at the CPSU's 27th Congress in February 1986 that it was
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necessary to make the workers Interested' in their work, 'morally' as well as 
materially (zainteresovat' ikh moral'no i material'no), should not be dismissed 
as mere speechifying. (1986, p.30). Although the idea of acceleration was 
sometimes used to support the somewhat fanciful notion of the achievability 
of a literal quickening of the growth rate (see Aganbegian 1988, p.9), it also 
denoted, more profoundly, the breaking of the worker's general attitude in 
the workplace.
Among the two most im portant academic theorists inspiring 
government economic policy at this time were the economist Aganbegian 
and the sociologist Zaslavskaia; and it will be instructive to look at their 
contributions in turn, and more specifically at their views on the workers.
In a text devoted to the issue of the "transition to intensive 
development," Aganbegian presents the underlying, problem facing the 
Soviet economic administration as being "the negative tendencies in the 
dynamic of efficiency," and poses the rhetorical question of how  to 
overcome these tendencies in order to achieve a "qualitative leap forward." 
(1988, pp.104-05). The solution,he explains, is two-sided. First of all {prezhde 
vsego), there is the need for a mobilisation of the
organisational, economic, and social reserves and potential through 
the better use of existing resources and the existing technical basis 
of production; the strengthening of discipline and order; the raising 
of qualifications and responsibility; and the raising of people's 
interest in their work [usilenie zainteresovannosti], etc.
Second, there is the issue of scientific-technical progress. (p.l06). Uskorenie,
in this view, depends on the 'organic combination' of the two factors.
(pp.106-07). Such an analysis is not, of course, wholly 'classist,' but it should
be noted that he does not hesitate to place the task of making workers
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'in terested ' in their work at the same level of im portance as the 
technological development of production.'^
Zaslavskaia, who is perhaps best known in the West as the author 
of the seminal 'Novosibirsk Report' of 1983,' '^  ^ goes much further in a 
'theoretical' direction; and from the present point of view she can be seen as 
a more acute analyst. Reporting to a conference hosted jointly by the Central 
Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Gosplan, she 
introduces into official Soviet discourse for the first time an idea which 
clearly indicates an attempt to cut through the ideological deadwood in 
order to address the ruling class's problems in a pragmatic fashion. This is 
the idea that the development of production relations is 'lagging behind' the 
development of the productive forces. (1983, pp.88-89). Thus she argues that 
whereas over several decades the "size and value of the means of 
production" have grown many times over, as has the technical level of 
production, the form which growth has taken has been contradictory. On 
one hand, she states,
the level of productive labor has greatly increased, but on the other, 
the scale of damage inflicted upon society through careless labor, 
violations of labor and technology discipline, irresponsible 
attitudes to technology, etc., [has] also risen. (1983, pp.91-92).
This, then, put succinctly, is the principal problem. Having recognised that
"man is often the weakest link in the technological chain" (p.92), she notes
that there has been a gradual "increase in the technological demands made
on the labor behaviour of the workers." The whole point of her analysis is
that since the workers have been strong enough not to accede to these
demands, or not to accede to them to an adequate degree, the problem of
their attitude to their work has necessarily grown worse. It follows that the
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main 'production relation' which needs to be changed is precisely that of the 
workers' behaviour.
In considering the road to a solution, she calls for research into the 
right kind of incentive schemes. Removing all possibility of doubt about 
what she is saying, she writes that
it is in the interests of socialist society, while regulating the key 
aspects of the socioeconomic activity of the workers, to leave them 
a sufficiently wide margin of freedom of individual behaviour. 
Hence the necessity for directing behaviour itself, i.e. the subjective 
relationship of the workers to their socioeconomic activity. 
Administrative methods of management are powerless here. The 
management of behaviour can only be accomplished in an oblique 
fashion, with the help of incentives which would take into account 
the economic and social demands of the workers and would 
channel their interests in a direction which would be of benefit to 
our society, (pp.95-96).
Later she makes the further clarificatory point that
any serious reorganization of economic m anagem ent m ust be 
accom panied by a certain red istribu tion  of righ ts and 
responsibilities among various groups of workers. Thereby, the 
expansion of every group '5 rights is, as a rule, combined with an 
increase of responsibilities; and a decrease of responsibilities goes 
hand in hand with a reduction of rights, (p.99).
She thus focuses extremely sharply on workers' resistance to the needs of
'society': that is, of Soviet capital.
This preoccupation is also apparent in texts she produces after 
Gorbachev has come to power. In calling for an enhancem ent of the 
"creative activity of the masses," she writes that under today's conditions,
a sober, skilled, and reliable worker produces tens and hundreds of 
times more products [than he did in the 1930s]. An irresponsible or 
inebriated worker, on the other hand, who produces defective 
products in enormous quantities, who breaks valuable machinery, 
who puts an industrial livestock complex out of action, or who 
causes trains to crash into one another, causes scores and hundreds
A : A  A :  Î
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of times more damage even than the Herostratuses of the past. 
(1986a, p.4).
In this context, it is hardly surprising that in another text of the same year 
she describes the 'resolution' of a broad 'complex' of problems as being a 
powerful means by which the "human factor" (chelovecheskii faktor) can be 
successfully "intensified.'' (1986b, p.73; see also Loginov 1989, pp.102-11).
Such analyses as this, produced at the time that they were, can only 
corroborate the view that the future development of Soviet capitalism came 
increasingly to depend upon the intensification of labour.
3 THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE USSR: ITS SPECIFICITY
In conclusion, it is now necessary to comment on the specificity of the class 
struggle in the USSR in the context of the overall development of Soviet 
capitalism.
As became apparent in the discussion of the development of the 
opposition between working class autonomy and capitalist growth, the 
specificity of Soviet economic development lay in the one-sidedness of the 
extraction of relative surplus value. Thus whilst the two aspects of 
successful grow th under w estern Fordism  and Keynesianism  — 
productivity and intensification — were closely intertw ined and indeed 
interdependent, in the USSR there was a division between them which 
eventually proved critical.
The theoretical conclusion, then, cannot be that relative surplus 
value extraction is necessarily tw o-staged, and th a t the Soviet 
administrative-command system was functional only in the first stage. Such 
a theory would have little explanatory value in regard to why such a
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périodisation has not been especially evident elsewhere. (Consider, for 
example, the importance in the West of the car industry). On the contrary, 
the causes of the problems faced by capitalist development in the USSR 
m ust necessarily lie in the specific history of the underlying antagonism: the 
class struggle. Conversely, the class struggle in the USSR can only properly 
be understood in relation to its opposition to the efficiency of capitalist 
growth.
In these terms, two factors in particular stand out. The first is the 
importance of the Russian (or Soviet) State bureaucracy. Crucial in the 
organisation of industry since the time of Tsar Peter I (1682-1725) (see for 
example Crisp 1972, Mil ward and Saul 1977, pp.334-35, and Kochan and 
Abraham 1983, pp. 114-15), this was the natural weapon for capital to 
employ not only in 1917-18, faced with enormous unrepayable debts (Carr 
1952, p.l43) as well as fhe force majeure of working class struggle against the 
bourgeoisie; but also at the end of the 1920s, when the new urban ruling 
class tied itself to a policy of extremely rapid  urbanisation and 
industrialisation. More specifically, what Stalinism amounted to was the 
massive employment of quasi-military means by the ruling class in struggle: 
in political-economic terms, the control by responsible officials of capital 
investment both in means of production and in labour-power. The role of 
such officials, or administrators, became the defining characteristic of Soviet 
economic management even after concessions had to be made to workers' 
mobility in the 1950s. This was not 'despotism' in the sense of full central 
control, any more than it was real 'planning.' Rather, it was a local form of 
capitalist competition based on a restricted form of fluidity of the general
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equivalent. And this latter form was to a great extent based on the 
prioritisation of rapid investment and productivity^ growth.
The second factor is the form of working class power, which 
according to the present analysis subverted the capitalist strategy of extreme 
prioritisation of 'gross output' by seemingly conceding to it. As workers 
used mobility to force managerial concessions on wages, especially in the 
Brezhnev period, the intensification of labour appeared to be a non-issue as 
long as the 'ratchet effect' was functioning properly. Put simply, the 
workers had wage drift, the rulers had the fulfilment of plans formulated 
'from  the achieved level' (of dostignutogo). Under these conditions 
poor-quality labour, as a political-economic reality, operated against the 
increase of turnover, both absolute and relative, and what is more it actually 
reinforced the prevalence of full employment. This in turn allowed the 
workers to make more use of mobility, and so on. At the same time, by 
holding back intensification, poor-quality labour prevented even the 
offering of a new 'deal' based on the rapidity of consumer turnover: that is, 
on 'consumerism.'
The one-sided nature of the strategy of Soviet capital, closely bound 
up w ith the organisation of the ruling class upon the basis of the 
bureaucratic form of capitalist money, thus led it to be brought into 
'stagnation' by workers' power: not in a way that was subject to political 
mediation and representation, but in terms of resistance to capital's drive to 
develop the political-economic means of its control. The lack of 
representedness of this form of class struggle corresponded very closely to 
w hat was identified above as the irrecuperability of the struggle against 
hard work. The 'productivity deal' which existed, then, was literally that —
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a deal on productivity — which, given the resistance of the workers and the 
prevalence of concessions to workers by local managers, involved minimal 
class co-operation on labour intensification.
Operating at the same time as the deal over productivity, the high 
level of refusal of hard work tended inevitably to bring down the rate of 
profit. What was worse, from the point of view of capital, was the fact that 
the controllers of capital — those who possessed significant bureaucratic 
clout — had to a great extent to rely upon productivity growth as an 
alternative for intensification. Indeed this can be seen as providing the 
material basis for the Stalinist ideology of the 'primacy of the productive 
forces': that is, of the material means of production. It is therefore highly 
revealing that when Zaslavskaia issued her resonant call for the ruling class 
to face facts, fund a programme of truly functional social scientific research, 
and attem pt to rem ould working class composition according to the 
interests of 'society,' this was precisely the ideological target on which this 
proponent of the 'human factor' concentrated her fire.
4 SUMMARY
In formulating a theoretical understanding of working class struggle in the 
USSR I have emphasised throughout its relationship to the fundamental 
categories of capitalist political economy.
For this reason I start by discussing the issue of capitalist control, 
with detailed reference to the circuit of capital (investment and sale) and to 
the circuit of labour-power (exertion and regeneration). A M arxist
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understanding is presented of the necessary opposition between working 
class autonomy and capitalist growth.
The growth which does occur is then considered in terms of the 
dynamic class relation: that is, the class struggle. Distinguishing between 
absolute surplus value extraction and relative surplus value extraction, I 
show how under relative surplus value extraction — more precisely, 
capital's real subsumption of labour — the struggle takes two forms. First, 
there is a struggle over the wage. In this area, productivity growth creates 
space for the capitalist concession of higher 'real wages,' but only on 
condition that the value of necessary labour-time falls. Second, there is a 
struggle over labour intensity. In this connection the concepts are 
in troduced of absolute and relative turnover, and of the organic 
composition of production and the organic composition of the commodity, 
the latter two being taken from Kay. Here, it is argued, the intensification of 
labour does not create space for any concessions to the struggle for less work 
in the same way that a growth in productivity does for concessions to the 
struggle for higher wages.
Moving the focus of consideration to capitalism in the USSR, I begin 
by demonstrating the class opposition implicit within each moment of the 
twin circuits of capital and labour-power. Soviet specificities include the role 
of b u r e a u c r a t i c / m o n e y  in investment, and the related division within 
the ruling class between the central bureaucratic elite and the enterprise 
managers. It is noted, first, how it was at enterprise level that concessions 
were made to the workers over both work quality and norms; and second, 
how  the position of the enterprise manager, w hilst it involved a
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contradiction between his own interests and the interests of capital as a 
whole, did not remove the fact of a fundamentally shared capitalist interest 
in the extraction of surplus value.
With reference to capitalist control over the labour-power circuit, I 
consider four aspects in particular: proletarianisation, mobility, control over 
the labour process, and control over the time worked. Proletarianisation, or 
the making available of workers for capitalist exploitation, is held to be the 
only area of unqualified capitalist success: the others are noted in turn to 
have been forms of control which met permanent resistance. Looking then at 
the reproduction of labour-power, I draw attention to the role in the USSR 
of the social wage, and more specifically the enterprise social wage.
The discussion then focuses on the opposition between workers' 
power and capitalist growth. Three forms of working class struggle are 
noted: namely, worker-led labour mobility, low-quality production, and 
absenteeism. These are shown to have involved resistance to the three 
specific areas of capitalist control over labour-power already mentioned.
The nature of Soviet capitalist growth is then considered in more 
detail in the context of the dynamic class relation.
It is argued on the basis of Soviet economic statistics that Soviet 
capital did achieve some success in extracting relative surplus value. More 
specifically, it is shown that productivity growth coincided with a general 
rise in real wages throughout the post-war period. But it is noted that 
nonetheless the levels of both productivity and wages did not reach western 
levels.
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The discussion then necessarily moves to the area of labour 
intensification. I proceed to show that in various ways the acceleration of 
turnover was restricted by the force of workers' struggle, and in particular 
by the prevalence of low-quality work. In regard to the rate of absolute 
turnover, the high level of work stoppages, along with the size of the repair 
sector, are described as major retarding factors. And the fact that the 
absolute turnover rate was indeed low is backed up with reference to the 
weak level of penetration of 'consumerism' on Soviet territory, especially in 
terms of car ownership.
The size of the industrial repair sector is then argued to have 
retarded the rate of relative turnover too, increasing the ratio between 
investment in Department One and investment in Department Two whilst 
tending to reduce the ratio between the organic composition of production 
and the organic composition of the commodity.
The conclusion is reached that Soviet growth and the Soviet 
economic system were based upon an inefficient form of the real 
subsumption of labour. This is backed up with brief reference to some of the 
strategic writings which appeared in the USSR in the mid-to-late 1980s. 
A ttention is draw n to such concepts as those of 'acceleration'
{uskorenie), the need to increase workers' 'interest' {zainteresovannosti in 
their work, and the 'human factor.' {chelovecheskii faktor).
Lastly, the specificity of capitalist development in the USSR is 
described from both sides of the class divide. On the side of capital,
investment was largely in the hands of responsible officials and was geared
'towards the prioritisation of investment and productivity growth. On the 
side of the proletariat, concessions were certainly made to the capitalist need
I
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for increased gross output, but only at the expense of the absence of any real 
co-operation on labour intensification. As wages rose, the rulers seem to 
have responded by using output growth as a sort of alternative for 
intensification. The scale of concession in this area of capitalist control 
brought economic stagnation — and an ever-increasing strategic need for 
the rulers to force up labour intensity by whatever radical means are 
necessary.
*****
:
f
1NOTES
On the production of surplus value as the essence of the capitalist 
valorisation process, see especially Marx 1933, pp.989-91 and 1939, 
pp.321-26 and 373-447.
This is not to deny that accumulation also permits the growth of the 
exploiters' privileged consumption. As Tillium has shown, privileged 
consumption cannot reasonably be described as 'accidental' to the 
underlying nature of capitalism. (1994, p.l7). The point in the present 
context, though, is that since value is founded upon competition — as 
the means by which it regulates production — the controllers of capital 
are compelled to reinvest surplus value so as to ensure its continued 
production. (See Marx 1867, p.789). Since it is in the nature of the 
system that if a capitalist interest does not seek to expand the 
production under its control, then it will be taken advantage of by its 
more rapacious rivals, it is clear that the exploiters as a whole could 
only introduce 'zero growth,' and thus consume the entire surplus, if 
they were to abolish generalised competition. But at that time the form 
of exploitation would no longer be capitalism.
In the Grundrisse Marx states explicitly that "Moment IV belongs in the 
section on wages" (1939 p.421), and disagreement has since arisen as to 
whether or not his plans to write a book on wage-labour (as part of a 
six-volume work) were or were not fully realised in Part 6  of Volume 1 
of Capital. See for example, arguing that they were fully realised, 
Rosdolsky 1968, chap.2, especially pp.56-62, agreed with by E. Mandel 
1976, p.29; and, arguing that they were not fully realised, Rubel 1973, 
pp.220-21, Lebowitz 1992, pp. 12-34, and Shortall 1994, p p .185-97. 
Negri, meanwhile, although ascribing fundamental importance in his 
consideration of Marx to the theory of wage-labour and the working 
class as subject, holds the distinctive view that "Marx d idn 't write a 
separate book on the wage because his whole work constantly returns 
to this theme." (1979, p.l34).
A lthough the developm ent and contradictions of M arx's 
publication plans are not of central importance in the present context, a 
few comments on Marx's view of the determination of wage-levels will 
be in order. Thus in the Grundrisse he writes that the supposition that 
wages are at a minimum level is necessary in order to establish the 
"laws of profit," insofar as "they are not determined by the rise and fall 
of wages or by the influence of landed property." He then goes on to 
state that
however the standard of necessary labour may differ at various
epochs and in various countries, or how much, in consequence
:
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of the demand and supply of labour, its amount and ratio may 
change, at any given epoch the standard is to be considered 
and acted upon as a fixed one by capital. To consider those 
changes themselves belongs altogether to the chapter treating 
of wage labour. (1939, p.817).
This can be compared with what is said in Volume 1 of Capital, where it 
is held that
the value of labour-power is determined by the value of the 
means of subsistence habitually required by the average 
worker. The quantity of the means of subsistence required is 
given at any particular epoch in any particular society, and can 
therefore be treated as a constant magnitude. W hat changes is 
the value of this quantity. (1867, p.655).
In this area the main theoretical advance — first made explicit in 
the Grundrisse (see 1939, p.282), omitted in the Contribution of 1859, but 
stressed throughout Capital — lies in the focusing on the category of 
labour-power rather than simply on that of labour. And indeed it is this 
which forms the basis of Marx's 'abstract social labour' theory of value 
and surplus value. Unfortunately, though, he does not reach the stage of 
theorising changes in the value of labour-power which are determined 
by changes in the quantity of goods consumed by the workers. This has 
allowed the fact that this determination can occur to become obscured. 
But in fact such determination is quite straightforward, given that the 
value of labour-power is equivalent to the value of the workers' 
consumption, and therefore to the quantity of 'average socially 
necessary' labour-time which is expended in producing the goods 
consumed. In short: if the quantity of goods consumed changes, then, 
other things being equal, so do the quantity of necessary labour and the 
value of labour-power, as a matter of definition. The corresponding 
partition of the social product among classes is evidently a matter of 
class struggle if anything is, especially given that class struggle is the 
crucial factor in history. (Marx and Engels 1848, p.32).
As Kay puts it,
the short answer to the question — what process determines 
the level of socially necessary consumption and the value of 
labour-power? — is the class struggle. A more complete 
answ er situates the class struggle w ithin the general 
development of production, the value of commodities, the 
pattern of output and the type of techniques employed. But the 
fact remains that the value of labour-power is not determined 
by economic forces defined in the narrow sense: there are no 
m arket laws to be discovered that stipulate the level of
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necessary consumption; no strict correlation between wages 
and the technical conditions of production.... [The] class 
struggle, the relentless opposition of the working class to 
capital, is not an extraneous assum ption plucked from 
nowhere to patch a hole in an economic theory; the class 
struggle is nothing but the concrete expression of the law of 
value; or, to put it the other way round, the law of value is the 
general theoretical statement of the class struggle. (1979a, p.90).
Marx's critique of political economy as given in Capital should thus be 
seen as a critique of capital's nature and internal laws, wherein the 
issue of class struggle has been provisionally — but only provisionally 
— "closed." (See especially Shortall 1994; and also Cleaver 1979 and 
Lebowitz 1992).
The m oment of the circulation of labour-power defined by its 
reproduction is also a moment of the circulation of capital. This area 
wül be recognised as that in which Autonomist Marxism has made its 
principal theoretical contribution. In preparing the following analysis I 
have found Negri 1979 especially useful; and also Dalla Costa 1971, 
Cleaver 1979, and Lebowitz 1992.
An indispensable part in the reproduction of employed labour-power 
is played by housework, most of which is done by women. By helping 
to reproduce such labour-power, which takes a commodity form, this 
work is evidently productive of value. Equally clearly, it is atomised to 
a qualitatively much greater degree than work outside the home for a 
capitalist employer. It is instructive, however, to consider the fact that 
the housewife's own reproduction involves not only her own work in 
the home, bu t also her consumption of commodities which are 
them selves produced by em ployed w age-labourers. Thus the 
reproduction of her own labour-power, which constitutes the basis 
upon which she is able to carry out work which is productive of her 
partner's labour-power, and of her children's in the future, is itself a 
moment in the cycle of value and therefore of capital. Given the 
socialised essence of value. Dalla Costa is therefore right to insist that 
housework is productive of surplus value. (1971, pp.32-33).
It is additionally necessary to recognise that female houseworkers 
are usually economically exploited by male working-class partners. 
Perhaps the easiest way to show this is with reference to the fact that 
women considered to be of an 'employable age' usually engage in 
work for an outside employer as well as doing the bulk of the 
housework in the family home. Even when they do not have an outside 
job they normally work longer hours than their partners who do. But 
this exploitation, although atomised in its own specific way, also serves 
to keep wages in general at a lower level than would otherwise be the
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case. It is therefore a part of the overall relationship between 
wage-labour and capital.
This is a point which Negri misses quite badly. In order to reinforce a 
view of a proletarian sphere of 'self-valorisation' which is wholly 
antagonistic, he thus asserts that "small-scale circulation seems to reject 
the functions of money, even though money can function within it in 
terms of simple commodity circulation." (1979, p. 138). The implication 
is that the function of money defined by M-C-M' is successfully rejected. 
But even if wage rigidity and workers' struggles do indeed antagonise 
the M-C-M^ function, this is still a remarkable over-stating of the case. 
The fact that the (socialised) worker produces surplus-value only after 
he has been sufficiently 'reproduced' to do so, and not while he is 
being 'reproduced,' is not of overriding importance in a society based 
on generalised exchangeability and growth. That Negri has bent the 
stick too far is evident when he proceeds to state that "money 
exchanged between proletarians is use-value" (p.l38), thus forgetting 
that the use-value of all money is precisely — and exclusively — its 
exchangeability: namely, the fact that it has exchange-value. In reality, 
the reproduction of workers is permitted precisely on the basis that 
they will continue to produce surplus value. (Marx 1939, p.421). Their 
needs and struggles do conflict with this basis, but this does not mean 
that the basis ceases to be a basis! As a result, a m ultitude of 
contradictions is introduced into workers' reproduction 'off the job.' In 
this respect Dalla Costa's theorisation, in which she emphasises the 
oppression of working class women (1971), is in advance of Negri's. 
(See also Kay 1979a, pp.84-89).
It might be argued that needs are principally objective. Certainly the 
existence of objective needs for food and shelter is indisputable. But 
humans need food and shelter so that they can stay alive as subjective 
beings who feel, think, and choose, not merely as beings in the 
objective chemical-mechanical sense.
"The owner of labour-power is mortal. If then his appearance in the 
market is to be continuous, and the continuous transformation of 
money into capital assumes this, the seller of labour-power m ust 
perpetuate himself 'in the way that every living individual perpetuates 
himself, by procreation.' The labour-power withdrawn from the market 
by wear and tear, and by death, must be continually replaced by, at the 
very least, an equal amount of fresh labour-power. Hence the sum of 
means of subsistence necessary for the production of labour-power 
must include the means necessary for the worker's replacements, i.e. 
his children...." (Marx 1867, p.275).
This is not to suggest that town hall clerks or nurses, for example, are 
significant controllers of capital. It should be clear that the bigger the
: X'.:
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decision concerning resource distribution, the higher up the ladder it is 
made.
The qualitative side to capitalist growth, which raises questions as to 
the capitalistic necessity or otherwise of increasing global pollution; of 
constantly causing, through war and other means, the mass destruction 
of human life; and of producing conditions ever more riven through 
with madness and illusion (see Debord 1967, chap. 9), cannot be 
discussed here.
11 See note 3 above.
■*2 For a useful theoretical discussion of labour productivity and labour 
intensity, and their development under modern market capitalism, see 
Kay 1975, pp.157-67,1976, pp.59-62, and 1979a, pp.72-78.
At that time in Britain this institutionalisation was m anifested 
especially in the spread of piece-rates. See Marx 1867, pp.411-16, 
694-700 and Hobsbawm 1968, pp.123-24.
In an important text, Kay has argued that
the maintenance of the rate of profit with rising real wages in 
the post-War period — at least until the late Sixties — which 
has been analysed almost exclusively in term s of rising 
productivity, is probably due, in considerable part at least, to 
the intensification of labour. [And] if Marxism is to be used as 
a means of analysing working class experience as a basis for 
revolutionary political action, this matter is much more than a 
footnote to the theory of the rate of profit. (1976, p.62).
It is not held that what follows marks an important methodological 
advance in relation to Marx. Rather it is seen as implicit in the relevant 
section of Capital. Thus he ends the consideration of labour 
intensification by stating that
If the intensity of labour were to increase simultaneously 
and equally in every branch of industry, then the new and 
higher degree of intensity would become the normal social 
degree of intensity, and would therefore cease to count as an 
extensive magnitude. But even so, the intensity of labour 
would still be different in different countries, and would 
modify the application of the law of value to the working days 
of different nations. The more intensive working day of one 
nation would be represented by a greater sum of money than 
the less intensive day of another nation. (1867, pp.661-62).
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It might be suggested, certainly, that he is simply denying the 
relevance of a concept of intensification at the level of overall social 
capital. But a consideration of the footnote which he appends to the 
end of this section is adequate to show that this is not the case. In this 
brief note he not only refers to its general significance, but he then 
makes a direct reference to the possible concession of a shorter working 
day across the European Continent, (p.662, n.4). He has already made it 
clear that in fact this issue is one of workers' struggle "on both sides of 
the Atlantic"; and indeed he has referred explicitly to the demand of 
the International for the introduction of an eight-hour day across the 
capitalist world, (pp.411-16). It cannot rightly be held that Marx was 
unaware of any linkage between the intensity of labour and the class 
struggle, when he links it — albeit without elaboration — to what he 
saw as the pivotal issue for the internationalisation and advance of 
working class struggle at the time. The reality was that in the second 
half of the 19th century the main issue in the class struggle concerned 
the fight to limit the extraction of absolute surplus value. I would argue 
that the struggle over intensification, which is a form of increase of 
relative surplus value, was one of the areas which Marx would have 
dealt with at greater length in the book on wage-labour.
The relationship between the end of Keynesianism and, on one side, 
the workers' successful struggles for higher wages and the impact of 
the radical social movements of 1968-72 and, on the other, the rising 
organic composition of production and the related return of mass 
unemployment in the advanced western countries, cannot be gone into 
here.
The material means of production include both the instruments of 
production and raw materials. Under capitalism, this division takes the 
form of the division between fixed capital and circulating capital. In 
relation to turnover Kay thus discusses the ratio between, on one side, 
the total of the fixed capital present all the time and the circulating 
capital used up in each project, and on the other, the variable capital 
advanced. (1975, pp.134-36). The assumption in the present context is 
that all constant capital is fixed. This simplifies but does not undermine 
the demonstration of the relevance of turnover to the class relation.
I would suggest that Kay's Autonomist Marxist views on the falling 
"organic composition of the commodity" and capital's increasing 
"colonisation of time" strongly suggest a need for a cross-fertilisation 
with Debord's Situationist critique of the capitalist spectacle as the 
"technical realization of the exile of human powers into a beyond" and 
of "spectacular time." (1967, para. 20 and chap.6 ). There is a very real 
need to base a critique of modem false consciousness upon a critique of 
capitalist political economy, and it is possible that Kay's demonstration 
that commodities undergo an increasing level of 'hum an input' could
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point the way towards a theoretical explanation of the development of 
advanced false consciousness as a political-economic necessity in 
advanced capitalism. This project, however, which has yet to be 
embarked upon by those engaged in revolutionary theoretical critique, 
clearly lies beyond the terms of reference of the present thesis.
When making general points about the USSR below I have sometimes 
preferred to use the present tense. Had I instead put the entire analysis 
in the past tense, the inference could easily be draw n that the view 
being advanced was that the demise of the Soviet political regime on 
31 December 1991 m arked an overwhelm ing political-economic 
change. This I do not wish to argue, since — to cite but one reason — 
the field of analysis concerns the USSR and not the changes which have 
taken place under Yeltsin between 1991 and 1995.
20 I would argue that since capitalism is a mode of production which is 
global, the controllers of capital and those who have access to such 
control constitute a capitalist ruling class on a w orld level. The 
bourgeoisie is thus one section of that class, and the Soviet bureaucratic 
elite, including both central bureaucrats and enterprise managers, is 
another. Furthermore, it is hardly convincing to call the director of an 
enterprise employing, say, a thousand workers under a regime of 
'one-man management' anything other than a member of the ruling 
class, even if he is not a member of the smaller and more central ruling 
elite within that class. (As a rule, nor will the owner of a firm of similar 
size in Britain be a member of the central ruling circles in that country). 
It is, however, convenient to refer to the bourgeoisie as the 
market-based ruling class and the Soviet rulers as a ruling class based 
on a form of capitalist money which is fundamentally bureaucratic. 
The question as to whether the two layers within the Soviet ruling class 
should them selves be term ed 'classes' is no t crucial to an 
understanding of the nature of Soviet society. (See above. Chapter 6 , 
section 2.3.2b). The distinction between the two layers, however, is.
The world proletariat, meanwhile — that is, the class dominated 
by capital and absolutely dispossessed of the means of production — 
contains not only workers and those seeking work, but also people 
who for long periods of time derive their means of subsistence from the 
social wage, or who are starving. It is not especially important whether 
or not the long-term unemployed or the starving are described as being 
in the working class. What is im portant is to recognise that the 
fundamental division in world capitalist society is between capital and 
its controllers on one side and the proletarian dispossessed on the 
other; that these two forces are global; and that an understanding of 
their antagonism (the fundamental class struggle) is necessary to a full 
understanding of their nature. On this basis consideration can be given
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to the unfolding of this class antagonism at a local level, and the related 
'composition' of its two sides.
21 Doubtless the use by Ticktin and Filtzer of the idea of 'negative' 
workers' control appears to have a certain radicality with respect to 
both the traditional Trotskyist support for Soviet production relations 
and the various critiques of the 'all-powerfuT Soviet regime made by 
other Leninists such as Cliff. (And it is evidently more radical than the 
use of the term by Connor, who does not endeavour to make a critique 
of the overall mode of production). But it must be criticised nonetheless 
as a product of an exaggerated conceptual separation of the category of 
the 'labour process' from the broader categories of a political economy 
founded upon the generalised socialisation of alienated labour. 
Typically, this has led Filtzer to state that "the price of labour-power 
has nothing to do with the 'value' of its reproduction." (1986, p.259). In 
the absence of a discussion of what form actually is taken by the 
reproduction of the socialised worker, and of what relation does exist 
between this reproduction and the price of labour-power, this appears 
to be little more than an ideological avowal of the belief that Soviet 
production relations were other than capitalist. Thus it obscures the 
nature of w hat in fact was precisely working class struggle against 
capitalist accumulation — a necessary struggle underm ining the 
efficiency of the exploitation of wage-labour. Once the Critique school's 
w ork is placed alongside Autonom ist M arxist w ork on the 
development of working class struggle in the West, it undoubtedly 
appears highly useful in the form ulation of a com m unist 
understanding of working class struggle against the needs of capital in 
the USSR. But at the same time much of its basis can only stand in the 
way of a unification of a theoretical appraisal of the subversion by 
workers' power of capitalist strategy in market capitalism w ith a 
corresponding appraisal of the subversion by workers' pow er of 
capitalist strategy in the USSR.
22 The reforms of 1965 were meant to overcome this latter tendency, but 
their failure to do so only demonstrated its systemic nature. (Nove 
1980b, p. 106; Kontorovich 1988).
23 In a discussion of the Soviet academic theory of investment, formulated 
within the discipline of economics, Giffen concludes that Soviet 
investm ent "methodology" has developed "as a result of the 
immediate and pressing needs to make planning decisions." Moreover, 
"this has resulted in a multitude of norms and instructions precisely 
because there is no a priori theory, acceptable to the Soviet Union, 
which allows all expenditures and benefits to be measured on one 
scale." (1981, p .604). O bserving in passing  the in heren t 
anti-m aterialism  of the view that the form taken by Soviet 
decision-making in the area of investment resulted from the absence of
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a theory which would allow it to be different, we note that Giffen's 
article does reinforce the view that to be understood in a profound 
sense Soviet investment m ust necessarily be grasped in terms of 
systemic competition of a bureaucratic nature.
24 Only the absence of a theory of the fundamental categories underlying 
the social production relations can allow Soviet enterprise relations to 
appear as essentially harmonious, and the conclusion to be reached 
that the making of what are really concessions suggests that "a suitable 
term for the typical Soviet factory director is the ^benevolent boss.'" 
(Andrle 1976, p.8 6 ). But since the attempt to fit a concept of surplus 
appropriation inside a theory founded on "dimensions of social 
stratification" is premised upon a fairly superficial view of the role of 
exploitation, it is not surprising that it leads to an ascription of minimal 
antagonistic importance to workers' self-assertion, (pp.158-60).
25 The categories of the capitalist reproduction of the worker (by which 
the wage relation is defined) and that of the class struggle (which 
determines the quantity of resources which the magnitude of the wage 
represents) are deeper than that of the specific form which the wage 
takes.
2® Ruble mentions how the supervision of a worker's medical care by 
enterprise trade union bureaucrats sometimes extended, revealingly, to 
making sure that he followed the officially prescribed treatment. (1981,
p.8 8 ).
27 But for a remarkable account of the highly resistant blatnoi culture, see 
Demin 1973. Whilst the importance of the hlatnye, their autonomy, and 
their refusal to co-operate, should not be under-estim ated, it is 
significant that there came a point where the culture operated mainly 
within the confines of the camps.
28 The fact deserves stressing that Berliner devotes a whole sub-chapter to 
the pressure on managers to raise wages in order to keep hold of 
workers, and to their subsequent falsification of wage reporting, as 
early as 1957. In 1955 Prime Minister Bulganin had already criticised 
the managerial practise of adjusting norms so as to use up available 
wage funds. (See Kirsch 1972, p.46).
29 Helgeson notes that between 1959 and 1970 "while there may have 
been a great deal of movement into and out of Siberia...the net result is 
nearly insignificant." (1986, p.l52).
30 This is a point that Standing, writing for the International Labour 
Organisation, fails to recognise when he states that "geographical 
mobility has been restricted by the housing shortage." His further
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assertion that a massive reduction in the enterprise social wage will 
enable the Soviet authorities to raise workers' productivity and thereby 
"combat poverty" (1991, pp.239, 241, 244-48, 250-53) is as typical a 
statement of bourgeois (or modern Soviet) political ideology as his 
corresponding 'policy proposal' is of its aims. See Chapman 1991 for a 
similar view.
31 In relation to problems with maintenance work, Berliner focuses on the 
'pressure' to increase output, and on storming. (1957 pp.234-38). That 
this is an inadequately profound level at which to consider this 
particular problem for the Soviet system is evident from the fact that 
the dysfunctional effects of the cycle of storming and slacking would 
not have been so severe if only workers would have obeyed a simple 
call to work at a steady pace.
32 Although Negri has referred very briefly in an Eastern European 
context to the incomplete development of capitalist real subsumption 
(see Note 1 in Chapter 6 ), this question can be said to be discussed here 
for the first time.
33 In Table 1 I have purposefully avoided giving growth figures in 
roubles, preferring to cite figures for absolute volume. This is because 
Soviet money, especially in the producer goods sector, was not based 
on the rouble. In the argunrient made, therefore, the problem of relative 
rouble prices does not arise.
34 These comments about the length of the working day are of general 
applicability for most workers. There is, of course, a degree of 
variation: thus miners, for example, normally work six rather than 
seven hours a day. But the fall of the official average from 7.96 hours in 
1956 to 6.93 hours in 1962 (Brown 1966, pp.304-05) is ample evidence to 
support the general point being made.
33 There remains the question, of course, of whether in the absence of
such a rate of flow of labour into the towns — after, say, 1945 — 
sufficient growth could have been achieved to satisfy the needs and 
thirst of Soviet capital w ithin the framework of the prevailing 
economic system. The fact of productivity growth does not necessarily 
suggest that this question should be answered in the affirmative, any 
more than the tendency for 'over-investmenf into construction and 
therefore into new projects (Nove 1980b, pp.163-64) necessarily implies 
the opposite. After all, we do not know what rate of growth was 
necessary, and the original question is so counter-factual as to be 
incapable of successful resolution.
For a discussion of the relative importance to Soviet growth of 
what in Marxist terms are understood as absolute surplus value as
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against relative surplus value, see Rutland 1985, pp. 109-12. Rutland 
shows, interestingly but without making a critique at a conceptual 
level, how Soviet economists wrote in classically bourgeois fashion 
about labour productivité and 'capital productivity.'
The merit of Bordiga's work, as is recognised by Camatte (1974) and 
Goldner (1991), lies in the insistence on the historical importance to 
Soviet capitalism of the capitalist 'agrarian revolution' associated with 
Stalin. As noted in Chapter 2 above, however, Bordiga grossly 
over-estimates the role of the market in the Soviet agricultural sector.
On capitalist enclosure more generally, see Midnight Notes 1990.
Clearly it would be vain to believe that one could quantify this 
cheapening in value terms with great precision. Even in regard to food, 
which is only one wage good of many, it would be impossible to count 
the number of necessary labour-hours exactly. In addition to work in 
the countryside, for example, one would also have to account for what 
was necessary labour in the rest of the agro-industrial complex: not 
only in fertiliser plants and tractor factories — and tractor repair 
workshops — but right down to the mines where coal is extracted to 
make steel to make the lorries which deliver the fertilisers to the 
villages. Most clerical work for kolkhozy, meanwhile, as for the food 
processing plants, is probably not 'necessary.' One would also have to 
look at food imports and exports, and indeed at the amount of food 
consumed by the ruling class. Such an analysis would be of limited 
usefulness, and in view of the various assumptions which would have 
to be made it might even be more appropriate simply to take the 
official rouble productivity figures straight out of Narodnoe Khoziaistvo. 
Here I have endeavoured only to give a broad overview  of 
developments in Soviet agriculture (changes in grain output, sown 
area, and rural population) in order to show that over the generations 
there has indeed been a substantial increase in productivity. It remains 
true that by international standards this sector is highly 'capital 
intensive' (Dovring 1980): meaning, essentially, that productivity is low 
and it is not very profitable, or even, considered by itself, actually 
loss-making. Thus it has its own specific problems which as early as 
the 1960s led some analysts to refer to its "permanent crisis." (Laird 
1965). But in the present context, which is that of overall social capital 
and the opposition to it, it is not possible to delve into these problems, 
nor indeed into those of any other specific sector of the economy.
From the present perspective. Chapman's statement that "over the 
entire period 1928-58 Soviet real wages made no gain while real per 
capita consumption doubled" (1963a, p.248) is therefore w ithout 
meaning.
. i i '  ' -X X
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40 No position is expressed here on whether an increased consumption of 
meat or dairy products involves a 'higher' standard of living in the 
ethical sense.
41 On housing space see also Matthews 1979, pp.209-14.
42 See the four volumes of articles published under the collective title 
Uskorenie: Aktual'nye Problemy Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiia, 
(1985-87).
43 A similar analysis is given by Aitov, who writes that one of the 
principal conditions for the turning of labour into a "prime need" is the 
"guarantee of order, the reign of organisation [organizovannosi 1, the 
strict control over the observation of labour discipline." (1987, p.95). 
This is interesting insofar as the context is that of the "change in the 
relationship to labour" (pp.91-101) which itself is seen as a necessary 
feature of the "acceleration of scientific-technical progress." Aitov's 
form ulation is couched in more traditional language — it was 
published by the 'conservative' Sovetskaia Rossiia — bu t overall it 
differs little from Aganbegian's.
44 Extracts from this document were first made public in Britain. How it 
reached the West, whether by espionage or though an official leak, was 
not revealed.
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CHAPTER 8
Summary and Suggested Future Research
In this final chapter I summarise the overall significance of the work 
presented above, and suggest some areas for future research.
1  THE THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION MADE
The contribution to knowledge which I feel I have made in the present work 
can be summarised as follows.
First, I have developed an original theoretical fram ework for 
understanding the USSR as a capitalist country. My description of it as 
bureaucratic capitalist rather than state capitalist, as based upon a 
bureaucratic form of exchange-value and a bureaucratised form of money (Chapter 
3), is held to be more coherent and more explanatory than the various 
'capitalist' theories developed hitherto. Although this is offered as a
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contribution in its own right, the critique of previous theories of Soviet 
capitalism (Chapter 2) is also held to be of importance. Thus the observation 
is made that very few of these theories base their critique of Soviet 
capitalism on a demonstration of the operation of capital; and even those 
that attempt to do so, do not do so satisfactorily.
More generally, the theoretical critique of Soviet capitalism given 
here is held to mark a clear contribution to the bringing together of the 
critique of capitalist bureaucracy with the critique of capitalist exchange, 
money, and value. In doing so, it thus represents a move towards the 
unification of the critique of Statist domination with the critique of the 
bourgeois individual and bourgeois freedom (civil society and the market). 
Rather than following Castoriadis in treading a Weberian path towards the 
hypostatisation of bureaucracy, and rather than espousing as Ticktin does 
the 'orthodox Marxism' of nationalisation and the 'transitional society,' 
I have made a definite step towards internalising an antagonistic critique of 
the modern State within the Marxist critique of capital
Second, I have endeavoured to explain Soviet political economy 
and its historical development in resolutely classist terms: that is, in terms of 
an irreducible antagonism between the working class and the controllers of 
capital, betw een proletarian subjectivity and the logic of capital 
accumulation. This has involved an extension of the Autonomist Marxist 
critique to a region which previously it has largely ignored. The class 
struggle in the USSR is not simply stated to incorporate a 'dem and' for 
'more money, less work': rather, an understanding of the force of the
Il
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working class is rooted firmly in a theoretical critique of Soviet political 
economy, with specific reference to the control over capital and the 
contradictions involved in that control in the context of capitalist growth.
(Chapter 7).
For the first time the distinction between productivity and labour 
intensity, as conceived of by Kay, has been used in a critique of the USSR.
The argument is made that it was the successful struggle of the working 
class against intensification which led to the basing of capitalist 
developm ent upon an inefficient form of real subsumption^ and to the 
stagnation and eventual crisis of the Soviet economic system. This is held to 'be a contribution to an understanding of the forms of working class struggle 
not only against Soviet capital, but also against capital more generally.
Since the class relation has also featured centrally in the theory of 
the nature of the USSR developed by Ticktin, the discussion of the letter's 
work (Chapter 6 ) is further offered as an important contribution to Marxist 
critique. In relation to his work, however, the Autonomist understanding 
given here is held to involve a more direct recognition of the importance of 
the form of the socialisation of labour. Moreover, it is seen as involving a 
more profound consideration of the class struggle dynamic in specific 
relation to the overall development of the economy. In short, it explains not 
only the stagnation of Soviet economic development, but also its vitality 
prior to the stagnation.
"ft
:
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"A2  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In accordance with the achievements made, there are three main areas in 
which future research is called for.
First, the specific history of Soviet capitalism might be studied in 
more detail, w ith special reference to such m atters as urbanisation.
i
concentration camps, and the detailed lines of organisation and command 
within the ruling class. Numerous questions arise. What was the actual level 
of realism and pragmatism on the part of the ruling elite in matters of 
investment policy, and what was the level of 'paranoia'? Was the camp 
system, for example, really profitable? Was agriculture, considered in itself, 
profitable at any time? These are all questions which can be addressed on 
the basis of the theory of the specific Soviet form of bureaucratic capitalism.
Questions also arise as to the development of forms of working 
class struggle, from the civil war onwards. Various factors could be studied.
from the role of divisions in the working class by gender and ethnicity, to 
the role of subcultures of opposition, from the importance of alcohol to the 
importance of theft, from the memory of the camps to the memory of the 
village. How were the forms of working class struggle opposed 'on the 
ground,' from day to day, by managers, the militia, union representatives, 
local party and soviet officials? And how were they opposed culturally, by 
officials and 'providers' in the media and the 'education' system? The 
theory of working class struggle against the needs of capital would clearly 
be of use in a critical investigation of these areas and m any others.
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Moreover, a vast range of comparative research would be possible with 
historical developments elsewhere: not only to the West of Soviet borders, 
but also to the East and South.
Second, there is, of course, the matter of Russia's future. W hat kind 
of furtherance of the crisis is necessary to enable the establishment of a 
viable capitalist growth dynamic? What are the forms which the rulers are 
using to attack the living-standards of the working class, and what is their 
political-economic significance? Is there arising a viable capitalist 
representation of the working class? And what are the forms of working 
class resistance? I have purposefully avoided any discussion of the 
post-Soviet period, but the theoretical critique of the developm ent of 
capitalism prior to 1991 clearly poses questions concerning capitalist 
imperatives and the dynamic of class struggle in the present and the near 
future. In particular: what proportion of the industrial base m ust be 
destroyed owing to the poor quality of its production, and what proportion 
can be saved in the context of a capitalist revitalisation? Which portions of 
Soviet/Russian capital are likely to be able to renew their growth, and 
which are not? What are the precise problems involved in the establishment 
of a fluid currency, and what is the detailed composition of the changing 
Russian part of the world ruling class?
Third, there are broader theoretical questions. These too evoke 
possible research topics. Thus the resistance to labour intensification might 
be considered from a more global perspective, in relation to the overall 
strengths and weaknesses of capital and the proletariat on a world-historical
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scale. Or it might be asked to what extent the power of the proletariat has 
involved the resistance to the intensification of labour in specific countries 
and regions. In relation to the West, one might investigate the extent to 
which workers' co-operation with intensification can be ensured upon the 
basis of consumerist ideology.
A world-historical approach might also be adopted with regard to 
the critique of capitalist (State) bureaucracy, raising questions as to the 
precise characteristics of its profitability-determined functions in the past, 
present, and future. More generally, how does capitalist administrative and 
'strategic' centralisation relate to other capitalist forms, such as the currency, 
over time? In what way have weaknesses in its functioning related to 
proletarian struggle, in various regions and various epochs, and in what 
way will they do so in the future?
ii
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